REESE   LIBRARY 

OF   THK 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

MAR  13  1893 

..........................  ,  189    . 


ATLANTA 


CAMPAIGNS   OF    THE   CIVIL    WAR.—IK. 


ATLANTA 


BY 


JACOB    D.    COX,    LL.D., 

LATE   MAJOR-GENERAL  COMMANDING  TWENTY-THIRD   ARMY  CORPS 


UHIYERSIT7 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES    SCKIBNER'S    SONS 
1882 


COPTBIGHT   BT 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1882 


O  o 


TROW'S 

PRINTING  AND  BOOKBINDING  COMPANY 

201-213  East  iztk  Street 

NEW  YORK 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

LIST  OP  MAPS, ix 

CHAPTER  I. 
ORGANIZATION — PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS,      ...      1 

CHAPTER  II. 

EAST  TENNESSEE,  9 


CHAPTER   III. 
THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES, 19 

CHAPTER   IV. 
THE  LINES  BEFORE  DALTON, 33 

CHAPTER  V. 
RESACA, .    42 

CHAPTER  VI. 

FilOM   THE   OOSTANAULA   TO   THE   ETOWAH,  .  .  .49 

CHAPTER   VII. 

FIELD  LIFE— RAILWAY   REPAIRS— MAP-MAKING— MARCH 
ON  DALLAS, 59 


vi  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

PAGE 

NEW  HOPE  CHURCH — COMBATS  AT  PICKETT'S  MILL  AND 
BEFORE  DALLAS, 70 

CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA—AFFAIR  AT  GULP'S  FARM,     89 

CHAPTER  X. 
KENESAW, 116 

CHAPTER  XI. 
ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCIIEE,    ......  130 

CHAPTER  XII. 

JOHNSTON  SUCCEEDED  BY  HOOD — PEACHTREE  CREEK — 
CLOSING  IN  ON  ATLANTA, 144 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA — DEATH  OF  MCPHERSON,         .        .  163 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
SIEGE  OF  ATLANTA— EZRA  CHURCH, 177 

CHAPTER  XV. 

THE    LINES    NEAR    EAST    POINT — JONESBORO — FALL   OF 
ATLANTA, 188 

* 
CHAPTER  XVI. 

RESULTS, 211 


CONTENTS.  vii 

CHAPTER   XVII. 

PAGE 

THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER — HOOD  UPON  SHERMAN'S 
LINES  OP  COMMUNICATION, 218 

APPENDIX  A. 
STRENGTH  OP  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY,  .....  241 

APPENDIX   B. 

ORGANIZATION  OP  THE  ARMY  IN  THE  FIELD,  MILITARY 
DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 245 

APPENDIX  C. 
ORGANIZATION  OP  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY,    .        .        .250 

APPENDIX  D. 
BATTLE  OP  ALATOONA, 253 

APPENDIX  E. 
MOVEMENTS  OP  OCTOBER  13,  1864,     .        .        .       .        .255 

INDEX, 257 


LIST   OF  MAPS. 


PAGE 

FROM  CHATTANOOGA  TO  ATLANTA, 20 

RESACA, 42 

OPERATIONS  NEAR  NEW  HOPE  CHURCH,    .        .        .        .71 

OPERATIONS  AROUND  MARIETTA, 90 

OPERATIONS  AROUND  ATLANTA, 165 

BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA, 168 

BATTLE  OF  JONESBORO, 205 


ATLANTA 


CHAPTER  I. 

ORGANIZATION— PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS. 

THE  battle  of  Chattanooga  was  fought  by  General  Grant 
as  Commander  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
which  was  a  territorial  command  made  by  uniting  under 
one  head  the  Departments  of  the  Ohio,  the  Cumberland, 
and  the  Tennessee.  Arkansas  was  temporarily  united  to 
these,  but  need  not  be  considered  in  our  present  sketch. 
It  will  help  to  a  clear  understanding  of  the  organiza 
tion  under  which  the  campaign  of  Atlanta  was  conducted 
to  recall  the  general  outline  of  these  departments,  which, 
with  little  change,  had  been  the  territorial  units  of  mili 
tary  command  from  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The  De 
partment  of  the  Tennessee  had  been  Grant's  field  of  oper 
ations  till  Vicksburg  was  taken,  and  included  the  country 
between  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Eivers  on  the  north  and 
west,  the  Tennessee  Eiver  to  Decatur  on  the  east,  and  run 
ning  indefinitely  southward  till  it  should  reach  country 
in  which  troops  of  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  might  be 
Operating,  The  Department  of  the  Cumberland  was  com 
manded  by  Major-General  George  H.  Thomas,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  Eosecrans  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  It  iu- 
IX— 1 


2  ATLANTA. 

eluded  middle  Tennessee  with  part  of  Kentucky,  so  that 
Louisville  on  the  Ohio  River  was  its  dep6t  for  supplies,  and 
the  lines  of  railroad  from  that  city  to  Nashville,  and  thence 
to  Northern  Alabama  and  Georgia,  lay  within  it.  Like  the 
Department  of  the  Tennessee  its  southern  boundary  was  not 
fixed,  but  would  embrace  whatever  territory  its  troops 
should  occupy.  The  Department  of  the  Ohio  was  com 
manded  by  Major-General  John  M.  Schofield,  and  included 
East  Tennessee  and  the  eastern  part  of  Kentucky.  Cincin 
nati  was  its  depot  and  its  line  of  posts  extended  through 
Kentucky  by  way  of  Lexington  and  Richmond  to  Cumber 
land  Gap  and  the  other  mountain  passes  upon  the  country 
roads  leading  to  Knoxville  and  the  Holston  valley.  Its  only 
line  of  railway  reached  no  farther  south  than  Lexington, 
though  General  Burnside  had  begun  the  construction  of 
another,  which  was  meant  to  extend  the  Central  Kentucky 
railroad  to  Knoxville.  Whilst  that  officer  was  in  command 
of  the  Department  in  the  summer  and  fall  of  1863,  he 
thought  such  a  line  would  be  necessary,  if  East  Tennessee 
was  to  be  firmly  held  and  made  the  base  for  movements 
looking  toward  Charleston  and  Savannah  as  objective 
points.  No  one  doubted  that  a  railroad  upon  the  line  sur 
veyed  would  be  of  great  advantage  in  military  operations  if 
it  were  once  constructed,  but  even  the  enterprise  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration,  accustomed  as  it  was  to  gigantic 
operations,  shrank  from  engaging  in  building  hundreds  of 
miles  of  railway,  and  Burnside's  project  was  dropped.  The 
sufferings  of  the  army  in  East  Tennessee  during  the  winter 
following  proved  how  inadequate  country  roads  were  to 
supply  an  army  so  far  from  its  depots,  and  when  the  enemy 
had  interrupted  the  railway  communication  of  Thomas* 
army  at  Chattanooga  with  Nashville,  Burnside's  forces  about 
Knoxville  were  reduced  to  the  verge  of  starvation. 


ORGANIZATION— PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS.          3 

From  the  sketch  thus  given  it  will  be  seen  that  the  gen 
eral  plan  on  which  the  armies  between  the  Allegheny  Moun 
tains  and  the  Mississippi  worked  during  18G3  was  one  in 
which  three  parallel  columns,  each  with  its  own  lino  of 
communications,  were  pushing  their  way  toward  the  Gulf 
and  the  ocean.  The  War  Department  at  Washington  and 
General  Halleck,  as  the  President's  Chief  of  Staff,  had  the 
task  of  combining  and  harmonizing  these  movements,  and 
of  furnishing  the  material  of  war  and  the  recruits  needed  to 
keep  up  the  strength  and  vigor  of  each.  The  department 
commanders  not  only  led  in  person  the  larger  moving  forces 
at  the  front,  they  had  multifarious  duties  of  administration 
within  their  territorial  jurisdiction,  and  the  responsibility 
for  the  safety  of  their  own  communications  and  lines  of  sup 
ply,  as  well  as  for  the  peace  and  quiet  of  the  country  behind 
them.  It  was  for  them  to  determine  how  much  the  posts 
and  garrisons  in  the  rear  could  be  reduced  for  the  purpose 
of  strengthening  the  army  at  the  front,  and  each  was  inde 
pendent  of  the  others,  except  as  they  were  subject  to  the 
orders  of  the  President  as  Commander-in- Chief.  Each  would 
naturally  be  anxious  to  increase  the  importance  of  his  own 
part  in  the  campaign,  and  to  secure  all  the  men  and  means 
possible  to  increase  the  strength  and  efficiency  of  his  own 
army.  The  emulation  was  usually  generous,  a  common  ear 
nestness  of  patriotism  was  felt  by  the  generals  in  command, 
and  co-operation  was  sincerely  aimed  at ;  but  the  system 
had  its  disadvantages,  and  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  and  Port 
Hudson,  with  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi,  gave  the  oppor 
tunity  for  more  unity  of  effort,  and  indicated,  by  a  process  of 
natural  selection,  the  officer  for  the  larger  task. 

In  October,  Grant  was  put  in  command  of  the  military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  Major-General  William  T. 
Sherman  succeeded  him  in  the  command  of  the  Department 


4  ATLANTA. 

and  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  The  organization  of  the  mili 
tary  division  did  not  supersede  the  departments.  These  re 
mained  as  before,  subordinate,  however,  to  the  superior  com 
mander,  who  might  modify  the  control  of  the  department 
commander  on  special  matters.  This  power  was  exercised 
a  little  later,  in  regard  to  the  management  of  railways ;  for 
when  the  united  army  became  dependent  for  supplies  upon 
lines  of  read  lying  within  the  Department  of  the  Cumber 
land,  it  was  necessary  that  the  railroads  should  be  operated 
by  officers  reporting  directly  to  the  General-in-Chief.  A 
civil  engineer  and  railway  expert,  Colonel  Anderson,  was  as 
signed,  with  military  rank,  to  this  duty,  and,  as  Master  of 
Railway  Transportation  on  the  Headquarters  Staff,  issued 
his  orders  in  the  name  of  the  general  commanding  the  mil 
itary  division.  This  was  not  done,  however,  till  General 
Sherman  had  succeeded  Grant  in  the  command,  and  was 
preparing  for  the  advance  into  Georgia. 

To  complete  this  view  of  the  military  organization  it  is 
only  necessary  to  add  that  the  three  department  commanders 
were  designated  as  commandants  of  armies  in  the  field,  so 
that  when  acting  together,  the  grand  army  consisted  of  the 
Armies  of  the  Cumberland,  the  Tennessee  and  the  Ohio, 
constituting  the  centre  and  wings  of  the  whole  force,  and 
the  orders  of  the  General-in-Chief  issued  to  the  three  army 
commanders  as  his  immediate  subordinates.  Questions  of 
precedence  were  settled  by  the  rule  that  the  assignment  by 
the  President  of  any  general  officer  to  the  command  of  an 
army  or  a  corps,  gave  him  temporary  superiority  of  rank  over 
officers  in  the  same  command  not  so  assigned,  even  though  his 
commission  might  be  junior  in  date.  The  positions  of  army 
commander  and  corps  commander  were  thus  practically  made 
distinct  temporary  grades  in  the  army,  equivalent  to  those  of 
general  and  lieutenant-general  in  the  Confederate  service. 


ORGANIZATION— PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS.          5 

The  opening  of  the  Mississippi  River  isolated  the  country 
west  of  it  from  the  rest  of  the  Confederacy.  The  hostile 
river  navy  was  destroyed,  and  the  gunboat  fleet  of  the 
United  States,  by  constant  patrol  of  the  water  system  of  the 
great  West,  prevented  any  considerable  passage  of  supplies 
or  of  men  from  one  part  of  the  rebellious  States  to  the  other. 
The  problem  for  Grant  now  to  solve,  was  how  to  cut  another 
such  section  from  the  hostile  country,  and  so  to  diminish 
proportionately  the  strength  of  the  enemy.  The  Confederate 
Government  felt  severely  the  diminution  of  its  resources ; 
for  not  only  had  Texas  and  Western  Louisiana  with  Arkansas 
furnished  large  amounts  of  subsistence  stores  to  their  com 
missariat,  which  were  now  lost,  but  the  enforcement  of  the 
conscription  became  impracticable,  and  after  one  consider 
able  effort  in  the  Eed  River  campaign  of  the  spring  of 
1864:,  the  war  in  that  region  dwindled  to  a  partisan  conflict, 
having  no  appreciable  importance.  If  Mississippi  and  Ala 
bama  could  be  in  a  similar  way  severed  from  the  active 
theatre  of  war,  it  would  be  very  hard  for  the  Government  at 
Richmond  to  find  the  means  of  prolonging  the  struggle  at 
the  East.  The  winter  was  spent  by  General  Grant  in  sub 
ordinate  operations,  tending  to  simplify  the  situation,  and 
all  looking  to  a  campaign  with  his  united  forces  against  the 
Army  in  Northern  Georgia,  which  he  had  recently  de 
feated,  and  which  was  now  in  winter  quarters  around  Dalton. 
Thomas,  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  was  to  occupy 
the  attention  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who  had  re 
lieved  Bragg  of  the  command  at  Dalton  ;  Schofield,  with  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  was  to  rid  East  Tennessee,  if  possible,  of 
the  forces  operating  there  under  Longstreet ;  and  Sherman, 
with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  was  directed  to  make  a 
rapid  movement  from  Vicksburg  toward  Meridian,  for  the 
purpose  of  destroying  the  railroads  and  thus  to  make  hostile 


6  ATLANTA. 

operations  toward  tlie  Mississippi  so  difficult  that  a  small 
force  could  protect  the  great  valley  and  a  concentration 
could  be  made  of  the  larger  part  of  all  the  forces  under 
Grant's  command  against  Johnston's  army. 

It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  Confederates  would 
allow  these  preliminary  movements  to  be  made  without 
resistance ;  but  it  was  reasonably  reckoned  probable  that 
if  Johnston  should  concentrate  against  Sherman,  Thomas 
would  be  able  to  push  his  column  southward  from  Chatta 
nooga  toward  the  important  railway  connecting  points  at 
Eome  and  Atlanta,  and  thus  secure  even  greater  advantages 
than  could  be  hoped  from  Sherman's  success. 

Thomas,  therefore,  kept  up  such  activity  through  the  early 
spring  as  the  condition  of  his  army  and  the  state  of  the 
roads  permitted,  and  in  fact  kept  Johnston  from  detaching 
any  sufficient  forces  from  his  command  to  prevent  Sherman 
from  accomplishing  his  purpose.  Meanwhile,  the  reopen 
ing  of  its  railway  line  of  communications  relieved  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  from  its  long-continued  scarcity  of  sup 
plies  ;  the  men  were  comfortably  clothed,  the  artillery  and 
wagon  teams  were  put  in  good  condition,  the  cavalry  was 
partly  remounted,  and  the  whole  force  was  brought  into  an 
excellent  state  of  efficiency  and  confidence. 

Sherman  started  from  Vicksburg  on  February  3d  with 
about  twenty  thousand  men,  organized  in  two  columns,  which 
were  commanded  respectively  by  Major-Generals  McPherson 
and  Hurlbut.  He  gave  out  that  he  aimed  at  Mobile,  but 
his  real  purpose,  as  previously  settled  between  himself  and 
General  Banks,  who  was  in  command  at  New  Orleans,  was  to 
destroy  the  railways  at  and  about  Meridian.  A  strong  cav 
alry  force,  under  Brigadier-General  W.  Sooy  Smith,  was 
ordered  to  march  from  Memphis  simultaneously  with  Sher 
man's  advance  from  Vicksburg,  to  seek  and,  if  possible,  to 


ORGANIZATION— PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS.          7 

rout  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  Forrest,  then  operating 
in  Northern  Mississippi  and  Southern  Tennessee,  and  after 
ward  to  join  Sherman  at  Meridian  for  further  operations. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  the  significance  and  im 
portance  of  the  movement.  Meridian  is  near  the  eastern 
boundary  of  Mississippi,  where  the  railway  from  Vicksburg 
to  Montgomery  and  eastward  crosses  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad.  If  Sherman's  advance  should  force  a  concentra 
tion  of  all  the  available  Confederate  troops  to  resist  him,  it 
was  hoped  that  General  Smith  would  find  little  difficulty  in 
making  a  rapid  raid  southward  from  Corinth,  destroying 
railroad  bridges  and  crippling  that  line  of  railway  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  make  it  useless  for  military  operations  dur 
ing  the  coming  campaign.  When  Sherman  had  done  the 
same  for  the  east  and  west  line  to  Meridian,  it  was  safe  to 
assume  that  no  large  column  of  troops  could  operate  against 
Memphis  or  Nashville  by  way  of  Northern  Mississippi  for 
some  months  at  least,  for  the  experience  of  the  war  had  de 
monstrated  that  no  considerable  army  could  subsist,  depend 
ing  upon  wagons  and  common  country  roads  for  more  than 
a  few  miles  from  railway  depots.  A  rapid  march  could  be 
made,  living  upon  the  country,  if  it  led  to  a  point  where 
military  stores  could  be  reached  or  captured ;  but  protracted 
operations  were  indissolubly  tied  to  the  railway  and  water 
lines,  which  could  be  depended  on  in  all  weather  and  to 
any  extent.  Complete  success  in  both  parts  of  Sherman's 
movement  would,  therefore,  have  taken  the  northern  half  of 
Mississippi  out  of  the  theatre  of  active  operations,  and  if 
Banks  could  subsequently  take  Mobile,  that  port  would  be 
come  a  most  important  base  for  a  new  movement  co-opera 
ting  with  the  one  to  be  made  from  Chattanooga  as  soon  as 
the  spring  should  open.  Sherman's  own  part  in  the  plan 
was  the  only  one  successfully  carried  out ;  but  it  was  sum- 


8  ATLANTA. 

cient  to  secure  the  principal  object,  and  his  subsequent 
campaign  in  Northern  Georgia  was  undisturbed  by  any  for 
midable  demonstrations  of  the  enemy  in  the  Valleys  of  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Lower  Tennessee.  He  reached  Meridian 
on  February  14th,  and  after  tearing  up  the  railways  in  that 
vicinity,  burning  the  ties,  twisting  the  rails,  and  destroying 
the  bridges,  he  withdrew  to  Central  Mississippi.  Two  divi 
sions  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  Major-General  A. 
J.  Smith,  were  detached  to  assist  in  Banks's  Red  River  expe 
dition  in  March,  and  became  permanently  separated  from 
the  army  in  the  field.  The  rest  of  it  was  given  rendezvous 
near  Huntsville,  Ala.,  and  was  gradually  collected  and  pre 
pared  for  its  part  in  the  coming  campaign. 


CHAPTEK  H. 

EAST   TENNESSEE. 

THE  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  during  the 
autumn  of  1863  have  an  interest  of  their  own  which  will  jus 
tify  a  little  further  retrospect.  General  Burnside  had  been 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio  in 
the  spring,  and  at  his  special  request  two  divisions  of  the 
Ninth  Army  Corps,  made  up  of  troops  which  had  been  with 
him  ever  since  his  expedition  against  the  North  Carolina 
coast,  were  sent  to  him  from  the  Potomac.  He  began  also 
the  organization  of  the  Twenty-third  Army  Corps,  made  up 
in  the  main  of  new  recruits  raised  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois, 
and  Kentucky.  These  were  collected  at  camps  of  instruc 
tion  in  Kentucky,  with  a  view  to  an  early  movement  into 
East  Tennessee.  The  Holston  Valley  and  the  mountain 
region  on  either  side  of  it  had  been  the  stronghold  of 
loyalty  to  the  Union,  and  had,  in  consequence,  suffered 
severely  at  the  hands  of  the  Confederates.  Its  leading  pub 
lic  men  had  urgently  pressed  Mr.  Lincoln  to  send  an  army 
to  its  relief,  and  it  was  commonly  thought  a  reproach  to  the 
Federal  Government  that  so  large  and  important  a  region  in 
the  heart  of  the  South,  devoted  to  the  Union,  should  be  left 
to  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  who  was  determined  to  crush 
out  its  loyal  men.  The  difficulty  of  sustaining  an  army 
more  than  two  hundred  miles  from  its  base,  from  which  it 
was  separated  by  rugged  mountains,  over  which  there  were 
1* 


10  ATLANTA. 

only  a  few  roads,  and  these  scarce  better  than  pack-mule 
tracks,  was  fully  felt  by  all  military  men  who  studied  the 
problem  ;  but  the  political  reasons  for  making  the  attempt 
were  imperative,  and  Burnside  prepared  for  the  undertak 
ing.  It  was  concerted  between  him  and  Eosecrans  that 
their  movements  should  be  so  timed  as  to  be  mutually  sup 
porting,  in  the  hope  that  the  occupation  of  Chattanooga 
would  make  it  easy  to  hold  East  Tennessee,  whilst  Burn- 
side's  little  army  at  Knoxville  would  effectually  cover  the 
left  flank  of  Eosecrans.  On  June  2d  Burnside  was  ready  to 
start  from  Lexington,  Ky.,  with  his  two  corps — the  Ninth, 
under  command  of  Major-General  John  G.  Parke,  and  the 
Twenty-third,  under  Major- General  George  L.  Hartsuff. 
He  himself  left  his  headquarters  at  Cincinnati  to  take  per 
sonal  charge  of  the  movement,  but  was  met  on  the  3d  by 
orders  from  Washington  to  send  eight  thousand  men  to 
reinforce  General  Grant  at  Vicksburg.  The  Ninth  Corps, 
being  the  oldest  and  best  organized  force  in  the  Depart 
ment,  was  sent  at  once,  and  the  Tennessee  movement  was  of 
course  delayed  till  the  newer  troops  should  be  strengthened 
and  better  fitted  for  their  work.  The  unwelcome  delay  in 
Burnside's  movement  affected  Eosecrans's  plans  of  campaign 
also,  and  it  was  not  till  the  16th  of  August  that  the  com 
bined  advance  began,  Eosecrans  marching  from  Winchester, 
Tenn.,  and  Burnside  from  Lexington,  Ky. 

Meanwhile  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  had  been  fought,  and 
the  only  formidable  invasion  of  the  Northern  States  had 
been  defeated.  Vicksburg  had  fallen,  and  the  Mississippi 
was  opened  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  country  was  full  of 
hopeful  excitement,  and  called  loudly  on  the  officers  com 
manding  the  central  columns  to  do  their  part  in  making  the 
whole  campaign  a  great  success.  The  story  of  Eosecrans's 
movement  is  fully  told  in  another  of  these  volumes. 


EAST   TENNESSEE.  11 

The  Ninth  Corps  divisions  had  come  back  from  Vicks- 
burg  the  mere  skeletons  of  their  former  strength.  Being 
Eastern  troops,  wholly  uiiacclimated  to  the  Western  climate, 
they  suffered  fearfully  from  the  malaria  of  the  Yazoo  River 
and  the  bayous  about  Vicksburg,  and  on  their  return  left 
large  detachments  in  every  hospital  between  the  captured 
city  and  Cincinnati.  Their  whole  camp  was  a  hospital,  and 
they  were  necessarily  scattered  in  garrison  encampments 
among  the  hills  of  Kentucky  till  returning  health  should 
bring  the  men  back  to  the  ranks.  Their  return,  however, 
relieved  Burnside  from  the  need  of  keeping  other  troops  in 
his  rear,  and  enabled  him  to  gather  up  his  detachments  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  make  a  moving  column  of 
about  eighteen  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  Dividing  these 
into  several  columns,  he  sent  those  on  his  right,  under  Gen 
eral  Hartsuff,  by  way  of  Tornpkinsville,  Somerset,  and  Chit- 
woods  to  Montgomery,  whilst  he  led  another  through  Crab 
Orchard,  London,  "Williamsburg,  and  the  east  fork  of  the 
Cumberland  River  to  unite  with  Hartsuff  at  Montgomery, 
whence  the  whole  infantry  force  moved  upon  Kingston. 
He  thus  turned  Cumberland  Gap,  which  was  held  in  consid 
erable  force  by  the  enemy,  but  was  obliged  to  cross  the 
mountains  by  roads  which  were  considered  impracticable 
for  military  purposes.  Part  of  the  way  his  own  road  lay 
through  the  gorge  of  Rockcastle  River,  whose  perpendicular 
sandstone  cliffs,  towering  a  thousand  feet  above  the  torrent, 
simulated  the  fantastic  forms  of  ruined  towers  and  battle 
ments.  The  infantry  passed  the  principal  range  of  the 
Cumberland  Mountains,  by  Emory  and  Winters's  Gaps, 
whilst  the  cavalry  crossed  further  to  the  north  by  Big  Creek 
Gap  and  other  equally  romantic  passes  and  defiles.  The 
last-named  of  these  is  a  fair  type  of  the  wild  barriers 
through  which  the  little  army  forced  its  Svay.  At  the  prin- 


U2?I7ER 


&  .»«- 


12  ATLANTA. 

cipal  ascent  of  the  mountain  the  teams  of  two  or  three  guns 
had  to  be  hitched  to  a  single  cannon  to  pull  up  to  the  sum 
mit,  and  even  then  were  aided  by  soldiers  at  every  wheel ; 
but  when  the  summit  was  reached,  a  glorious  panorama 
opened  to  the  east.  The  circling  mountains  made  a  vast 
amphitheatre  into  which  the  head  of  column  looked  down, 
whilst  directly  in  front,  the  rocky  strata,  upheaved  till  they 
stood  vertically  on  edge,  were  broken  by  a  gap  as  regular  as 
the  proscenium  of  a  stage.  Through .  this  dashed  the  blue 
stream  which  gives  name  to  the  pass,  and  beyond,  the 
beautiful  valley  of  the  Clinch  and  Holston  Eivers  was  seen, 
backed  in  the  distance  by  the  peaks  of  the  Great  Smoky 
Mountains,  which  here  assume  more  picturesque  outlines 
than  any  other  mountains  of  the  Allegheny  range. 

The  march  had  been  a  laborious  one,  but  it  had  been 
made  without  resistance.  The  Confederate  forces  under 
General  Buckner  retreated  southward  rapidly.  The  passes 
of  the  mountains  were  held,  and  Burnside  entered  Knoxville 
with  his  infantry  on  September  3d,  amidst  the  sincere  and 
enthusiastic  rejoicings  of  the  people,  who  decorated  their 
houses  with  the  flags  they  had  carefully  concealed  against 
the  time  when  the  Union  should  re  establish  its  government 
among  them.  From  Lexington  to  Knoxville  is  two  hundred 
and  fifty  miles,  much  of  it  the  roughest  mountain  road.  To 
march  it  in  fourteen  consecutive  days  was  good  work,  and 
proved  that  the  regiments  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  con 
tained  good  cadres  of  re-enlisted  veterans  who  had  quickly 
made  reliable  troops  of  the  recruits.  Its  success  proved  the 
excellence  of  Burnside's  plan.  He  immediately  concen 
trated  forces  for  the  investment  of  Cumberland  Gap,  hur 
ried  in  person  to  the  scene,  and  on  the  9th  demanded  and 
received  the  surrender  of  the  garrison  under  General 
Frazer,  2,500  in  number.  The  little  Army  of  the  Ohio  and 


EAST  TENNESSEE.  13 

its  commander  had  earned  and  received  the  warm  thanks  of 
Congress  and  of  the  President. 

Eosecrans  occupied  Chattanooga  on  September  9th,  but 
Bragg  had  been  reinforced  by  Longstreet's  corps  from  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  and  was  preparing  to  resume  the  aggres 
sive.  Burnside  had  naturally  turned  his  attention  first  to 
getting  rid  of  the  enemy  under  General  Jones,  who  was 
farther  up  the  valley,  and  who  would  be  upon  his  rear  if  he 
moved  toward  Rosecrans.  He  pushed  him  back  beyond  the 
Watauga,  some  seventy -five  miles  from  Knoxville,  and  burned 
the  railroad  bridge  there.  In  consequence  of  news  he  re 
ceived  from  Rosecrans  he  ordered  the  Ninth  Corps  on  the 
16th  to  hasten  forward  from  Kentucky.  The  battle  of 
Chickamauga  occurred  on  the  19th  and  20th,  and  that  dis 
aster  to  our  arms  was  followed  by  peremptory  orders  from 
Washington  for  Burnside  to  drop  everything  and  go  to 
Rosecrans's  relief.  He  was  himself  at  the  Watauga,  but 
on  the  18th  had  ordered  a  concentration  of  the  bulk  of  his 
forces  at  Knoxville  and  at  Loudon,  which  lay  about  thirty 
miles  further  toward  Chattanooga.  Before  his  troops  could 
get  beyond  these  points,  Rosecrans's  position  at  Chattanooga 
was  regarded  defensible  and  the  urgency  ceased.  Some 
weeks  passed  ;  the  two  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  num 
bering  some  six  thousand  effective  men,  arrived.  General 
Grant  had  assumed  command  of  the  military  division,  Rose 
crans  had  been  relieved,  and  Mr.  Dana,  Assistant  (Secretary 
of  War,  was  at  Burnside's  headquarters  consulting  as  to 
future  plans  of  action.  Suddenly,  Longstreet,  who  had  been 
detached  by  Bragg  for  the  purpose,  attacked  Burnside's 
advanced  post  at  Loudon,  whilst  Mr.  Dana  was  still  with 
him.  In  consequence  of  the  information  carried  by  the 
latter,  Grant  encouraged  Burnside's  slow  withdrawal  toward 
Knoxville,  leading  Longstreet  after  him.  The  affair  at 


14  ATLANTA. 

London  on  November  14th  was  a  lively  one,  but  Longstreet*s 
advance  was  checked  by  a  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  under  Brigadier-General  Julius  "White.  Burnside 
halted  again  at  Campbell's  Station  on  the  16th,  when  he 
again  repulsed  the  Confederate  advance  in  a  warm  combat. 
On  the  18th  he  retired  within  his  lines  at  Knoxville,  under 
cover  of  a  gallant  resistance  to  Longstreet  by  Brigadier- 
General  Saunders  with  the  rear  guard,  though  with  the  loss 
of  Saunders  himself,  who  was  killed.  Longstreet  invested 
the  city,  and  was  now  beyond  supporting  distance  of  Bragg, 
against  whom  Grant  had  concentrated  part  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  as  well  as  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The 
battle  of  Chattanooga  was  fought  on  November  23d  and  25th, 
and  Grant's  victory  rendered  Longstreet's  return  to  Bragg 
impracticable.  Sherman,  who  had  marched  from  the 
Mississippi  to  the  relief  of  Thomas,  now  moved  again  to  the 
relief  of  Burnside.  Longstreet,  learning  of  his  advance, 
made  a  desperate  effort  to  cany  the  works  at  Knoxville  by 
storm  at  daybreak  of  November  29th,  but  suffered  a  bloody 
repulse.  His  troops  assaulted  Fort  Saunders  with  the  same 
persistent  intrepidity  they  had  shown  at  Gettysburg  and  on 
a  score  of  fields  in  Virginia,  but  were  driven  back  from 
the  ditch  of  the  earthwork,  with  a  loss  of  about  a  thou 
sand  men  whilst  that  of  the  Union  forces  was  only  forty- 
three.  On  the  night  of  December  4th,  Longstreet  raised 
the  siege  and  retired  toward  the  northeast,  taking  posi 
tion  in  the  upper  valley  of  the  Holston,  near  Morristown. 
Sherman,  who  was  now  within  supporting  distance  of  Burn- 
side,  was  no  longer  needed,  and  leaving  the  Fourth  Corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  under  Major-Genera  1  Gordon 
Granger  to  assist  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  he  returned  to  Chat 
tanooga  to  organize  still  another  distant  expedition,  which 
we  have  already  traced.  Burnside  had  asked  to  be  relieved 


EAST  TENNESSEE.  15 

of  his  command  on  September  10th,  as  soon  as  the  complete 
occupation  of  East  Tennessee  was  accomplished.  His  re 
quest  was  then  refused,  but  it  was  now  acted  upon  and  he  was 
succeeded  by  Major-General  John  G.  Foster,  who  was  soon 
compelled  to  retire  on  account  of  his  health,  and  was  suc 
ceeded  by  General  Schofield  about  the  middle  of  February. 
Whilst  Longstreet's  movement  upon  Knoxville  had  been 
advantageous  to  the  Union  armies  by  rendering  the  victory 
at  Chattanooga  an  easier  one,  it  was  the  cause  of  a  great 
deal  of  suffering  to  the  little  army  of  the  Ohio.  It  inter 
rupted  the  accumulation  of  supplies  during  the  favorable 
weather  of  the  autumn,  and  when  winter  set  in,  the  moun 
tain  roads  to  Kentucky  became  impassable,  and  neither 
food  nor  clothing  could  be  looked  for  in  that  direction. 
When  the  blockade  at  Chattanooga  ceased,  and  the  railroad 
thence  to  Nashville  was  repaired,  the  single  line  was  over 
burdened,  and  could  not  for  some  time  be  made  to  supply 
both  armies.  The  important  bridge  at  London  had  been 
burned,  and  though  a  few  light-draught  steamboats  were 
pushed  up  to  Knoxville,  the  navigation  of  the  Holston  was 
very  uncertain,  and  until  the  beginning  of  March  the  forces 
in  East  Tennessee  suffered  the  extremest  want.  A  consid 
erable  drove  of  live  cattle  had  been  collected  at  Knoxville 
before  the  siege ;  but  they  grew  thin  for  lack  of  forage. 
The  country  was  stripped  bare,  and  during  the  month  of 
January  the  cattle  that  were  turned  over  to  the  troops  for 
beef  were  so  poor  they  could  hardly  stand  up.  It  is  liter 
ally  true  that  it  was  the  custom  of  the  commissaries  to  drive 
the  cattle  over  a  little  ditch  in  the  field  where  they  were 
corralled,  and  those  only  were  killed  which  could  not  get 
over,  their  weakness  proving  that  it  would  not  do  to  keep 
them  longer,  whilst  the  others  might  still  last  for  future 
use.  Indian  corn  was  ground  up,  cobs  and  all,  for  bread. 


16  ATLANTA. 

Bran  and  shorts  were  diligently  hunted  and  used  for  the 
same  purpose.  The  country  was  scoured  for  subsistence 
stores,  and  nothing  but  a  patriotism  equal  to  that  of  the 
troops  made  the  country  people  patient  under  their  losses 
and  privations.  The  new  year  opened  with  a  furious  gale 
and  icy  storm,  which  came  as  a  cyclone  from  the  northwest, 
reducing  the  temperature  suddenly  below  zero.  The  half- 
naked  soldiers  hovered  around  their  camp  fires,  some  with 
out  coats,  some  without  pantaloons,  some  with  tattered 
blankets  tied  like  petticoats  about  their  waists.  An  officer 
passing  among  them  with  words  of  sympathy  and  encour 
agement  was  greeted  with  the  cheery  response,  "  It's  pretty 
rough,  Genera],  but  we'll  see  it  through  !  "  Even  during  that 
fearful  time  cheers  were  heard  ringing  out  from  one  and 
another  of  the  regimental  camps,  indicating  that  the  regi 
ment  had  "  veteranized,"  as  it  was  called  when  a  majority  of 
the  rank  and  file  had  re-enlisted  for  another  three  years,  or 
during  the  war.  The  only  inducement  the  Government 
offered  was  that  those  re-enlisting  should,  in  their  turn,  and 
as  rapidly  as  was  safe,  have  a  furlough  of  thirty  days  at 
home.  This  veteran  re-enlistment  was  going  on  in  all  the 
armies  among  the  troops  which  had  been  organized  in  1861, 
and  must  be  borne  in  mind  as  one  of  the  important  factors 
in  military  affairs  for  the  year.  Its  immediate  effect  was  to 
reduce  greatly  the  effective  force  of  the  armies  in  the  field, 
but  it  secured,  a  little  later,  a  body  of  experienced  soldiers 
who  kept  the  tide  of  success  moving  steadily  onward  to  the 
end. 

The  military  operations  in  East  Tennessee  during  the 
winter  were  unimportant.  Longstreet  remained  in  canton 
ments  near  Morristown,  except  for  a  short  time  in  January, 
when  he  marched  to  Dandridge  on  the  French  Broad  Eiver. 
He  was  met  by  a  counter-movement  of  our  forces  under 


EAST  TENNESSEE.  17 

General  Parke,  who  marched  to  meet  the  enemy  with  his 
own  corps  (the  Ninth),  Granger's  Fourth  Corps,  and  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was  temporarily  in  command  of 
General  Cox,  Hartsuff  having  been  relieved  at  his  own  re 
quest.  After  a  slight  affair  at  Dandridge,  the  return  of 
storms  of  snow  and  sleet  made  both  parties  willing  to  seek 
their  huts  again,  and  they  simultaneously  withdrew  to  their 
permanent  camps.  General  Grant  himself  made  a  visit 
of  inspection  and  of  consultation  with  General  Foster, 
about  the  1st  of  January,  but  it  was  plainly  seen  that  the 
first  work  to  be  done  was  to  improve  the  means  of  transpor 
tation  and  push  forward  supplies  by  way  of  Chattanooga. 
This  was  vigorously  done,  and  by  the  time  Schofield  as 
sumed  command,  the  army  was  in  much  better  case.  As 
soon  as  railway  transportation  could  be  had,  that  noble 
organization,  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commission,  sent 
forward  fresh  potatoes,  pickled  cabbage,  and  other  anti 
scorbutic  articles  of  food,  the  full  ration  was  again  issued, 
clothing  began  to  arrive,  and  before  the  first  of  March  the 
pinch  was  over. 

Longstreet  now  withdrew  beyond  Bull's  Gap,  and  Scho 
field  advanced  to  Morristown.  In  April  it  had  become 
evident  that  the  great  efforts  of  the  year  were  to  be  made  iv 
Virginia  and  in  Georgia.  Longstreet  was  recalled  by  Lee, 
leaving  only  a  corps  of  observation  in  the  Upper  Holston 
Valley.  Schofield  occupied  Bull's  Gap,  and  just  before  the 
concentration  of  Sherman's  army  for  the  great  campaign, 
destroyed  several  miles  of  the  railroad  beyond  the  pass  and 
began  the  concentration  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  for  its 
movement  toward  Georgia.  The  Ninth  Corps  left  East  Ten 
nessee  between  the  17th  and  23d  of  March,  proceeding  in 
detachments  to  Annapolis  in  Maryland,  where  it  was  greatly 
reinforced,  and  Burns ide  again  took  command  of  it  in  per- 


18  ATLANTA. 

son,  joining  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  for  the  memorable 
campaign  of  1864.  The  Fourth  Corps  returned  to  Cleve 
land,  Term.,  where  it  resumed  its  place  in  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland.  From  this  time  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  con 
sisted  only  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  of  infantry  and  artil 
lery,  a  corps  of  cavalry  under  Major-General  George  Stone- 
man,  and  the  garrisons  and  posts  in  East  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky. 


CHAPTER  m. 

THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES. 

GENERAL  GRANT  was  not  left  to  carry  out  his  plan  of  cam 
paign  for  the  Army  of  the  West.  Before  the  spring  opened 
Congress  had  created  the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General,  which 
was  conferred  upon  him,  and  he  was  called  to  Washington  to 
assume  the  direction  of  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 
In  accordance  with  his  desire,  the  President  assigned  Sher 
man  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  left  vacant  by  his  promotion,  and  the  two  generals  met 
in  Nashville  on  March  17th  to  consult  as  to  the  immediate 
steps  to  be  taken.  The  general  purpose  was  already  marked 
out  by  the  preliminary  movements  which  have  been  de 
scribed,  and  the  Confederate  army,  under  Johnston,  now 
lying  near  Dalton,  was  the  object  at  which  all  efforts  must 
be  aimed.  Some  days  before,  Sherman,  with  prophetic  en 
thusiasm,  had  written  to  his  commander  of  his  confidence  in 
the  future  of  the  National  armies  under  Grant's  direction, 
and  saying,  ' '  From  the  west,  when  our  task  is  done,  we  will 
make  short  work  of  Charleston  and  Eichmond,  and  the  im 
poverished  coast  of  the  Atlantic."  The  public  sentiment  of 
the  country  and  of  the  army  concurred  with  the  President 
in  approving  Grant's  indication  of  his  successor,  and  from 
this  day  to  the  close  of  the  war  the  confidence  of  his  army 
in  Sherman  and  its  personal  attachment  to  him  never  wa 
vered,  but  only  grew  stronger  from  month  to  month.  His 


20 


ATLANTA. 


From  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta. 


THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  21 

courage  and  activity  had  been  abundantly  proven,  but  his 
capacity  for  the  independent  command  of  a  large  army  was 
to  be  tested.  His  nervous  and  restless  temperament,  with  a 
tendency  to  irritability,  might  have  raised  a  doubt  whether 
he  would  be  successful  in  guiding  and  directing  men  of  the 
capacity  of  his  principal  subordinates ;  but  experience 
showed  that  he  had  the  rare  faculty  of  becoming  more  equa 
ble  under  great  responsibilities  and  in  scenes  of  great  ex 
citement.  At  such  times  his  eccentricities  disappeared,  his 
grasp  of  the  situation  was  firm  and  clear,  his  judgment  was 
cool  and  based  upon  sound  military  theory  as  well  as  upon 
quick  practical  judgment,  and  no  momentary  complication 
or  unexpected  event  could  move  him  from  the  purposes  he 
had  based  on  full  previous  study  of  contingencies.  His 
mind  seemed  never  so  clear,  his  confidence  never  so  strong, 
his  spirit  never  so  inspiring,  and  his  temper  never  so  amia 
ble  as  in  the  crisis  of  some  fierce  struggle  like  that  of  the 
day  when  McPherson  fell  in  front  of  Atlanta. 

On  March  18th  Sherman  issued  his  orders  assuming 
command  of  the  Military  Division,  and  Major-General  James 
B.  McPherson  succeeded  him  in  command  of  the  Depart 
ment  and  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  McPherson  had  under 
his  immediate  command  but  two  corps,  which  were,  at 
the  beginning  of  May,  scattered  by  divisions  along  the 
railroad  from  Nashville  to  Huntsville,  and  thence  to  Ste 
venson.  Of  these  the  Fifteenth  consisted  of  three  divi 
sions,  and  was  commanded  by  Major-General  John  A. 
Logan,  and  the  Sixteenth,  which  had  but  two  divisions, 
was  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Grenville  M.  Dodge. 
The  difficulty  which  had  been  found  in  supplying  Thomas's 
and  Schofield's  troops  by  the  single  line  of  railroad  from 
Nashville,  made  prompt  attention  to  the  question  of  trans 
portation  necessary.  The  plan  adopted  has  already  been  re- 


22  ATLANTA. 

ferred  to.  The  three  army  commanders  were  put  upon  an 
equal  footing  as  to  the  right  to  make  requisition  for  stores 
and  transportation,  but  the  control  of  the  railways  and  man 
agement  of  the  trains  was  held  strictly  in  hand  by  the  Gen 
eral-in-Chief,  and  his  orders  issued  through  his  Master  of 
Transportation  at  Nashville  were  absolute.  All  traffic  over  the 
lines  by  private  citizens  was  forbidden,  as  was  private  travel 
also.  No  one  could  travel  by  rail  except  by  permission  spe 
cially  given  or  under  army  orders.  Troops  en  route  were 
directed  to  march,  unless  in  cases  of  exigency  they  were 
ordered  forward  by  rail.  In  short,  the  railway  trains  were 
strictly  devoted  to  the  carrying  of  army  supplies,  and  every 
hundred  weight  the  engines  could  draw  was  to  be  made  im 
mediately  useful  to  the  army.  It  was  estimated  that  thirteen 
hundred  tons  per  day  must  be  forwarded  to  keep  the  army 
supplied  and  accumulate  such  stores  as  would  be  needed  in 
case  of  temporary  interruption  of  communications  by  acci 
dent  or  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  The  rolling  stock  and  ma 
chinery  under  army  control  were  not  sufficient  for  this,  even 
when  posts  within  a  radius  of  thirty  miles  from  Nashville 
were  ordered  to  be  supplied  by  wagons,  and  beef  cattle  for 
the  army  were  driven  on  foot  to  the  front.  Sherman  then 
ordered  the  cars  and  engines  of  other  railroads  coming  into 
Nashville  to  be  held  and  used  for  army  purposes,  and  in  this 
way  the  means  of  supplying  the  army  were  finally  secured. 

Such  vigorous  measures  were  not  adopted  without  oppo 
sition,  and  it  seemed  to  the  inhabitants  of  Tennessee  im 
possible  to  live  under  such  restrictions ;  but  the  military 
necessity  was  satisfactorily  shown  to  the  Government  at 
Washington,  and  the  Commanding  General  was  not  interfered 
with.  New  channels  of  communication  were  found  practi 
cable  by  citizen  traders,  and  when  the  army  was  in  possession 
of  a  surplus  the  rules  were  judiciously  relaxed,  so  that  little 


THE  OPPOSING  ARMIES.  23 

actual  suffering  was  occasioned.  The  sufficient  answer  to  all 
complaints  was,  that  it  was  the  only  system  under  which  a 
forward  movement  of  the  army  would  be  possible. 

The  field  transportation  of  the  army  was  also  regulated. 
Each  regiment  on  the  march  was  allowed  one  wagon  and 
one  ambulance,  and  to  the  company  officers  of  each  company 
was  assigned  a  pack-mule  in  common  for  carrying  theii 
mess- kit  and  personal  baggage.  A  similar  reduction  to  the 
minimum  reached  through  brigade,  division,  and  corps 
headquarters,  and  the  impedimenta  were  everywhere  as  small 
as  was  consistent  with  the  performance  of  the  necessary  offi 
cial  work  of  an  army  organization.  The  greater  part  of  all 
clerical  duty  was  performed  at  offices  in  the  rear,  to  which 
the  field  reports  of  various  kinds  were  sent  for  record  and 
for  proper  transmission,  only  the  absolutely  necessary  work 
being  done  in  the  field.  The  army  was  thus  stripped  for 
its  work,  and  its  commander  went  even  beyond  what  was 
necessary  in  setting  an  example  of  contempt  for  personal 
comfort  and  convenience,  and  of  the  subordination  of  every 
other  consideration  to  the  single  purpose  of  uniting  mobility 
with  strength  in  the  great  army. 

The  plan  of  campaign  which  Grant  adopted  for  the  year 
was  a  simple  one,  and  one  naturally  growing  out  of  the  posi 
tions  of  the  Confederate  armies.  The  Lieutenant-General 
took  upon  himself  the  task  of  pressing  Lee  back  upon 
Richmond,  unless  he  would  accept  a  decisive  battle  in  the 
open  field.  Sherman  was  to  do  the  same  with  Johnston's 
army,  for  which  Atlanta,  as  a  railway  centre,  had  similar  im 
portance  to  that  which  the  capital  of  Virginia  had  for  Lee. 
Banks  was  expected  to  collect  an  army  of  25,000  men  in  his 
Department,  and  move  from  New  Orleans  on  Mobile,  and, 
should  he  lake  it,  operate  thence  as  auxiliary  to  Sherman. 
The  beginning  of  May  was  fixed  upon  for  the  general  open- 


24  ATLANTA. 

ing  of  the  campaign,  and  each  of  the  three  columns  was  ex 
pected  to  keep  the  enemy  in  its  front  so  fully  employed  that 
reinforcements  from  one  to  the  other  of  the  Confederate 
armies  would  be  impracticable.  The  veteran  re-enlistments 
reduced  the  strength  of  the  National  forces  at  the  outset,  by 
reason  of  the  month's  furlough  given  to  those  who  renewed 
their  term  of  service ;  but  it  gave  assurance  of  increased 
and  more  valuable  disciplined  strength  later  in  the  cam 
paign,  and  even  from  the  beginning  gave  us  a  considerably 
larger  force  than  our  opponents  in  each  of  the  moving  col 
umns.  The  days  for  brilliant  detached  campaigns,  such  as 
Jackson  had  made  in  Virginia,  were  over.  Lee,  as  well  as 
Johnston,  settled  down  to  patient  defensive  operations  be 
hind  carefully  constructed  earthworks,  watching  for  some 
slip  in  the  strategy  of  the  Federal  commanders  which 
might  give  hope  of  success  to  aggressive  return  blows  by 
their  smaller  forces. 

Sherman  visited  his  subordinate  army  commanders,  in 
formed  them  of  his  purposes,  directed  the  concentration  of 
the  Armies  of  the  Tennessee  and  Ohio  near  the  respective 
flanks  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  fixed  the  5th  of 
May  for  a  general  forward  movement.  His  first  plan  had 
been  to  make  Dalton  the  point  for  concentration  of  his  three 
columns  ;  but  the  fact  that  McPherson  was  unable  to  con 
centrate  over  two-thirds  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  by 
reason  of  the  absence  of  the  divisions  which  were  with 
Banks  and  the  large  number  of  furloughed  veterans,  was 
the  primary  reason  for  changing  his  orders.  The  change 
was  in  accord  with  sound  military  maxims,  for  Johnston 
held  very  strong  positions  some  miles  in  front  of  Dalton, 
and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  would  have  been  in  a  dangerously 
exposed  position  had  it  marched  upon  that  place  whilst  the 
enemy  still  held  Kocky  Face  and  Mill  Creek  Gap. 


THE  OPPOSING   ARMIES.  25 

On  the  4th  of  May,  Schofield,  marching  out  of  East  Ten 
nessee  by  way  of  Cleveland  and  the  old  Federal  road,  had 
crossed  the  Georgia  line  and  reached  Bed  Clay,  passing  by 
part  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  which  immediately  took  up  its 
march  and  moved  to  Catoosa  Springs,  whilst  the  rest  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  advanced  to  the  immediate  neigh 
borhood  of  Einggold,  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  came 
close  upon  their  right  at  Lee  &  Gordon's  Mills.  Sherman 
himself  was  at  the  centre  with  Thomas,  and  the  whole  army 
was  well  in  hand,  the  extreme  distance  from  McPherson  to 
Schofield  being  about  sixteen  miles,  in  a  line  nearly  at  right 
angles  to  the  road  from  Chattanooga  to  Dalton,  Thomas, 
whose  force  was  nearly  equal  to  Johnston's,  being  somewhat 
advanced  beyond  the  wings. 

Sherman  entered  the  campaign  with  an  effective  force  of 
nearly  100,000  men  and  254  guns.  Of  these  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  had  60,000  men  and  130  guns,  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  25,000  men  and  96  guns,  and  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  14,000  men  and  28  guns. 

The  popular  tendency  to  clamor  against  an  unsuccessful 
general  was  quite  as  strong  in  the  Southern  States  as  else 
where,  and  Bragg  had  been  relieved  in  obedience  to  it  after 
the  battle  of  Chattanooga.  He  was  still  strong  in  the  confi 
dence  of  Jefferson  Davis,  and  was  called  to  Bichmond,  where 
he  performed  the  duties  of  chief-of-staff  to  the  Confederate 
President.  Gerferal  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  assigned  to  the 
command  of  the  army  at  Dalton,  but  did  not  have  the  full 
confidence  of  Mr.  Davis,  who  nominated  him  rather  because 
public  opinion  pointed  him  out  as  the  officer  most  fit  for  the 
command,  than  because  of  his  own  preference.  The  es 
trangement  between  them  dated  from  the  first  campaign  of 
the  war,  wnen  Johnston  had  not  taken  Mr.  Davis  as  fully 
into  his  military  confidence  as  the  latter  expected,  and  had 
IX.— 2 


26  ATLANTA. 

probably  hurt  the  self-esteem  of  the  Confederate  President 
in  a  point  on  which  he  was  understood  to  be  tender — his 
judgment  and  ability  in  military  matters. 

The  effect  of  these  relations  is  plainly  seen  throughout 
the  campaign.  A  game  of  cross  purposes  began  from  the 
first.  In  January,  Johnston  was  urged  to  assume  the  aggres 
sive,  but  he  somewhat  tartly  replied  by  demanding  the  re 
inforcements  in  men  and  material  which  he  considered 
necessary.  The  correspondence  with  Bragg,  as  the  mouth 
piece  of  Mr.  Davis,  continued  through  the  winter,  each  try 
ing  to  put  the  other  in  the  wrong.  Johnston  showed  that 
the  army  was  no  fitter  for  the  initiative  than  when  Bragg 
was  relieved,  and  the  latter  endeavored  to  show  a  much 
more  favorable  condition  of  things.  Early  in  March  rein 
forcements,  which  would  raise  his  army  to  75,000  effective 
men,  were  offered  him  on  condition  of  a  forward  movement. 
He  eagerly  urged  that  the  increase  be  given  him  at  once, 
but  indicated  that  it  was  wise  to  await  the  advance  of  Sher 
man,  repulse  him,  and  then  assume  a  vigorous  aggressive. 
No  doubt  his  army  needed  rest  and  recuperation  nearly  as 
much  as  the  Union  forces,  and  the  season  of  bad  roads  and 
wintry  weather  was  profitably  employed  in  bettering  the 
condition  of  artillery  and  train  animals,  disciplining  and 
drilling  the  troops  and  collecting  supplies.  At  any  rate,  the 
season  passed  in  a  tilt  at  letter-writing  between  Bragg  and 
Johnston,  and  no  reinforcements  were  sent  him  till  Sher 
man's  advance  in  force  compelled  it. 

Johnston  was  an  officer  who,  by  the  common  consent  of 
the  military  men  of  both  sides,  was  reckoned  second  only 
to  Lee,  if  second,  in  the  qualities  which  fit  an  officer  for  the 
responsibility  of  great  commands.  His  military  experience 
and  knowledge  were  large,  his  mind  eminently  systematic, 
his  judgment  sound,  his  courage  imperturbable.  He  was 


THE  OPPOSING   ARMIES.  27 

not  sanguine  in  temperament,  and  therefore  was  liable  to 
lack  in  audacity.  Inclined  by  nature  to  a  Fabian  policy,  ifc 
was  a  settled  conviction  with  him  that  in  the  existing  condi 
tion  of  the  Confederacy  such  a  policy  should  be  imposed  on 
the  most  audacious,  unless  a  great  blunder  on  the  other  side 
should  reveal  an  opportunity  for  a  decisive  advantage.  The 
results  which  followed  a  change  of  policy  later  in  the  cam 
paign  go  far  to  justify  him  in  his  judgment.  Eight  or  wrong, 
he  deliberately  adopted  a  plan  of  carefully  intrenched 
lines,  one  succeeding  the  other,  as  he  might  be  compelled  to 
retire.  He  practised  a  lynx-eyed  watchfulness  of  his  adver 
sary,  tempting  him  constantly  to  assault  his  intrenchments, 
holding  his  fortified  positions  to  the  last  moment,  but  choos 
ing  that  last  moment  so  well  as  to  save  nearly  every  gun  and 
wagon  in  the  final  withdrawal,  and  always  presenting  a 
front  covered  by  such  defences  that  one  man  in  the  line  was, 
by  all  sound  military  rules,  equal  to  three  or  four  in  the 
attack.  In  this  way  he  constantly  neutralized  the  superior 
ity  of  force  his  opponent  wielded,  and  made  his  campaign 
from  Dalton  to  the  Chattahoochee  a  model  of  defensive 
warfare.  It  is  Sherman's  glory  that,  with  a  totally  dif 
ferent  temperament,  he  accepted  his  adversary's  game,  and 
played  it  with  a  skill  that  was  finally  successful,  as  we  shall 
see. 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  satisfactorily  what  was  the  ex 
act  strength  of  Johnston's  army  as  compared  with  Sherman's 
at  the  opening  of  the  campaign.  The  Confederate  armies 
never  made  use  of  so  complete  a  system  of  reports  as  were 
used  among  us.  Their  poverty  imposed  upon  them  both  the 
disadvantages  and  the  advantages  of  an  absence  of  the  elab 
orate  bureau  organization  which  we  employed.  Their  field 
reports  of  effective  strength  were  almost  the  only  ones  upon 
which  their  generals  relied,  and  these  did  not  show  the 


28  ATLANTA. 

whole  number  of  men  present  and  fit  for  duty,  but  the  ac 
tual  number  of  muskets  in  line  after  deducting  all  the 
slightly  sick,  the  men  on  special  duty  of  every  sort,  and  all 
officers  and  detachments. 

This  is  illustrated  by  Johnston's  statement  in  a  letter  to 
Mr.  Davis  on  January  2,  1864,  that  the  reports  and  returns 
for  December  20th  showed  his  "effective  total  of  the  army 
(infantry  and  artillery)"  to  be  "not  quite  thirty-six  thou 
sand  ;  the  number  present  about  forty -three  thousand  ;  that 
present  and  absent  about  seventy-seven  thousand."  In  com 
parison  with  the  reports  of  the  National  forces  the  number 
present  affords  the  best  parallel  computation,  and  it  will 
usually  be  found,  as  in  the  example  given,  to  be  about 
twenty  per  cent,  more  than  their  reports  of  effectives.  In 
commenting  upon  the  expectations  of  his  Government, 
Johnston  complains  that  they  expected  him  to  open  the 
campaign  aggressively  with  sixteen  thousand  less  men  than 
had  been  named  in  the  proposal  in  March.  That  number 
was  75,000,  and  would  seem  to  show  that  he  reckoned  his 
force  about  sixty  thousand  men  when  Sherman  moved  upon 
Dalton  on  May  5th,  and  before  Folk's  corps  joined  him.  The 
Richmond  administration  gave  the  same  figures.  Add  to 
this  the  statement  of  General  Hood,  that  the  Confederate 
force  was  75,000  men  in  the  early  part  of  the  campaign,  and 
it  is  fairly  proven  that  the  44,000  which  Johnston  gives  as 
his  effective  force  at  Dalton  on  May  1st,  is  considerably  be 
low  the  number  present,  as  usually  computed,  and  that 
the  additions  to  his  command  made  soon  afterward,  would 
bring  it  nearly  or  quite  to  the  figures  named  by  the  Con 
federate  General  Hood.  The  chief  interest  in  the  question 
is  in  its  bearing  on  the  statements  of  "effective"  force  on 
the  one  side,  and  the  "  present  for  duty "  on  the  other, 
as  they  appear  in  the  reports  of  commanding  officers  of 


THE   OPPOSING  ARMIES.  29 

the  opposing  forces  and  in  the   current  histories  of  the 
time.1 

Johnston's  position  at  Dalton  was  not  originally  selected 
by  himself,  for  Bragg  had  gathered  his  defeated  forces  there 
at  the  beginning  of  the  winter.  But  the  new  commander 
had  strengthened  the  position  by  fortifications,  and  pre 
pared  it  with  such  skill  to  resist  an  attack  in  front  that  it 
was  practically  impregnable.  The  key  to  the  topography  of 
North  Georgia  is  the  general  trend  of  the  great  Allegheny 
range  of  mountains,  which  determines  the  eastern  shore  of 
the  continent  and  forms  the  backbone  of  the  Atlantic  States 
from  Vermont  to  the  region  we  are  considering.  The 
general  direction  of  the  mountains  is  northeast  and  south 
west.  In  the  valley  between  the  Cumberland  and  Great 
Smoky  ranges  lie  the  Holston  and  Clinch  Kivers,  which, 
uniting  to  form  the  Tennessee,  then  turn  to  the  west  at 
Chattanooga,  rounding  the  southern  spurs  of  the  Cumber 
land  Mountains.  The  more  eastern  ranges  continue  further 
south,  one  after  another  losing  its  character  as  a  ridge,  till 
Kennesaw,  Pine  Mountain,  and  Lost  Mountain,  near  Mari 
etta,  with  Stone  Mountain,  near  Atlanta,  stand  out  as  iso 
lated  highlands  in  the  midst  of  the  broken  but  not  quite 
mountainous  country  which  is  intermediate  between  the 
mountains  proper  and  the  sandy  plains  of  the  Gulf  coast. 
Going  south  from  Chattanooga  a  number  of  narrow  parallel 
valleys  are  drained  by  branches  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  which 
enters  the  Tennessee  just  east  of  the  town,  and  which  heads 
nearly  west  of  Dalton  about  twenty  miles  from  its  mouth. 
The  eastern  barrier  of  this  basin  is  Kocky  Face  Eidge,  a  con 
tinuous  wall  of  quartz  rock  with  precipitous  faces,  flanked 
on  the  west  by  a  subordinate  ridge,  through  which,  at  Tunnel 

1  See  Appendix  A. 


30  ATLANTA. 

Hill,  the  railway  pierces  and  runs  southeasterly  through  a 
gorge  in  Rocky  Face  known  as  Mill  Creek  Gap,  the  towering 
sides  of  which  are  called  the  Buzzard's  Boost.  Mill  Creek 
winds  southeasterly  five  or  six  miles  after  passing  the  gap 
and  flows  into  a  branch  of  the  Connasauga  River,  a  tributary 
of  the  Oostanaula.  Dalton  lies  about  a  mile  south  of  Mill 
Creek ;  through  it,  and  upon  the  same  side  of  the  Conna 
sauga,  the  railway  passes,  Tilton  and  Resaca  being  the 
neighboring  villages  and  stations,  the  latter  at  the  crossing 
of  the  Oostanaula,  and  about  twelve  or  fourteen  miles  from 
Dalton.  Rocky  Face  extends  some  three  miles  north  of  Mill 
Creek  Gap,  or  a  little  farther  than  Tunnel  Hill,  where  it 
breaks  into  separate  hills.  On  the  east,  Dalton  was  not 
covered  by  any  similar  natural  defence,  though  the  line  of 
Mill  Creek  und  the  river  could  easily  have  been  made  strong 
if  Sherman  had  shown  any  serious  intent  to  advance  on  that 
side.  The  transportation  question,  however,  was  a  great 
obstacle  to  such  a  plan,  for  it  required  the  full  capacity  of 
his  railway  line  to  keep  the  army  supplied,  and  the  inter 
ruption  of  communications,  even  for  a  few  days,  was  not  to  be 
considered,  except  in  emergencies.  To  make  Cleveland  his 
base,  would  be  to  open  the  way  for  Johnston  into  Middle 
Tennessee  and  tempt  him  to  transfer  the  war  into  that 
region,  by  a  movement  with  his  whole  force  similar  to  that 
which  Hood  made  later  in  the  year.  He  would  have  been, 
from  the  beginning  of  such  a  movement,  between  Sherman 
and  his  line  of  supplies  in  the  lower  Tennessee  Valley. 
Johnston  rightly  judged,  therefore,  that  he  must  expect  his 
opponent  along  the  line  of  the  railway,  and  his  defences 
wrere  prepared  accordingly.  Mill  Creek  was  dammed  so  as 
to  make  a  deep  wret  ditch  in  a  part  of  his  front,  and  intrench- 
ments  made  in  the  Gap  connected  with  the  crests  of  Rocky 
Face  both  north  and  south.  Near  the  northern  extremitv  of 


THE   OPPOSING   ARMIES.  31 

this  ridge,  and  about  four  miles  from  Dalton,  an  east  and 
west  line  of  earthworks  on  a  very  strong  position  connected 
Rocky  Face  with  the  high  ground  commanding  the  East  Ten 
nessee  Hallway,  and  the  line  then  turned  southward  and 
made  a  nearly  continuous  chain  of  defences  east  of  the  town. 
In  front,  therefore,  and  on  either  flank  for  miles  to  the  rear, 
Dalton  was  so  strong  as  to  be  safe  from  a  coup  de  main;  too 
strong,  indeed,  to  make  it  probable  that  the  Federal  com 
mander  would  seriously  attack  the  works,  if  caution  counted 
for  anything  in  his  character.  But  Sherman  was  reckoned 
impulsive  and  enterprising,  and  Johnston  had  hopes  that  he 
might  dash  his  army  upon  these  formidable  barriers  and 
give  the  chance  for  a  destructive  counter-blow  when  weakened 
and  perhaps  disorganized  by  an  unsuccessful  assault. 

Before  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  Thomas  had  called 
Sherman's  attention  to  Snake  Creek  Gap  as  a  route  by 
which  Kesaca  or  Calhoun  could  be  reached,  and  the  position 
at  Dalton  be  turned.  He  had  offered  to  lead  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  by  this  defile,  whilst  the  Armies  of  the  Tennes 
see  and  Ohio  occupied  Johnston  in  front.  The  positions  of 
his  forces,  and  the  desire  to  have  the  greater  strength  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  the  centre  and  covering  his 
own  base,  made  Sherman  modify  whilst  he  accepted  the 
plan.  He  determined  to  send  McPherson  with  his  two 
corps  against  Resaca,  whilst  he  pressed  Johnston  in  front 
with  the  superior  force,  ready  to  follow  him  up  the  moment 
he  let  go  of  Dalton,  and  before  he  could  seriously  damage 
McPherson. 

It  is  uncertain  whether  Johnston  believed  Snake  Creek 
Gap  to  be  a  practicable  route  for  a  large  column.  It  is 
hard  to  realize  now  how  little  accurate  knowledge  either 
party  had  of  the  topography  of  the  country.  Maps  worthy 
the  name  there  were  none,  and  the  Confederate  staff  seems 


32  ATLANTA. 

to  have  been  greatly  inferior  to  that  of  the  United  States 
Army  in  working  up  such  material  as  they  had.  The  fact 
that  the  route  McPherson  followed  was  almost  entirely  un 
guarded  gives  strong  support  to  the  opinion,  which  wTas  the 
common  one  in  Sherman's  army  at  the  time,  that  Johnston 
rested  securely  in  the  belief  that  his  position  could  only  be 
turned  by  a  much  longer  detour,  and  one  involving  many 
more  contingencies  for  his  opponent. 

Before  extending  our  examination  of  the  topography,  let 
us  return  to  the  military  movements  of  the  7th  of  May  and 
the  week  following. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  LINES  BEFORE  DALTON. 

ON  Saturday,  May  7th,  under  orders  from  Sherman, 
Thomas  advanced  the  Fourteenth  Corps  (Major-General 
John  M.  Palmer)  from  Einggold  upon  Tunnel  Hill,  the 
Fourth  Corps  (Major-General  O.  O.  Howard)  from  Catoosa 
Springs  to  Dr.  Lee's  house  on  the  Tunnel  Hill  road,  where 
it  would  be  in  support  of  Palmer,  and  the  Twentieth  Corps 
(Major-General  Joseph  Hooker)  from  Lee  &  Gordon's 
Mills  southeasterly  into  Dogwood  Valley  at  and  above 
Trickum,  where  it  would  be  about  three  miles  nearly  due 
south  from  the  centre  at  Tunnel  Hill. 

At  the  same  time  Schofield  moved  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  from  Eed  Clay  southwest,  his  leading  division 
(Cox's)  to  Dr.  Lee's,  where  it  was  close  upon  the  Fourth 
Corps,  and  the  rest  extending  toward  Catoosa  Springs, 
McCook's  division  of  cavalry  covering  Varnell  Station  and 
the  East  Tennessee  Eailway. 

McPherson,  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  diverging 
from  Hooker's  line  of  march,  moved  toward  Ship  Gap  and 
Villanow,  under  orders  to  be  near  the  Gap  on  the  7th,  and 
the  following  day  to  proceed  via  Villanow  and  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  and  place  himself  upon  the  railroad  in  Johnston's  rear. 

These  movements  concentrated  the  army  on  a  much 
shorter  line  than  before,  and  swung  the  right  centre 
(Hooker)  close  to  Rocky  Face  ridge  south  of  Mill  Creek  Gap, 


34  ATLANTA. 

where  he  covered  the  road  leading  to  Villanow.  They  were 
made  with  no  serious  resistance,  except  that  at  Tunnel  Hill 
the  enemy's  cavalry  presented  a  pretty  firm  front,  and  de 
layed  Palmer's  advance  long  enough  for  the  deployment  of 
part  of  Howard's  corps  on  their  flank,  when  they  speedily 
retired  within  the  gap. 

On  the  8th  the  concentric  movements  continued.  Barker's 
brigade  of  Newton's  division,  Fourth  Corps,  scaled  the  north 
end  of  Rocky  Face  and  moved  southward  along  the  crest. 
The  advance  was  led  by  Colonel  Opdycke,  125th  Ohio,  who 
drove  back  the  enemy's  outposts  and  skirmishers  till  the 
Confederates  were  found  in  force  upon  a  very  strong  posi 
tion  crossing  the  ridge  at  a  place  where  it  rose  rapidly  in 
front  of  Newton's  men,  an  abrupt  and  rugged  rocky  barrier, 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  north  of  the  signal  station  at  Buz 
zard's  Roost,  above  Mill  Creek  Gap.  The  ridge  was  so  nar 
row  that  no  deployment  could  be  made,  sometimes  scarce  a 
dozen  men  having  room  to  stand  abreast.  The  progress  was 
therefore  tedious,  and  numbers  gave  little  or  no  advantage. 
The  rest  of  the  Fourth  Corps  troops  connected  with  Newton 
as  well  as  the  ground  would  admit,  forming  a  diagonal  line 
from  the  valley  on  the  west  up  to  the  summits  which  New 
ton  held.  At  the  centre,  Wood's  division  of  the  Fourth, 
Da  vis's  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Butterfield's  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps  pushed  back  the  enemy  into  the  mouth  of  the  Gap. 
About  two  miles  farther  to  the  south,  Geary's  division  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps  made  a  strong  effort  to  carry  the  summit 
of  Rocky  Face  at  Dug  Gap,1  but  were  foiled  by  the  same 
physical  difficulties  which  baffled  all  other  attempts  along 
this  palisaded  ridge.  The  skirmishers  advanced,  scrambling 

1  Van  Home  erroneously  describes  this  movement  as  being  against  Chattooga 
Mountain  "  separated  from  Ilocky  Face  by  Mill  Creek."  General  Thomas  calls  it 
Chattoogata  Mountain,  the  "ridge  running  due  south  from  Buzzard's  Roost." 
Geary's  report  describes  his  crossing  Mill  Creek  (which  here  runs  north)  before 
ascending  "  Rocky  Land  Ridge,'1  or  Rocky  Face  at  Dug  Gap. 


THE  LINES  BEFORE  DALTON.          35 

over  the.  rocks  and  through  the  undergrowth,  till  already 
blown  and  nearly  exhausted  they  found  themselves  facing  a 
perpendicular  wall  with  only  clefts  and  crevices  leading  up 
through  it,  the  narrow  roadway  which  had  been  their  guide 
being  strongly  held  by  the  enemy  and  intrenched.  A  gal 
lant  effort  was  made  to  reach  the  crest,  but  the  smaller 
force  of  Confederates  was  led  by  General  Hardee  in  person, 
and  held  their  natural  fortress. 

Meanwhile  the  Armies  of  the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  were 
also  moving  forward.  Schofield's  left  division  (Cox)  moved 
a  mile  eastward  to  Kincannon  Cross  Roads,  with  one  brigade 
a  mile  farther  to  the  south.  His  right  (Judah)  connected 
with  Newton  at  the  north  spur  of  Rocky  Face,  and  the 
centre  (Hovey)  completed  the  line,  covering  the  roads  from 
Dalton  direct  to  Varnell  Station,  whilst  the  cavalry  division 
of  McCook  watched  the  flank  further  to  the  east. 

McPherson,  following  his  orders,  pushed  forward  to  Vil- 
lanow,  and  on  the  next  day,  the  9th,  marched  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap.  At  two  in  the  afternoon  he  was  close 
upon  Eesaca,  and  Sherman  was  full  of  hope  that  he  would 
be  able  to  place  himself  astride  of  the  railway  in  Johnston's 
rear.  He  was  accompanied  by  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division. 

Snake  Creek  is  an  insignificant  branch  of  the  Oostanaula, 
running  southward  between  high  and  rugged  ridges,  which, 
on  the  east,  are  nearly  continuous  with  Rocky  Face,  and  are 
known  by  the  general  name  of  Chattoogata  Mountains.  On 
the  west  the  parallel  range  is  called  Horn  Mountain.  A 
watershed  half-way  from  Tunnel  Hill  to  the  Oostanaula 
separates  the  sources  of  Mill  Creek  from  those  of  Snake 
Creek,  and  this  divide  is  properly  the  gap.  The  whole 
pass,  howTever,  is  known  by  this  name,  and  is  a  wild  and 
picturesque  defile,  five  or  six  miles  long.  Hardly  a  cabin 
was  to  be  seen  in  its  whole  length.  The  road  was  only  such 


36  ATLANTA. 

a  track  as  country  wagons  had  worn  in  the  bed  of  the  stream 
or  along  the  foot  of  the  mountain.  The  forest  shut  it  in, 
and  only  for  a  little  while  at  midday  did  the  sun  enter  it. 
Near  its  southern  extremity,  at  Sugar  Valley  P.  O.,  it 
reached  the  more  open  country  bordering  the  river,  which 
here  runs  for  a  little  way  nearly  west,  and  roads  branch  off 
to  Kesaca  eastward,  and  southward  to  Calhoun,  turning  the 
south  end  of  the  precipitous  ridges  which  guard  Dalton  on 
the  west.  Eesaca  itself  stands  in  the  elbow  at  the  junction 
of  the  Connasauga  with  the  Oostanaula,  and  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  latter  stream.  Camp  Creek,  another  small 
stream,  flows  into  the  river  just  west  of  the  village,  and  the 
high  plateau  bordering  it  and  the  more  rugged  hills  be 
tween  it  and  the  Connasauga  a  little  further  north,  made  it 
a  very  strong  place  for  the  intrenched  camp  which  the  Con 
federate  commander  had  prepared  there.  It  was  held  by 
two  brigades  under  General  Canty,1  and  such  a  force  could 
easily  defend  it  against  a  very  strong  column.  It  was  a 
well-fortified  post,  suitable  for  a  safe  depot  of  supplies; 
but  it  is  improbable  that  Johnston  regarded  it  as  a  posi 
tion  for  his  whole  army. 

McPherson  passed  the  defile  without  opposition,  and 
pushed  his  advance  close  to  the  fortifications  about  the 
post.  His  reconnoissance  satisfied  him  that  he  could  not 
cany  the  works  by  assault,  or  that  it  was  at  least  not  worth 
the  cost  in  lives  which  it  would  involve.  He  had  no  accu 
rate  knowledge  of  the  topography  or  of  roads  by  which  he 
could  turn  the  position  and  reach  the  railroad  further  north. 
Neither  could  he  tell  to  what  extent  Johnston  had  already 
detached  portions  of  his  command  to  resist  him.  He  there- 

1  Some  of  the  accounts  speak  of  only  one  brigade  as  the  parrison,  but  John 
ston,  in  his  Narrative  (p.  316),  distinctly  says  that  two  brigades  defended  it 
against  MoPherson. 


THE  LINES  BEFORE  DALTON.  37 

fore  adopted  the  prudent  course  of  retiring  to  a  strong  posi 
tion  at  the  southern  mouth  of  the  gap,  where  he  made  sure 
of  keeping  the  way  open  for  the  whole  army,  and  reported 
the  situation  to  his  superior.  Sherman  was  disappointed  in 
this,  and  when  they  met,  told  McPherson  that  he  had  lost  a 
great  opportunity ;  but  he  carefully  spared  the  feelings  of 
his  subordinate,  with  whom  his  friendship  was  most  inti 
mate,  and  he  applied  his  energies  at  once  to  making  the 
most  of  the  actual  situation. 

During  Monday,  the  9th,  Thomas  and  Schofield  pressed 
Johnston's  front  at  all  points.  The  divisions  of  Hooker's, 
Palmer's,  and  Howard's  corps  in  front  of  Buzzard's  roost 
were  all  engaged,  and  whilst  there  was  no  combined  and  de 
termined  assault  of  the  Confederate  lines  in  form,  the  attack 
was  kept  up  with  well-supported  skirmish  lines,  and  Sher 
man's  purpose  of  keeping  his  opponent  fully  occupied  was 
well  carried  out.  On  the  north  crest  of  Kocky  Face,  Hark- 
er's  brigade  of  Newton's  division  made  the  most  serious 
effort  of  the  day,  and  became  committed  to  an  attack 
which  fully  tested  the  possibility  of  pushing  the  enemy 
away  from  his  stronghold  on  that  summit  at  Buzzard's 
Eoost.  The  brigade  was  supported  by  the  rest  of  the  divi 
sion  as  well  as  by  Judah's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 
Meanwhile  Schofield  advanced  Cox's  and  Hovey's  divisions 
along  a  lower  parallel  ridge  on  the  east,  nearly  two  miles, 
till  they  came  upon  the  fortifications  extending  across  the 
valleys  north  of  Dalton  already  described.  The  works  were 
found  to  be  very  strong,  and  the  enemy  was  not  tempted  to 
leave  them.  Schofield's  troops  were  due  east  from  the 
crest  where  Harker  was  fighting,  and  from  there  the  view 
of  the  combat  above  was  an  exciting  one.  The  line  of  blue 
coats  could  be  seen  among  the  rocks,  nearly  at  right  angles 


38  ATLANTA. 

with  the  line  of  the  ridge,  the  men  at  the  top  in  silhouette 
against  the  sky,  close  up  to  the  Confederate  trenches,  where 
their  charges  were  met  with  a  line  of  fire  before  which  they 
recoiled  only  to  renew  the  effort,  till  it  became  apparent 
even  to  the  most  daring  that  it  was  useless  to  lead  men 
against  such  barriers.  The  orders  were  not  to  waste  life  in 
serious  assault  upon  intrenchments,  but  the  zeal  of  the 
troops  and  subordinate  commanders  turned  the  intended 
skirmish  into  something  very  like  a  ranged  battle,  and  the 
Confederate  reports  state  that  five  separate  and  regular 
assaults  were  made  upon  their  lines. 

Johnston's  disposition  of  his  troops  was  such  as  was  natu 
rally  indicated  by  the  contour  of  the  ground.  He  relied 
upon  the  inaccessible  palisades  of  Kocky  Face  to  defend  his 
left  rear,  and  hadReynolds's  Arkansas  and  Granberry's  Texan 
brigades  and  Grigsby's  brigade  of  dismounted  Kentucky 
Cavalry  holding  Dug  Gap  and  the  ridge  adjacent.  Bate's 
division  was  on  the  left  of  the  stream  in  Mill  Creek  Gap 
under  Buzzard's  Eoost,  Stewart's  on  the  right  of  it,  Cheat- 
ham's  continued  Stewart's  lines  about  a  mile  along  the  crest 
to  the  commanding  point  attacked  by  Harker,  thence  turn 
ing  down  the  mountain  to  the  east  came  in  succession  Ste 
venson's,  Hindman's,  and  Cleburne's  divisions,  crossing 
Crow  Valley  and  holding  the  works  in  front  of  Schofield's 
Twenty-third  Corps.  Walker's  division  was  in  reserve  near 
the  angle  of  the  Confederate  line.  Lieutenant-General 
Hardee  commanded  the  left  wing,  and  Lieutenant-General 
Hood  the  right.  "Wheeler's  cavalry  covered  Johnston's  right, 
and  during  the  day  McCook,  whose  division  of  horse  was 
near  Varnell's  Station,  had  a  lively  affair  with  him.  La- 
Grange's  brigade  attacked  and  drove  Wheeler  back  some 
distance  to  a  hill  defended  by  artillery,  known  as  Poplar 
Place.  Here  the  enemy  resumed  the  aggressive  with  supe- 


THE  LINES  'BEFORE  DALTON.  39 

rior  force,  having  two  brigades  of  infantry  as  well  as  the 
cavalry,  and  LaGrange  was  routed  and  himself  captured. 
In  this  affair  the  loss  in  casualties  and  prisoners  was  about 
a  hundred  and  fifty  on  either  side. 

During  the  night  the  National  army  rested  on  its  arms, 
the  troops  on  the  mountain  sides  and  crests  in  line  of  bat 
tle.  Eest  it  could  hardly  be  called,  for  the  surface  of  the 
ground  was  a  mass  of  broken  quartz  rock,  the  sharp  edges 
and  angles  of  which  had  not  yielded  to  weathering,  and  the 
bivouac  was  a  rough  one. 

The  10th,  the  demonstrations  were  continued  along  the 
line,  but  with  less  vigor.  Johnston  was  now  aware  of  Mc- 
Pherson's  presence  in  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  during  the 
night  had  sent  Hood  with  Walker's,  Hindman's,  and  Cle- 
burne's  divisions  toward  Eesaca.  The  Kichmond  Govern 
ment  was  also  awake  to  his  necessities,  and  Folk's  corps  was 
on  the  way  to  him.  On  getting  news  that  McPherson  was 
not  pressing  an  attack  upon  Eesaca  but  had  taken  position 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Gap,  Hood  was  recalled  with  Hindman's 
division,  leaving  Cleburne  and  Walker  near  Tilton,  covering 
the  Eome  and  Eesaca  roads.  Lieutenant-General  Polk  with 
his  advanced  division  (Loring's)  reached  Eesaca  on  the  llth 
and  was  authorized  by  Johnston  to  call  Cleburne  and  Walker 
to  him  in  case  of  need. 

During  the  10th  Sherman  became  aware  that  it  would 
not  now  be  practicable  for  McPherson  to  reach  the  railroad 
in  view  of  Johnston's  new  disposition  of  his  forces,  and  that 
the  latter  was  not  yet  ready  to  let  go  of  Dalton.  He  directed 
McPherson  to  strengthen  his  position,  and  intimated  his 
wish  not  to  have  Johnston  hurried  in  leaving  Dalton 
for  a  couple  of  days,  till  his  own  arrangements  for  the 
larger  movement  should  be  complete.  Schofield  was 
swung  back,  marching  to  the  rear  in  line,  till  his  com- 


40  ATLANTA. 

mand  prolonged  the  line  of  the  Fourth  Corps  on  the  ridge 
of  Rocky  Face,  with  his  front  to  the  east.  Williams's  divi 
sion  of  Hooker's  corps  advanced  to  the  support  of  McPherson 
on  the  Villanow  and  Snake  Creek  road,  and  the  rest  of  that 
corps  was  ordered  to  follow.  The  movement  of  the  whole 
army  by  that  flank  was  only  awaiting  the  arrival  nearer  the 
front  of  Major-General  Stoneman  with  the  cavalry  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  which  had  been  refitting,  and  which  was 
expected  to  cover  the  Chattanooga  and  Cleveland  roads. 

On  the  llth  orders  were  issued  for  a  general  movement  on 
the  next  day  at  daybreak  :  Howard's  (Fourth)  corps  to  re 
main  in  position,  Stonenian's  cavalry  to  take  the  place  of 
Schofield's  Twenty -third  Corps,  and  the  rest  of  the  armies 
of  the  Cumberland  and  Ohio  to  follow  the  movement  by  the 
right  flank  through  Snake  Creek  Gap.  In  the  afternoon  of 
the  llth,  Johnston  being  anxious  to  learn  whether  the  Na 
tional  army  was  in  motion,  made  a  reconnoissance  in  force  of 
Wheeler's  cavalry  supported  by  Hindman's  division  against 
Schofield's  left.  The  enemy  were  resisted  by  the  cavalry 
under  Stoneman,  and  did  not  reach  the  infantry  lines,  which, 
though  called  to  arms,  were  not  engaged.  Johnston  was  in 
duced  by  false  reports  from  scouts  and  country  people  to 
believe  that  Stoneman  burned  many  wagons  of  the  train. 
The  affair  was  an  unimportant  one,  though  causing  some 
scores  of  casualties  on  either  side. 

By  sunrise  next  morning,  Thomas,  with  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  (Palmer's),  was  in  motion,  closely  followed  by  Scho- 
field,  and  during  the  day  the  whole  army,  except  Howard's 
corps  and  Stoneman's  cavalry,  was  concentrated  near  Mc- 
Pherson's  position  at  the  debouche  of  the  Gap  looking  toward 
Eesaca.  The  troops  had  ten  days'  rations,  of  which  three  were 
cooked  and  in  haversacks,  all  baggage  was  at  the  rear  near 
Ringgold,  no  tents  were  allowed  even  to  general  officers. 


THE   LINES  BEFORE  DALTON  41 

The  deep  valleys  and  forests  west  of  Rocky  Face  had  per 
fectly  covered  the  movement,  and  it  was  made  without  the 
slightest  interruption  from  the  enemy.  Johnston  learned 
from  Polk  at  Eesaca  of  the  gathering  forces  in  front  of  that 
place  on  the  12th,  evacuated  Dalton  during  the  night,  and 
concentrated  his  command  in  front  of  Sherman.  He  took 
his  position  under  cover  of  the  resistance  made  by  Loring's 
division  of  Folk's  corps  to  the  advance  of  McPherson's  col 
umn.  His  rear  was  covered  by  his  cavalry  which  Howard 
followed  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  passing  through  Dalton 
at  nine  o'clock  and  capturing  a  considerable  number  of 
prisoners  as  he  advanced.  Wheeler  was  supported  by  infan 
try  at  Tilton,  and  by  this  means  was  able  to  delay  Howard 
near  that  point  till  night. 

The  first  important  step  in  the  campaign  had  been  suc 
cessfully  taken,  and  the  enemy  had  been  compelled  to  evac 
uate  the  impregnable  lines  about  Dalton,  with  but  trifling 
loss  on  Sherman's  part.  Johnston  had  been  disappointed  in 
his  hope  of  making  a  heavy  return  blow  upon  his  opponent. 
The  prestige  of  a  fortunate  initiative  was  with  the  National 
commander. 


CHAPTEK  V. 

RESACA. 

THE  sketch  already  given  of  Kesaca  will  make  it  easy  to 
understand  the  position  which  Johnston  took  about  the 
place.  Folk's  corps,  which  was  already  on  the  ground  and 
facing  McPherson,  naturally  became  the  left  of  his  line, 
with  his  left  flank  resting  on  the  Oostanaula.  Next  to  him 
was  placed  Hardee's  corps,  extending  the  line  northward, 
and  Hood's  corps,  bending  to  the  east,  reached  the  Conna- 
sauga  Eiver  with  his  right  flank.  The  valley  of  Camp  Creek 
was  in  front  of  his  centre  for  a  distance  of  two  miles  or  more 
nearly  north  and  south.  Polk  had  part  of  his  troops  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  creek  near  its  mouth,  because  the  high 
hills  which  he  thus  occupied  covered  and  protected  the 
railroad  bridge  at  Kesaca.  This  advanced  position  also  en 
filaded  the  upper  part  of  Carnp  Creek  and  served  as  a  bas 
tion  for  the  line  of  works  along  the  east  bank  of  the  stream. 
Further  north  the  Confederate  line  left  the  creek  and  fol 
lowed  the  line  of  high  wooded  hills  facing  to  the  north. 

Sherman  brought  his  trains  into  Snake  Creek  Gap,  Gar- 
rard's  cavalry  picketing  the  roads  to  the  rear.  Schofield  left 
one  division  (Hovey's)  at  the  mouth  of  the  Gap,  one  brigade 
of  it  being  stationed  near  the  rear  of  the  parked  trains, 
about  five  miles  southeast  of  Villanow.  During  the  day  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  advanced  to  cover  the  movement 
of  the  rest  of  the  forces,  Logan's  corps  being  deployed  and 


RESACA.  43 

supported  by  Veatch's  division  of  Dodge's.  Logan,  who 
met  with  a  sharp  resistance,  succeeded  in  occupying  a  ridge 
nearly  parallel  to  that  held  by  Polk  in  front  of  him  ;  but  as 
his  right  did  not  reach  far  south  of  the  Kesaca  road,  the  divi 
sion  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  was  brought  up  and  deployed 
on  his  right.  This  gave  the  whole  army  a  strong  flank  rest 
ing  on  the  Oostanaula.  On  the  morning  of  the  14th  McPher- 
son  was  ordered  to  move  straight  on  Eesaca,  his  right  cov 
ered  by  Kilpatrick's  cavalry.  He  was  to  occupy  the  line  of 
Camp  Creek  on  its  west  bank,  and  endeavor  to  reach  the  rail 
road  with  his  left.  The  lack  of  topographical  information 
made  it  seem  possible  to  do  this,  but  it  turned  out  that  the 
maps  were  misleading,  and  the  railroad  curved  eastward 
above  Kesaca,  behind  the  enemy's  centre.  Thomas  was  di 
rected  to  take  advantage  of  country  roads  and  paths  to  reach 
McPherson's  left  with  the  Twentieth  and  Fourteenth  Corps 
and  to  form  there.  Schofield's  remaining  two  divisions, 
Judah's  and  Cox's,  followed  the  Eome  and  Dalton  road  some 
two  miles  to  the  north,  and  then  struck  across  country  and 
came  in  on  Thomas's  left.  The  broken  nature  of  the  ground 
made  this  a  difficult  march,  and  it  required  extraordinary 
exertions  to  take  the  artillery  across  the  ravines  and  streams 
which  had  to  be  passed.  About  noon  the  whole  line  was 
facing  the  valley  of  Camp  Creek,  and  Howard  with  the 
Fourth  Corps  was  about  a  mile  to  the  north  of  Schofield's 
left. 

In  the  deployment,  the  left  of  Palmer's  (Fourteenth) 
corps  reached  nearly  to  the  place  where  Camp  Creek  Valley 
bends  to  the  northwestward,  and  where  the  enemy's  in 
trenched  line  curved  away  from  it  to  the  east.  Thomas  and 
Schofield  were  in  person  at  this  point,  and  word  being 
received  that  Howard  was  within  supporting  distance,  the 
order  was  given  for  the  line  to  advance.  Along  the  right  the 


44  ATLANTA. 

enemy's  skirmishers  were  driven  over  the  creek,  except  at 
the  bridge  where  the  Eesaca  road  crosses  it.  The  defensive 
lines  on  the  east  bank  were  fully  developed,  and  the  artil 
lery  opened  on  both  sides  of  the  valley.  Schofield's  divi 
sions  moved  in  line  across  the  creek.  His  left  division 
(Cox's)  carried  and  held  the  intrenchrnents  in  its  front, 
driving  the  enemy  from  them  at  a  charge  after  a  fierce  strug 
gle.  His  right  division  (Judah's)  marched  against  the  angle 
of  the  Confederate  works  where  these  turned  away  from  the 
valley.  The  ground  was  very  difficult  there,  and  the  troops 
in  crossing  the  valley  were  subject  to  enfilade  from  salients 
further  to  the  right  as  well  as  to  the  direct  fire  in  front. 
They  were  unable  to  get  a  foothold  on  the  opposite  bluffs, 
and  were  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  Meanwhile 
Cox's  right  was  exposed  to  a  cross  fire  of  artillery.  His  men 
made  use  of  the  reverse  of  the  enemy's  captured  trench, 
strengthening  it  by  such  means  as  were  at  hand,  and  New 
ton's  and  Wood's  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps  marched  to 
their  support.  The  enemy  fell  back  and  established  a  new 
line  several  hundred  yards  further  in  rear.  Wood  formed 
on  Cox's  left,  and  Stanley's  division  was  in  echelon,  still  be 
yond  Wood's  flank. 

The  movements  of  the  morning  had  crowded  our  forces 
too  much  to  the  right,  and  Howard's  left  was  in  the  air. 
Sherman  directed  Thomas  to  move  Hooker's  corps  to  the 
left,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  Palmer's  (Fourteenth) 
corps  being  able  to  extend  and  hold  the  west  bank  of  Camp 
Creek.  Johnston  also  had  detected  the  weakness  of  our  left 
flank,  and  Hood  was  already  marching  with  Stewart's  and 
Stevenson's  division  to  turn  it.  At  the  same  time  the  effort 
was  made  to  drive  back  all  the  National  forces  which  had 
crossed  Camp  Creek,  and  a  demonstration  was  made  all 
along  the  line.  Stanley  was  outflanked  and  was  being 


RESACA.  45 

pressed  back,  when  Hooker's  leading  division  (Williams's) 
arrived  and  turned  the  tide.  The  other  divisions  of  that 
corps  followed  promptly,  the  enemy  was  repulsed  and  the 
line  extended  on  the  continuation  of  the  intrenchment  car 
ried  by  Schofield's  men  earlier  in  the  day.  Cox's  division 
had  exhausted  its  ammunition  about  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon,  and  as  wagons  could  not  reach  him  over  the 
creek,  he  was  relieved,  one  brigade  at  a  time,  by  Newton. 
In  relieving  the  right  brigade  (Manson's)  by  Barker,  both 
brigade  commanders  were  injured  by  the  explosion  of  a 
shell,  and  at  this  point  the  losses  on  both  sides  were 
severe. 

On  the  right  a  brisk  skirmish  and  artillery  fight  was  kept 
up,  more  by  way  of  feints  and  demonstrations  than  with  the 
intention  of  serious  attack.  Osterhaus's  division  of  Logan's 
corps  was  upon  the  principal  road  leading  to  Resaca,  which 
runs  through  a  heavily  wooded  valley  before  reaching  the 
creek.  The  stream  is  there  deep  enough  to  make  a  formida 
ble  obstacle,  and  the  road  crosses  it  by  a  bridge.  In  the 
afternoon,  during  one  of  the  demonstrations,  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  showed  signs  of  weakness,  and  Osterhaus,  push 
ing  the  advantage  with  vigor,  succeeded  in  driving  them 
through  the  wood  and  over  the  bridge.  Before  this  could 
be  destroyed  the  Twelfth  Missouri  was  throwTn  across  it  and 
into  the  timber  on  the  farther  side,  wrhere  they  succeeded  in 
making  and  holding  an  intrenched  line  as  a  bridge  head. 
The  Confederates  under  Polk,  in  their  advanced  position  on 
our  extreme  right  were  a  good  deal  weakened  in  morale  by 
the  knowledge  that  the  National  troops  had  thus  made 
good  a  foothold  in  rear  of  their  flank,  and  between  five  and 
six  o'clock  Logan  ordered  forward  the  brigades  of  Generals 
Giles  A.  Smith  and  C.  R.  Woods,  supported  by  Veatch's  divi 
sion  from  Dodge's  corps.  The  height  held  by  Polk  was  car- 


46  ATLANTA. 

ried,  and  the  position  intrenched  under  a  galling  artillery 
and  musketry  fire  from  the  enemy's  principal  lines.  During 
the  evening  Polk  made  a  vigorous  effort  to  retake  the  posi 
tion,  but  was  repulsed,  McPherson  sending  forward  Light- 
burn's  brigade  to  the  support  of  the  troops  already  engaged. 
The  hill  thus  carried  commanded  the  railroad  and  wagon 
bridges  crossing  the  Oostanaula,  and  Johnston,  upon  learn 
ing  of  Folk's  failure  to  retake  the  lost  ground,  ordered  a 
road  to  be  cut  during  the  night,  and  a  pontoon  bridge  to  be 
laid  across  the  river  a  mile  above  the  town,  and  out  of  range 
of  fire. 

Early  in  the  day,  in  pursuance  of  Sherman's  orders,  McPher 
son  had  sent  Sweeny's  division  of  Dodge's  corps  to  Lay's 
Ferry,  with  instructions  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Oostanaula  and  cover  the  laying  of  a  pontoon 
bridge  by  Captain  Reese,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.  Sweeny  moved  to  the  river  and  effected  the  cross 
ing  by  one  brigade,  but  on  a  false  rumor  of  an  attempt  by  the 
enemy  to  cross  above  him,  he  withdrew  to  the  right  bank 
and  retired  a  mile  and  a  half  to  a  less  exposed  position. 
Johnston  received  the  report  of  this  movement  from  Gen 
eral  Martin  of  the  cavalry,  wThose  outposts  had  been  driven 
off,  and  marched  Walker's  division  of  infantry  toward  Cal- 
houn  in  the  night ;  but  this  officer,  finding  the  south  bank 
clear,  reported  the  alarm  a  false  one,  and  was  at  once  re 
called.  Sweeny,  however,  resumed  the  movement  on  the 
morning  of  the  15th,  got  his  whole  division  across  and  in 
trenched,  and  the  bridge  was  laid  with  comparatively  little 
opposition.  The  cavalry  under  Brigadier-General  Kilpat- 
rick  had  been  very  active  and  useful  in  covering  the  flank 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  that  enterprising  officer 
had  been  severely  wounded  in  the  advance  against  Folk's 
lines  in  front  of  Eesaca. 


RESACA.  47 

During  the  morning  of  the  15th  sharp  skirmishing  con 
tinued  along  the  whole  front,  but  the  left  flank  was  that  by 
which  Sherman  intended  to  advance.  Hooker's  whole  corps 
was  in  line,  and  Schofield's  two  divisions  were  withdrawn 
from  the  centre  and  passed  to  the  extreme  left  in  his  sup 
port.  On  the  Confederate  side  Hood  was  reinforced  by 
troops  from  Hardee's  and  Folk's  corps,  and  made  another 
effort  to  swing  his  right  forward.  This  was  shortly  after 
noon.  He  was  met  by  a  simultaneous  advance  from  Hooker. 
Butterfield's  division  drove  back  Hood's  advance  under 
Stevenson,  the  latter  being  unable  to  withdraw  a  battery 
which  had  been  run  forward  to  a  commanding  position. 
The  guns  remained  between  the  armies  till  night,  when  they 
were  taken  and  brought  off  by  a  detachment  of  the  Fifth 
Ohio  under  Colonel  Kilpatrick.  Hooker's  corps  made  a 
strong  line  of  defensive  works  along  its  front,  Schofield 
took  position  on  his  flank  and  rear,  and  everything  was  pre 
pared  for  a  still  closer  investment  on  the  morrow. 

Sherman's  purpose  was  to  contract  and  strengthen  his 
lines  as  much  as  possible,  so  that  a  considerable  part  of  his 
forces  could  be  withdrawn  for  another  flanking  movement 
south  of  the  Oostanaula.  He  had  laid  a  second  pontoon 
bridge  at  Lay's  Ferry,  near  the  mouth  of  Snake  Creek,  and 
Garrard's  cavalry  were  already  operating  toward  Calhoun, 
threatening  Johnston's  railway  line.  Johnston's  position, 
though  a  very  strong  one,  had  the  fatal  defect  of  giving  him 
a  river  at  his  back,  and  a  comparatively  small  force  on  the 
further  bank  would  make  his  investment  complete.  He  saw 
that  he  could  not  safely  make  a  longer  delay,  and  withdrew 
during  the  night  of  the  15th,  burning  the  railroad  bridge 
behind  him.  Folk's  and  Hardee's  corps  crossed  by  the  rail 
road  bridge  and  one  built  on  trestles  near  it,  and  marched 
to  Calhoun.  Hood  crossed  on  the  pontoon  laid  in  the  night 


48  ATLANTA. 

of  the  14th,  and  took  the  road  to  Adairsville   by  Spring 
Place. 

In  the  morning  Sherman  entered  the  town,  and  began  at 
once  the  work  of  repairing  bridges  and  putting  his  columns 
across  the  river.  Davis's  division  of  Palmer's  (Fourteenth) 
corps  was  immediately  sent  to  support  Garrard's  cavalry 
toward  Kome.  McPherson  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Oos- 
tanaula  at  Lay's  Ferry,  Thomas's  Fourth  and  Fourteenth 
Corps  to  cross  at  Kesaca,  Schofield's  Twenty  third  and 
Hooker's  Twentieth  Corps  to  cross  the  Connasauga  at  Fite's 
Ferry  or  Echota,  some  two  miles  above.  Stoneman,  with 
the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  was  on  the  extreme 
left,  and  Kilpatrick's  accompanied  the  central  columns. 


CHAPTER  YL 

FROM  THE  OOSTANAULA  TO  THE  ETOWAH. 

THE  country  south  of  Eesaca  and  between  the  Oostanaula 
and  E to wah  Rivers  is  much  more  open  and  less  broken  than 
any  other  portion  of  Northern  Georgia.  The  Oostanaula 
pursues  a  southwesterly  course  to  Rome,  where  it  is  joined 
by  the  Etowah  running  nearly  due  west,  and  the  two  form 
the  Coosa.  Taking  the  two  rivers  as  sides  of  a  triangle,  the 
third  side  from  Resaca  due  south  would  be  about  thirty 
miles  in  length.  The  railway,  after  crossing  the  river  at 
Resaca,  runs  south  through  Calhoun,  Adairsville,  and  King 
ston,  then  bends  eastward  through  Cassville  and  Carters- 
ville,  and  crosses  the  Etowah  at  Alatoona,  where  a  spur  of 
rugged  and  high  hills  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  is  trav 
ersed  by  a  deep  gorge,  the  famous  Alatoona  Pass.  From 
Kingston  a  branch  of  the  railroad  ran  to  Rome,  but  had  not 
at  that  time  been  built  farther  to  the  southwest. 

Johnston's  opinion  of  the  steadiness  of  the  National  troops 
and  of  Sherman's  ability  to  handle  them  was,  as  he  says, 
higher  than  that  which  Southern  newspaper  editors,  and 
even  the  Richmond  Government  held,  and  he  was  fully  re 
solved  not  to  risk  a  general  engagement  in  a  field  where 
Sherman's  superior  force  could  be  manoeuvred  so  as  to  reach 
his  flanks.  He  sought,  therefore,  for  a  position  in  some 
valley  narrow  enough  to  enable  him  to  rest  either  wing 
upon  commanding  ground  which  could  not  readily  be 
IX.— 3 


50  ATLANTA. 

turned  by  ordinary  field  tactics.  He  halted,  on  the  16th,  a 
mile  or  two  south  of  Calhoun,  in  the  valley  of  Oothcaloga 
Creek,  where  the  roads  on  which  Hardee  and  Hood  were 
moving  were  only  about  a  mile  apart.  Cheatham's  division 
of  Hardee's  corps,  with  Wheeler's  cavalry,  formed  the  rear 
guard. 

The  position  below  Calhoun  was  not  thought  a  good  one, 
but  Johnston's  engineers  reported  that  a  mile  or  two  north 
of  Adairsville  suitable  ground  could  be  found.  Accordingly 
he  marched  on  the  17th  to  the  position  reported,  and  halted 
whilst  a  careful  reconnoissance  was  made.  The  breadth  of 
the  valley  was  again  found  too  great,  and  by  this  time  Sher 
man  was  pressing  him  in  front  with  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  whilst  the  Armies  of  the  Tennessee  and  Ohio  were 
moving  on  his  left  and  right  flanks  respectively,  and  he  gave 
orders  for  a  further  retreat  to  Cassville. 

But  it  will  be  well  to  follow  the  movements  of  the 
National  forces  during  these  two  days  a  little  more  closely. 
Sherman's  calculation,  in  his  march  south  from  Resaca,  was 
that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  his  centre  was  always 
strong  enough  to  hold  Johnston  at  bay  until  one  of  the 
wings  could  attack  his  flank  or  rear.  This  simple  plan  con 
trolled  the  whole  campaign.  The  three  corps  under  Thomas 
pressed  constantly  and  closely  against  the  enemy,  keeping 
him  fully  employed,  whilst  McPherson  and  Schotield  alter 
nately  threatened  to  turn  his  positions. 

Garrard  had  been  ordered  to  move  with  his  cavalry  down 
the  right  bank  of  the  Oostanaula  till  near  Rome,  and  then  to 
operate  with  vigor  on  Johnston's  flank.  After  the  evacua 
tion  of  Resaca,  he  was  further  ordered  to  leave  his  ar 
tillery  at  Farmer's  Bridge,  some  eight  miles  above  Rome,  so 
that  he  might  be  "flying  light,"  and  Davis's  division  was 
detached  from  Thomas,  as  has  been  mentioned,  to  follow 


FROM  THE  OOSTANAULA  TO  THE  ETOWAH.    51 

Garrard,  take  his  artillery,  and  rejoin  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
at  Kingston.  This  threw  that  division  for  the  moment  be 
yond  McPherson  and  the  river,  and  gave  a  very  extended 
front,  apparently,  to  Sherman's  movement. 

McPherson  crossed  the  Ooostanaula  at  the  mouth  of 
Snake  Creek  (Lay's  Ferry)  as  ordered,  and  taking  up  the 
pontoon  bridges  marched  to  the  mill  on  the  Oothcaloga 
Creek,  about  a  mile  southwest  of  Calhoun.  The  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  found  it  slower  work  than  had  been  expected, 
getting  its  large  artillery  train  over  the  bridges  at  Resaca, 
and  the  whole  of  the  16th  was  used  up  in  doing  it.  It 
was  for  this  reason  that  Hooker  was  ordered  to  follow  the 
NewTtown  road  and  cross  the  Oostanaula  in  the  southward 
bend  of  the  river,  near  that  place.  By  some  error  in  trans 
mission  of  orders  his  leading  division  took  Schofield's 
route  instead,  and  crossing  the  Connasauga  between  Resaca 
and  Tilton,  marched  to  the  other  tributary  of  the  Oosta 
naula,  the  Coosawattee,  crossing  it  at  McClure's  Ferry. 

Schofield's  infantry  forded  the  Connasauga  at  Fite's 
Ferry,  the  artillery  and  wagons  being  ferried  over  in  a  small 
flat-boat,  and  Hooker  did  the  same.  The  water  was  waist 
deep,  and  the  men  stripped  naked,  carrying  their  clothes 
and  arms  upon  their  heads,  making  great  sport  at  the  ludi 
crous  appearance  of  the  column.  Neither  of  these  columns 
had  a  pontoon  train,  the  only  ones  with  the  army  being  at 
Resaca  and  Lay's  Ferry.  Schofield  marched  further  up  the 
Coosawattee,  to  Field's  mill.  Owing,  however,  to  the  delay 
caused  by  Hooker's  column  getting  on  the  same  road,  he 
wras  unable  to  get  nearer  to  Field's  than  four  miles.  On  the 
morning  of  the  17th  he  built  a  trestle  foot-bridge  for  his  in 
fantry,  the  Coosawattee  being  too  deep  to  ford,  and  ferried 
the  artillery  and  wagons  in  a  flat-boat.  This  occupied  the 
day,  but  as  the  centre  was  advancing,  Schofield  determined 


52  ATLANTA. 

to  be  in  position  near  Adairsville  in  the  morning,  and 
marched  at  ten  o'clock  at  night,  reaching  Big  Spring  about 
two  in  the  morning,  with  his  advanced  guard  forward  on  the 
Adairsville  road,  that  village  being  about  three  miles  dis 
tant. 

Hooker's  advanced  division  (Geary's)  had  crossed  the 
Coosawattee  at  McClure's,  in  the  night  of  the  16th,  and  rest 
ing  during  the  morning  while  the  rest  of  the  corps  came 
over,  the  whole  moved  at  one  o'clock  by  the  direct  road  to 
ward  Adairsville,  till  they  came  into  close  support  of  How 
ard's  corps  at  the  centre.  The  latter  moved  directly  south 
from  Kesaca  through  Calhoun,  where  lively  skirmishing  be 
gan.  In  the  afternoon,  as  Howard  approached  Adairsville, 
the  resistance  of  the  enemy's  rear-guard  grew  more  deter 
mined.  They  made  temporary  barricades  of  rails  and  logs, 
behind  which  they  fought,  several  lines  being  apparently 
formed,  the  front  when  driven  in  retiring  through  the  next 
line  to  the  rear,  and  so  on.  This  made  the  progress  slow, 
and  at  evening  the  position  was  reached  on  which  Johnston 
had  contemplated  a  decisive  engagement.  Sherman  was 
now  with  Newton's  division  in  the  advance,  and  had  a  nar 
row  escape  from  shots  of  the  enemy's  artillery  as  he  was  re 
connoitring,  the  group  about  him  having  attracted  their 
fire. 

McPherson's  way  diverged  from  Thomas's  as  he  moved 
south,  but  in  the  evening  of  the  17th  he  was  near  diagonal 
roads  leading  direct  upon  Adairsville  and  upon  the  flank  of 
the  position  of  Johnston  north  of  the  town. 

The  appearance  of  things  at  nightfall  made  Sherman  hope 
that  Johnston  would  offer  a  pitched  battle  the  next  day,  and 
that  the  campaign  might  be  at  once  decided.  His  orders 
were  therefore  issued  for  a  concentration  with  that  purpose. 
When  day  broke  on  the  18th,  however,  the  lines  in  front 


FROM  THE  OOSTANAULA  TO  THE  ETOWAH.    53 

were  vacant,  and  the  pursuit  took  a  new  and  somewhat  em 
barrassing  shape.  Johnston  divided  his  forces  at  Adairsville, 
Polk  and  Hood  marching  direct  to  Cassville,  and  Hardee  to 
Kingston.  The  movement  was  so  managed  as  to  leave  the 
impression  that  his  principal  force  had  gone  toward  King 
ston,  and  Thomas  with  two  corps  wras  kept  on  that  road, 
whilst  Hooker  and  Schofield  were  ordered  to  move  toward 
Cassville  direct  from  their  respective  positions. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  railway  makes  a  consider 
able  curve  to  the  east  at  Kingston,  and  as  the  wagon  road 
does  the  same,  it  follows  that  Sherman's  columns  in  moving 
from  Adairsville  diverged  rapidly.  Cassville  was  almost  or 
quite  as  near  as  Kingston,  and  if  Johnston  by  rapid  march 
ing  concentrated  there  whilst  Thomas  and  McPherson  were 
at  the  latter  point,  he  could  easily  turn  upon  Schofield  and 
Hooker  on  his  right,  whilst  Sherman  with  the  larger  part  of 
the  army  was  some  five  or  six  miles  off  on  the  left.  To  add 
to  the  enemy's  chances  of  success,  McPherson,  in  trying  to 
reach  Kingston  by  parallel  roads  on  the  west,  so  as  not  to 
crowd  upon  Thomas,  was  obliged  to  diverge  equally  far  in 
that  direction,  and  in  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  the  National 
army  was  more  scattered  than  at  any  time  since  the  5th, 
when  the  campaign  opened.  Could  Sherman  have  been 
sure  that  Johnston  would  not  cross  the  Etowah  at  Kingston, 
he  would  have  kept  McPherson  on  the  road  to  Adairsville 
according  to  his  first  orders,  pushed  the  whole  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  and  that  of  the  Ohio  straight  on  Cass 
ville,  and  given  McPherson  the  road  from  Adairsville  to 
Kingston.  But  the  maps  of  the  country  were  almost  worth 
less,  and  were  often  misleading  ;  the  inhabitants  were  hos 
tile  and  gave  false  reports,  and  Sherman  thought  the 
"  broad  trail  "  of  Johnston's  army  proved  that  the  whole  had 
followed  the  railroad. 


54  ATLANTA. 

It  was  in  the  hope  of  this  that  Johnston  had  made  his 
plan  in  leaving  Adairsville,  and  so  far  things  seemed  to 
work  as  he  wished.  His  corps  commanders  halted  in 
front  of  Cassville  after  they  had  crossed  Two  Run  Creek,  a 
considerable  stream  at  right  angles  to  the  Adairsville  road, 
which,  after  flowing  past  the  town  to  the  southwest,  turns 
west  and  empties  into  the  Etowah  at  Kingston. 

During  the  18th  Thomas  advanced  from  Adairsville  with 
the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps  to  within  three  miles  of 
Kingston.  Hooker  with  his  Twentieth  Corps  marched  by 
Adairsville  and  out  on  the  direct  Cassville  road  as  far  as 
Spring  Mills,  some  two  or  three  miles  beyond.  Schofield 
continued  his  march  in  the  general  direction  of  Adairsville 
eight  miles,  being  hindered  and  delayed  by  the  cavalry  of 
Stoneman,  which  passed  his  column  under  orders  to  try  to 
break  the  railroad  near  Cartersville. 

The  next  day  Thomas  occupied  Kingston  and  marched 
Howard's  and  Palmer's  corps  eastward  till,  toward  evening, 
after  sharp  skirmishing,  Hardee's  rear  guard  wTas  driven  into 
Cassville.  Hooker  had  also  advanced,  skirmishing  on  his 
road,  and  when  near  its  crossing  of  Two  Run  Creek,  his 
right  formed  connection  with  Howard.  Schofield  moved 
across  country  parallel  to  Hooker,  driving  back  the  cavalry 
which  covered  the  enemy's  flank,  crossed  the  upper  branches 
of  Two  Kun  Creek  north  of  Cassville,  and  before  evening 
the  line  was  complete  and  advanced  close  to  the  enemy's 
works,  which  stretched  along  a  commanding  chain  of  hilln 
back  of  the  town  and  running  nearly  north  and  south. 
McPherson  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  halted  at 
Kingston. 

Johnston  says  it  was  his  intention  to  advance  Hood  and 
Polk  on  the  18th,  in  the  expectation  of  overwhelming  Scho 
field,  at  least,  before  the  centre  and  right  of  Sherman's  army 


FROM  THE  OOSTANAULA  TO  THE  ETOVVAH.        55 

could  come  up.  He  declares  that  he  ordered  Hood  to  move 
in  the  afternoon  by  a  country  road  to  the  north,  then  to 
turn  west  and  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the  advancing  column. 
Polk  was  then  to  advance  against  the  front  of  the  same  force 
by  the  Adairsville  road.  Hood  denies  that  any  combined 
advance  was  planned,  and  says  that  he  asked  permission  to 
move  Hindman's  division  in  the  manner  stated,  but  that  he 
had  proceeded  only  a  little  way  northward  when  he  found 
himself  outflanked  by  the  National  forces  in  motion,  both 
infantry  and  artillery,  and  was  obliged  to  return.  If  the  in 
cident  occurred  on  the  19th  it  would  exactly  correspond 
with  the  advance  of  Schofield  and  Hooker  on  that  evening  ; 
but  it  is  certain  that  none  of  Sherman's  infantry  was  in  the 
position  Hood  indicates  on  the  18th.  Stoneman  was  oper 
ating  in  that  direction  with  cavalry  alone  in  his  efforts  to 
reach  and  cut  the  railway. 

The  19th  had  been  spent  by  the  Confederates  in  making  a 
strong  line  of  intrenchments.  Johnston  issued  a  general 
order  saying  that  the  retreat  had  gone  as  far  as  was  ne 
cessary  for  strategic  purposes,  that  the  time  had  come  for 
trying  conclusions  with  the  National  army  and  he  would 
give  battle  where  he  was.  No  sooner  had  the  left  of 
Sherman's  army  pushed  into  position  and  the  batteries 
opened  fire  than  Hood  and  Polk  protested  against  the  tena- 
bility  of  their  position  on  the  ridge,  a  large  part  of  Polk's 
line  being,  as  they  thought,  enfiladed  by  our  artillery. 
Hood  was  on  Polk's  right  and  Hardee  on  the  left.  A  con 
troversy  arose,  and  Johnston,  putting  upon  his  subordinates 
the  responsibility  of  thwarting  his  plans,  and  unwilling  to 
go  into  battle  under  their  protest,  gave  orders  to  retire  from 
the  place  and  march  through  Cartersville  to  the  Etowah, 
which  was  crossed  the  next  day.  Hood  asserts  that  he 
urged  an  aggressive  concentrated  movement  on  the  day 


56  ATLANTA. 

before,  when  alone  there  was  a  chance  to  take  Sherman  at 
any  disadvantage,  and  blames  strongly  the  strict  defensive  to 
which  Johnston  adhered.  The  only  thing  that  is  certain  in 
the  matter  is  that  their  dissensions  prolonged  the  campaign 
by  postponing  the  decisive  engagement,  as  to  the  result  of 
which  Sherman  was  justly  confident.  So  eager  was  he  to 
bring  on  a  battle  in  the  comparatively  open  country  north 
of  the  Etowah,  that  he  had  ordered  his  subordinates  not  to 
hesitate  to  engage  the  enemy  without  reference  to  supports, 
feeling  sure  that  he  could  at  any  time  concentrate  with 
rapidity  enough  to  secure  the  victory. 

Johnston's  only  chance  of  securing  any  important  advan 
tage  would  have  been  to  have  forced  the  marching  of  Har- 
dee's  corps  on  the  18th  till  he  concentrated  everything  at 
Cassville,  and  then  turn  with  all  his  force  upon  Sherman's 
left  wing.  The  country  between  the  Kingston  and  Cassville 
road  and  the  one  leading  from  Adairsville  to  the  latter  place 
is  a  high  gravelly  plateau,  becoming  rough  and  broken  in 
its  southern  part.  Sherman  would  have  been  obliged  to 
traverse  this  region  to  get  to  the  aid  of  Schofield  and 
Hooker  if  they  had  been  attacked  in  force ;  but  he  had 
every  reason  for  faith  that  his  subordinates  would  be  watch 
ful,  and  by  taking  advantage  of  the  defensible  positions 
everywhere  to  be  found,  could  hold  Johnston  at  bay,  or 
slowly  retreat  by  converging  movements  till  he  could  come 
to  their  assistance.  Although  he  was  in  the  dark,  therefore, 
as  to  the  position  of  Johnston  on  the  18th,  his  apparent 
carelessness  was  a  calculated  audacity,  willing  to  take  some 
risks  for  the  sake  of  tempting  his  adversary  to  a  general 
engagement  with  him  there.  His  despatch  to  Schofield 
late  in  the  evening  of  the  18th  said  :  "If  we  can  bring 
Johnston  to  battle  this  side  of  Etowah  we  must  do  it,  even  at 
the  hazard  of  beginning  battle  with  but  a  part  of  our  forces." 


PROM   THE   OOSTANAULA  TO   THE   ETOWAH.         57 

On  the  20th  Schofield  advanced  Cox's  division  to  Carters- 
ville,  a  rear  guard  of  the  enemy  disputing  the  movement. 
The  Confederates  were  driven  back  without  serious  resistance, 
and  crossed  the  Etowah  River,  burning  the  railroad  bridge  be 
hind  them.  A  show  of  force  was  made  in  the  enemy's  front 
at  this  place,  whilst  Eeilly's  and  Casement's  brigades  of  Cox's 
division  were  sent  several  miles  up  the  river  and  destroyed 
the  important  iron  works  and  other  factories  situated  there. 

We  have  seen  that  Davis's  division  had  been  sent  to  sup 
port  Garrard's  cavalry  in  a  movement  down  the  west  bank  of 
the  Oostanaula,  whilst  the  forward  movement  from  Resaca 
was  taking  place.  His  orders  were  to  find  a  bridge  or  easy 
ford  of  the  Oostanaula,  and  bring  into  the  central  column 
Garrard's  artillery  and  trains,  whilst  the  cavalry,  unencum 
bered,  should  operate  rapidly  against  the  flank  of  Johnston. 
Garrard,  finding  no  bridges  or  satisfactory  crossing,  and 
believing  that  to  continue  on  to  Rome  would  separate  him 
too  far  from  the  head  of  column,  returned  by  the  route 
he  had  travelled  and  crossed  at  Lay's  Ferry.  Davis  deter 
mined  to  continue  on  to  Rome,  and  on  the  18th  took  that 
place  after  a  sharp  engagement,  losing  in  killed  and 
wounded  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  men.  The  town  was 
a  considerable  depot  for  army  supplies,  and  contained  im 
portant  factories  and  the  repair  shops  for  ordnance.  The 
capture  in  supplies  and  material  of  war  was  not  very  great, 
but  the  occupation  of  the  town  was  opportune,  and  by  giv 
ing  a  broad  front  to  Sherman's  movement,  handsomely 
covered  his  principal  columns  and  imposed  upon  the  enemy. 
As  Major- General  F.  P.  Blair  was  at  this  time  at  Decatur, 
Ala.,  moving  to  the  front  with  two  divisions  of  veteran  vol 
unteers  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  he  was  ordered  to 
march  by  way  of  Rome,  and  General  Davis  was  directed  to 
hold  the  place  till  Blair  should  relieve  him. 
3* 


58  ATLANTA. 

Sherman  secured  in  the  vicinity  of  Kingston  two  good 
bridges  over  the  Etowah,  and  being  thus  sure  of  his  ability 
to  deploy  on  the  south  of  that  river,  he  gave  his  army  a  few 
days  of  rest,  during  which  the  railroad  was  repaired  and 
pressed  to  its  utmost  capacity  to  accumulate  supplies  for 
another  advance. 

The  losses  in  the  engagements  about  Dalton,  and  in  the 
battle  of  Besaca  cannot  be  accurately  given,  as  the  system 
of  reports  covered  the  casualties  of  a  month,  in  most  cases, 
instead  of  stating  them  after  each  engagement.  The  bri 
gade  and  division  reports  enable  us  to  approximate  it  only. 
There  were  not  more  than  six  or  eight  hundred  killed  and 
wounded  in  front  of  Dalton.  At  Eesaca  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  lost  about  a  thousand,  the  two  divisions  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  which  were  engaged  lost  nearly  a  thou 
sand,  the  casualties  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  cannot 
be  accurately  given,  but  they  were  fewer  than  in  either  of 
the  other  armies.  A  comparative  view  of  the  losses  on  both 
sides  can  be  better  made  at  a  later  point  in  the  campaign, 
for  the  reason  already  stated. 


CHAPTER  VH. 

FIELD  LIFE-RAILWAY  REPAIRS— MAP-MAKING— MARCH 
ON  DALLAS. 

WHEN  the  movement  of  May  7th  began,  preparation  was 
made  for  four  days  of  extreme  exertion,  and  under  the  im 
perative  orders  of  General  Sherman  all  baggage  had  been 
left  behind.  When  the  four  days'  cooked  rations  were  ex 
hausted,  the  advance  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  was  just 
beginning,  and  an  issue  of  the  most  necessary  supplies  was 
all  that  was  possible.  Till  the  army  reached  the  Etowah 
River  the  same  condition  of  things  existed.  A  tent-fly — a 
single  sheet  of  light  canvas— was  the  only  shelter  for  divi 
sion  and  brigade  headquarters ;  mess-kits  there  were  none, 
and  the  superior  officers  were  even  worse  off  relatively  than 
the  company  officers  and  the  privates.  The  company  pack- 
mule  carried  the  simple  cooking  utensils  and  compact  kit 
which  experience  had  shown  to  be  best  for  the  bivouac ; 
and  the  mule,  driven  by  a  negro  servant,  could  keep  up  with 
the  company,  on  or  off  the  roads,  and  would  not  be  far  at 
the  rear  even  when  the  command  was  under  fire.  The  pri 
vate  soldier  carried  his  shelter-tent  or  rubber  blanket,  and 
he  and  the  comrade  who  was  his  "  partner  "  made  of  the  two 
a  comfortable  protection  from  the  weather.  His  haversack 
contained  his  rations,  his  canteen  and  a  small  tin  coffee-pot 
or  pail  clattered  at  his  belt,  and,  in  half  an  hour  of  halt,  the 
veteran  knew  how  to  prepare  a  wholesome  and  abundant 
meal.  The  ration  of  meat,  bread,  coffee,  and  sugar  was  a 


60  ATLANTA. 

large  one,  and  of  excellent  quality,  and  by  foraging  or  traffic 
extras  could  be  added  to  it  on  the  way. 

The  general  officers  could  not  manage  in  quite  the  same 
simple  style.  From  the  adjutant-general,  the  surgeon,  the 
quartermaster,  the  commissary,  the  ordnance  and  mustering 
officers  regular  statistical  reports  were  required  by  army  regu 
lations,  and  enforced  by  stopping  the  pay  of  delinquent  com 
mands.  At  each  headquarters,  therefore,  a  good  deal  of  busi 
ness  had  to  be  transacted,  and  much  clerical  work  had  to  be 
done  in  the  intervals  of  fighting.  The  order  to  leave  all  bag 
gage  behind  for  four  days  implied  only  a  short  interruption 
of  the  usual  routine,  but  when  it  was,  by  the  circumstances, 
extended  to  nearly  a  month,  it  involved  no  small  trouble 
and  privation.  But  the  weather  at  this  time  was  good,  each 
day  was  full  of  excitement,  the  enemy  was  retreating,  and  it 
would  be  hard  to  find  anywhere  a  merrier  company  than  as 
sembled  each  evening  around  the  headquarters  camp-fires. 
Necessity  was  the  mother  of  invention,  and  at  Cartersville 
the  mess  at  a  division  headquarters  boasted  that,  beginning 
with  nothing,  they  had  accumulated  a  kit  consisting  of  a  tin 
plate,  four  tin  cups  without  handles,  three  round  oyster 
cans  doing  duty  as  cups,  two  sardine  boxes  for  extra  plates, 
and  a  coffee-pot!  Pocket-knives  were  the  only  cutlery 
needed,  and  for  dishes  nothing  could  be  better  than  one  of 
the  solid  crackers  familiarly  known  as  "  hard  tack."  This 
outfit  they  declared  was  luxurious  compared  with  that  of 
the  General-in-Chief. 

Good  weather,  however,  could  not  be  calculated  upon  to 
last  forever.  The  orders  issued  at  the  Etowah  were  to  be 
ready  for  twenty  days'  separation  from  the  railway,  and 
everybody  prepared  for  contingencies  as  fully  as  was  con 
sistent  with  the  utmost  mobility,  and  in  the  best  manner 
that  experience  and  ingenuity  could  devise. 


FIELD   LIFE-MARCH  ON   DALLAS.  61 

The  railway  repairs  of  the  army  were  tinder  the  manage 
ment  of  Colonel  Wright,  a  civil  engineer,  with  a  corps  of 
two  thousand  men.  The  efficiency  and  skill  of  this  branch 
of  the  service  was  beyond  praise.  The  ordinary  wooden 
bridges  of  the  railway  were  reconstructed,  where  destroyed, 
of  a  standard  pattern  of  truss,  of  which  the  parts  were  inter 
changeable,  and  the  prepared  timbers  were  kept  in  stock  at 
safe  points  in  the  rear.  By  this  means  a  bridge  could  be 
renewed  as  if  by  magic,  and  perhaps  nothing  produced 
more  moral  effect  upon  the  enemy  than  hearing  the  whistle 
of  the  locomotives  in  rear  of  our  lines  within  a  few  hours 
after  they  had  received  reports  that  the  railway  had  been 
broken  so  thoroughly  as  to  cause  us  great  delays.  But  the 
triumph  of  energy  and  mechanical  skill  came  when,  as  at 
the  Chattahoochee,  great  trestle  bridges,  hundreds  of  feet 
long,  and  near  a  hundred  high,  were  flung  across  a  chasm 
with  as  little  delay  or  trouble  as  an  ordinary  pioneer  corps 
would  make  in  bridging  a  petty  stream.  The  construction 
corps  and  the  railway  transportation  department,  under 
Colonel  Anderson,  worked  in  complete  accord,  and  at  no 
time  during  the  campaign  was  there  the  slightest  anxiety 
about  supplies,  whilst  a  reduction  of  the  ration  was  veiy 
rare. 

For  instantaneous  communication  between  the  Command 
ing  General  and  his  principal  subordinates  the  military  tele 
graph  was  organized.  A  light  train  of  wagons  carrying 
wires  and  insulators  moved  with  the  headquarters ;  the 
forest  trees  were  used  as  poles ;  an  operator  with  his  instru 
ment  accompanied  each  army  commander,  who  could  thus 
converse  directly  with  the  central  station  and  with  General 
Sherman  himself.  This  was  supplemented  by  the  ordinary 
flag  signals  used  by  the  Signal  Corps,  whose  officers  pushed 
to  the  very  front,  and,  from  any  commanding  hill  or  tree- 


62  ATLANTA. 

top,  waved  their  flags,  conveying  information  or  orders  by 
means  of  a  code  of  cipher  signals,  of  which  the  key  was 
frequently  changed  to  prevent  its  interpretation  by  the 
enemy. 

Another  part  of  the  administration  of  the  army  deserves 
mention  also.  The  topography  of  the  country  was  almost 
unknown.  The  maps  in  common  use  were  erroneous  and 
misleading  to  a  degree  that  was  exasperating.  They  gave 
the  outlines  of  counties,  the  names  of  towns  and  villages, 
and  some  remote  approximation  to  the  courses  of  the  prin 
cipal  streams.  The  smaller  creeks  and  watercourses  were 
drawn  at  random,  as  if  to  fill  up  the  sheet,  and  were  uni 
formly  wrong.  A  few  principal  country  roads  were  laid 
down,  but  so  incorrectly  that  every  attempt  to  calculate  dis 
tances  upon  them  or  between  them  was  sure  to  lead  to 
trouble. 

To  meet  these  difficulties  each  division  commander  was 
ordered  to  detail  a  competent  officer  as  acting  topographer, 
reporting  to  the  engineers  at  corps  and  army  headquarters. 
It  was  the  duty  of  these  officers  to  make  an  itinerary  of 
every  march,  to  sketch  all  roads  and  streams,  hills  and  val 
leys,  woods  and  open  land ;  to  collect  from  citizens  and 
negroes  all  possible  information  as  to  distances,  names  of 
residents  and  the  like  ;  to  accompany  reconnoitring  parties 
and  extend  their  topographical  knowledge  with  diligence 
and  enterprise.  They  were  furnished  with  a  few  portable 
instruments,  always  carried  on  their  persons.  The  informa 
tion  thus  obtained  was  consolidated  and  connected  ;  im 
proved  sketch  maps  of  the  vicinity  of  the  army  were  thus 
made,  and  by  a  simple  photographic  process  they  were  mul 
tiplied  and  distributed  to  the  proper  officers  of  the  com 
mand.  New  editions  were  issued  from  time  to  time,  with 
bulletins  giving  newly  discovered  information,  and  thus  the 


FIELD  LIFE— MARCH  OX  DALLAS.  63 

effort  was  made  to  supply  the  army  with  the  knowledge  vital 
to  its  success. 

The  changes  in  the  relative  strength  of  the  opposing 
armies  had  been  in  Johnston's  favor  during  the  preceding 
part  of  the  campaign.  French's  division  of  infantry  and 
Jackson's  of  cavalry  had  joined  Folk's  corps  at  Adairsville, 
so  that  the  three  Confederate  corps  were  now  full,  and  the 
local  militia  were  being  organized  and  used  to  cover  the 
lines  of  communication  and  perform  duties  which  on  the  Na 
tional  side  required  detachments  from  the  army  in  the  field. 
Johnston's  line  was  being  shortened  whilst  Sherman's  was 
stretching  out.  The  one  was  picking  up  his  detachments, 
the  other  was  constantly  making  new  ones.  From  the  15th 
of  May  for  a  month  the  forces  of  the  two  armies  were  more 
nearly  equal  than  at  any  other  time  in  the  campaign,  and  no 
opportunity  so  favorable  could  again  occur  for  Johnston  to 
make  an  aggressive  movement,  as  he  had  whilst  crossing  the 
open  country  between  the  Oostanaula  and  the  Etowah. 
That  he  did  not  do  so  was  accepted  by  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  National  army  as  proof  that  he  would  not  be  likely  to 
attempt  it  in  the  more  difficult  country  they  were  now  enter 
ing,  and  their  operations  were  carried  on  with  a  confidence 
which  was  in  itself  a  guaranty  of  success. 

The  Besaca  bridge  had  been  rebuilt  in  three  days,  and  on 
the  22d  of  May,  rations  for  twenty  days  had  been  issued  to 
the  divisions.  Kingston  was  announced  as  the  base  of  sup 
plies  until  the  railroad  should  be  reached  again  at  some 
point  south  of  the  Alatoona  Pass,  and  orders  were  issued  for 
a  forward  movement. 

Johnston  had  crossed  the  Etowah  at  the  railway  bridge 
and  occupied  the  high  rocky  hills  facing  northward,  whilst 
he  placed  the  greater  part  of  his  army  a  little  in  rear,  ready 
to  meet  his  opponent  as  soon  as  Sherman's  line  of  advance 


64:  ATLANTA. 

should  be  developed.  The  new  theatre  of  operations  lay 
between  the  Etowah  and  Chattahoochee  rivers,  and  like  the 
last  was  a  strip  of  country  of  which  the  features  were  deter 
mined  by  the  general  trend  of  the  mountain  ranges  pointing 
to  the  southwest.  The  Alatoona  Hills,  Kenesaw  Mountain, 
Pine  and  Lost  Mountains  lay  near  the  line  of  the  railroad 
and  necessarily  formed  the  most  important  strategic  points 
for'both  armies.  The  town  of  Marietta,  just  south  of  Kene 
saw  and  about  midway  between  the  two  rivers,  became  at 
once  Johnston's  new  base  of  supplies,  as  Kingston  was 
Sherman's.  Dallas  is  a  village  lying  nearly  south  of  King 
ston  and  west  of  Marietta,  about  twenty-five  miles  from  the 
first  and  nearly  twenty  miles  from  the  other.  A  line  run 
ning  southwesterly  from  Marietta,  a  little  south  of  Dallas, 
marks  sufficiently  well  the  watershed  of  this  region,  sepa 
rating  the  streams  flowing  north  into  the  Etowah  from  those 
running  south  into  the  Chattahoochee.  For  several  miles 
west  of  the  railroad  the  hills  are  high,  the  mountains,  how 
ever,  standing  out  coinrnandingly  above  them,  giving  to 
Johnston  the  most  admirable  points  of  observation,  from 
which  the  smoke  of  Sherman's  camp  fires  revealed  every 
movement  that  was  made.  Farther  west  the  hills  dimin 
ished,  the  line  of  the  watershed  was  a  rolling  sandy  region, 
and  the  streams,  cutting  their  way  in  pretty  sharp  ravines, 
ran  through  forests  and  thickets  of  the  loblolly  pine,  often 
growing  almost  as  closely  as  a  cane-brake,  and  nearly  im 
penetrable  for  man  or  horse.  The  creeks  form  frequent 
ponds,  called  lagunes  in  the  country,  full  of  quicksands,  in 
which  wagons  or  artillery  were  likely  to  be  hopelessly  mired. 
The  more  important  roads,  besides  the  railway  and  the 
wagon  roads  near  it,  are  those  that  lead  south  from  Kingston 
through  Stilesboro  and  Burnt  Hickory  to  Dallas,  east  from 
Dallas  to  Marietta,  and  east  from  Burnt  Hickory  to  Ack- 


FIELD   LIFE— MARCH   ON   DALLAS.  65 

worth,  a  station  on  the  railway  between  Marietta  and  Ala- 
toona. 

Sherman's  centre  being  at  Kingston,  the  topography  of 
the  country  determined  for  him  his  line  of  march,  which 
was  to  move  southward  to  Dallas,  and  then  east  to  Marietta, 
or  some  other  point  on  the  railroad  near  there. 

There  was  little  danger  that  Johnston  would  meet  him 
near  the  Etowah  in  front  of  Kingston,  for  the  Confederate 
commander  could  not  afford  to  divide  his  army,  and  had  he 
massed  in  front  of  Kingston,  Sherman  would  have  pushed 
his  left  wing  over  the  river  at  Alatoona,  and  seized  at  once 
the  line  of  the  railroad.  This  was  what  would  have  pleased 
Sherman  most,  and  would  have  shortened  the  campaign. 
Johnston  wisely  determined  to  make  the  Pumpkin  Vine  and 
Alatoona  Creeks  the  cover  for  his  front,  and  to  meet  his  op 
ponent  with  strong  entrenched  lines  across  the  Dallas  and 
Marietta  road,  or  that  from  Burnt  Hickory  to  Ackworth,  as 
Sherman  should  choose  either  for  his  principal  line  of  ad 
vance. 

The  fact  that  the  Dallas  and  Marietta  road  followed  very 
nearly  the  line  of  the  watershed  made  it  naturally  the  easier 
one,  and  Sherman  resolved  to  try  for  it,  and  if  he  were  too 
stubbornly  met  there,  to  swing  his  left  flank  forward  by  the 
Burnt  Hickory  and  Ackworth  road,  forcing  Johnston  back 
and  establishing  himself  afresh  upon  the  railway  as  soon  as 
possible.  Accordingly,  on  May  22d,  Sherman  issued  his 
orders  directing  his  centre,  under  Thomas,  to  move  south 
ward  on  parallel  roads  through  Euharlee  and  Stilesboro  on 
Dallas,  excepting  Davis's  division  of  Palmer's  corps,  which, 
being  at  Eome,  was  ordered  to  move  direct  to  Dallas  by 
way  of  Van  Wert.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  keeping 
to  the  right  of  Thomas,  was  to  move  from  near  Kingston 
to  Van  Wert  and  thence  to  Dallas.  Blair's  corps  (the 


66  ATLANTA. 

Seventeenth),  had  not  yet  joined  it,  being  on  the  march 
toward  Rome,  which  it  was  ordered  to  garrison  with  about 
two  thousand  men,  and  then  march  to  Kingston.  The  garri 
soning  of  Kingston,  meanwhile,  and  of  Eesaca  (the  latter 
being  the  principal  depot  of  supplies)  was  left  to  Thomas' 
army  of  the  Cumberland.  Schofield's  Twenty-third  Corps  was 
to  cross  the  Etowah  at  any  point  above  Euharlee,  then  take 
roads  on  the  east  of  those  occupied  by  Thomas,  to  Burnt 
Hickory  and  thence  to  the  left  of  Dallas.  His  cavalry, 
under  Stoneman,  was  ordered  to  cross  still  further  up  the 
Etowah,  and  cover  the  movement  on  that  flank.  Kilpat- 
rick's  division  of  cavalry  was  left  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Etowah  to  cover  that  line.  Garrard  covered  the  movement 
of  the  columns  on  the  right,  and  McCook  the  centre. 

On  the  evening  of  the  22d  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  marched  to  Milam's  Bridge  on  the  Etowah,  where  the 
roads  from  Cassville  and  Cartersville  to  Stilesboro  cross 
the  river.  The  enemy's  cavalry  retreated,  burning  the 
bridge ;  but  Stoneman  was  able  to  cross  by  a  ford  above 
the  mouth  of  Eaccoon  Creek,  and  cover  the  laying  of  two 
pontoon  bridges  on  the  following  morning. 

Early  on  the  23d  McPherson  crossed  on  the  bridge 
which  had  been  secured  at  the  mouth  of  Conasene  Creek. 
Thomas  crossed  Howard's  and  Palmer's  corps  at  the  bridges 
on  the  direct  road  from  Kingston  to  Euharlee ;  but  Hooker, 
instead  of  waiting  his  turn  at  these,  in  accordance  with 
orders,  moved  further  to  the  left  and  crossed  at  Milam's 
Bridge  on  the  pontoons  laid  down  for  Schofield.  When 
the  latter,  therefore,  marching  from  Cartersville,  reached 
the  river,  he  found  both  pontoons  already  occupied,  and  the 
whole  afternoon  was  lost  waiting  for  Hooker  to  cross  and 
get  out  of  the  way.  This  was  a  repetition  of  what  had  oc 
curred  at  the  Oostanaula,  and  was  characteristic  of  Hooker, 


FIELD   LIFE— MARCH   ON  DALLAS.  67 

who  was  apt  to  be  reckless  of  what  interference  he  made 
with  any  plan,  so  that  he  got  a  road  or  a  position  which 
better  suited  him.  By  this  means  he  anticipated  the  rest 
of  the  army  of  the  Cumberland  in  crossing  the  Euharlee 
Creek  toward  Stilesboro,  and  camped  in  the  advance,  fol 
lowed  by  Howard  and  Palmer. 

McCook's  cavalry  advanced  to  Stilesboro,  which  he  found 
occupied  by  the  horsemen  of  the  enemy,  supported  by  in 
fantry,  and  was  unable  to  make  further  progress  before 
night. 

Next  morning  Thomas  ordered  one  division  of  Hooker's 
corps  (Geary's)  to  cross  Raccoon  Creek  on  the  Alatoona  road, 
and  cover  the  way  leading  up  the  creek  till  relieved  by 
Schofield.  The  other  divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps 
marched  through  Stilesboro  to  Burnt  Hickory,  preceded  by 
McCook's  division  of  horse,  which  skirmished  with  the  ene 
my's  cavalry  under  Jackson  as  they  advanced. 

Schofield  crossed  at  Milam's  Bridge  at  daybreak,  fol 
lowed  the  Alatoona  road  till  he  relieved  Geary,  who  rejoined 
his  own  corps.  He  then  marched  up  Richland  Creek  to 
Sligh's  Mills,  at  the  forks  of  the  roads  leading  to  Ackworth 
and  to  Burnt  Hickory.  Stoneman's  cavalry  covered  the  ad 
vance  and  the  flank  toward  Alatoona,  skirmishing  as  he 
went. 

Johnston  was  still,  on  the  evening  of  the  23d,  a  little  un 
certain  whether  Sherman  had  crossed  the  Etowah  with  his 
whole  force,  and  therefore  hesitated  about  his  own  move 
ments,  fearing  to  leave  his  right  flank  weak  till  he  knew 
there  was  no  danger  from  that  quarter.  He  therefore  or 
dered  Wheeler,  who  had  forded  the  Etowah  the  day  before, 
to  push  in  on  Cassville  with  his  division  of  cavalry  and  to 
discover  and  report  what  was  there.  This  was  done  on  the 
24th.  Wheeler  found  that  the  whole  army  had  moved  toward 


68  ATLANTA. 

Kingston,  but  part  of  the  supply  train  was  still  at  Cassville 
with  a  small  train  guard.  By  crossing  several  miles  to  the 
right  he  had  eluded  Kilpatrick  and  made  an  easy  swoop 
upon  the  wagons  and  quartermaster's  men  who  were  thus 
delaying  in  the  rear.  He  claimed  to  have  captured  seventy 
wagons  with  their  teams,  and  a  hundred  and  eighty-two 
prisoners,  besides  burning  some  other  wagons.  He  certainly 
did  some  mischief  through  the  negligence  and  tardiness  of 
those  who  were  in  charge  of  the  trains,  and  who  had  been 
ordered  to  Kingston  as  soon  as  the  infantry  had  moved.  By 
this  time  Johnston  was  getting  reports  from  Jackson's  cav 
alry  toward  Stilesboro,  and  hardly  needed  the  news  from 
Wheeler.  He  now  knew  that  Sherman  was  over  the  Etowah 
and  evidently  pushing  toward  Dallas.  On  the  afternoon  of 
the  23d  he  ordered  Hardee's  corps  to  march  by  New  Hope 
Church  to  the  Stilesboro  and  Dallas  road,  Folk's  corps  to 
move  in  the  same  direction  but  a  little  further  south,  and 
Hood's  corps  was  directed  to  follow  Hardee  the  next  day. 
On  the  25th  the  whole  command  was  in  line.  Hardee's  left 
division  (Bate)  was  placed  across  the  Stilesboro,  Dallas,  and 
Atlanta  road,  south  of  Dallas,  where  it  crosses  over  the 
ridge  which  there  forms  the  watershed  already  referred  to. 
Hood  was  put  upon  the  right,  his  centre  at  New  Hope 
Church,  and  his  line  in  front  of  and  covering  the  road 
leading  from  Dallas  to  Ackworth.  Folk's  corps  constituted 
Johnston's  centre,  but  closed  up  upon  Hood,  leaving  a 
somewhat  thinner  line  between  himself  and  Hardee.  In 
front  of  New  Hope  Church  was  a  valley  wooded  along  the 
road,  but  with  open  fields  a  little  further  to  the  north,  and 
the  stream,  which  is  a  branch  of  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  flows 
northeastwardly  at  that  place,  parallel  to  Hood's  front. 
The  banks  sloped  easily  on  either  side,  and  were  some  fifty 
feet  in  height.  The  whole  of  Johnston's  line  was  admirably 


FIELD   LIFE— MARCH   ON   DALLAS.  G9 

chosen  for  defence,  occupying  as  it  did  a  series  of  ridges 
covered  with  wood  on  their  summits,  but  having  open  val 
leys  in  front,  over  which  attacking  forces  must  advance 
without  shelter.  It  covered  the  roads  leading  from  Dallas 
to  Atlanta,  to  Marietta,  and  to  Ackworth,  as  well  as  those 
passing  near  New  Hope  Church  in  the  same  directions.  He 
says  that  only  a  part  of  Hood's  front  was  protected  by 
breastworks,  and  these  only  of  logs  thrown  hastily  to 
gether;  but  the  reports  of  his  subordinates,  on  which  his 
statement  is  based,  may  properly  be  taken  with  many  grains 
of  allowance.  They  had  intrenched  at  Dalton  and  at 
Kesaca,  at  Adairsville  and  at  Cassville,  and  certainly  noth 
ing  had  occurred  to  increase  their  confidence  as  they  had 
retreated  step  by  step  south  of  the  Etowah.  When  they 
were  forced  to  evacuate  these  lines  a  little  later,  they  were 
found  to  be  of  the  most  solid  character.  They  had  been 
some  hours  in  position,  with  full  opportunity  to  intrench, 
and  it  would  be  every  way  strange  and  contrary  to  their 
already  fixed  habit  if  they  had  not  done  so.  The  circum 
stances,  therefore,  all  sustain  the  reports  of  Hooker's  divi 
sion  commanders  that  they  drove  the  Confederate  advance 
guard  and  skirmishers  within  intrenched  lines.  But  we  are 
anticipating  the  current  of  events. 


CHAPTEE  Yin. 

NEW  HOPE  CHURCH— COMBATS  AT  PICKETT'S  MILL 
AND  BEFORE  DALLAS. 

ON  the  morning  of  Wednesday  the  25th  of  May,  Sher 
man's  extreme  right  under  McPherson  was  near  Van  Wert, 
some  sixteen  miles  north  of  west  from  Dallas,  where  it  had 
struck  into  the  Eome  and  Dallas  road,  and  met  Davis's 
division  of  Palmer's  (Fourteenth)  corps  on  its  way  to  re 
join  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  McPherson  kept  on  by 
the  direct  road,  but  Davis,  to  get  clear  of  his  column,  turned 
east,  tailing  a  by-road  over  the  hills  which  he  found  pass 
able,  and  which  enabled  him  to  rejoin  his  corps  before  even 
ing.  At  the  centre,  Thomas  sent  forward  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  on  several  roads  from  Burnt  Hickory.  The 
corps  of  Palmer  and  Howard  (Fourteenth  and  Fourth) 
made  a  detour  to  the  right  by  country  roads,  intending  to 
reach  the  Van  Wert  and  Dallas  road  three  or  four  miles  out 
from  the  latter  place.  Hooker's  corps  (Twentieth)  took  the 
direct  road  to  Dallas  with  his  centre  division  (Geary's),  But- 
terfield's  and  Williams's  divisions  taking  country  roads  on 
the  left  and  right  respectively. 

The  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  (Twenty-third 
Corps)  was  ordered  to  rest  near  Burnt  Hickory  during  the 
day,  whilst  the  cavalry  under  Stonernan  scoured  the  roads 
to  left  and  front.  Garrard's  cavalry  had  pushed  back  the 
outposts  of  Bate's  division  of  Hardee's  corps  near  to  Dallas 


NEW   HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE   DALLAS. 


71 


the  preceding  evening,  and  camped  at  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek, 
about  three  miles  from  the  town.  McCook's  cavalry,  in 
front  of  Hooker's  column,  had  captured  an  orderly  with  a 
despatch  from  Johnston  to  General  Jackson,  who  commanded 
the  mounted  troops  in  his  front.  The  message  informed 


Bu£nt Hickory  pET3^ 
JMnit  Hickory  ~* 

MCMoriah  Ch. 


Operations  near  New  Hope  Church. 

Jackson  that  the  Confederate  army  was  moving  toward  Dal 
las.  It  was  this  information  that  led  Sherman  to  hold  back 
his  left  a  little,  till  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  could  come 
forward  on  his  right,  and  by  a  partial  wheel,  his  front  would 
be  brought  nearly  parallel  to  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  whilst 


72  ATLANTA. 

he  still  concentrated  toward  Dallas.  When  Geary's  division 
reached  the  Pumpkin  Vine  near  Owen's  Mills,  the  bridge 
was  found  burning,  but  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  driven  off, 
the  fire  put  out,  and  the  bridge  repaired.  The  appearances 
convinced  Hooker  that  the  stronger  force  of  the  enemy  lay 
in  the  direction  of  New  Hope  Church,  and  Geary  was  or 
dered  to  take  the  fork  of  the  road  leading  there.  Ascending 
the  hill  on  the  east  side  of  the  stream  with  his  front  cov 
ered  by  the  Seventh  Ohio  regiment  deployed  as  skirmish 
ers,  Hooker  found  the  infantry  advance  of  Hood's  corps.  It 
consisted  of  the  Thirty-second  and  Fifty-eighth  Alabama 
regiments  and  Austin's  Sharpshooters,  under  command  of 
Colonel  Bush  Jones.  It  had  been  ordered  to  make  a  stub 
born  resistance,  and  did  so  with  such  gallantry  as  to  force 
Geary  to  support  and  extend  his  skirmish  line  greatly,  and 
produced  the  belief  that  he  was  dealing  with  a  larger  force. 
This  sharp  contest  continued  for  half  a  mile  or  more. 
Geary  deployed  Candy's  brigade,  and  repulsed  several  de 
termined  counter-charges  made  by  the  enemy  in  his  front. 
He  had  now  reached  the  ridge  facing  that  on  which  Hood's 
line  was  deployed  in  force,  and  had  driven  the  advanced 
guard  in  upon  Stewart's  division,  to  which  it  belonged.  He 
threw  together  such  logs  as  were  at  hand,  and  made  a 
breastwork  of  them  for  temporary  cover.  At  the  sound  of 
the  firing  Sherman  had  hastened  to  the  front,  and  directed 
Hooker  to  call  in  his  divisions  from  right  and  left,  and  to 
attack  and  develop  the  force  before  him.  Williams  had 
advanced  well  toward  Dallas,  but  being  recalled,  faced 
about  and  crossed  the  creek  at  Owen's  Mills.  He  came  up 
with  Geary  about  five  o'clock,1  marching  left  in  front  so  as 


1  General  Thomas's  report  states  that  Williams  and  Butterfield  joined  Geary 
about  3  P.M.,  but  Geary  says  it  was  five,  and  that  hour  best  agrees  with  the  time 
when  heavy  firing  was  heard  by  Schofield's  column. 


NEW   HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE  DALLAS.  73 

to  enable  him  more  quickly  to  take  position  on  Geary's 
right.  Butterfield  arrived  about  the  same  time ;  the  three 
divisions  were  formed  in  columns  of  brigades  and  moved 
forward  to  the  attack.  They  bravely  assaulted  the  ridge, 
moving  through  a  dense  wood  which  covered  both  slopes  of 
the  intervening  valley.  In  the  midst  of  their  fight  a 
thunder-storm  came  up,  followed  by  a  pouring  rain,  which 
lasted  through  the  night.  The  noise  of  the  storm  mingled 
with  the  roar  of  the  artillery,  but  it  was  the  continuous  rat 
tling  and  volleying  of  the  musketry,  heard  more  than  half 
way  to  Burnt  Hickory,  that  told  the  columns  in  the  rear 
there  was  sharp  work  at  the  front.  Hooker's  columns  as 
saulted  Hood's  position  again  and  again,  each  division  by  a 
brigade  front,  and  the  several  brigades  relieving  each  other 
by  passing  lines  ;  but  the  position  was  too  strong  to  be  car 
ried  by  assault,  and  was  hourly  becoming  stronger.  They 
persisted  in  their  efforts,  however,  till  darkness  shut  down 
on  the  field,  when,  gathering  up  their  dead  and  wounded, 
they  retired  to  the  ridge  behind  them. 

Thomas  was  directed  to  bring  Howard's  corps  (Fourth)  to 
Hooker's  support,  and  by  six  o'clock  Newton's  division  was 
up  and  went  into  position  on  Hooker's  left,  the  rest  of  the 
corps  following  as  fast  as  Hooker's  trains,  which  filled  and 
blocked  the  road,  would  let  them.  They  were  all  on  the 
field  by  morning  and  extended  the  line  still  further  to  the 
left.  Davis's  division  of  Palmer's  corps  (Fourteenth)  was 
coming  over  from  Van  "Wert,  as  we  have  seen,  and  was  or 
dered  forward  on  the  Dallas  road  to  support  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  and  feel  forward  toward  Hooker's  right. 
Baird's  division  was  left  at  Burnt  Hickory  to  protect  the 
trains,  and  Johnson's,  which  could  not  get  over  the  block 
aded  roads  during  the  night,  was  ordered  to  come  up  in  the 
morning,  and  was  then  placed  in  reserve. 
IX. -4 


74  ATLANTA. 

McPherson  hastened  forward  from  Van  Wert  with  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  moving  direct  on  Dallas,  which  he 
reached  early  on  the  26th,  and  took  position  facing  Hardee, 
putting  Davis's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  on  his  left, 
a  gap  of  two  or  three  miles  still  being  between  this  division 
and  the  rest  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  to  which  it  be 
longed.  McPherson1  s  line  was  about  two  miles  in  front  of 
Dallas.  He  placed  Logan's  (Fifteenth)  corps  on  his  right, 
with  its  flank  reaching  across  and  a  little  beyond  the  Villa 
Rica  (Atlanta)  road,  whilst  Dodge's  (Sixteenth)  corps  con 
nected  on  the  right  with  Logan,  and  on  the  left  with  Davis. 
Beyond  Logan,  on  the  extreme  flank  of  the  army,  Garrard's 
cavalry  picketed  the  country,  and  maintained  an  active 
skirmishing  warfare  with  Jackson's  division  of  the  Confed 
erate  horse. 

Schofield  marched  at  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
25th,  upon  getting  news  that  Hooker's  advance  guard  had 
found  the  enemy.  He  left  Hovey's  division  to  cover  and 
protect  the  trains,  and  with  Hascall's  and  Cox's  divisions, 
took,  by  Sherman's  directions,  the  road  from  Sligh's  Mills 
to  Burnt  Hickory,  and  thence  by  the  Dallas  road  to  Owens's 
Mills.  As  he  was  now  getting  in  rear  of  two  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  Hooker's  wagons  were  imped 
ing  everything,  the  progress  was  slow  and  tedious.  The 
storm  came  up  and  the  men  plashed  along  through  the  mire, 
throwing  down  fences  and  marching  in  the  fields,  or  thread 
ing  their  way  among  the  mule  teams  on  the  road.  After 
passing  Burnt  Hickory  the  musketry  firing  was  plainly 
heard,  and  the  column  pushed  along  in  the  drenching  rain 
till  midnight,  when  they  were  still  west  of  Pumpkin  Vine 
Creek.  Halting  the  troops  by  the  roadside,  and  directing 
them  to  bivouac  where  they  were,  Schofield  himself  rode 
forward  to  learn  the  situation  and  receive  further  orders 


NEW   HOPE   CHURCH— BEFORE   DALLAS.  75 

from  Sherman.  The  night  was  utterly  black  in  its  darkness 
and  storm,  and  trying  to  pick  his  way  around  some  wagons, 
his  horse  fell  with  him  into  agulley,  and  he  was  so  severely 
injured  that  he  was  forced  to  relinquish  his  command  for 
several  days.  Orders  were  sent  back  to  the  senior  division 
commander  (Cox)  to  continue  the  march.  Having  had  only 
an  hour's  rest,  the  corps  moved  again  and  reached  the  field 
at  break  of  day. 

Sherman,  who  had  rested  beside  a  log  in  the  woods  dur 
ing  the  night,  himself  met  the  head  of  column  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  and  directed  it  to  move  to  the  left 
toward  Brown's  saw-mill  on  Little  Pumpkin  Vine,  and 
thence  swing  forward  upon  an  extension  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
line.  Cheery  and  undisturbed,  as  if  the  most  ordinary  busi 
ness  were  going  on,  the  General  sat  upon  a  log  and  sketched 
upon  a  leaf  of  his  pocket  memorandum  book  a  map  of  the 
supposed  situation,  for  the  use  of  the  officer  leading  the 
column.  Its  firm  delicate  lines,  and  neat  touches,  even  to 
the  fine  lettering  of  the  names  of  houses  and  roads,  showed 
how  completely  his  nerves  w7ere  unaffected  by  the  night  of 
battle  and  storm,  and  the  map  is  still  preserved  as  a  precious 
memento  of  the  scene.  The  corps  moved  northeast  through 
a  wood  so  tangled  with  undergrowth  that  the  direction  of 
column  could  only  be  kept  by  the  compass  ;  then  advancing 
to  the  right,  the  position  of  Howard's  corps  (Fourth)  was 
reached,  and  forming  on  its  left  the  two  swung  forward  to 
the  right,  reaching  the  open  ground.  They  crossed  Little 
Pumpkin  Vine  Creek  at  the  saw-mill  and  continued  the 
wheeling  movement  until  the  extreme  left  crossed  and  cov 
ered  the  Dallas  and  Alatoona  road.  The  whole  front  of  the 
two  corps  was  along  the  crest  of  a  series  of  hills,  a  narrow 
open  valley  intervening  between  this  wing  and  the  right  of 
the  Confederate  lines.  The  movement  was  made  with  coil- 


76  ATLANTA. 

tinuous  hot  skirmishing,  and  the  hostile  lines  were  at  night 
fall  intrenched  so  close  to  each  other  that  for  several  days  a 
bickering  fire  was  almost  incessant  from  the  breastworks  on 
both  sides,  and  skirmishers  could  only  be  relieved  in  the 
darkness ;  indeed  they  could  only  be  kept  out  at  all  by  mak 
ing  each  man  cover  himself  by  means  of  a  pit,  or  by  help  of 
a  log  or  a  few  fence-rails.  Casualties  were  of  frequent  oc 
currence  within  the  lines ;  and  there  were  openings  between 
the  knolls  across  which  no  mounted  officer  could  ride  with 
out  being  a  target  for  the  enemy's  sharpshooters,  who  were 
constantly  on  the  watch  for  an  opportunity  to  pick  off  who 
ever  came  within  range. 

During  the  26th  a  similar  skirmishing  fight  ranged  along 
the  whole  line.  McPherson  pressed  in  close  to  Hardee's 
works  on  the  extreme  right,  and  found  that  flank  of  the  ene 
my  somewhat  refused,  running  a  little  east  of  south  after 
passing  a  salient  angle  immediately  in  front  of  Dallas. 
Our  superiority  in  numbers  made  it  plain  that  the  intrench- 
ments  could  be  held  with  less  than  the  whole  force,  and  a 
part  of  it  could  be  withdrawn  for  a  flanking  movement. 
Sherman  was  determined  in  his  plan  by  the  fact  that  at  the 
close  of  the  day,  and  at  the  extreme  left,  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  already  covered  the  direct  road  to'  Alatoona ;  and  he 
had  only  to  extend  by  that  flank  to  reopen  communications 
with  the  railroad  south  of  the  Etowah.  He  therefore  directed 
General  Thomas  to  withdraw  Wood's  division  of  Howard's 
(Fourth)  corps  from  the  line,  supplying  its  place  by  the 
greater  extension  of  the  other  divisions,  and  that  it,  sup 
ported  by  Johnson's  division  of  Palmer's  (Fourteenth)  corps 
(which  was  already  in  reserve)  and  by  McLean's  brigade 
from  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  should  make  a  vigorous  effort 
to  turn  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy.  McCook's  cavalry  had 
been  operating  in  that  direction  during  the  day,  and  had  a 


NEW   HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE   DALLAS.  77 

lively  combat  with  part  of  Wheeler's  horse,  in  which  Mc- 
Cook  had  been  the  victor,  inflicting  considerable  loss  and 
capturing  some  fifty  prisoners.  This  affair  and  the  state 
ments  of  prisoners  seemed  to  indicate  that  only  Wheeler's 
cavalry  were  holding  the  enemy's  flank  beyond  the  left  of 
the  Army  of  Ohio. 

During  the  forenoon  of  the  27th,  Wood's  division  was 
drawn  out  and  formed  in  a  column  six  lines  deep,  in  rear  of 
Schofield's  extreme  left.  Passing  northward  on  the  Ala- 
toona  road  beyond  our  lines  it  faced  eastward  and  ad 
vanced.  Its  skirmishers,  however,  soon  developed  a  line  of 
strong  intrenchments  reaching  beyond  its  front,  and  as  the 
orders  to  the  division  were  to  avoid  a  direct  assault  on 
fortified  lines,  it  was  withdrawn  from  the  sight  of  the  ene 
my.  Wood  now  moved  about  a  mile  still  farther  to  the 
left,  his  supports  doing  the  same,  and  he  again  formed, 
Hazen's  brigade  being  in  front  and  facing  nearly  south. 
This  time  the  reconnoissance  by  Generals  Howard  and  Wood 
seemed  to  show  that  they  overlapped  the  Confederate  line, 
and  Howard  determined  to  attack.  Johnson's  division  was 
in  echelon  on  Wood's  left,  Scribner's  brigade  in  front,  and 
was  to  advance  also,  keeping  its  relative  position.  McLean's 
brigade,  the  support  on  the  right,  was  ordered  to  show  itself 
in  an  open  place  in  full  view  of  the  enemy's  works,  to  at 
tract  their  attention  and  draw  their  fire.  When  the  pre 
parations  were  complete,  and  the  troops  had  rested  a  few 
minutes,  the  order  to  advance  to  the  attack  was  given. 
Hazen  led  boldly  forward,  and  the  enemy's  skirmishers 
were  quickly  driven  within  the  works,  which  he  promptly 
assaulted.  His  left  seemed  still  to  outflank  the  position, 
and  it  pushed  forward  confident  of  success.  The  movement 
of  Johnson's  division  still  farther  to  the  left  brought  it  near 
to  Pickett's  Mill  on  a  tributary  of  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  and 


78  ATLANTA. 

the  leading  brigade  (Scribner's)  receiving  a  fire  in  flank 
from  across  the  stream,  halted  and  faced  in  that  direction  to 
protect  itself.  This  left  that  flank  of  Wood  unsupported, 
and  he  too  was  met  with  a  withering  fire  from  that  direc 
tion.  Through  some  mistake  McLean's  movement  on  the 
right  did  not  result  as  expected,  and  Wood's  column  was 
assailed  with  a  furious  cross-fire  of  artillery  and  musketry 
in  front  and  on  both  flanks.  Wood  was  forced  to  retire, 
which  he  did  deliberately,  and  halted  upon  a  ridge  a  little 
in  rear  and  on  the  right ;  Johnson  connected  with  him,  con 
tinuing  the  line,  with  the  left  curving  backward  and  mak 
ing  a  strong  refused  flank  in  the  direction  of  the  mill  and 
the  creek. 

Whilst  this  movement  was  in  progress  a  strong  demon 
stration  was  making  by  Newton's  and  Stanley's  divisions  of 
Howard's  corps,  to  keep  the  enemy  occupied  in  their  front, 
though  no  serious  attack  was  made.  Cox,  temporarily  com 
manding  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  swung  his  left  forward 
as  Wood  advanced.  Hascall's  division,  which  had  been 
refused,  now  straightening  out,  and  the  whole  advanced, 
pivoting  upon  the  right  of  the  corps,  into  a  new  position 
continuous  with  the  advanced  ground  which  Howard  had 
gained,  but  with  a  considerable  gap  between.  McLean  had 
left  Howard's  command  when  the  attack  had  been  aban 
doned,  regarding  his  connection  with  it  as  limited  to  the 
day,  and  his  men  being  without  rations.  Howard,  with 
some  reason,  complained  of  this,  and  McLean's  brigade  was 
jjlaced  by  the  Commandant  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  in 
rear  of  the  gap  in  the  line,  with  orders  to  support  either 
command  in  case  of  need,  and  the  whole  front  was  covered 
by  a  strong  connected  chain  of  skirmishers  and  pickets. 

The  affair  was  a  costly  one,  for  Howard  reported  a  total 
loss  of  about  fifteen  hundred.  The  ground  gained  was 


NEW   HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE   DALLAS.  79 

nevertheless  very  valuable,  for  it  enabled  the  whole  left 
wing  to  swing  forward  so  far  as  to  cover  and  conceal  the 
extension  of  Sherman's  line  toward  the  Ackworth  road,  and 
protected  the  Alatoona  road  upon  which  his  cavalry  were 
operating.  Howard  supposed  that  he  had  brought  off  all 
his  wounded,  but  Johnston  claims  that  seventy  fell  into  his 
hands,  being  concealed  in  a  little  hollow  close  to  the  enemy's 
line,  and  covered  by  the  fire  of  his  troops,  and  that  a  hun 
dred  and  forty  prisoners  were  taken  at  the  same  place. 
This  very  closely  agrees  with  General  Wood's  list  of  missing. 
The  Confederate  accounts  of  the  affair  show  that  what 
Howard  and  Wood  supposed  to  be  the  extremity  of  the 
enemy's  line  was  only  an  angle  of  his  works,  which  there 
made  a  sharply  refused  flank.  Cleburne's  division  had  been 
sent  from  Hardee's  corps  to  reinforce  Johnston's  extreme 
right,  and  on  the  approach  of  Wood's  division,  Cleburne 
moved  out  in  rear,  taking  position  where  Wood,  to  reach 
him,  must  expose  his  right  flank  to  the  fire  of  Hindman's 
division  of  Hood's  corps,  which  held  the  re-entrant  at  the 
angle  referred  to,  where  was  also  a  battery  of  artillery. 
Granberry's  brigade  of  Texans  checked  Hazen  in  front, 
whilst  Wheeler's  dismounted  cavalry  made  the  flank  attack 
upon  Johnson's  division  at  Pickett's  Mill.  This  gave  time 
to  move  other  troops  of  Hood's  around  Cleburne  to  attack 
Wood  on  his  left  flank  also. '  Had  Johnson  noticed  that  he 
was  first  attacked  in  flank  by  cavalry  only,  and  pushed 
Scribner's  brigade  straight  on  in  support  of  Hazen,  whilst 
he  took  care  of  the  horsemen  with  another  brigade  of  his 
division,  the  determined  attack  of  the  Fourth  Corps  men 


1  General  J.  E.  Johnston  in  his  Narrative  says  that  Polk  had  been  transferred 
to  his  right,  and  that  Folk's,  and  not  Hood's  troops  supported  Cleburne.  On  this 
point,  however,  Hood's  circumstantial  statement  seems  the  more  accurate  one, 
and  is  supported  by  other  probable  evidence. 


80  ATLANTA. 

would  probably  have  been  successful.  The  ground,  however, 
was  a  dense  wood  broken  into  ravines,  where  nothing  could 
be  seen,  and  where  the  embarrassments  were  scarcely  less 
than  in  a  night  attack.  Under  the  circumstances  the 
wonder  is,  not  that  the  attack  failed,  it  is  rather  that  Howard 
was  able  to  withdraw  in  order,  carrying  off'  his  wounded ; 
and  that  he  did  so  proves  the  magnificent  steadiness  and 
courage  of  his  officers  and  men. 

The  attack  of  Hooker  at  New  Hope  Church,  and  this  of 
Howard  at  Pickett's  Mill  were  both  made  in  column  of 
brigades  or  demi-brigades.  The  result  in  both  cases  de 
monstrated  that  in  a  difficult  and  wooded  country,  and 
especially  against  intrenched  lines,  the  column  had  little, 
if  any  advantage  over  a  single  line  of  equal  front.  It  could 
not  charge  with  the  ensemble  which  could  give  it  momentum, 
and  its  depth  was  therefore  a  disadvantage,  since  it  ex 
posed  masses  of  men  to  fire  who  were  wholly  unable  to  fire 
in  return.  Since  the  office  of  breastworks  is  to  give  the 
defence  an  advantage  by  holding  the  assailant  under  fire 
from  which  the  defenders  are  covered,  the  relative  strength 
of  the  two  is  so  changed  that  it  is  within  bounds  to  say  that 
such  works  as  were  constantly  built  by  the  contending 
forces  in  Georgia  made  one  man  in  the  trench  fully  equal 
to  three  or  four  in  the  assault.  Each  party  learned  to  act 
upon  this,  and  in  all  the  later  operations  of  the  campaign 
the  commanders  held  their  troops  responsible  for  making 
it  practically  good.  The  boasts,  on  either  side,  that  a  bri 
gade  or  division  repulsed  three  or  four  that  attacked  it, 
must  always  be  read  with  this  understanding.  The  troops 
in  the  works  would  be  proven  to  be  inferior  to  their  assail 
ants  if  they  did  not  repulse  a  force  several  times  greater  than 
their  own. 

From  this  time  till  Hood  succeeded  Johnston  in  command 


NEW  HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE  DALLAS.  81 

of  the  Confederate  forces,  troops  were  almost  never  massed 
for  an  assault  on  either  side.  The  attack  near  Kenesaw  on 
June  27th  is  perhaps  the  only  exception.  The  usual  forma 
tion  was  in  two  lines,  the  second  only  half  as  strong  as  the 
first  and  kept  under  cover  from  fire  till  the  front  line  need 
ed  instant  help.  Coming  up  then  with  a  rush,  it  would 
sometimes  give  the  advance  a  new  impulse  which  would 
carry  it  over  obstacles  that  it  could  not  otherwise  have  sur 
mounted.  On  the  other  hand,  an  attack  in  column  was 
quickly  seen  to  have  only  a  narrow  front,  and  the  right  and 
left  of  the  defensive  line  was  stripped  of  troops  to  strengthen 
the  point  of  danger,  or  to  attack  in  flank  the  advancing 
column.  So  far  was  this  practice  carried  that  a  line  of 
earthworks  was  often  held  by  a  skirmish  line  alone,  with 
such  reserve  of  troops  near  at  hand  as  could  quickly  move  to 
and  fill  the  trench  at  a  menaced  point. 

The  character  of  the  intrenchrnents  changed  by  the  nat 
ural  increase  of  experience  and  the  education  which  it  gave. 
It  did  not  take  long  to  learn  the  advantage  which  cover 
gave,  when  rifled  arms  had  more  than  doubled  the  range  of 
effective  fire.  In  the  open,  a  covered  line  could  be  sure  of 
crippling  an  attacking  force  whilst  it  was  passing  over  eight 
hundred  or  a  thousand  yards,  so  that  its  power  to  harm 
would  be  gone  before  it  reached  the  ditch.  In  the  woods, 
an  abattis  or  entanglement  in  front  of  the  breastwork  pro 
duced  the  same  effect  by  delaying  and  holding  the  enemy 
so  long  under  fire  that  he  was  no  longer  formidable  when 
the  obstruction  was  passed. 

From  the  combat  at  New  Hope  Church  onward,  it  may  be 
said  that  every  advanced  line  on  both  sides  intrenched  itself 
as  soon  as  a  position  was  assumed.  On  our  side  the  prac 
tical  method  was  this.  A  division  having  been  moved  to  a 
place  it  was  expected  to  hold,  the  general  in  command,  by  a 


82  ATLANTA. 

rapid  reconnoissance  of  the  topography,  determined  the 
most  available  line  for  defence,  and  directed  brigade  com 
manders  to  form  their  troops  upon  it,  following  the  outline 
of  the  ground  and  making  such  angles,  salient  or  re-entrant, 
as  it  required.  The  skirmish  line  was  kept  in  front,  the 
rest  stacked  arms  a  few  paces  in  rear  of  the  intended  place 
for  the  breastwork,  intrenching  tools  were  taken  from 
wagons  that  accompanied  the  ammunition  train,  or  were 
carried  by  the  troops  in  the  movement,  and  each  company 
was  ordered  to  cover  its  own  front.  Trees  were  felled  and 
trimmed,  and  the  logs,  often  two  feet  thick,  rolled  into  the 
line.  The  timber  revetment  was  usually  four  feet  high,  and 
the  earth  thrown  from  the  ditch  in  front  varied  in  thickness 
according  to  the  exposure.  When  likely  to  be  subjected  to 
artillery  fire  it  was  from  ten  to  thirteen  feet  thick  at  base, 
and  three  feet  less  on  the  upper  line  of  the  parapet.  Skids 
or  poles,  resting  on  the  top  of  the  revetment  at  right  angles 
to  it,  sustained  a  head-log,  a  horizontal  loophole  for  firing 
under  it  being  about  three  inches  wide.  The  skids,  when 
left  in  place,  served  to  prevent  the  head-log  from  falling 
upon  the  men  in  the  line  if  it  were  knocked  off  by  a  cannon- 
ball.  The  timber  in  front  was  then  slashed  so  as  to  fall  out 
ward,  making  an  entanglement  which  was  too  heavy  for  re 
moval,  and  which  utterly  broke  the  formation  of  any  line 
attempting  to  pass  it.  Indeed,  it  would  be  only  painfully 
and  slowly  that  single  men  could  clamber  through  it.  As 
the  troops  became  familiar  with  the  work,  they  were  able  to 
cover  themselves  with  an  intrenchment  of  this  kind  within 
an  hour  from  the  time  they  stacked  arms. 

Circumstances  would,  of  course,  vary  the  character  of 
these  lines,  and  in  special  cases  the  engineers  would  plan 
particular  works.  The  usual  custom,  however,  was  that 
stated,  and  the  intelligence  of  the  soldiers  was  such  that 


NEW  HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE   DALLAS.  83 

their  eye  for  a  position  was  often  as  quick  and  keen  as 
that  of  any  of  their  officers.  Foreign  officers,  visiting  the 
army,  often  expressed  their  amazement  at  seeing  the  troops 
of  the  line  doing  instantly  and  without  engineering  assist 
ance  what  was  elsewhere  done  by  a  corps  of  sappers  under 
direction  of  the  scientific  staff. 

The  Confederate  troops  were  differently  situated  and  pro 
ceeded  a  little  differently.  Anticipating  the  necessity  of  re 
treating  to  a  new  line,  Johnston  directed  his  Chief  Engineer, 
Colonel  Prestman,  to  prepare  it  beforehand.  It  was  care 
fully  surveyed  and  marked  from  near  Powder  Springs  to 
Lost  Mountain,  thence  to  Pine  Mountain  and  Kenesaw ; 
making  a  curve  facing  the  northwest,  and  six  or  seven  miles 
in  rear  of  the  lines  at  New  Hope  Church.  Still  another  line 
was  afterward  located  in  the  same  way  along  Nickajack  Creek, 
and  yet  others  at  the  Chattahoochee,  Peach  Tree  Creek, 
and  Atlanta.  In  the  construction  of  these  the  Confederate 
engineers  used  the  Georgia  militia  and  impressed  negroes  ; 
and  in  some  respects  they  were  even  more  elaborate  than 
those  built  by  the  National  army.  At  exposed  places  they 
were  covered  by  chevau.x-de-frise,  made  of  logs  pierced  with 
sharpened  spokes,  and  by  sharpened  palisades  along  the 
ditch.  This,  however,  was  exceptional,  and  the  general 
character  of  the  works  was  the  same  on  both  sides.  No  clear 
understanding  of  this  remarkable  campaign  can  be  had,  un 
less  the  difficult  character  of  the  country  and  the  formida 
ble  nature  of  these  artificial  defences  are  remembered.  It 
has  seemed  worth  while  to  anticipate  a  little  in  order  to  give 
an  idea  of  their  construction,  and  to  save  recurrence  to  the 
subject. 

The  fighting  of  three  days  had  fully  developed  Johnston's 
line,  and  proven  to  Sherman  that  the  three  Confederate 
corps  were  all  in  his  front,  with  defensive  works  which  it 


84  ATLANTA. 

was  unwise  to  assault.  He  determined  to  transfer  troops 
from  his  right  to  his  left,  and  by  crowding  in  beyond  John 
ston's  right  flank,  gain  control  of  the  Ackworth  road.  When 
this  should  be  done,  Blair's  (Seventeenth)  corps  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  could  be  moved  from  Home,  which  it  was 
approaching,  and  be  used  to  effect  the  occupation  of  Ala- 
toona  Pass  and  the  rebuilding  of  the  railway  bridge  over 
the  Etowah. 

In  the  extension  of  the  line  to  the  left,  divisions  had  been 
used  wherever  they  were  at  hand,  without  reference  to  corps 
or  army  organizations.  Howard's  corps  was  on  both  sides 
of  Schofield,  and  Johnson's  division  of  Palmer's  was  at  the 
extreme  left,  whilst  Davis  was  with  McPherson  at  the  right, 
several  miles  away.  McPherson  was  therefore  ordered  to 
relieve  Davis,  sending  him  back  to  Thomas,  and  to  take 
ground  farther  to  the  left,  relieving  part  of  Hooker's  corps, 
which  in  its  turn  could  take  the  place  of  Schofield's  (Twenty- 
third),  and  this,  passing  beyond  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land,  would  become  the  extreme  left  flank  again.  Supply 
trains  were  ordered  to  be  concentrated  at  Burnt  Hickory,  so 
that  Baird's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  which  was 
there,  could  protect  them  all,  and  Hovey's  division  of  the 
Twenty-third  could  be  brought  to  the  front. 

It  happened  that  as  McPherson  was  preparing  to  execute 
his  part  of  this  plan,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  Johnston, 
suspecting  that  our  right  was  withdrawing,  had  directed 
Hardee  to  make  a  forced  reconnoissance  of  the  lines  in  his 
front  and  ascertain  if  they  were  still  strongly  held.  Hardee 
ordered  Bate's  division  out  for  this  purpose,  and  the  latter 
formed  his  three  brigades  in  separate  columns.  Bate  ordered 
his  brigade  commanders  to  await  a  given  signal,  which  was 
to  be  given,  it  seems,  by  Armstrong,  whose  brigade  of  cav 
alry,  dismounted,  tried  to  penetrate  between  the  National 


NEW  HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE  DALLAS.  85 

cavalry  and  the  right  flank  of  Logan's  corps.  On  hearing 
the  signal  they  were  to  advance  rapidly  against  the  lines 
before  them.  Armstrong  was  received  with  a  cannonade 
and  fire  of  musketry  so  spirited  that  each  of  the  brigade 
commanders  supposed  that  all  of  the  troops  but  his  own 
were  engaged,  and  ordered  the  assault  of  the  works.  The 
error  cost  them  dear. 

Logan's  corps  was  formed  with  Harrow's  division  on  his 
right,  that  of  Morgan  L.  Smith  in  the  centre,  and  Osterhaus 
on  the  left.  The  road  from  Dallas  to  Marietta  ran  out 
through  the  centre  of  the  corps,  and  the  Villa  Eica  road  on 
the  right.  The  latter  ran  up  a  ridge  curving  toward  the 
south,  and  continued  to  ascend  for  a  considerable  distance 
after  passing  beyond  Logan's  line.  McPherson  had  not 
thought  it  practicable  to  extend  his  flank  far  enough  to  in 
clude  the  highest  crest  of  the  ridge,  and  Bate's  left  brigade 
charged  along  the  line  of  the  road,  coming  down  hill  upon 
Walcutt's  brigade  which  held  that  part  of  Harrow's  line. 
Three  guns  of  the  First  Iowa  battery  had  been  run  out  near 
the  skirmish  line,  and  their  supports  being  driven  back,  the 
guns  were  temporarily  in  the  enemy's  hands,  though  they 
were  unable  to  carry  them  off.  The  assault  was  made  in 
column  of  regiments,  and  was  only  checked  close  to  Wal 
cutt's  breastworks,  by  the  withering  front  and  flank  fire  of 
the  division.  The  combat  raged  for  half  an  hour,  when  the 
enemy  retreated,  having  suffered  terrible  loss.  Similar  at 
tacks  upon  Smith's  and  Osterhauc's  divisions  followed  with 
in  a  few  minutes,  but  they  also  were  repulsed.  The  enemy, 
however,  charged  up  to  Smith's  breastworks  with  the  most 
determined  courage,  and  though  suffering  terribly,  was  not 
driven  back  till  he  had  inflicted  considerable  loss  upon  us, 
some  of  our  bravest  and  best  officers  being  among  the  killed 
and  wounded.  Logan  reports  that  he  buried  over  300  of  the 


86  ATLANTA. 

enemy  in  his  front  and  took  97  prisoners.  He  estimated  the 
whole  of  Hardee's  loss  at  2,000,  which  would  not  be  exces 
sive  if  the  usual  proportion  between  killed  and  wounded  was 
maintained.  The  losses  of  a  Kentucky  brigade,  one  of  the 
assaulting  columns,  wrere  so  great  that  the  memory  of  the 
engagement,  as  one  almost  destructive  to  it,  was  treated  as 
a  cause  of  special  sorrow  by  the  Confederate  officers  and 
soldiers  long  after  the  war.  The  reports  to  Johnston,  how 
ever,  do  not  seem  to  have  been  full,  for  he  speaks  of  Bate's 
loss  as  "  some  three  hundred,  killed  and  wounded." 

To  cover  the  withdrawal  of  Bate's  division,  Hardee  sent 
forward  other  troops,  and  McPherson  reported  the  engage 
ment  as  an  active  one  along  the  whole  extent  of  the  Fif 
teenth  and  Sixteenth  Corps.  Logan's  loss  aggregated  379 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing;  those  of  the  Sixteenth 
Corps  were  not  separately  enumerated  in  the  reports.  In 
the  evening,  after  the  affair  was  over,  McPherson  wrote  to 
Sherman  that  he  regarded  it  impracticable  to  move  that 
night  in  pursuance  of  the  previous  plan,  unless  imperative 
necessity  demanded  it,  and  by  the  direction  of  the  General- 
in-Chief  the  movement  was  delayed  for  a  few  days.  In  the 
interim  the  time  was  improved  by  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  in  preparing  interior  lines  by  means  of  which  they 
were  able  to  withdraw  without  difficulty  when  the  order  was 
finally  given. 

Davis's  division  was  also  unable  to  withdraw  on  the  28th, 
though  he  had,  after  sharp  skirmishing,  put  Mitchell's  bri 
gade  in  a  strong  position  half  way  between  himself  and 
Hooker,  where  he  was  very  useful  in  covering  the  subse 
quent  transfer  of  troops  from  the  right  flank.  The  Confed 
erate  attack  from  Hardee's  corps  was  accompanied  by  strong 
demonstrations  all  along  the  line,  made  by  well-supported 
skirmish  lines,  though  there  was  no  other  serious  attack. 


NEW  HOPE  CHURCH— BEFORE  DALLAS.  87 

The  same  night  Hood's  corps  was  moved  out  from  its  place 
in  line,  and  passed  to  the  rear  beyond  Johnston's  right  flank 
with  the  purpose  of  attacking  Sherman's  extreme  left.  His 
place  was  filled  by  Polk  and  Hardee,  the  whole  Confederate 
army  thus  taking  ground  to  their  right  to  meet  the  parallel 
movement  of  Sherman.  Hood  had  supposed  that  Thomas's 
left  was  over  the  creek  at  Pickett's  Mill,  but,  learning  that 
it  was  not,  he  did  not  pursue  his  march,  and  was  re 
called.  The  hostile  lines  were  so  closely  applied  to  each 
other  that  this  night  movement  was  discovered,  and  all  were 
on  the  alert.  The  night  following  (May  29th)  another  effort 
was  made  against  McPherson,  and  the  alarm  ran  down  the 
whole  line.  Nearly  all  of  Johnston's  batteries  opened  from 
right  to  left,  and  skirmish  lines  were  pushed  up  close  to 
Sherman's  works.  The  night  was  dark,  and  along  the  centre, 
where  the  valley  was  open,  the  flashing  artillery  from  the 
hill-tops  and  the  flying  and  bursting  shells  made  a  magnifi 
cent  spectacle,  but  it  ended  in  display.  It  drew  fire  enough 
from  McPherson  to  prove  that  he  was  still  there,  and  this 
was  probably  all  that  the  enemy  intended  by  it.  Along  the 
rest  of  the  line  the  batteries  responded  and  the  troops  were 
on  the  alert,  but  in  an  hour  or  two  the  noise  subsided,  ex 
cept  that  a  desultory  picket-fire  was  kept  up  till  morning. 

In  the  midst  of  these  incessant  alarms  the  positions  of  the 
corps  were  rectified,  and  those  minor  changes  made  which 
were  necessary  preparations  for  extending  the  National  lines 
eastward  ;  but  the  month  closed  upon  a  situation  substan 
tially  the  same.  Sherman  was  sure  of  being  able  to  transfer 
his  forces  systematically  from  one  flank  to  the  other,  he  was 
ready  to  seize  Alatoona  Pass  with  his  cavalry,  and  a  new 
base  upon  the  railroad  was  practically  secure.  It  had  been 
a  hard  month's  work.  Every  day  had  brought  its  combat, 
and,  in  the  latter  part  of  it,  the  army  had  lived  day  and 


88  ATLANTA. 

night  under  fire.  The  gains  had  been  solid,  however,  and 
the  country  felt  that  the  campaign  was,  so  far,  a  success. 
The  losses  had  been  9,000  in  all  forms,  of  which  less  than 
two  thousand  were  killed,  and  a  large  part  of  the  wounded 
soon  returned  to  the  ranks. 

Johnston  gives  the  number  of  his  killed  during  the  month 
of  May  as  720,  and  his  wounded  as  4,670,  but  this  is  in  his 
infantry  alone.  Add  to  this  the  prisoners  captured  by  the 
National  forces,  which  ought  to  appear  in  his  report  as 
"missing,"  and  which  Sherman  states  at  3,250,  together 
with  his  cavalry  losses,  Wheeler's  420,  and  Jackson's  at 
least  as  many,  and  his  total  loss  amounts  to  9,480.  Hood 
and  Jefferson  Davis  make  a  larger  estimate,  but  the  figures 
given  show  that  his  losses  were  numerically  greater  than 
those  of  the  National  forces,  and,  of  course,  much  larger 
in  proportion  to  the  size  of  his  army. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE    LINES    AROUND    MARIETTA— AFFAIR    AT     GULP'S 
FARM. 

ON  the  1st  of  June,  Stoneman  occupied  Alatoona  with  his 
cavalry,  and,  taking  a  strong  position  in  the  pass,  was  able 
to  cover  the  repair  of  the  railway  from  Kingston  to  the 
Etowah,  which  was  immediately  begun.  The  next  day 
Sherman  resumed  in  earnest  his  flanking  movement  to  the 
left.  McPherson's  Army  of  the  Tennessee  relieved  Hooker's 
corps,  and  with  Davis's  division  occupied  the  whole  line 
which  Hooker  and  Schofield  had  held.  Schofield  having  all 
three  of  the  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  united, 
moved  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Burnt  Church,  at  the  crossing  of 
the  Alatoona  road  with  that  leading  from  Burnt  Hickory  to 
Marietta.  Here  he  formed  the  corps  in  line,  Hovey's  divi 
sion  on  the  right,  Cox's  in  the  centre,  and  Hascall's  on  the  left. 
Hooker's  corps  meanwhile  had  come  up  and  was  in  support 
of  Schofield.  The  latter  then  advanced,  guiding  his  left  by 
the  Marietta  road.  The  movement  was  sharply  contested 
by  the  Confederates,  but  Schofield  pressed  steadily  for 
ward  till  his  centre  division  crossed  Alatoona  Creek  close  to 
the  Dallas  and  Ackworth  road.  Here  he  came  upon  an  in 
trenched  position  of  the  enemy  covering  the  forks  of  the 
road.  The  men  dashed  through  the  creek  in  the  midst  of  a 
furious  thunderstorm,  which  made  it  difficult  to  distinguish 
between  the  discharges  of  the  enemy's  artillery  at  close 
quarters  and  the  rattling  thunder.  The  slope  beyond  was 


90 


ATLANTA. 


THE   LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  91 

wooded,  and  the  fortified  line  was  found  to  be  a  hundred 
and  fifty  yards  beyond  the  top  of  the  bank.  Cox's  division 
was  halted  and  ordered  to  intrench  where  it  was,  facing 
southeasterly.  Hascall's,  which  had  been  left  a  little  in 
rear  by  the  swinging  movement,  advanced  till  it  came  into 
line,  and  intrenched  also.  The  same  was  done  by  Hovey's 
division  on  the  right.  The  movement  had  been  followed  by 
Hooker  in  support,  and  Butterfield's  division  was  placed  in 
echelon  on  Hascall's  left. 

So  dense  had  been  the  wood  through  which  the  centre 
moved  that  skirmishers  two  hundred  feet  in  advance  of  the 
line  could  not  be  seen,  and  the  direction  could  only  be  kept 
by  compass.  Even  then  the  skirmish  line  took  ground  to 
the  left,  and  partly  uncovered  the  front  without  being  aware 
of  it.  The  Division  Commander,  noticing  that  the  dropping 
skirmish  fire  was  ceasing,  spurred  forward  to  see  if  the 
skirmishers  were  in  position.  Crossing  a  little  ravine  he 
was  met  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  picket  at  pistol  range, 
and  Captain  Saunders,  the  Division  Adjutant-General,  fell 
mortally  wounded.  To  wheel,  meet  the  line  and  deploy 
forward  a  fresh  line  of  skirmishers  was  the  work  of  a  mo 
ment;  but  the  incident  proved  how  precarious  and  blind 
all  movements  in  such  a  tangled  wilderness  must  be,  and 
what  constant  risk  there  was  of  accidents  like  that  which 
befell  McPherson  later  in  the  season. 

The  second  line  was  halted  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
stream,  but  the  storm  changed  the  creek  in  half  an  hour 
into  an  unfordable  torrent.  The  knowledge  of  this  gave 
speed  to  the  exertions  of  the  first  line  to  strengthen  their 
breastworks,  and  they  did  so  under  a  galling  fire  of  both 
cannon  and  small  arms.  The  density  of  the  wood  made 
this  but  random  firing  in  the  main,  and  the  position  was 
held  through  the  night  with  comparatively  little  loss. 


92  ATLANTA. 

Whilst  Schofield  and  Hooker  were  thus  advancing  on  the 
extreme  left,  Thomas  threw  forward  Baird's  division  of 
Palmer's  corps  beyond  Pickett's  Mill,  and  Johnson's  (which 
had  bent  back  along  the  creek)  was  swung  out  to  keep  pace 
with  Baird,  so  that  at  the  close  of  the  day  the  whole  line 
had  been  extended  to  the  left  some  three  miles,  and  the  di 
visions  were  intrenched  securely  upon  it. 

The  Confederate  trenches  east  of  Pickett's  Mill  following 
the  commanding  lines  of  the  ground,  ran  nearly  due  east  for 
a  mile  and  then  almost  directly  north  to  the  point  which 
Schofield  had  reached.  One  line  of  this  angle  could  be 
enfiladed  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  the  other  by 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  When  therefore  on  the  following 
day  (June  3d)  Hooker  extended  Geary's  and  Butterfield's 
divisions  along  the  Ackworth  road,  McCook's  cavalry  being 
still  further  east,  Johnston  became  satisfied  that  he  could  no 
longer  hold  the  line  of  New  Hope  Church.  McCook's  and 
Stoneman's  troopers  reached  Ackworth  on  the  3d,  capturing 
a  few  vedettes,  and  finding  the  town  already  abandoned. 
The  same  day  Schofield  transferred  Hovey's  division  to 
his  left,  Hooker's  command  being  still  farther  out  on  that 
flank,  and  the  enemy  abandoned  the  works  in  the  imme 
diate  front  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  falling  back  into  in- 
trenchnients  which  were  the  continuation  of  that  above 
Pickett's  Mill,  and  facing  due  north. 

This  was  only  preparatory  to  abandoning  the  whole  line 
in  front  of  New  Hope  Church,  which  was  done  in  the  night 
of  the  4th,  and  Johnston  retreated  to  the  new  positions 
which  his  engineers  had  selected  between  Lost  Mountain 
and  Brush  Mountain,  two  or  three  miles  north  of  Kenesaw. 
On  this  line,  Pine  Mountain,  a  high,  isolated  hill,  formed  a 
salient  near  the  centre,  but  as  it  was  somewhat  exposed  on 
the  west,  an  advanced  line  was  occupied  southwest  of  it, 


THE   LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  93 

crossing  the  Burnt  Hickory  and  Marietta  road  a  mile  or 
more  north  of  Gilgal  Church.  This  road  crosses,  at  the 
church,  the  so-called  Sandtown  road,  which  from  this  point 
continues  in  a  southerly  direction  to  the  Chattahoochee, 
reaching  the  town  from  which  it  is  named,  and  thence 
going  on  toward  Atlanta. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known  that  Johnston  had  been  manoeu 
vred  out  of  his  position,  Sherman  at  once  took  steps  to 
reach  the  railroad  at  Ackworth.  Schofield  was  ordered  to 
stand  fast,  whilst  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  followed 
Hooker,  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  moved  somewhat  in 
rear  of  both,  until  the  positions  of  June  2d  were  reversed, 
Schofield  becoming  the  right  of  the  whole  army  as  he  had 
before  6een  its  left. 

On  the  evening  of  the  7th  McPherson  had  reached  the 
railroad  in  front  of  Ackworth,  Thomas  was  south  of  him 
with  his  right  on  the  Sandtown  road  ;  and  Schofield  re 
mained  in  his  former  position,  covering  the  transfer  of  the 
hospitals  and  trains  to  the  railroad.  The  weather  was  show 
ery  and  the  roads  were  becoming  very  bad.  This  made  the 
change  of  base  all  the  more  opportune,  for  the  way  from  Kings 
ton  was  long  and  the  mud  deep.  By  driving  beef  cattle  "  on 
the  hoof  "  there  had  been  no  lack  of  rations,  except  of  bread, 
of  which  the  allowance  was  short  in  some  of  the  camps. 

Another  step  in  the  campaign  was  thus  successfully 
taken,  and  the  army  buckled  to  its  work  again  with  un 
bounded  faith  in  its  commander  and  in  itself.  Sherman 
ordered  Blair  to  hasten  forward  from  Kingston  with  the 
Seventeenth  Corps,  saying  he  wanted  "to  go  to  Marietta  on 
Wednesday  or  Thursday."  Several  Wednesdays  were  des 
tined  to  pass  before  Johnston's  skilful  and  obstinate  defence 
should  be  overcome,  but  every  man  in  the  National  army 
felt  that  it  was  only  a  question  of  time.  The  certainty  of 


94  ATLANTA. 

ultimate  success  was  undoubted.  From  the  5th  to  the  9th 
of  June  the  several  corps  were  ploughing  through  the  mud 
toward  the  railroad,  taking  and  rectifying  their  positions  in 
line.  Schofield  kept  one  of  his  divisions  (Cox's)  near  the 
crossing  of  the  Dallas  and  Burnt  Hickory  roads  to  cover  the 
movement  of  the  hospitals  and  trains,  and  new  field  depots 
were  established  for  the  several  commands  as  follows  :  Mc- 
Pherson's  at  Big  Shanty  Station  on  the  railroad,  Thomas's  at 
Ackworth,  and  Schofield's  at  Alatoona.  Pontoons  were  laid 
at  the  Alatoona  crossing  of  the  Etowah,  and  Colonel  Wright 
promised  to  have  the  railway  bridge  rebuilt  by  the  12th. 
Blair  reached  Ackworth  with  his  Seventeenth  Corps  on  the 
8th,  leaving  a  brigade  as  a  garrison  at  Alatoona.  He 
brought  about  nine  thousand  men  in  his  two  divisions,  and 
the  reinforcement  was  almost  exactly  equal  to  Sherman's 
losses  up  to  that  time. 

"When  Johnston  evacuated  his  lines  before  New  Hope 
Church,  the  first  impression  in  the  army  was  that  his  next 
line  would  be  the  Chattahoochee  Eiver,  and  Sherman  shared 
this  belief.  Eeconnoitring  parties  soon  brought  informa 
tion  that  the  enemy  held  Pine  Mountain  and  a  chain  of 
hills  eastward,  and  made  it  plain  that  another  prolonged 
contest  must  be  had  around  the  commanding  spurs  of  the 
mountains  that  covered  Marietta  on  the  north  and  west. 
Alatoona  Pass  was  fortified  under  the  direction  of  Captain 
Poe,  Chief  Engineer,  and  remained  an  important  post  during 
the  rest  of  the  campaign.  Garrard's  division  of  cavalry  was 
ordered  to  report  to  McPherson,  and  to  cover  the  operations 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  left  flank  ;  Stoneman's 
was  already  attached  to  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  covered 
the  extreme  right ;  and  McCook's,  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  picketed  the  rear,  protecting  the  crossing  of  the 
Etowah  and  covering  the  fords  of  that  river. 


THE   LINES   AROUND   MARIETTA.  95 

On  Thursday,  June  10th,  in  accordance  with  orders  issued 
the  evening  before,  the  whole  army  moved  forward,  feeling 
for  the  enemy.  McPherson,  putting  Blair's  corps  on  his 
left,  marched  down  the  Ackworth  and  Marietta  road  through 
the  village  and  station  of  Big  Shanty,  and  found  the  Con 
federates  occupying  Brush  Mountain  in  force.  In  the  deep 
valley  in  front  of  these  heights  runs  Noonday  Creek,  first 
eastwardly  and  then  north  into  the  Etowah.  A  branch  of 
the  same  stream  is  found  behind  Brush  Mountain,  separa 
ting  it  from  the  three  peaked  ridges  of  Kenesaw  and  a  line 
of  hills  east  of  it.  Logan's  and  Dodge's  corps  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  were  on  the  right  of  McPherson,  but  the 
troops  of  this  wing  wrere  kept  a  good  deal  massed,  so  that 
they  might  rapidly  extend  farther  to  the  left  if  circum 
stances  should  make  it  of  advantage  to  do  so. 

Thomas  divided  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  into  three 
columns,  Palmer's  corps  on  his  left,  keeping  connection 
with  McPherson  and  following  the  road  to  Newton's  Mills, 
Howard's  in  the  centre,  and  Hooker's  on  the  right,  mov 
ing  straight  upon  Pine  Mountain.  The  country  in  which 
Thomas  was,  included  the  upper  waters  of  Proctor's  Creek, 
which  takes  its  rise  in  the  highlands  between  Kenesaw  and 
Pine  Mountain,  and  runs  nearly  midway  between  Noonday 
and  Alatoona  Creeks,  all  three  seeking  their  outlets  in  the 
Etowah. 

Schofield  followed  the  general  course  of  Alatoona  Creek, 
marching  from  Mount  Olivet  Church,  on  the  Marietta  road 
toward  Gilgal,  known  in  the  neighborhood  as  Hard  Shell 
Church.  His  Twenty-third  Corps  was  consolidated  into 
two  divisions,  Hovey  having  become  discontented  and  ask 
ing  to  be  relieved.  Hascall's  division  followed  the  road 
southward  from  Kemp's  Mills,  and  Cox,  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  army,  marched  from  Alatoona  Church  by  the 


96  ATLANTA. 

Sandtown  road.  On  this  flank  the  enemy  was  found  in 
position  just  over  Alatoona  Creek,  in  a  line  of  intrench- 
ments  facing  northwest,  about  a  mile  in  front  of  Gilgal 
Church.  Stoneman's  cavalry  reconnoitred  toward  Lost 
Mountain,  where  lines  of  intrenchments  were  also  found, 
though  they  were  not  held  by  infantry. 

Johnston  seeing  the  movement  of  the  National  forces  by 
their  left  flank,  rightly  interpreted  its  meaning,  and  con 
centrated  his  infantry  between  Gilgal  and  Brush  Mountain. 
Hardee's  left  was  at  the  church,  Bate's  division  occupied 
Pine  Mountain  and  constituted  the  right  of  that  corps. 
Folk's  corps  extended  from  that  point  across  the  railway  to 
the  Ackworth  and  Marietta  wagon  road,  where  his  right 
rested,  Noonday  Creek  covering  part  of  his  front.  Hood's 
corps  was  the  Confederate  right,  and  was  massed  behind 
Noonday  Creek  and  along  the  base  of  Brush  Mountain, 
awaiting  events.  Wheeler's  cavalry  covered  the  Confederate 
right,  and  Jackson's  was  on  the  left. 

In  front  of  the  centre  and  left  of  the  National  army  the 
country  was  rough,  almost  mountainous.  On  the  right  it 
was  hilly,  but  less  difficult.  The  Confederate  lines  toward 
the  southwest  followed  the  line  of  the  watershed,  heretofore 
described,  and  could  only  be  approached  by  crossing  the 
ravines,  which  were  generally  parallel  to  Johnston's  front. 
The  general  trend  of  the  mountains  is  continued  in  the 
lower  ridges,  and  the  watercourses  furrowing  their  way  be 
tween  the  hills  find  outlets  to  the  north  or  the  south,  whilst 
the  prevailing  course  of  these  valleys  continues  to  be  nearly 
northeast  and  southwest.  The  country  to  the  east  of  Mari 
etta  was  in  some  respects  the  most  favorable  for  Sherman's 
approach,  and  his  movements  showed  that  he  thought  seri 
ously  of  using  it ;  but  the  line  of  the  railway  from  Kingston 
would  have  been  a  good  deal  exposed,  for  it  ran  parallel  to 


THE  LINES   AROUND   MARIETTA.  97 

tlic  river  for  several  miles,  and  had  the  National  forces  moved 
to  the  east  of  Marietta,  Kingston  and  the  Etowah  with  its 
numerous  fords  would  have  been  nearer  to  Johnston  than  to 
Sherman.  These  considerations  settled  the  question  of 
strategy,  and  determined  the  National  commander  to  oper 
ate  by  his  right  flank. 

Continuous  drenching  rains  and  storms  had  lasted  from 
the  4th  of  the  month,  and  the  roads  were  fast  becoming  im 
passable.  Streams  were  up  and  the  woods  and  fields  so 
soaked  with  water  that  activity  was  impossible.  Singularly, 
too,  the  winds  were  chilling,  even  cold,  blowing  from  the 
east  and  bringing  from  the  ocean  an  endless  succession  of 
pouring  showers.  The  Northern  troops  were  finding  their 
summer  in  Georgia  quite  unlike  their  anticipation  of  the 
"  sunny  South,"  but  waited  patiently,  strengthening  their 
lines  whilst  the  bickering  skirmish  fire  went  on.  On  the 
llth,  the  Etowah  bridge  was  completed,  Colonel  Wright 
having  more  than  made  good  his  promise,  and  the  next  day 
the  whistle  of  the  locomotive  was  heard  at  Big  Shanty, 
notifying  friend  and  foe  that  Sherman's  supplies  were  now 
close  in  rear  of  his  line. 

On  Tuesday,  the  14th,  there  was  a  partial  cessation  of  the 
rain,  and  Sherman  directed  strongly  supported  skirmish 
lines  to  be  advanced,  and  the  whole  front  to  be  moved  as 
close  to  the  enemy's  works  as  possible,  but  without  direct 
assault  of  fortifications  unless  some  specially  favorable 
opportunity  should  occur.  Thomas  pushed  forward  the 
right  of  Palmer's  corps  and  the  left  of  Howard's  into  the  re 
entrant  angle  between  Pine  Mountain  and  the  Confederate 
works  east  of  it,  advancing  until  the  forces  on  the  mountain 
were  in  danger  of  being  quite  separated  from  the  rest  of 
the  line.  The  right  and  left  wings  of  the  army  drove  back 
the  outposts  and  pickets  in  their  front,  and  made  new 
IX.— 5 


98  ATLANTA. 

trenches  for  themselves  close  to  the  enemy.  As  the  high 
points  held  by  the  Confederates  overlooked  the  camps  of 
our  army,  the  artillery  were  ordered  to  open  upon  groups 
which  seemed  to  be  reconnoitering.  It  happened  that 
Johnston  with  Hardee  and  Polk  were  upon  Pine  Mountain 
during  the  movement  of  the  14th,  and  Lieutenant-General 
Polk  was  killed  by  a  cannon-ball  from  one  of  General 
Thomas's  batteries.  The  conference  between  the  Confed 
erate  generals  had  been  at  Hardee's  instance,  as  he  thought 
Bate's  division  in  danger  of  being  cut  off,  and  the  advance 
of  Thomas's  troops  only  confirmed  the  opinion.  During  the 
night  the  position  was  abandoned  and  Bate's  division  placed 
in  reserve.  General  Polk,  a  Tennesseean,  had  been  Bishop 
in  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  before  the  war,  but  he 
had  received  a  military  education  in  early  life,  and  that 
circumstance  led  him  to  tender  his  services  as  a  soldier  to 
the  Confederate  Government.  His  influence  was  large  and 
his  example  influenced  a  multitude  of  followers  in  a  State 
where  Union  sentiments  had  prevailed  down  to  the  actual 
beginning  of  hostilities.  A  cousin  of  a  former  President 
of  the  United  States,  his  position  in  Church  and  State  made 
him  an  important  personage  in  the  Confederacy.  A  higher 
military  rank  was  given  him  than  his  experience  or  abilities 
as  a  soldier  would  alone  have  warranted,  and  it  was  rather 
as  a  citizen  than  as  a  general  that  his  loss  was  severely  felt 
in  the  South.  Loring,  his  senior  division  commander, 
succeeded  temporarily  to  the  corps,  but  General  S.  D.  Lee 
was  soon  after  assigned  to  the  permanent  command. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  Thomas  moved  his  line  for 
ward  beyond  Pine  Mountain.  The  advance  guard  of  the 
enemy  held  the  trenches  connecting  their  principal  lines 
with  Pine  Mountain  and  some  other  detached  works  which 
had  been  made  to  cover  these.  Hooker's  corps  marched 


THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  99 

against  these  works,  and  after  a  sharp  engagement  carried 
them.  He  then  pushed  Geary's  division  against  the  princi 
pal  line,  but  found  it  too  strong,  and  after  a  gallant  effort 
Geary  was  forced  to  retire  with  a  loss  of  several  hundred 
men. 

Meanwhile  Schofield  ordered  Cox's  division  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  to  try  the  works  in  his  front,  supported 
by  Hascall.  A  line  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers  was  driven 
from  a  hill  beyond  Alatoona  Creek  which  proved  an  excel 
lent  position  for  artillery,  a  cross  fire  being  obtained  and 
directed  upon  the  Confederate  intrenchments,  and  under 
cover  of  this  the  division  was  able  to  carry  the  line  with 
comparatively  small  loss,  capturing  a  number  of  prisoners. 
On  this  flank  Johnston's  troops  were  now  driven  back  into 
their  principal  defences  at  Gilgal  Church.  Stoneman's 
cavalry  was  skirmishing  and  advancing  toward  Lost  Moun 
tain,  to  which  the  enemy  still  held  fast. 

Thomas's  centre  and  left  drove  back  Loring's  corps  from  a 
similar  line  of  outworks,  making  more  than  a  mile  of  prog 
ress,  and,  connecting  with  McPherson,  applied  the  National 
line  so  closely  to  that  of  the  enemy  that  there  was  the  same 
constant  and  irritating  skirmish  going  on  which  had  been 
so  marked  near  New  Hope  Church. 

Blair's  freshly  arrived  corps  formed  the  extreme  left  of 
McPherson,  and  simultaneous  with  the  advance  of  the  rest 
of  the  line  on  the  14th,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  moved 
forward.  Force's  brigade  of  Leggett's  division  was  the 
flank  of  the  movement,  and  Force,  pushing  forward  the 
Thirtieth  Illinois  with  a  dashing  charge,  carried  a  spur  of 
the  hills  before  him,  taking  in  reverse  a  long  line  of  in 
trenched  skirmishers  of  Hood's  corps,  and  forcing  the  whole 
to  fall  back  behind  Noonday  Creek.  On  the  15th,  a  divi 
sion  of  Logan's  (Fifteenth)  corps  was  passed  to  the  lef :  of 


100  ATLANTA. 

Blair,  and  the  extreme  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
on  that  side  was  well  lapped  beyond  the  Confederate  right. 

In  the  advance  of  McPherson's  left,  which  immediately 
followed  the  gaining  of  the  hill  by  Force,  his  line  ran  over 
and  captured  the  Fortieth  Alabama  regiment,  320  strong.1 

Johnston's  left  had  now  become  the  weak  part  of  his  line, 
for  his  troops  were  not  numerous  enough  to  enable  him  to 
hold  the  trenches  beyond  Gil  gal  Church  in  any  great  force, 
though  Hardee  made  that  position  very  strong  by  recurving 
his  line  and  making  an  interior  retrenchment  covering  the 
first  on  the  extreme  flank.  Jackson's  cavalry  had  to  be  de 
pended  upon  to  hold  Lost  Mountain,  and  to  guard  the  line 
between  there  and  Gilgal,  and  Stonenian  was  keeping  them 
busy.  On  the  16th,  Schofield  moved  Hascall's  division  to 
his  right,  some  distance  clear  of  the  rest  of  his  line,  and 
then  sharply  advancing  the  left  brigade  of  that  division,  and 
swinging  forward  the  right  of  Cox's  at  the  same  time,  got 
possession  of  high  ground,  from  which  his  artillery  was 
able  to  enfilade  a  good  deal  of  Hardee's  line,  taking  part  of 
it  in  reverse,  and  also  to  sweep  the  road  from  Gilgal  to 
Marietta  for  a  considerable  distance. 

With  his  usual  prudence  and  foresight,  Johnston  had  pre 
pared  for  this  contingency,  by  constructing  in  advance  a 
new  line  of  earth-works  behind  Mud  Creek.  These  trenches 
left  the  old  line  near  Hardee's  right,  and  bending  south 
from  a  high  point  on  the  watershed,  followed  the  east  bank 
of  the  creek  far  enough  to  cross  the  direct  road  from  Mari 
etta  to  New  Hope  Church  by  way  of  Lost  Mountain.  Hardee 
was  drawn  back  into  this  line  on  the  night  of  the  16th.  His 
extreme  left,  by  this  wheel  to  the  rear,  was  retired  about 
three  miles  from  its  former  position. 

Thomas  and  Schofield  were  both  on  the  alert,  and  early 
on  the  next  morning  the  right  wing  of  the  National  army 

1  In  Sherman's  despatches  (Tleport  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War)  this 
regiment  is  said  to  be  the  14th — probably  an  error  in  copying.  The  14th  Alabama 


THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  101 

followed  Hardee  vigorously,  brushing  away  Jackson's  cav 
alry,  which  was  hardly  able  to  retard  the  advance  notice 
ably,  and  only  enlivened  it  by  a  skirmishing  opposition,  the 
noise  of  the  batteries,  as  they  moved  southward  from  hill  to 
hill,  telling  plainly  of  the  advance  of  Sherman's  right  along 
the  Sandtown  road.  Near  Derby's  house  the  road  to  Mari 
etta  was  reached,  and  Schofield  ordered  his  advanced  divi 
sion  (Cox's)  to  take  it  and  try  to  find  the  enemy's  flank. 
The  valley  of  Mud  Creek  was  soon  reached.  The  stream 
flows  nearly  due  south  in  a  deep  valley  which  here  widens 
out,  a  bend  of  the  creek  washing  an  almost  precipitous  cliff, 
on  which  Hardee  had  posted  his  extreme  left  with  batteries 
of  artillery  in  position.  This  fortress  covered  a  mile  or 
more  of  the  open  bottom  land  through  which  the  road  ran ; 
but  between  the  two  hilly  banks  the  erosion  of  the  stream 
had  left  a  bare  rounded  hill  nearly  as  high  as  the  others. 
Schofield's  men  advanced  rapidly  across  the  open  ground  to 
the  protection  of  this  mamelon,  where  the  division  was  de 
ployed  in  two  lines,  and  made  to  lie  down  in  close  support 
of  Cockerill's  battery  of  Ohio  artillery,  which  unlimbered 
just  below  the  crest  that  made  for  them  an  admirable  para 
pet,  over  which  nothing  but  the  muzzles  of  the  guns  were 
visible  from  the  front.  Soon  after  a  battery  from  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps  came  to  the  same  position,  but,  not  taking  the 
precaution  to  use  the  cover  of  the  crest  of  the  hill,  suffered 
so  much  from  the  enemy's  fire  that  it  was  forced  to  with 
draw.  Cockerill  maintained  the  artillery  duel  in  a  most 
brilliant  manner  for  an  hour,  when  he  silenced  the  guns  op 
posed  to  him,  and  the  deployment  of  the  infantry  went  on. 
Hooker's  corps  occupied  the  whole  front  of  Hardee's  left, 
and  Schofield  advancing  Hascall's  division  in  close  support 
of  the  other,  gained  the  crest  between  Mud  Creek  and  Noses 
Creek.  Hardee  drew  back  his  left  flank,  making  a  sharp 

was  in  Lee's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  McPherson's  prisoners,  mostly  taken  by 
Walcutt'e  brigade  of  Harrow's  division,  were  of  the  31st  and  40th  Alabama. 


102  ATLANTA. 

crotchet  in  his  line,  the  angle  being  at  the  fortified  point 
above  described,  and  hung  on  to  his  position  during  the 
next  day. 

In  front  of  Palmer's  and  Howard's  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  the  union  of  Hardee's  new  line  with  the 
old  intrenchments  was  found  to  make  a  salient  angle,  and 
hills  in  front  were  so  situated  that  Thomas's  batteries  might 
succeed  in  getting  an  enfilading  fire  upon  the  faces  of  it. 
Johnston,  therefore,  regarded  it  untenable,  and  Colonel 
Prestman,  his  engineer,  was  already  at  work  on  the  17th, 
tracing  a  new  contour  for  fortifications  destined  to  be  the 
last  of  the  lines  around  Marietta,  though  not  the  last  north 
of  the  Chattahoochee.  He  was  not  allowed  the  opportunity 
to  retire  at  leisure,  however,  for  on  the  18th,  early  in  the 
morning,  upon  indications  that  the  enemy  was  preparing  to 
withdraw,  Howard  threw  forward  Wood's  and  Newton's  divi 
sions,  whose  strongly  supported  line  of  skirmishers  were 
able  by  a  rush  to  carry  the  line  in  their  front,  capturing 
about  fifty  prisoners.  Several  counter-charges  were  made  in 
the  hope  of  regaining  the  line,  but  they  were  repulsed. 
During  the  day  and  night  batteries  were  worked  into  the 
commanding  positions  above  referred  to.  As  soon  as  the 
skirmishers  of  the  two  divisions  had  gained  the  enemy's 
works  in  the  morning,  Harker,  of  Newton's  division,  without 
waiting  for  orders,  deployed  two  regiments  to  hold  and  se 
cure  the  ground  that  was  gained,  and  Howard,  seeing  the 
advantage,  ordered  up  the  whole  of  Newton's  division  in 
their  support.  The  line  thus  carried  was  the  trench  at  and 
near  the  junction  of  the  old  works  with  the  new,  and  wThich 
was  held  by  the  enemy  as  an  advanced  line  before  their 
principal  intrenchments,  in  a  position  they  could  not  afford 
to  abandon  on  account  of  its  relation  to  the  salient  already 
described.  During  the  night,  Newton's  men  made  the  posi- 


THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  103 

tion  strong,  and  before  morning  were  firmly  placed  within 
about  a  hundred  yards  of  the  main  line  in  their  front. 

These  advantages  were  decisive,  and  Johnston  lost  no  time 
in  getting  his  forces  into  the  trenches  which  his  engineer 
had  marked  out  still  closer  to  Marietta.  They  moved  to  the 
rear  during  the  night,  leaving,  as  usual,  a  strong  skirmish 
line  with  supports  to  hold  the  old  works  and  delay  the  ad 
vance  of  the  National  army.  The  key  of  the  new  Confeder 
ate  line  was  Kenesaw  Mountain,  which  is  the  summit  of 
the  watershed,  and  whose  wood-covered  sides,  breaking 
down  into  deep  ravines,  made  an  impregnable  military  posi 
tion,  whilst  its  summit,  overlooking  the  country  in  all  direc 
tions,  made  concealment  of  movements  on  Sherman's  part 
next  to  impossible.  The  railway  coming  from  the  north 
turns  back  to  the  northeast  between  Kenesaw  and  Brush 
Mountain,  till  passing  beyond  the  flank  of  the  former  it 
again  curves  to  the  south,  a  couple  of  miles  north  of  Mari 
etta.  The  mountain  was  occupied  by  Loring's  (formerly 
Folk's)  corps,  French's  division  holding  its  southwestern 
slope  and  part  of  the  crest,  Walthall's  continuing  the  line 
along  the  ridge,  and  Loring's  own  (commanded  by  Feather- 
ston)  reaching  down  the  northeastern  slope  to  the  railroad. 
Hood's  corps  held  the  high  upland  east  of  the  railway, 
looking  down  into  the  branches  of  Noonday  Creek,  which 
skirted  the  eastern  part  of  Brush  Mountain,  and  facing  the 
ridge  of  that  hill.  Hood's  troops  were  not  deployed  as  much 
as  Loring's,  though  their  right  reached  far  enough  eastward 
to  cover  the  Marietta  and  Canton  wagon  road.  The  divi 
sions  were  massed,  ready  to  be  used  promptly  as  a  moving 
column  if  necessary.  Hardee's  corps  was  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  army,  and  his  divisions  from  left  to  right 
were  Cheatham's,  Cleburne's,  Bate's,  and  Walker's,  the 
latter  connecting  with  Loring  at  the  base  of  Kenesaw. 


104  ATLANTA. 

From  the  mountain  southward  his  front  was  covered  by 
Noses  Creek,  now  swollen  to  the  dimensions  of  a  river  by 
the  incessant  rains.  The  road  from  Marietta  to  Lost  Moun 
tain  ran  through  the  intrenchments  near  Hardee's  right, 
and  his  left  rested  on  high  ground  above  a  branch  of  Noses 
Creek,  which  rises  in  the  town.  A  glance  at  the  map  will 
show  that  in  these  retreating  movements  the  contour  of  the 
country  made  it  necessary  for  Johnston  to  retire  his  left 
more  than  his  right,  Hardee  having  swung  backward  six  or 
eight  miles,  whilst  Hood  had  not  needed  to  move  more  than 
two.  The  curve  of  defensive  lines  about  Marietta  had  now 
become  nearly  a  semicircle  facing  the  west,  but  considera 
bly  nearer  the  town  on  the  north.  In  front  of  the  principal 
line  was  even  more  than  the  usual  number  of  lunettes  and  ad 
vanced  works  on  spurs  and  commanding  hills,  and  a  marvel 
lous  industry  had  been  used  in  covering  the  whole  with 
abattis  and  entanglements  of  slashed  forest  trees. 

As  soon  as  the  movement  of  Johnston  was  known,  early  on 
the  19th,  the  centre  and  wings  of  the  National  army  were  all 
in  motion  likewise.  The  pouring  rain  had  not  ceased  since 
the  beginning  of  the  month,  and  the  whole  country  was  a 
quagmire.  Streams  that  were  ordinarily  dry  at  this  season 
of  the  year  were  now  formidable  obstructions.  The 
"  lagunes "  in  the  hollows  were  dangerous  quicksands  in 
which  artillery  and  horses  were  in  peril  of  being  utterly  en 
gulfed.  The  supply  trains  for  Thomas's  right  and  for 
Schofield  toiled  painfully  along  wherever  solid  ground 
could  be  found,  leaving  the  impassable  roads  for  new  tracks, 
which  a  few  trains  made  in  their  turn  impassable,  until  the 
whole  country  between  Alatoona  and  the  centre  and  right  of 
the  army  was  a  wilderness  of  mire  in  which  the  original 
roads  could  not  be  traced. 

The  19th  of  June  was  occupied  in  a  skirmishing  advance, 


THE   LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  105 

driving  the  enemy's  rear  guard  from  the  old  trenches  and 
feeling  the  way  forward  to  new  positions.  The  next  day 
Blair's  corps  was  advanced  strongly  on  McPherson's  left, 
Leggett's  division  being  on  the  extreme  flank.  Force's 
brigade  was  directed  to  occupy  a  hill  somewhat  east  of  the 
direct  line  of  advance,  and  marching  rapidly  forward,  after 
a  brisk  skirmishing  fight  carried  the  crest,  and  found  that 
they  were  overlooking  a  combat  between  Garrard's  cavalry 
and  Wheeler's,  which  was  one  of  the  most  fiercely  contested 
of  the  campaign.  General  Leggett  being  informed  of  this, 
succeeded  in  getting  a  battery  up  the  hill,  and  opening  with 
spherical  case  shot  on  the  Confederate  horsemen,  was  able 
to  give  Garrard  timely  assistance.  But  Leggett's  divergent 
movement  had  carried  him  so  far  to  the  left  and  front  that 
the  other  wing  of  the  corps  took  him  to  be  the  enemy,  and 
opened  with  artillery  upon  him,  till  a  messenger  going  at 
speed  explained  the  mistake,  and  the  firing  was  stopped 
before  serious  mischief  was  done.  Logan's  and  Dodge's 
corps  (Fifteenth  and  Sixteenth)  moved  forward,  keeping 
pace  with  Blair's,  developing  the  enemy's  new  position  on 
Kenesaw,  and  advancing  close  to  them  under  a  hot  fire. 
In  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  Palmer's  corps  was  on  the 
left  and  moved  up  close  to  the  base  of  the  southern  spurs  of 
the  mountain.  Howard  was  on  the  west  bank  of  Noses 
Creek,  his  centre  on  the  road  from  Gilgal  Church  to  Mari 
etta.  In  front  of  Hooker's  corps  the  creek  made  a  consider 
able  bend  to  the  west,  where  the  road  from  Lost  Mountain  to 
Marietta  crosses  it,  and  the  principal  Confederate  lines  being 
farther  from  the  stream,  Geary's  division  had  been  able 
to  cross,  using  a  bridge  which  the  swollen  stream  was  con 
stantly  threatening  to  carry  away.  Butterfield's  and  Wil- 
liams's  followed,  and  the  whole  of  the  corps  took  positions, 
massed  by  brigades  with  the  front  covered  by  skirmishers. 


106  ATLANTA. 

On  the  20th,  Howard  sent  Wood's  division  and  a  brigade 
of  Stanley's  to  relieve  the  left  of  Hooker's  corps  ( Williams' s 
division),  which  in  its  turn  was  moved  to  the  right.  Stanley 
got  his  other  brigades  over  the  creek,  and  in  the  afternoon 
occupied  two  hills  in  his  front.  The  hill  on  the  right  was 
a  bald  knob  and  was  occupied  by  Kirby's  brigade,  but  not 
in  force.  The  other  was  wooded  and  was  quickly  intrenched 
by  Whittaker's  brigade,  and  held  despite  the  vigorous 
efforts  of  the  enemy  to  retake  it.  Kirby  was  not  so  fortu 
nate,  and  his  skirmishers  and  pioneers  were  driven  off. 
During  the  21st,  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
relieved  by  McPherson,  and  the  process  of  taking  ground  to 
the  right  continued.  Palmer's  corps  relieved  the  left  of 
Howard's,  and  Newton's  division  of  the  latter  moved  to  the 
right  and  relieved  part  of  Hooker's,  which  was  "extended 
still  farther  toward  that  flank. 

Howard  determined  to  take  again  and  to  hold  the  bald 
hill  in  front  of  Stanley's  right.  The  left  brigade  of  Wood 
(Nodine's)  was  ordered  to  co-operate  with  Kirby,  and  a  con 
centrated  artillery  fire  was  directed  upon  the  hill  for  half 
an  hour.  The  advance  by  the  two  brigades  was  then  made, 
the  enemy  was  driven  off  with  a  loss  of  some  prisoners,  and 
the  knob  was  intrenched  under  a  hot  fire  from  the  Confed 
erate  batteries  in  front.  Wood  was  enabled  at  the  same 
time  to  march  two  regiments  against  another  height  still  far 
ther  to  the  right  and  front,  which  he  occupied,  thereby 
forcing  the  abandoning  of  a  long  intrenched  skirmish  line 
and  enabling  the  whole  of  the  right  of  Howard's  corps  to 
move  forward  across  an  open  field  several  hundred  yards. 
Hooker's  corps  advanced  at  the  same  time,  occupying  im 
portant  positions  on  hills  upon  Gulp's  farm,  and  connecting 
with  Howard  on  his  left. 

Schofield  had  marched  on  the  19th  along  the   Sandtown 


THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  107 

road  some  three  miles,  meeting  with  no  serious  opposition 
till  his  head  of  column  reached  the  crossing  of  Noses 
Creek.  Here  the  planking  of  the  bridge  was  found  to  be 
removed,  the  stream  was  up  so  that  the  water  was  over 
the  bottom  land  skirting  it,  and  the  enemy's  cavalry  with 
artillery  disputed  the  passage.  The  two  principal  branches 
of  the  creek  unite  before  crossing  the  road  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  now  marching  on,  and  the  road  from  Pow 
der  Springs  Church  to  Marietta  crosses  it  on  a  ridge  just 
beyond  the  creek.  As  the  position  was  about  two  miles 
from  the  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Schofield,  in 
accordance  with  instructions  from  General  Sherman,  made 
no  serious  effort  to  cross  the  stream,  but  kept  the  enemy 
amused  whilst  Stoneman  was  operating  with  his  cavalry 
toward  Powder  Springs.  The  village  of  Powder  Springs 
is  three  or  four  miles  south  of  the  church  of  the  same  name, 
and  the  road  from  Marietta  to  this  village  forks  near  the 
Culp  farm,  the  northern  branch  being  that  which  has  al 
ready  been  mentioned  as  crossing  the  Sandtown  road  just 
south  of  Noses  Creek,  and  the  other  fork  crossing  the  same 
road  a  mile  and  a  half  farther  south  at  Cheney's  farm.  On 
the  20th,  the  enemy  still  showed  a  bold  front  to  Schofield's 
advanced  division  (Cox's),  and  Cameron's  brigade  was  or 
dered  to  make  a  serious  effort  to  cross.  The  creek  being 
unfordable,  and  the  dismantled  bridge  covered  by  artillery 
fire,  the  task  was  a  little  difficult,  but  the  bushes  border 
ing  the  stream  were  filled  with  sharpshooters,  a  battery  was 
advanced  to  a  knoll  close  to  the  creek,  and  under  protection 
of  the  fire  of  both  cannon  and  small  arms,  Colonel  Casement 
of  the  One  Hundred  and  Third  Ohio  succeeded  in  getting 
a  small  party  across,  running  over  on  the  timbers  and 
string-pieces  of  the  bridge.  The  party  being  deployed  and 
advancing  under  cover  of  the  bank  were  able  to  drive  back 


108  ATLANTA. 

the  enemy's  skirmishers  from  the  bridge  head,  and  the  Con 
federate  artillery,  being  overmatched,  drew  back  also. 
The  remainder  of  the  brigade  was  quickly  put  over,  the 
bridge  repaired,  and  the  crest  beyond  was  intrenched. 
The  21st,  the  whole  of  Cox's  division,  was  over  the  creek, 
Hascall's  division  was  moved  up  in  close  support,  send 
ing  pickets  to  the  left  between  the  forks  of  Noses  Creek, 
where  they  connected  with  the  right  of  Hooker's  corps. 
The  Confederate  cavalry  under  Jackson  showed  an  aggres 
sive  disposition  in  the  direction  of  Powder  Springs,  and 
on  word  from  Colonel  Adams,  who  commanded  Stoneinan's 
detachment  on  that  road,  that  he  was  hard  pressed,  a 
regiment  of  infantry  and  a  section  of  artillery  was  sent  from 
Cox's  division  to  his  support.  With  this  help  Stoneman 
drove  back  his  assailants,  but  the  enemy's  activity  indicated 
a  nearer  support  of  his  infantry. 

Johnston  had  begun  to  be  concerned  for  the  Marietta  and 
Powder  Springs  road,  for  Hooker's  right  was  close  to  it,  and 
Schofield's  movements  were  threatening  to  put  him  astride 
of  it.  Hardee  had  stretched  his  lines  quite  as  far  as  was 
safe,  and  the  Confederate  commander  determined  to  move 
the  whole  of  Hood's  corps  from  the  right  to  the  left  flank. 
Ordering  Wheeler  to  show  a  bold  front  and  make  as  strong 
a  fight  with  his  dismounted  cavalry  as  he  could,  Johnston 
left  these,  with  such  help  as  could  be  got  by  stretching 
Loring's  corps  to  the  right,  to  fill  the  trenches  out  of  which 
Hood  was  drawn.  The  movement  was  made  in  the  night  of 
the  21st,  and  by  the  next  morning  Hood  was  upon  the  Pow 
der  Springs  road,  near  Zion  church,  about  a  mile  east  of 
Gulp's  farm.  With  his  characteristic  aggressiveness  he  sig 
nalized  his  appearance  in  front  of  our  right  wing  by  a  fierce 
attack,  which  was  made  with  his  whole  corps,  Hindman's 
and  Stevenson's  divisions  in  front,  supported  by  Stewart. 


THE   LINES   AROUND   MARIETTA.  109 

This  attack  was  not  made,  however,  till  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon,  and  meanwhile  important  changes  had  occurred 
on  the  extreme  right. 

During  the  morning  Schofield  ordered  Cox's  division  to 
inarch  southward  on  the  Sandtown  road,  toward  its  crossing 
of  the  road  from  Marietta  to  Powder  Springs  village,  at 
Cheney's  house.  Hascall's  division  had  directions  to  fol 
low  across  Noses  Creek,  turn  to  the  left  on  the  road  from 
Powder  Springs  Church  to  Marietta,  and  go  into  position  on 
Hooker's  right,  near  Gulp's.  Hascall  was  in  his  appointed 
place  about  noon,  and  Cox  had  reached  the  forks  of  the  road 
at  Cheney's,  which  he  found  to  be  in  rear  of  commanding 
ground  overlooking  the  crossing  of  Olley's  Creek,  the  next 
of  the  nearly  parallel  streams  flowing  southwest  from  the 
plateau  at  Marietta.  Reilly's  brigade  was  moved  forward  to 
the  heights  bordering  this  valley,  and  the  other  three  bri 
gades  of  the  division  (which  was  a  large  one)  were  arranged 
to  cover  well  both  flanks  and  rear,  as  the  position  was  iso 
lated. 

Hooker's  corps  front  consisted  of  Geary's  division  on  the 
left  and  Williams's  on  the  right.  Butterfield's  was  in  line 
with  Howard's  corps  further  to  the  left.  At  Geary's  right 
was  an  eminence  facing  open  fields,  partly  in  front  of  Wil 
liams,  and  this  right  was  strongly  intrenched  and  held  by 
well-supported  artillery.  It  had  been  occupied  only  a  little 
before,  for  Hooker  had  swung  his  whole  command  forward 
at  the  same  time  that  Schofield  advanced  on  his  flank,  and 
the  new  positions  had  barely  been  assumed  when  the  storm 
Hood  was  preparing  burst  upon  them.  Williams  had  ad 
vanced  with  his  division  massed  by  brigades,  Kobinson's 
on  the  left,  Knipe's  in  the  centre,  and  Kuger  on  the  right, 
reaching  to  the  Marietta  road  at  Gulp's,  where  connection 
was  made  with  Hascall's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 


110  ATLANTA. 

Eavines  with  small  marshy  brooks  ran  down  between  Geary 
and  Williams  into  Noses  Creek  behind  them,  and  there  were 
similar  depressions  between  Williams's  brigades.  The  Mari 
etta  road  was  on  the  ridge,  and  Hascall's  division  was  over 
it  to  the  south,  his  right  facing  the  valley  of  Olley's  Creek 
and  covering  the  road  from  Gulp's  to  Cheney's,  where  Cox's 
division  was,  though  with  a  gap  of  nearly  two  miles  be 
tween. 

In  the  sharp  skirmishing  which  had  accompanied  these 
movements,  some  prisoners  had  been  taken,  and  these  were 
found  to  belong  to  Hood's  corps,  and  reported  both  Hood 
and  Hardee  prepared  to  attack.  Hooker  immediately  or 
dered  Williams  to  deploy  the  whole  division  and  throw  up 
breastworks  at  once.  Schofield  gave  the  same  orders  to 
Hascall.  The  deployment  was  just  completed,  and  a  begin 
ning  made  in  throwing  up  breastworks,  when  Hood  advanced 
with  his  usual  impetuosity.  The  conformation  of  the  ground 
gave  Williams  a  convex  front,  his  centre  brigade  being  in 
advance  of  the  others.  The  same  circumstance  made  Hood's 
advance  somewhat  divergent,  his  right  division  (Hindman's) 
striking  the  centre  of  Williams  and  the  right  of  Geary, 
whilst  his  left  (Stevenson's)  attacked  Hascall's  division  of 
Twenty-third  Corps,  on  the  south  side  of  the  Marietta  road. 
Knipe's  brigade  maintained  its  ground,  but  the  enemy  gained 
some  advantage  in  the  hollow  between  Williams  and  Geary ; 
but  this  only  brought  him  into  open  ground.  From  the  hill 
on  Geary's  right  the  Thirteenth  New  York  Artillery  opened 
a  rapid  fire  on  the  charging  lines.  Winegar's  battery  of 
three-inch  rifles,  and  Woodbury's  of  light  twelves  joined  in 
the  cannonade  from  Williams's  left  and  front,  and  the  con 
verging  fire  of  canister  and  case  shot  played  havoc  with  the 
exposed  enemy.  Williams's  and  Geary's  lines  were  re 
formed,  and  after  the  exchange  of  a  few  volleys  of  mus- 


THE  LINES  AROUND   MARIETTA.  HI 

ketry,  the  repulse  of  the  Confederates  was  complete  and 
they  retreated  to  their  intrenchments.  When  the  attack 
was  made,  Hooker  called  upon  Howard  for  Butterfield's 
division.  It  was  so  placed  in  the  trenches  that  it  could  not 
be  instantly  relieved ;  but  Howard  sent  reinforcements  of 
such  regiments  as  were  in  reserve,  and  relieved  Butterfield 
and  sent  him  to  Hooker  early  in  the  night.  As  Williams's 
division  connected  with  Hascall's  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
Butterfield  was  put  in  reserve. 

The  ground  along  the  Marietta  road  was  thickly  wooded, 
and  Hood's  left,  passing  quite  by  Euger's  brigade,  came  in 
contact  with  Hascall's  division. 

Hascall  had  gone  into  position  on  the  right  of  Hooker,  and 
upon  the  continuation  of  the  ridge  held  by  him,  and  was,  as 
we  have  seen,  covering  both  the  road  upon  which  he  had 
marched  and  one  which,  branching  from  it,  ran  directly  to 
Cox's  position  at  Cheney's.  The  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  therefore  occupied  two  angles  of  a  triangle 
formed  by  the  diverging  roads  upon  which  they  had  travelled 
and  that  which  connected  them  in  the  manner  just  stated. 
Hascall  found,  however,  that  a  ridge  just  in  front  of  him  was 
a  desirable  position  to  hold,  and  would  soon  be  needed  for 
a  new  line  when  an  advance  should  be  made.  He  therefore 
ordered  his  skirmish  line,  supported  by  Colonel  Gallup's 
Fourteenth  Kentucky  Regiment  to  advance  and  occupy  it. 
His  three  brigades,  Strickland's,  McQuiston's,  and  Hobson's, 
began  throwing  up  breastworks  on  the  main  line.  Gallup 
captured  some  prisoners  in  his  advance,  and  learned  from 
them  that  Hood's  corps  had  just  come  from  the  enemy's  ex 
treme  right  and  was  preparing  to  assault.  He  reported  the 
fact  to  Hascall,  with  whom  Schofield  was  in  person.  The 
news  was  immediately  followed  by  the  attack ;  but  Gallup 
had  succeeded  already  in  making  a  sliglit-  barricade,  and  for 


112  ATLANTA. 

some  time  resisted  obstinately  the  Confederate  onset,  which 
was  made  by  part  of  Stevenson's  division.  He  had  been 
ordered  to  retire  to  the  principal  line  when  hard  pressed, 
but  stimulated  by  the  terrible  effect  of  their  own  volleys 
upon  the  advancing  enemy,  and  not  realizing  that  his  flanks 
would  soon  be  turned,  his  men  held  on  till  peremptory 
orders  were  given  him  to  retire.  He  then  came  back  in  good 
order,  the  enemy  following,  and  nearly  sixty  Confederate 
dead  still  lying  on  that  part  of  the  field  the  next  day,  at 
tested  the  gallantry  with  which  this  little  advanced  guard 
had  done  their  duty.  As  soon  as  Gallup  was  within  the 
lines,  Shields's  and  Paddock's  batteries,  which  had  been 
placed  in  well-selected  positions,  opened  with  canister  upon 
the  Confederate  lines,  and  with  the  fire  from  the  breastworks 
soon  cleared  the  front. 

But  Hood's  attacks  had  been  so  determined  and  persistent 
that,  at  half  past  four,  Schofield  ordered  Cox  to  leave  but  one 
brigade  in  front  of  Cheney's,  and  with  the  rest  of  his  division 
move  by  the  direct  road  from  Cheney's  to  Gulp's,  to  Hascall's 
support.  This  was  promptly  done,  but  by  the  time  the 
march  could  be  made,  the  brunt  of  the  attack  on  that  front 
wras  over.  The  three  brigades  of  that  division  were  put  in 
the  line,  however,  with  the  right  refused,  covering  the  open 
ground  in  the  valley  of  Olley's  Creek,  and  extending  pickets 
and  patrols  to  watch  the  interval  of  a  mile  still  remaining 
between  them  and  the  brigade  of  Eeilly  on  the  far  right  and 
front. 

Johnston  admitted  a  loss  of  "  about  a  thousand  "  in  this 
combat,  which  seems  to  have  been  made  by  Hood  upon  his 
own  responsibility.  He  evidently  hoped  that  he  could  out 
flank  the  National  army  on  that  side,  and  by  catching  them 
in  motion  by  columns,  could  gain  some  decided  advantage. 
That  he  was  disappointed  does  not  detract  from  the  good 


THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  H3 

generalship  of  the  effort.  He  had  moved  by  an  interior  line 
from  the  front  of  McPherson,  Hardee  had  been  able  to  ex 
tend  his  line  as  far  as  Hooker  up  to  the  day  before,  and  on 
every  theory  of  probabilities  he  had  the  right  to  calculate 
upon  finding  an  inferior  force  in  his  immediate  front  on  that 
flank.  The  extension  of  our  own  lines  in  the  same  direction, 
which  has  been  detailed,  upset  his  calculations.  He  found 
at  every  point  an  array  of  men  every  way  equal  to  his  own  in 
courage  and  self-reliance,  and  handled  with  intelligent  skill ; 
and  he  withdrew  his  battered  divisions,  covering  his  defeat 
as  well  as  he  could  by  a  report  which  tried  to  diminish  the 
importance  of  the  engagement. 

Williams  reported  a  loss  of  only  130  men,  Geary's  was 
trifling,  and  Hascall's  about  the  same  as  Williams's.  The 
affair  throws  instructive  light  also  on  the  relations  of  attack 
and  defence  in  such  a  country  as  that  in  which  operations 
were  going  on.  The  weight  of  the  attack  on  the  north  of 
the  road  fell  upon  Knipe's  brigade,  and  there  was  hardly  a 
score  of  casualties  in  the  rest  of  the  division.  So  on  the 
south  of  the  road,  Hascall's  left,  which  was  the  most  ad 
vanced,  had  sustained  a  fierce  and  determined  attack,  and 
the  rest  of  the  division  was  able  to  inflict  great  loss  by  a 
flanking  fire  upon  the  enemy  whilst  suffering  very  little  in 
return.  It  would  be  in  strict  accordance  with  the  style  of 
the  Confederate  reports  of  similar  affairs  to  say  that  Hood's 
corps  attacked  two  brigades  and  were  defeated.  The  truth, 
however,  is  that  in  every  such  attack  in  country  where  the 
whole  field  is  not  visible,  the  obstinate  defence  of  any 
salient  position  checks  a  whole  line,  or  makes  its  momen 
tum  so  weak  as  to  be  easily  stopped.  The  fear  of  being 
themselves  taken  in  flank  produces  great  caution  when  of 
ficers  and  men  hear  sharp  fighting  in  rear  of  a  point  they 
have  reached,  especially  in  a  thick  wood.  In  such  circum- 


114  ATLANTA. 

stances  they  rarely  go  far  after  their  connections  with  lines 
right  and  left  of  them  have  been  broken.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  advanced  brigade  which  holds  its  defensive  posi 
tion  is  strengthened  by  the  consciousness  of  strong  cover 
for  its  flanks.  This  reciprocal  support  is  a  large  element  in 
the  chances  of  battle,  and  it  is  every  way  fairer,  in  such 
cases,  to  consider  the  forces  of  both  attack  and  defence  with 
reference  to  the  whole  numbers  within  supporting  distance 
on  both  sides. 

During  the  evening  after  the  engagement,  and  acting  upon 
second-hand  information  from  prisoners  (to  which  Geary  also 
refers  in  his  report),  Hooker  reported  to  General  Sherman 
that  he  had  been  attacked  by  three  corps,  but  had  repulsed 
them,  and  was  only  anxious  about  his  right  flank.  The 
General-in-Chief,  who  had  been  near  the  centre  of  the  whole 
line,  at  his  signal  station,  was  concerned  lest  Schofield  had 
not  fully  met  the  spirit  of  his  instructions,  and  next  morn 
ing  went  in  person  to  the  little  church  in  the  woods  near 
Gulp's,  where  he  met  both  those  officers.  On  his  way  Sher 
man  had  passed  through  Ward's  (Butterfield's)  division,  and 
learned  that  it  was  in  reserve.  Schofield,  on  being  informed 
of  the  despatch  sent  by  Hooker,  indignantly  declared  it  in 
excusably  wrong,  and  invited  both  officers  to  go  to  Hascall's 
front  and  see  whose  dead  lay  farthest  in  advance.  Sher 
man,  reminding  Hooker  that  three  corps  was  the  whole  of 
Johnston's  army,  which,  if  it  had  attacked,  would  have 
made  itself  felt  along  a  larger  front  than  two  or  three  bri 
gades,  indicated  his  dislike  of  such  sensational  reports,  and 
especially  of  the  unjust  insinuation  as  to  Schofield.  After  a 
repulse  of  the  enemy,  and  with  Butterfield's  division  of  his  own 
corps  still  within  reach,  he  thought  an  officer  of  Hooker's  ex 
perience  should  not  have  been  so  anxious  about  his  flank  as  to 
have  sent  the  despatch,  even  if  Schofield  had  not  been  there. 


THE  LINES  AROUND  MARIETTA.  115 

The  incident  was  a  personal  one  which  might  well  be 
omitted  from  history,  but  as  it  had  its  influence  upon  the 
subsequent  relations  of  these  officers,  and  upon  General 
Hooker's  withdrawal  from  the  army,  it  is  necessary  to 
notice  it. 

Hood's  attack  had  been  accompanied  by  a  fierce  cannon 
ade  along  nearly  the  whole  front,  and  lively  demonstrations 
were  made  on  both  sides  from  right  to  left ;  but  no  material 
change  in  positions  or  in  forces  was  discovered,  except  the 
transfer  of  Hood's  corps.  It  is  uncertain  to  what  degree 
Loring's  corps  had  been  extended  to  Johnston's  right  to 
supply  the  place  from  which  Hood  had  been  taken ;  but  it 
is  hardly  credible  that  Wheeler's  cavalry  alone  had  been 
able  to  impose  upon  McPherson,  who  certainly  believed  and 
reported  that  the  intrenchments  in  his  front  were  held  by 
infantry. 


CHAPTER  X, 

KENESAW. 

SHERMAN'S  embarrassments  at  this  juncture  were  almost 
altogether  due  to  the  trouble  in  keeping  his  army  supplied. 
The  extraordinary  and  still-continuing  rains  made  it  impos 
sible  to  lengthen  the  distance  between  the  troops  and  their 
depots,  and  so  long  as  Johnston  held  fast  to  Kenesaw,  no 
nearer  points  than  those  in  use  could  be  selected  for  the  is 
suing  of  stores.  Besides  this,  his  long  line  of  railway  was 
tempting  the  Confederate  commander  to  more  vigorous  ef 
forts  to  cut  his  communications,  and  several  cavalry  raids  had 
partial  success  in  destroying  bridges,  tearing  up  rails,  and 
burning  one  or  two  small  trains.  Torpedoes — a  favorite 
weapon  with  the  enemy — had  been  used  to  blow  up  a  pass 
ing  train,  and  Sherman  was  forced  to  threaten  that  he 
would  test  the  safety  of  the  track  by  an  advance  train  of 
prisoners.  He  rightly  distinguished  between  the  use  of 
mines  and  torpedoes  to  defend  a  position  attacked,  and  the 
efforts  to  blow  up  railway  trains  upon  roads  far  in  the  rear. 
The  former  is  legitimate  warfare;  the  latter,  like  dissemi 
nating  contagion  or  incendiary  burnings  of  towns  beyond 
the  theatre  of  war,  is  a  barbarism  which  could  legitimately 
be  met  by  the  means  he  threatened  to  use,  but  did  not  find 
necessary,  the  threat  itself  having  the  desired  effect. 

The  affair  of  the  22d  decided  Sherman  that  his  best 
course  was  to  bring  McPherson  from  the  left,  where  the 


KENESAW.  117 

ground  in  his  front  seemed  peculiarly  difficult ;  and  he  no 
tified  that  officer  in  the  evening  to  be  ready  for  a  transfer 
to  the  extreme  right.  To  do  this  required,  however,  an  ac 
cumulation  of  supplies,  and  getting  ahead  of  the  daily  de 
mand  was  slow  work  in  the  condition  of  roads  and  railways, 
though  from  June  23d  the  weather  improved.  Impatient  at 
the  obstacles  which  seemed  to  bring  everything  to  a  stand 
still,  and  disappointed  that  the  attack  by  Hood  had  made  it 
necessary  to  call  back  Schofield's  advanced  division  from  a 
very  promising  flank  movement  on  the  Sandtown  road,  the 
mind  of  the  National  commander  naturally  recurred  to  the 
chances  of  breaking  through  a  line  which  he  was  sure  could 
not  be  so  strong  as  his  own.  Although  it  was  certain  that 
great  efforts  were  making  to  reinforce  Johnston,  and  the 
Georgia  militia  under  General  G.  W.  Smith,  a  full  division  at 
least,  were  known  to  be  in  the  field,  it  still  seemed  probable 
that  the  enemy's  whole  line  must  be  very  attenuated,  and  that 
the  rugged  character  of  the  mountain  must  be  greatly  relied 
upon  by  Johnston  for  his  security  on  that  flank.  Hood  was 
known  to  be  in  front  of  Schofield  and  part  of  Hooker's 
eorps  ;  Hardee  must  be  well  stretched  out  to  hold  the  cen 
tre  against  the  rest  of  Hooker's,  Howard's,  and  Palmer's 
corps,  so  that  it  seemed  probable  that  somewhere  along  the 
lines  weak  places  might  be  found,  where  a  determined  at 
tack  might  break  through.  Johnston's  line,  from  the 
southern  spurs  of  Kenesaw  to  his  extreme  right,  including 
the  mountain,  was  held  by  Loring's  corps  and  whatever  re 
inforcements  he  might  recently  have  got.  Abundant  mili 
tary  experience  proved  that  strength  of  position  often  begot 
a  careless  security  in  the  defenders,  and  the  assault  of  what 
were  considered  almost  inaccessible  cliffs  has  very  often 
turned  out  to  be  the  most  brilliant  success.  Lookout  Moun 
tain  had  been  an  example  of  this  in  the  very  last  campaign, 


118  ATLANTA. 

where,  by  that  fortune  which  in  war  so  often  favors  the 
bold,  a  so-called  impregnable  position  had  been  carried  with 
surprisingly  little  loss.  There  was  hope,  therefore,  that 
Kenesaw  itself  might  be  captured  while  the  attacks  were 
progressing  on  other  parts  of  the  front. 

One  of  two  things  Sherman  must  do.  He  must  either 
confess  that  in  stretching  his  right  to  Olley's  Creek  he  had 
gone  as  far  as  possible,  and  must  therefore  wait  patiently 
for  good  weather  and  better  roads,  till  with  accumulated 
stores  he  could  swing  McPherson's  command  quite  to  the 
south  of  the  enemy  as  he  had  done  at  Dalton,  or  he  must 
make  a  bold  effort  to  break  the  lines  before  him.  Thomas 
suggested  an  approach  to  the  enemy's  works  by  regular  sap, 
but  Sherman  replied  that  when  that  slow  process  had  car 
ried  one  line,  our  experience  showed  that  two  or  three 
equally  strong  would  be  prepared  behind  it.  Hitherto  the 
army  had  steadily  gained  ground,  and  had  seen  successive 
lines  of  formidable  works  abandoned  by  their  opponents. 
To  let  it  feel  that  it  had  gone  the  full  length  of  its  tether, 
and  must  halt  whilst  the  enemy  redoubled  his  efforts  to  in 
terrupt  our  supplies  would  be  demoralizing.  There  was  a, 
fair  chance  to  carry  some  point  in  the  enemy's  line.  If 
an  assault  succeeded  it  would  be  a  decisive  event.  If  it 
failed,  the  venture  would  at  least  be  justified  on  sound  mil 
itary  principles.  Sherman  therefore  determined  on  a  seri 
ous  effort  to  break  through  Johnston's  intrenchments,  and 
made  his  preparations  accordingly. 

He  fixed  upon  Monday  morning,  June  27th,  at  eight  o'clock, 
for  a  general  advance.  McPherson  was  ordered  to  make  a 
feint  with  his  extreme  left,  keeping  Garrard's  cavalry  also 
demonstrative  and  busy,  whilst  he  made  an  attack  at  the 
south  and  west  of  Kenesaw.  Strong  skirmish  lines  were 
to  take  advantage  of  the  combat  elsewhere  to  seize  the  crest 


KENESAW.  119 

of  the  mountain  if  possible.  Thomas  in  the  centre  was 
ordered  to  select  a  point  in  his  front  for  an  assault,  masking 
it  by  such  other  demonstrations  as  would  assist  it.  Scho- 
field,  on  the  right,  was  ordered  to  attack  some  point  near 
the  Marietta  and  Powder  Spring  road,  whilst  he  threatened 
the  extreme  flank  of  the  enemy.  All  were  to  be  prepared  to 
follow  up  rapidly  any  advantage  that  might  be  gained. 

On  the  26th,  Schofield  was  directed  to  make  a  demonstra 
tion  with  his  right  which  should  attract  the  enemy's  atten 
tion,  and  possibly  induce  him  to  strengthen  that  wing  at  the 
expense  of  his  centre  and  right,  when  Thomas  and  McPher- 
son  would  attack  on  the  morrow.  Schofield  accordingly 
ordered  General  Cox  to  push  Eeilly's  brigade,  which  was 
still  in  front  of  Cheney's,  to  Olley's  Creek,  and  make  a  lively 
demonstration  on  anything  he  might  find  in  his  front,  sup 
porting  the  movement,  if  successful,  by  another  brigade 
from  the  division.  Eeilly  advanced,  and,  after  a  brisk  skir 
mish,  occupied  the  hills  close  to  the  stream  under  cover  of 
a  cannonade  by  Myers's  Indiana  Battery.  He  found  Jack 
son's  cavalry  dismounted,  and  occupying  a  commanding  hill 
on  the  right  of  the  road  beyond  the  creek,  where  they  had 
artillery  intrenched  in  a  very  strong  position.  This  forti 
fied  hill  was  nearly  on  the  prolongation  of  the  line  of  the 
ridge  beyond  Olley's  Creek  and  separating  it  from  the  Nicka- 
jack.  Eeilly  was  directed  to  take  forward  his  battery,  in 
trench  it  and  his  brigade  as  near  the  enemy  as  possible,  and 
keep  up  the  artillery  fire.  Meanwhile  Byrd's  brigade  was 
taken  from  the  right  of  the  line  near  Gulp's,  marched  down 
the  creek  till  within  about  a  mile  of  Eeilly.  There  it  made 
a  bridge,  crossed  the  stream,  and  occupied  a  hill  northeast 
of  that  held  by  the  enemy  in  Eeilly's  front,  and  which  was 
directly  connected  with  the  line  of  heights  east  of  Olley's 
Creek,  on  which  Hood's  left  flank  rested.  A  depression  in 


120  ATLANTA. 

the  ridge  partly  isolated  this  hill  from  the  rest  of  the  high 
ground,  and  made  it  defensible.  Byrd  was  ordered  to  in 
trench  immediately  on  all  sides,  and  hold  the  place  against 
all  comers  as  a  separate  redoubt,  connecting  his  front  by  a 
chain  of  pickets,  however,  with  both  Eeilly  on  his  right,  and 
with  the  rest  of  the  division  in  Schofield's  line  on  his  left. 
The  space  between  was  the  open  valley  through  which  the 
creek  ran,  and  the  Twenty -third  corps  batteries,  which  had 
been  used  to  cover  Byrd's  advance,  were  disposed  so  as  to 
search  this  interval  with  their  fire.  The  Confederate  reports 
show  that  these  movements  caused  much  uneasiness,  but 
the  activity  of  skirmish  lines  along  the  whole  army  front 
made  both  Johnston  and  Hood  feel  that  they  could  not  af 
ford  sufficiently  strong  detachments  to  successfully  resist 
them.  Sherman  warmly  approved  what  was  done  on  this 
flank,  but  warned  Schofield  of  the  necessity  of  extreme 
watchfulness  for  brigades  so  far  from  support.  He  directed 
that  Byrd's  bridge  be  made  good,  and  operations  on  that 
flank  resumed  early  in  the  morning.  Schofield  accordingly 
determined  to  let  Cox  continue  the  movement  down  the 
Sandtown  road  next  day  with  three  of  his  brigades,  whilst 
Hascall's  division,  as  the  extreme  flank  of  the  continuous 
line,  should  try  to  advance  toward  Marietta  on  the  road 
from  Gulp's. 

McPherson  selected  a  point  at  the  south  and  west  of  the 
principal  crest  of  Kenesaw  for  his  attack,  and  committed 
the  details  of  the  plan  to  Logan,  whose  corps  lay  opposite 
the  point  chosen.  Blair  and  Dodge  were  ordered  to  assist 
Logan  by  active  feints  and  demonstrations  along  the  fronts 
of  their  respective  corps.  Logan  ordered  the  attack  to  be 
made  by  the  division  of  Morgan  L.  Smith,  consisting  of  the 
brigades  of  Giles  A.  Smith  and  Lightburn,  assisted  by  Wal- 
cutt's  brigade  of  Harrow's  division.  The  attacking  troops 


KENESAW.  121 

were  ordered  to  form  in  two  lines,  and  to  move  simulta 
neously  with  the  columns  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
when  the  signal  should  be  given. 

Recent  changes  in  the  line  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  in  taking  ground  farther  to  the  right  had  put  Palmer's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  in  the  centre  and  Howard's  (Fourth)  on 
the  left.  The  only  points  which  seemed  at  all  favorable  for 
an  attack  were  in  front  of  Stanley's  division  of  Howard's 
corps.  There  the  conformation  of  the  ground  separated  the 
hostile  lines  more  than  at  other  places,  and  room  could  be 
found  for  forming  the  troops  for  the  attack  outside  of  our 
own  works  and  yet  under  cover.  To  Howard  and  Palmer 
was  committed  the  duty  of  selecting  the  positions  to  be 
earned,  and  detailing  the  troops  for  the  assault.  Howard 
ordered  General  Newton  to  prepare  for  an  advance  in  the 
morning  from  the  left  front  of  Stanley's  division  in  two 
columns  of  attack.  Newton  arranged  his  division  with 
Harker's  and  Wagner's  brigades  in  front,  and  Kimball's  in 
reserve.  They  were  formed  in  two  columns,  having  each  a 
front  of  a  regimental  division,  the  columns  being  about 
one  hundred  yards  apart.  Portions  of  the  divisions  of 
Stanley  and  of  Wood  were  held  in  readiness  to  support  the 
movement. 

General  Palmer  had  likewise,  with  General  Thomas's  ap 
proval,  selected  his  point  for  attack  in  front  of  Stanley's 
division  and  some  distance  to  the  right  of  that  chosen  by 
General  Howard.  Palmer  therefore  withdrew  the  division  of 
General  Davis  from  its  place  in  line  on  the  evening  of  the 
26th,  and  it  lay  in  bivouac  in  rear  of  Stanley  during  the 
night.  Soon  after  daybreak  Davis  reconnoitred  the  front  with 
his  brigade  commanders,  and  determined  to  assault  in  front 
of  Whittaker's  brigade  of  Stanley's  division.  There  the 
enemy's  line  coming  forward  on  a  ridge,  presented  a  salient 
IX.— 6 


122  ATLANTA. 

•which  was  not  covered  with  the  usual  abattis  and  entan 
glement.  Davis  formed  his  division  in  front  of  Stanley's 
trenches,  and  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  Confederate 
fortifications,  that  being  as  near  as  they  could  be  placed  with 
out  being  in  view  and  subject  to  fire.  His  formation  was  sim 
ilar  to  Newton's  ;  McCook's  and  Mitchell's  brigades  were  in 
advance,  and  Morgan's  brigade  in  reserve.  Baird's  division 
of  the  same  corps  supported  the  whole,  and  Hooker's  corps, 
still  farther  on  the  right,  was  in  readiness,  under  General 
Thomas's  orders  to  assist  either  Palmer  or  Howard,  or  to 
take  advantage  of  any  favorable  contingency  that  might 
arise. 

The  movement  on  the  right  of  Schofield's  corps  which 
had  been  made  on  the  26th  so  far  indicated  that  better 
results  could  be  attained  by  pushing  forward  Cox's  divi 
sion  in  that  direction,  that,  with  Sherman's  approval,  the 
attack  which  Schofield  had  purposed  to  make  with  Has- 
call's  divisions  was  limited  to  a  strong  demonstration, 
whilst  the  divergent  movement  down  the  Sandtown  road 
was  made  by  Cox. 

In  the  orders  for  the  day  on  Monday  morning,  the  first 
aggressive  movement  was  on  the  extreme  right,  and  in  con 
tinuation  of  that  which  has  been  already  described  as  oc 
curring  on  the  preceding  evening.  At  daybreak  Cameron's 
brigade  of  Cox's  division  crossed  Olley's  Creek  by  the 
bridge  Byrd  had  made  the  day  before,  and  marching  through 
the  valley  ascended  the  slopes  in  rear  and  to  the  right 
of  the  position  Byrd's  brigade  already  occupied.  At  the 
same  time  Reilly's  brigade  resumed  its  efforts  to  cross 
Olley's  Creek  near  the  Sandtown  road,  and  both  movements 
were  covered  and  assisted  by  the  fire  of  the  division  batter 
ies.  Byrd,  who  was  left  on  the  ridge  during  the  night  fa 
cing  in  all  directions,  reformed  his  lines,  straddling  the  hill, 


KENESAW.  123 

and  pushed  a  strongly  supported  skirmish  line  up  the  creek 
toward  Hood's  refused  line  of  works.  Cameron  at  the  same 
time  changed  direction  to  the  right,  down  the  stream,  facing 
the  enemy's  detached  works  in  front  of  Eeilly,  who  was  held 
at  bay  by  the  artillery  which  commanded  the  road  and  the 
broken  bridge  across  the  stream  there.  A  portion  of  Eeilly's 
brigade  deployed  as  skirmishers  kept  up  a  lively  fire  at  the 
road  and  in  its  vicinity,  whilst  the  rest  of  it  was  moved  in 
rear  of  some  hills  further  down  the  creek,  which  there  runs 
nearly  parallel  to  the  Sandtown  road,  until  a  good  position 
for  a  battery  was  found,  quite  on  the  flank  of  the  Confeder 
ate  intrenchment.  Under  protection  of  its  fire  Eeilly's  men 
waded  a  swamp,  forded  the  stream,  which  is  there  shallow, 
and  pushed  up  the  farther  bank.  Cameron  moved  forward 
simultaneously  so  as  to  threaten  the  other  flank,  and  after  a 
sharp  resistance  the  enemy  broke  and  fled.  Eeilly  at  once 
occupied  the  abandoned  position  and  intrenched  it,  fronting 
to  the  south,  and  soon  afterward  Cameron  formed  connec 
tion  on  his  left,  reaching  along  the  ridge  till  he  joined 
hands  with  Byrd  who  was  on  the  higher  eminence  north 
ward. 

This  had  all  occurred  before  the  hour  fixed  for  the  attacks 
on  the  main  line,  and  whilst  Cox  was  strengthening  the 
position  of  his  division  the  roar  of  a  general  engagement 
was  heard  far  off  to  the  left  and  rear.  Advantage  was  taken 
of  this  to  move  Eeilly's  brigade  forward,  following  Jackson's 
retreating  cavalry  some  two  miles  farther,  where  a  cross 
road  rounding  the  south  spurs  cf  the  hilly  ridge  separating 
Olley's  Creek  from  the  Nickajack,  leads  into  the  principal 
road  from  Marietta  to  Sandtown  on  the  Chattahoochee  Eiver. 
The  importance  of  the  position  was  evident  as  soon  as  seen. 
The  trend  of  the  hills  bordering  the  Nickajack  made  it 
plain  that  the  Confederate  line  could  not  be  extended  south 


124  ATLANTA. 

in  this  direction  with  any  real  continuity,  and  that  a  way 
was  open  to  the  railroad  near  Smyrna,  five  miles  south  of 
Marietta.  The  position  itself  was  defensible  also.  The 
spurs  from  the  principal  ridge  ran  southward  in  such  a  way 
that  Byrd's  position  could  be  connected  with  Eeilly's  by  a 
strong  line,  though  too  long  for  a  single  division.  Calling 
to  him  Cameron's  brigade,  the  Division  Commander  put 
it  on  Reilly's  left,  connecting  it  by  outposts  with  both 
the  other  brigades ;  and  on  reporting  the  situation  to  Gen 
eral  Schofield  he  was  ordered  to  intrench  the  line  and  hold 
it  firmly.  An  advanced  hill  a  little  up  Nickajack  Valley  was 
intrenched  with  a  lunette,  which  was  occupied  by  a  battery 
and  a  regiment  of  infantry,  and  the  greatest  industry  was  used 
to  make  the  position  of  the  whole  division  tenable  against  an 
attack  in  front  or  flank,  separated  as  it  was  by  a  Jong  interval 
and  by  Olley's  Creek  from  the  rest  of  the  army. 

But  whilst  this  skirmishing  advance  had  been  making  on 
the  right,  a  bloody  engagement  was  going  on  elsewhere,  and 
one  assuming  the  character  of  a  general  battle.  McPherson's 
batteries  opened  with  rapid  and  continuous  firing  upon 
the  works  of  the  enemy  situated  at  the  southern  end  of  the 
rocky  ridge  known  as  Little  Kenesaw. 

The  attack  by  the  detachments  from  the  Cumberland 
army  was  substantially  along  the  Burnt  Hickory  and  Mari 
etta  road,  the  same  which  leads  from  Gilgal  Church  to 
Marietta.  Like  McPherson's,  it  was  preceded  by  a  general 
artillery  fire  along  the  line  for  about  fifteen  minutes,  and 
then,  at  a  signal  preconcerted  between  Howard  and  Palmer, 
a  little  before  nine  o'clock  the  columns  advanced.  At  the 
same  time  the  skirmish  lines  of  the  whole  army  pushed  for 
ward  also  and  engaged  the  enemy,  but  on  the  selected 
routes  the  narrow  heads  of  column  rushed  to  the  front, 
cheering  as  they  went,  and  led  with  as  devoted  courage  as 


KENESAW.  125 

soldiers  ever  showed.  Newton's  columns  were  not  checked 
till  they  reached  the  entanglement  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
works.  Here  the  formation  necessarily  lost  its  order  in 
struggling  through  and  over  the  trunks  and  interlaced 
branches  of  felled  forest  trees,  and  the  concentrated  fire  of 
infantry  and  artillery  became  too  hot  for  endurance.  The 
advance  was  checked,  and  the  men  deploying  as  they  could, 
and  taking  advantage  of  such  shelter  as  the  ground  and  the 
felled  timber  afforded,  opened  a  returning  fire  upon  the 
Confederates  within  their  works.  General  Harker,  with  a 
gallantry  already  famous  in  the  army,  attempting  to  renew 
the  assault,  was  mortally  wounded,  and  hundreds  of  brave 
men  and  valuable  officers  fell  on  every  side. 

From  Palmer's  corps  Davis's  division  made  an  equally 
heroic  effort  with  no  better  result.  Indeed,  the  Confederate 
reports  award  to  all  the  columns  the  merit  of  the  most  de 
termined  and  persistent  bravery  in  their  attack.  Davis's 
men  had  to  pass  over  rocky  and  rough  ground,  part  of  it 
covered  with  the  forest  and  tangled  with  undergrowth.  In 
their  enthusiasm  they  took  too  rapid  a  pace  at  the  start,  and 
by  the  time  they  had  traversed  the  third  of  a  mile  between 
them  and  the  enemy's  works  the  men  were  so  blown  that 
they  had  not  the  strength  called  for  in  the  final  effort  to 
carry  the  parapet  before  them.  Colonel  Daniel  McCook  and 
his  second  in  command,  Colonel  Harmon,  both  fell  in  the 
assault,  and  both  brigades  had  a  heavy  list  of  casualties 
among  field  and  company  officers  as  well  as  of  private 
soldiers.  They  reached  the  trench  in  front  of  their  objec 
tive  point,  but  the  narrow  front  of  the  column  now  stood 
revealed  to  the  enemy,  who  were  able  to  concentrate  upon 
them  also  a  storm  of  rifle-balls  and  canister  which  made 
farther  advance  impossible.  Lying  upon  the  ground  within 
the  range  of  musket-fire  from  the  works,  they  covered  them- 


126  ATLANTA. 

selves  as  they  could,  and  finally,  by  General  Thomas's  con 
sent,  intrenched  themselves  under  a  terrible  fire,  the  open 
ground  over  which  they  must  retreat  making  it  safer  to  stay 
than  to  return.  The  cover  they  were  able  to  make  enabled 
them  to  hold  on  till  night,  and  then  their  works  were  so 
strengthened  that  they  were  permanently  held,  though  for 
several  days  and  nights  the  troops  could  rest  only  by  sleep 
ing  on  their  arms. 

Simultaneous  with  the  rest,  the  lines  of  Smith's  division  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  marched  upon  Little  Kene- 
saw.  They  crossed  Noses  Creek,  carrying  the  intrenched 
lines  of  the  enemy  with  a  dash.  Beyond  these  the  slope  of 
the  mountain  was  steep  and  rocky,  and  felled  trees  formed 
so  thick  an  entanglement  that  the  advance  became  slow,  the 
men  climbing  rather  than  marching  toward  their  foe. 

Logan's  attack  had  fallen  upon  the  left  of  Loring's 
corps  (French's  and  Walker's  divisions),  Howard's  upon  Cle- 
burne's  division,  in  Hardee's  centre.  Loring  had  a  strong 
skirmish  line  in  rifle-pits  six  hundred  yards  in  advance  of 
his  principal  works,  and  these  kept  up  a  rapid  fire  upon 
Smith's  column  till  it  was  within  pistol-shot,  and  then  rap 
idly  retreated  to  the  principal  line.  The  National  troops 
advanced  steadily  till  it  met  the  fire  of  the  infantry  in  the 
trenches,  and  received  in  flank  the  cannonade  of  four  bat 
teries  of  artillery.  This  checked  their  advance,  but  with  a 
steadiness  and  determination  which  extorted  the  admiration 
of  their  enemy,  they  held  the  ground  they  had  gained, 
remaining  more  than  an  hour  under  the  storm  of  shot  and 
shell,  the  nature  of  the  forest-covered  ground  saving  them 
from  utter  destruction.  Logan  then  ordered  Smith  to  with 
draw  the  division  to  the  line  of  rifle-pits  they  had  first  cap 
tured,  and  these  were  put  in  a  defensible  condition  and 
held.  Seven  commanding  officers  of  regiments  fell  in  this 


KENESAW.  127 

charge,  one  of  them,  Colonel  Barnhill  of  the  Fortieth  Illi 
nois,  within  thirty  feet  of  the  enemy's  principal  works. 

Howard's  columns  met  a  similar  opposition  from  Cle- 
burne's  division,  and  a  similar  concentration  of  artillery  fire, 
the  batteries  of  the  Confederate  lines  having  been  so  in 
trenched  as  to  sweep  the  front.1 

Palmer's  attack  fell  upon  Cheatham's  division  of  Hardee's 
corps,  and  at  one  time  threatened  to  penetrate  between 
Hardee  and  Hood,  but  this  was  repelled  by  Cheatham's  re 
serve  brigade,  which  was  brought  into  line. 

Sherman's  losses  during  the  day  were  about  twenty-five 
hundred  in  all,  and  Johnston  admits  over  five  hundred  cas 
ualties.  The  latter  professes  to  think  that  the  courage 
and  character  of  Sherman's  attacks  warrant  the  belief  in  a 
much  greater  loss  to  the  National  forces.  The  returns  are, 
however,  fairly  reported,  and  a  little  consideration  will  show 
that  they  would  in  no  way  impeach  the  conduct  of  the  at 
tacking  columns,  even  if  all  the  Confederate  reports  had  not 
testified  admiringly  to  their  gallantry,  and  to  their  marvel 
lous  steadiness,  which  enabled  them  to  hold  and  intrench  po 
sitions  close  to  the  works  from  which  they  refused  to  retreat. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  only  three  points  in  the  ene 
my's  line  had  been  selected  for  assault.  The  middle  of 
these  was  attacked  by  two  columns,  having  each  a  front  of 
two  companies  only,  and  those  on  right  and  left  did  not 
show  a  greater  deployment  than  a  regimental  front.  By  the 
time  each  column  had  been  checked  by  the  obstructions  in 
its  way,  and  the  terrible  concentric  fire  to  which  it  had 
been  subjected,  conscious  of  having  lacked  the  impetus 


1  French  gives,  in  his  report,  a  very  vivid  description  of  his  position  on  the 
mountain,  and  of  the  perfect  way  in  which  every  movement  of  our  forces,  even 
to  the  occasional  change  of  a  headquarters  camp,  and  the  coming  and  going  of 
our  orderlies,  could  be  watched  and  noted  from  his  rocky  outlook. 


128  ATLANTA. 

necessary  to  carry  the  works  before  them  by  the  first  effort, 
the  experience  of  the  division  commanders  taught  them 
that  further  efforts  at  those  points  would  only  be  destruc 
tive,  and  they  allowed  their  brigades  to  seek  such  cover  as 
they  found  at  hand,  maintaining  so  rapid  a  fire  that  any 
counter-charge  by  the  enemy  was  not  thought  of.  Except 
at  a  very  few  open  points,  the  forest  came  up  to  the  verge  of 
the  abattis  covering  the  trenches,  and  once  within  its  mar 
gin,  the  timber,  the  undergrowth,  the  rocks,  all  gave  such 
shelter  that  the  loss  was  slight  to  soldiers  who  knew  how  to 
take  cool  and  intelligent  advantage  of  them. 

From  the  moment  that  the  heads  of  the  attacking  columns 
were  well  developed,  the  enemy  knew  that  these  alone 
needed  serious  attention,  and  understood  as  well  as  our  own 
officers,  that  the  rest  was  only  a  demonstration  to  cover 
these  real  assaults.  They,  too,  were  brave  and  ready,  and 
instantly  concentrated  both  artillery  and  musketry  upon 
these  three  points  of  danger.  Reserves  within  the  lines 
were  hurried  hither,  and  unless  the  first  rush  were  success 
ful,  everybody  knew  that  there  would  not  be  one  chance  in  a 
hundred  for  a  second  attempt.  It  would  have  been  easy  to 
have  doubled  or  trebled  the  numbers  of  killed  aud  wounded 
that  covered  the  narrow  space  where  each  assault  had  been 
made ;  but  it  was  impossible  that  columns  should  be  better 
led,  and  they  did  not  stop  till  further  progress  was  out  of 
the  question.  The  one  chance  to  break  through  had  been 
bravely  tried  and  lost,  and  it  would  have  been  criminal  in 
the  commanders  to  have  caused  a  further  carnage  that 
would  have  been  futile.  About  eight  hundred  men  had 
fallen  at  the  head  of  each  of  these  three  assaults  before  its 
progress  was  stopped,  and  on  so  contracted  a  front  this  was 
proof  that  they  had  done  enough  to  test  fully  the  impregna 
ble  nature  of  the  Confederate  defences,  and  the  vigilance  of 


KENESAW.  12Q 

the  troops  that  held  them.  Each  of  the  opposing  armies 
had  tried  the  same  experiment,  and  each  in  turn  had  found 
that  with  the  veteran  soldiers  now  arrayed  against  each 
other,  one  rifle  in  the  trench  was  worth  five  in  front  of  it. 
The  attacking  columns  saw  little  more  before  them  than  a 
thin  and  continuous  sheet  of  flame  issuing  beneath  the 
head-log  of  the  parapet,  whilst  they  themselves  marched 
uncovered  against  the  unseen  foe.  In  this  case,  as  has 
already  been  said,  the  exigencies  of  the  situation,  and  the 
chance  of  finding  an  open  joint  in  the  harness  had  war 
ranted  the  effort,  but  the  division  and  corps  commanders 
were  wise  in  judging  when  the  effort  had  failed. 

The  evidence  which  the  assaults  by  both  armies  near  New 
Hope  Church  gave  of  the  tactical  weakness  of  narrow  and 
deep  columns  of  attack  against  such  fortifications  in  such  a 
country,  is  greatly  strengthened  by  the  experience  in  front 
of  Marietta.  Our  books  of  tactics,  copying  from  the  French, 
had  taught  that  the  regimental  column  of  divisions  of  two 
companies,  "doubled  on  the  centre,"  was  par  excellence  the 
column  of  attack.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Wellington  in 
the  Peninsular  war  had  shown  again  and  again  that  such  a 
column,  even  over  open  country,  melted  away  before  the 
"  thin  red  line  "  of  British  soldiers  armed  only  with  the  old 
"Brown  Bess  "  with  its  buck-and-ball  cartridge,  i\\e prestige 
of  Napoleonic  tradition  kept  the  upper  hand.  We  made  our 
attacks  in  this  instance  (excepting  Logan's)  in  a  formation 
which  did  not  give  front  enough  to  have  any  appreciable  ef 
fect  in  subduing  the  enemy's  fire ;  which  by  its  depth  offered 
the  greatest  possible  mark  to  a  concentric  and  flanking  fire 
of  the  enemy ;  and  which  the  obstructions  in  its  way  deprived 
of  all  the  impetus  to  pierce  an  opposing  line,  which  is  the 
only  merit  of  such  a  column.  So  hard  it  is  to  free  ourselves 
from  the  trammels  of  old  customs  and  a  mistaken  practice  ! 
6* 


CHAPTER  XI. 

ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE. 

SHEKMAN  lost  no  time  in  unavailing  regrets  over  the  fail 
ure  of  the  effort  to  break  Johnston's  lines,  but  frankly  said 
that  among  the  chances  for  and  against  success,  the  unfav 
orable  ones  had  prevailed,  the  enemy  having  been  found 
vigilant  and  prepared  to  hold  the  works  at  all  the  points 
assailed.  For  similar  reasons  the  lesser  demonstrations  had 
also  produced  no  results,  except  on  the  Sandtown  road, 
where  Schofield's  position  beyond  Olley's  Creek  he  re 
garded  as  really  important,  and  described  it  as  "the  only 
advantage  of  the  day."  Probably  this  advantage  would  not 
have  been  attained  but  for  the  hot  work  going  on  along  the 
line,  which  so  thoroughly  occupied  Johnston  that  no  de 
tachments  could  be  spared  to  help  Jackson,  whose  cavalry 
was  waging  an  unequal  contest  on  the  extreme  flank  ;  for 
not  only  was  Schofield's  infantry  engaging  them  in  front, 
but  his  cavalry  under  Stoneman  was  actively  demonstrating 
toward  Powder  Springs  village. 

The  necessity  of  holding  Johnston  with  such  a  grip  that 
he  could  not  detach  aid  to  Lee  in  Virginia  was  one  of  the 
motives  for  active  operations  in  front  and  continuously  ;  but 
on  the  28th  Grant  despatched  Sherman  that  this  considera 
tion  might  now  be  dropped  out  of  the  calculation.  Sher 
man  at  once  resumed  the  plan  for  the  flank  operations  he 
had  conceived  before,  and  an  inspection  of  the  position 


ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  131 

occupied  by  Schofield's  advance  determined  him  to  move 
McPherson's  Army  of  the  Tennessee  bodily  to  the  right 
flank,  as  soon  as  a  few  days'  supplies  could  be  accumulated. 
The  rains  were  over,  and  a  scorching  sun  was  rapidly  drying 
up  the  more  open  country.  A  movement  became  daily  more 
practicable,  and  as  soon  as  the  army  could  get  out  of  a  re 
gion  so  utterly  cut  up  by  wagon  trains  as  that  they  were  now 
in,  the  supply  question  would  be  a  much  less  formidable 
one. 

Johnston  had  not  failed  to  see  the  fact  that  his  position 
was  already  turned,  and  his  engineers  were  already  at  work 
on  the  28th  with  heavy  details  of  the  Georgia  militia  and  of 
impressed  negroes,  fortifying  two  lines  north  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee.  One  of  these  crossed  the  railroad  at  Smyrna  on 
a  ridge  running  northeast  and  southwest,  but  which  about 
three  miles  from  Smyrna  on  his  left  curved  south,  following 
the  line  of  Nickajack  Creek.  The  other  was  closer  to  the 
river  covering  only  about  two  miles  of  the  railroad  on  the 
hither  side  of  the  Chattahoochee  bridge,  which  was  in  a 
deep  southerly  bend  of  the  river.  On  the  northeast  it  was 
protected  by  the  deep  ravine  of  Kottenwood  Creek  which 
enters  the  Chattahoochee  with  a  southeast  course.  Turning 
nearly  at  right  angles,  the  line  then,  crossing  a  ridge, 
reached  the  Nickajack  again,  which  here  runs  for  several 
miles  above  its  mouth  nearly  parallel  to  the  Chattahoochee 
and  about  a  mile  distant  from  it. 

At  the  same  time  a  good  deal  of  work  was  doing  at  Atlan 
ta,  where  fortifications  had  already  been  made  ;  but  these 
were  greatly  strengthened  and  extended  in  anticipation  of 
the  necessity  of  making  a  final  stand  there,  if  the  line  of 
the  Chattahoochee  should  be  broken. 

All  these  intrenchments  were  made  with  a  thoroughness 
and  skill  which  was  admirable,  but  the  improvement  in  the 


132  ATLANTA. 

weather  and  the  use  of  better  roads  gave  Sherman  a  freedom 
of  movement  which  enabled  him  to  manoeuvre  the  enemy 
out  of  these  formidable  positions  with  an  ease  and  rapidity 
that  astonished  and  alarmed  the  Eichmond  Government,  and 
led  to  an  early  change  in  commanders  for  their  army. 

Already  in  the  night  of  June  28th  the  sounds  of  moving- 
railway  trains  between  Marietta  and  the  river  were  heard  so 
continuously  at  Schofield's  advanced  position  as  to  indicate 
that  stores  and  material  of  war  were  being  sent  by  Johnston 
to  the  rear;  but  Sherman  meant  to  move  with  rations 
enough  to  accomplish  something  decisive,  and  the  two  or 
three  days  necessary  to  get  up  his  supplies  were  spent  in 
preliminary  movements.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
stretched  its  lines  a  little  more  to  the  right,  so  that  Hooker 
relieved  Hascall's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  this 
was  marched  down  the  Sandtown  road  till  it  covered  all  the 
direct  roads  to  Marietta  and  to  the  railroads  in  the  Nicka- 
jack  Valley.  This  threw  the  whole  of  Schofield's  corps 
together  on  a  strong  line  reaching  from  the  ridge  beyond 
Olley's  Creek  on  the  left,  to  some  hills  near  the  Nickajack, 
where  the  Marietta  and  Sandtown  road  runs  into  that  on 
which  his  movement  had  been  made.  On  July  2d  Smith's 
division  of  Logan's  corps  marched  from  the  old  position  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  and  reported  temporarily  to 
Schofield  to  strengthen  the  right  flank.  Stoneman's  cavalry 
was  able  to  reach  the  Chattahoochee  near  Sandtown,  and  the 
whole  of  McPherson's  command  was  moving  to  the  right, 
leaving  Garrard's  cavalry  to  cover  the  roads  to  Marietta  near 
the  railroad. 

That  night  Johnston  evacuated  the  works  at  Kenesaw  and 
along  the  whole  front,  falling  back  into  the  intrenchments 
prepared  behind  the  Nickajack.  Sherman  now  orders 
Thomas  to  advance  directly  through  Marietta  and  along 


ACROSS   THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE.  133 

the  railway,  and  his  columns  reach  Ruff's  station,  develop 
ing  the  line  which  has  been  already  described.  The  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  reaches  the  extreme  right,  and  bivouacs 
near  Schofield's  position.  On  the  4th,  McPherson  advances 
Dodge's  corps  well  forward  on  the  Sandtown  road,  whilst 
with  the  rest  of  his  command  he  unites  his  lines  with 
Thomas's  half  way  to  the  railroad.  In  this  movement,  by 
Sherman's  special  orders,  the  skirmish  lines  are  greatly 
strengthened  and  the  advance  has  nearly  the  weight  of  a 
line  of  battle.  Dodge  pushes  over  a  line  of  Hood's  rifle- 
pits  in  spite  of  fierce  resistance,  but  with  heavy  loss.  In 
the  attack,  Colonel  E.  F.  Noyes,  leading  a  demi-brigade, 
falls  severely  wounded.  This  moving  forward  of  a  strongly 
reinforced  right  flank  by  Sherman  brings  him  nearer  to  At 
lanta  at  this  point  than  Johnston,  and  the  latter  sees  that  if 
he  is  to  make  any  stand  at  the  Chattahoochee  he  must  be 
near  enough  to  guard  its  ferries  and  fords.  He  does  not 
wait  in  his  new  lines,  but  in  the  night  of  the  same  day 
leaves  these  also,  and  before  daybreak  his  troops  have  en 
tered  the  works  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  Again  all 
the  National  forces  except  Schofield's  corps  are  in  motion,  a 
brisk  cannonade  tells  of  a  sharp  affair  of  advanced  guards. 
Stoneman's  cavalry  push  boldly  in  on  Johnston's  left  near 
the  river,  take  some  prisoners  and  a  black  flag  which  a 
Texas  regiment  of  horse  was  carrying. 

Information  of  the  lines  along  the  Upper  Nickajack  had 
reached  Sherman's  army,  but  the  intrenched  position  at  the 
crossing  of  the  river  was  unknown.  Sherman  was  at  first 
unwilling  to  believe  there  was  anything  there  ;  but  a  strong 
reconnoissance  quickly  showed  the  heavy  earthworks,  the 
abattis  in  front,  the  batteries  arranged  for  cross  fire  and  all 
the  most  elaborate  of  the  Confederate  preparations  for  de 
fence.  The  length  of  these  lines  was  five  or  six  miles,  and 


134  ATLANTA. 

in  spite  of  all  the  activity  Sherman  and  his  subordinates 
could  use,  the  hope  of  catching  the  enemy  in  the  midst  of  a 
movement  was  disappointed,  and  the  problem  now  before 
them  was  not  only  the  flanking  of  an  intrenched  army,  but 
the  crossing  of  a  river  in  his  presence. 

Sherman  had  said  to  Halleck  in  a  despatch  of  the  8th  of 
June,  that  if  Johnston  should  select  the  line  of  the  Chatta- 
hoochee  he  "must  study  the  case  a  little,"  before  commit 
ting  himself.  McPherson  was  put  in  position  on  the  ex 
treme  right,  covering  Turner's  Ferry,  which,  however,  like 
other  crossings  for  a  dozen  miles  along  the  river,  was 
guarded  by  a  detached  fortification  on  the  south  side. 
Thomas,  wTith  his  three  corps,  completed  the  investment  of 
Johnston's  position,  Howard's  corps  being  at  Pace's  Ferry, 
where  one  of  the  principal  roads  from  Marietta  to  Atlanta 
crosses  the  river,  that  near  McPherson's  flank  being  another, 
with  a  third  near  the  railway  bridge.  Schofield  with  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  was  moved  to  Smyrna  Camp  Ground,  near 
the  railway,  and  held  as  a  movable  column  ready  for  use  in 
any  direction.  Stoneman's  cavalry  was  kept  active,  looking 
for  fords  or  crossings  down  the  river,  and  Garrard's  was  sent 
some  eighteen  miles  above  to  seize  the  Boswell  factories 
and  hold  also,  if  possible,  a  bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee 
there. 

Meanwhile  some  breaks  in  the  railway  were  to  be  repaired, 
steam  communication  to  be  again  brought  to  the  camps,  and 
the  "case"  was  to  be  "studied  a  little."  Sherman  estab 
lished  his  headquarters  for  a  few  days  at  Vining's  Station, 
and  from  a  hill  near  by  could  see  the  distant  town  of 
Atlanta,  the  coveted  prize  of  the  campaign.  There,  too, 
could  be  seen  the  preparations  Johnston  was  making  to  re 
sist  his  crossing  of  the  river,  and  the  general  features  of  the 
country  for  some  miles  south  of  the  river  could  be  observed. 


ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  135 

A  little  more  than  a  month  had  passed  since  the  Etowah 
was  crossed.  It  was  a  month  of  continuous  sharp  skirmish 
ing  combat,  with  occasional  severer  engagements.  It  was  a 
month  in  which  the  troops  had  been. day  and  night  under 
fire,  and  the  incessant  strain  on  nerve  and  brain  had  never 
for  a  moment  been  relaxed.  It  was  a  month  of  continuous 
pouring  rains,  converting  the  camps  into  mire  and  the 
roads  into  almost  impassable  sloughs  ;  making  insignifi 
cant  streams  as  obstructive  as  rivers,  and  multiplying  the 
discomforts  and  the  perils  of  duty  in  the  trenches  or  on  the 
picket.  That  such  a  month's  work  was  rapid  education  to 
soldiers  hardly  needs  telling.  The  ordinary  experience  of  a 
year  was  condensed  into  a  few  weeks,  and  the  army  of  vet 
erans  became  consolidated  by  a  true  unity  of  feeling  ;  confi 
dent  in  itself  as  a  whole,  and  the  several  corps  in  each  other 
as  parts,  every  portion  of  it  could  be  trusted  to  uphold  the 
credit  and  rival  the  soldierly  conduct  of  the  rest. 

The  monthly  returns  for  June  show  that  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  the  army  had  lost  7,500  men.  Of 
these  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  reported  5,500,  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  1,300,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio 
about  700.  As  the  attack  upon  the  Confederate  lines  on 
the  27th  of  June  was  the  only  departure  from  the  usual 
method  of  vigorous  advance  of  skirmish  lines  and  extension 
of  flanks  beyond  the  enemy,  it  will  be  seen  how  fierce  a 
bickering  fire  that  must  have  been  which  was  constantly 
kept  up.  Day  by  day  the  losses  averaged  nearly  two  hun 
dred  men,  and  nearly  every  day  had  its  success  in  the  carry 
ing  of  some  new  hill,  the  crossing  of  some  contested  stream, 
or  the  intrenching  of  some  closer  position  in  the  enemy's 
front. 

Johnston  gives  his  hospital  returns  as  showing  a  loss  of 
4,000  in  killed  and  wounded  during  the  month  of  which  we 


136  ATLANTA. 

are  speaking  ;  but  this  is  of  liis  infantry  alone,  and  excludes 
prisoners.  Sherman  rightly  estimates  the  proportion  of 
prisoners  taken  during  the  month  at  2,000,  out  of  the  whole 
number  captured  in  the  campaign,  and  putting  the  propor 
tion  of  cavalry  losses  at  the  same  ratio  to  infantry  as  John 
ston  gives  for  the  month  of  May,  another  thousand  must 
still  be  added.  The  Confederate  losses  are  thus  found  to 
have  been  7,000,  with  a  probability  of  their  having  exceeded 
that  number.  Each  army  had  in  its  turn  tried  the  strength 
of  the  other's  lines  by  assault,  and  each  had  experienced 
the  disproportionate  losses  which  come  of  assaulting  such 
intrenched  positions.  It  was  not  only  the  principal  lines 
which  were  of  the  formidable  character  that  has  been  de 
scribed,  but,  to  use  the  words  of  Hardee,  "  it  soon  became 
customary,  in  taking  up  a  new  position,  to  intrench  the 
skirmish  line,  until  it  was  only  less  strong  than  the  main 
one.  This  line  was  well  manned,  and  the  roar  of  musketry 
on  it  was  sometimes  scarcely  distinguishable  from  the 
sound  of  a  general  engagement."  l  Such  was  the  skirmish 
ing  which  lasted  incessantly  for  months  ! 

After  occupying  the  line  of  fortifications  covering  the 
crossings  of  the  Chattahoochee  by  the  railway  and  two  of 
the  principal  wagon  roads  leading  to  Atlanta,  Johnston  sent 
his  cavalry  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  to  operate  on  the 
same  flanks  as  before :  Jackson  to  cover  his  left,  watching 
the  ferries  and  bridges  below,  and  Wheeler  on  the  right, 
looking  after  the  upper  ones.  The  usual  method  of  cross 
ing  the  river  was  by  ferries,  or  flat  boats  pushed  over  by 
poles.  The  Koswell  bridge,  some  twenty  miles  above,  was 
the  nearest  structure  of  that  kind,  and  this  was  burned  by 
Wheeler  before  it  could  be  reached  by  Garrard.  Johnston 


1  Johnston's  Narrative,  p.  S57. 


ACROSS  THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE.  137 

speaks  of  the  fords  as  numerous  and  easy,  but  whatever 
might  be  the  case  ordinarily,  the  almost  constant  rains  of 
June  had  swollen  the  river  so  that  there  were  very  few 
places  where  a  practicable  ford  could  be  found.  Instead  of 
making  an  intrenched  camp  for  his  whole  army  north  of  the 
Chattahoochee,  it  would  seem  more  in  accordance  with  sound 
strategic  principles  to  have  held  only  a  bridge-head  there, 
and  to  have  placed  the  greater  part  of  his  command  in  such 
a  position  behind  the  river  that  he  could  strike  with  over 
whelming  force  any  head  of  column  that  should  attempt  a 
crossing. 

The  two  days  prior  to  the  7th  of  July  sufficed  to  make 
the  repairs  in  the  railway,  so  that  supplies  were  delivered 
on  Sherman's  lines.  Garrard  had  occupied  Eoswell,  where 
he  found  very  extensive  cotton,  wool,  and  paper  mills,  run 
ning  at  their  full  capacity  and  till  the  last  moment,  turning 
out  supplies  for  the  Confederate  government.  The  nominal 
proprietors  attempted  to  protect  them  with  a  thin  veil  of 
neutrality,  alleging  French  ownership  and  hoisting  tho 
French  flag ;  but  Garrard,  with  Sherman's  approval,  burned 
the  mills  and  sent  the  owners  and  employees  under  guard  to 
Marietta.  He  found  the  bridge  burned,  and  made  a  careful 
reconnoissance  for  practicable  fords. 

Sherman  sent  General  Schofield  in  person  on  the  7th 
to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  parts  of  the  river  between  Pace's 
Feriy  and  Eoswell,  and  in  consequence  of  his  report  deter 
mined  to  make  a  crossing  near  the  mouth  of  Soap  Creek,  if 
possible.  Although  the  crossing  was  not  opposed  by  any 
force  worth  naming,  being  in  fact  a  complete  surprise,  this 
could  not  be  anticipated,  and  the  operation,  being  one  of 
the  picturesque  incidents  of  the  campaign,  may  be  worth 
describing. 

Soap  Creek  enters  the  Chattahoochee  about  six  or  seven 


138  ATLANTA. 

miles  above  Pace's  Ferry  and  Vining's  Station,  where  General 
Sherman's  headquarters  were.  It  was  about  the  same  dis 
tance  from  the  camp  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  at  Smyrna 
Camp  Ground.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the  corps, 
with  Colonel  Buell's  pontoon  train,  moved  by  roads  some 
distance  from  .the  river  to  the  paper  mill  near  the  mouth 
of  the  creek.  The  leading  division  (Cox's)  was  ordered 
to  take  position  as  close  to  the  river  as  was  consistent  with 
remaining  unseen,  to  permit  no  camp  fires  and  no  expos 
ure  of  men  to  view.  The  river  was  to  be  picketed,  but  the 
vedettes  to  conceal  themselves  from  the  opposite  side.  A 
fish-dam  was  found  half  a  mile  above  the  creek,  which  had 
been  made  by  piling  rough  stones  across  the  current  in  such 
a  way  that  at  low  water  the  stream  was  confined  to  the  mid 
dle  of  the  ordinary  channel  by  diagonal  wing-dams.  In  the 
condition  of  the  river  on  thai?  day,  this  was  a  difficult  and 
dangerous  ford,  but  it  was  determined  to  use  it  in  connec 
tion  with  the  pontoon  boats,  as  will  be  seen  presently. 

The  creek  runs  for  a  considerable  distance  near  its  mouth 
parallel  to  the  river,  and  then  turns  into  the  larger  stream 
by  a  short  curve.  Between  the  river  and  the  creek  is  a  high 
ridge,  two  or  three  hundred  feet  in  height,  which  is  about 
the  altitude  also  of  the  hills  bordering  the  river  on  the  op 
posite  side. 

In  the  reach  of  the  creek  thus  shielded  from  view,  the 
canvas  pontoons  were  set  up  and  launched,  a  detail  of  five 
hundred  men  from  the  infantry  helping  in  the  work.  Byrd's 
brigade  was  ordered  to  lead  in  the  crossing  by  the  pontoons, 
the  Twelfth  Kentucky  regiment  to  be  ferried  over  in  the 
boats,  the  rest  of  the  brigade  deploying  and  advancing  to 
the  river's  edge  on  the  run  when  the  boats  should  start,  so 
as  to  cover  them  with  their  fire. 

Cameron's  brigade  was  ordered  to  cross  Soap  Creek  at  the 


ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  139 

paper  mill,  and  concealing  his  men  near  the  fish-dam,  push 
an  advanced  guard  over  it,  if  possible,  at  the  time  appointed, 
and  if  the  ford  proved  practicable,  follow  it  with  the  bri 
gade  and  make  a  junction  with  those  who  should  cross  be 
low  in  the  pontoon  boats.  Soap  Creek,  near  the  mill,  runs 
in  a  rocky  gorge  with  precipitous  sides,  and  Cameron's  men 
had  to  cross  it  by  clambering  down  the  dangerous  rocks  and 
by  picking  their  way  along  the  edge  of  the  slippery  dam 
above. 

Half  past  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  was  the  time  set 
for  the  crossing.  At  that  hour  a  careful  reconnoissance  from 
the  top  of  the  ridge  showed  that  there  were  no  symptoms 
of  alarm  on  the  opposite  bank.  A  cavalry  outpost  with  a 
piece  of  artillery  was  all  that  seemed  to  oppose  the  move 
ment,  and  these  were  on  the  heights  immediately  in  front 
of  the  mouth  of  the  creek,  at  what  was  known  as  Phillips's 
Ferry.  The  signal  to  advance  was  given.  Cameron's  advance 
guard,  led  by  Colonel  Casement,  One  Hundred  and  Third 
Ohio,  entered  the  water  at  the  fish-dam,  scrambling  along 
the  broken  rocks  in  the  swift  current.  Immediately  twenty 
white  pontoon  boats  shot  out  from  the  mouth  of  the  creek, 
pulled  by  expert  oarsmen  selected  from  Hascall's  division, 
and  loaded  with  Colonel  Eousseau's  Kentuckians.  The  rest 
of  Byrd's  brigade,  which  had  been  deployed  under  cover  of 
the  woods  along  the  base  of  the  hills,  rushed  forward  across 
the  bottom  land  and  lined  the  margin  of  the  stream.  A 
single  cannon-shot  was  fired  from  the  enemy's  outpost,  and 
the  gun  was  reloaded  and  run  forward  to  fire  again  ;  but  so 
completely  was  it  now  covered  by  the  rifles  of  Byrd's  men, 
that  no  one  could  aim  it  or  fire.  The  mounted  men,  con 
scious  of  their  inability  to  cope  with  the  force  before  them, 
galloped  away  to  carry  the  news.  A  few  moments  sufficed 
to  put  the  boats  over,  and  Eousseau,  mounting  the  steep 


14:0  ATLANTA. 

hillside,  captured  the  gun  without  the  loss  of  a  man,  the 
gunners  following  the  horsemen  in  quick  retreat.  Came 
ron's  brigade,  coming  down  from  the  fish-dam,  joined  Bous- 
seau  and  took  post  on  the  ridge  covering  the  ferry.  The 
boats  were  kept  running  till  the  whole  of  Byrd's  brigade 
was  ferried  over,  whilst  the  work  of  laying  the  pontoon 
bridge  was  also  begun  with  other  boats,  and  before  dark 
one  bridge  was  completed  and  a  second  progressing. 

It  was  found  that  the  ridges  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee  were  so  shaped  as  to  make  a  natural  bridge-head 
and  an  admirable  place  of  defence ;  and  the  whole  of 
Cox's  division  was  immediately  intrenched  upon  it,  Came 
ron's,  Byrd's,  Barter's,  and  Beilly's  brigades  in  line,  and  Crit- 
tenden's  brigade  of  dismounted  cavalry  in  reserve. 

The  character  of  the  surprise  was  well  indicated  by  an  in 
cident  which  brought  the  private  and  personal  experiences 
of  war  into  interesting  comparison  with  its  exterior  glitter 
and  excitement.  In  the  deserted  camp  of  the  outpost,  in 
which  even  the  half-cooked  supper  was  left,  an  unfinished 
letter  from  one  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  to  his  wife  was 
found.  In  it  he  calms  her  fears  for  his  safety,  saying  that 
he  was  now  almost  as  free  from  peril  as  if  he  were  at  home 
on  his  plantation  :  that  the  solitude  about  them  was  rarely 
broken,  even  by  the  appearance  of  a  single  horseman  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  river.  But  the  incomplete  sentence  was 
broken  by  the  apparition  of  the  crowded  boats  and  the 
hostile  line  of  infantry  on  the  river  bank,  and  the  letter,  by 
war's  strange  fortune,  reached  other  eyes  than  those  for 
which  it  was  written. 

Johnston  lost  no  time  in  testing  by  cavalry  reconnoissances 
the  strength  of  the  National  forces  now  holding  the  bridge 
head,  and  realized  the  fact  that  the  crossing  of  the  Chatta- 
hoochee  was  secured  to  Sherman.  Wheeler  withdrew  from 


ACROSS   THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  HI 

the  upper  river,  and  next  morning  Garrard  found  no  force  in 
his  front  at  Koswell.  Sherman  immediately  ordered  New 
ton's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  and  Dodge's  (Sixteenth) 
Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  to  march  to  Eoswell 
and  fortify  the  hills  opposite  the  ford  on  the  south  side  of 
the  river,  now  held  by  Garrard's  cavalry.  Dodge  was  also 
ordered  to  build  a  trestle  bridge  there  on  the  site  of  that 
which  the  enemy  had  burned. 

From  his  hill  near  Vining's  Station,  Sherman  was  able 
to  see,  on  the  9th,  "  a  good  deal  of  flutter  in  the  enemy's 
camps,"  and  movements  of  troops  to  the  eastward,  which 
might  mean  either  a  concentration  to  attack  the  force  al 
ready  over  the  river,  or  preparations  for  taking  a  new  posi 
tion.  He  needed  a  few  days,  however,  for  the  accumulation 
of  supplies,  and  wished  also  to  give  time  for  a  cavalry  expe 
dition  under  Major-General  Eousseau,  starting  from  Decatur, 
Alabama,  to  reach  the  railroads  between  Montgomery  and 
Atlanta  near  Opelika.  Stonemaii  was  at  the  same  time  or 
dered  to  make  his  cavalry  active  along  the  Chattahoochee 
toward  Sandtown  and  Campbelltown,  and  if  he  could  secure 
the  ferry  at  the  last-named  place,  he  too  was  directed  to 
strike  out  for  the  railroads  southwest  of  Atlanta,  on  a 
"  raid  "  of  four  or  five  days. 

On  the  night  of  the  9th  of  July,  Johnston  moved  his  in 
fantry  across  the  Chattahoochee,  the  country  bridges,  with 
that  of  the  railway  and  his  pontoons,  giving  two  bridges  to 
each  of  his  three  corps.  He  had  maintained  a  bold  front  up 
to  the  last  moment,  holding  off  the  vigorous  attacks  by  skir 
mish  line  which  Thomas  and  McPherson  kept  up  during  the 
movements  going  on  up  the  river.  In  the  morning  the  pon 
toons  had  been  removed,  and  his  rear  guard  retired,  burning 
the  railway  and  wagon  bridges. 

Sherman  immediately  ordered  Howard  to  march  his  corps 


142  ATLANTA. 

(Fourth)  to  support  Schofield  at  Pliillips's  Ferry,  leaving 
Newton's  division  with  Dodge  at  Eoswell.  McPherson  was 
directed  to  keep  up  for  two  or  three  days  his  demonstrations 
of  a  purpose  to  cross  at  Turner's  Ferry  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Nickajack,  so  as  to  leave  as  much  doubt  as  possible  by 
which  flank  the  National  Army  would  now  move.  Schofield 
was  ordered  to  build  a  bridge  at  his  position,  so  that  the 
pontoons  could  be  used  elsewhere  if  needed.  The  divi 
sion  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  already  over  the  river, 
was  strengthened  by  two  more  brigades  and  moved  out  to  a 
ridge  a  mile  south  of  the  crossing,  intrenching  a  very  strong 
position  across  the  bend  of  the  river  and  covering  both  the 
ford  and  the  bridges.  Dodge  made  a  similar  advance  at 
Eoswell  and  hurried  the  building  of  the  bridge,  650  feet 
long — the  ford,  "  the  best  on  the  whole  river,"  being  belly- 
deep  for  horses  and  very  rough. 

The  plans  of  the  National  commander  were  announced  to 
his  principal  subordinates  on  the  10th  and  llth.  Thomas 
was  to  lay  a  pontoon  bridge  at  Powers's  Ferry  on  the  night  of 
the  12th,  and  fortify  a  bridge-head  on  the  south  bank  there. 
On  the  13th,  McPherson  wras  to  join  Dodge  with  Logan's 
Corps,  and  Newton's  division  would  rejoin  Howard  at  Phil- 
lips's  Ferry,  behind  Schofield.  Blair's  Corps  would  await 
Stoneman's  return  from  his  raid,  and  then  march  to  Eoswell. 
Stoneman  did  not  succeed  in  reaching  the  railroads  near  At 
lanta,  but  destroyed  bridges  and  boats  between  Campbell- 
town  and  Newnan,  and  was  back  by  the  night  of  the  15th,  so 
that  on  the  16th  everything  was  ready  for  a  general  advance. 

The  northern  part  of  Georgia  had  been  made  a  military 
district  under  command  of  Major-General  Steedman,  so  that 
the  protection  of  Sherman's  communications  might  be  sys 
tematized  under  a  responsible  head.  The  mounted  infantry 
of  this  district,  under  Colonels  Watkins  and  Croxton,  had 


ACROSS   THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE  143 

given  a  good  account  of  itself  in  the  latter  part  of  June,  by 
defeating  a  Confederate  force  under  General  Pillow,  which 
had  advanced  to  Lafayette,  in  an  effort  to  reach  the  railway. 
On  the  28th  of  June,  Brigadier-General  John  E.  Smith's 
division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  arrived  at  Chattanooga  and 
was  divided  into  several  parts,  guarding  the  more  important 
posts  and  bridges  along  the  line  to  Alatoona. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

JOHNSTON  SUCCEEDED  BY  HOOD— PEACHTREE  CREEK- 
CLOSING  IN   ON  ATLANTA. 

IT  was  by  no  means  a  simple  or  easy  matter  for  Sherman 
to  decide  whether  he  would  attempt  to  cross  the  Chatta- 
hoochee  by  his  right  or  his  left  flank.  From  the  Boswell 
factories  to  the  railway  crossing,  the  course  of  the  river  is 
very  little  west  of  south,  Koswell  being  in  fact  a  little 
north  of  Marietta  when  parallels  are  drawn.  Below  the 
railway  bridge  the  course  of  the  river  is  nearly  southwest, 
Sandtown  being  about  as  much  south  of  Atlanta  as  Boswell 
is  north  of  Marietta.  Atlanta  itself  is  about  ten  miles  from 
the  river,  by  the  railroad,  and  is  upon  a  high  plateau,  from 
which  the  streams  descend  in  all  directions ;  or  more  ac 
curately  stated,  Atlanta  and  Decatur  are  both  on  the  water 
shed  separating  the  tributaries  of  the  Chattahoochee  from 
those  of  the  Ocmulgee,  which  flows  southeastward  to  the 
ocean.  The  line  of  the  watershed  is  nearly  parallel  to 
the  Chattahoochee,  and  southwest  of  Atlanta  the  valleys  of 
the  smaller  streams  are  on  the  short  line  from  the  river 
to  the  town.  For  this  reason  it  would  be  difficult  for  John 
ston  to  make  any  defensive  line  on  that  side  much  closer  to 
the  river  than  the  city,  because  it  would  have  been  crossed  by 
deep  ravines  perpendicular  to  his  fortifications,  which  would 
make  it  hard  to  move  supports  from  one  part  of  the  line  to 
the  other.  The  railroads  leading  from  Atlanta  to  Montgomery 


CLOSING  IN  ON  ATLANTA.  145 

and  to  Macon  run  out  of  the  city  by  the  same  route  to  the 
southwest  for  several  miles,  till  they  reach  East  Point, 
where  they  separate,  the  former  continuing  its  course  nearly 
parallel  to  the  river,  and  the  latter  turning  away  at  a  right 
angle  to  the  southeast.  On  this  flank,  therefore,  lay  the 
shortest  route  to  Johnston's  southern  communications,  and 
the  National  Army  once  on  the  south  of  the  Ohattahoochee, 
between  Sandtown  and  Gampbelltown,  would  have  been 
already  in  rear  of  Atlanta.  The  Confederate  commander 
must  then  have  evacuated  the  town,  or  have  changed  his 
base,  making  the  railway  through  Decatur  and  his  commu 
nications  with  Eichmond  his  line  of  supplies  and,  if  neces 
sary,  of  retreat. 

Turning  now  to  the  country  northeast  of  Atlanta,  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  terrain  is  a  different  one.  The  streams, 
instead  of  flowing  into  the  Chattahoochee  by  valleys  at 
right  angles  to  the  river,  are  found  between  ridges  parallel 
to  it,  and  after  getting  a  few  miles  south  of  the  bank,  are 
branches  of  one  larger  creek,  the  Peachtree,  of  which  the 
northernmost,  called  Nancy  Creek,  is  parallel  to  the  river ; 
the  middle  one,  called  Little  Peachtree,  has  nearly  the 
same  course ;  but  the  southern,  which  is  the  larger  and 
principal  stream,  runs  nearly  west,  covering  both  Decatur 
and  Atlanta,  and  entering  the  Chattahoochee  by  a  wide  and 
muddy  bed,  very  close  to  the  railway  bridge.  The  ridges 
parallel  to  the  river  on  this  flank  afforded  admirable  lines 
for  the  Confederate  Army,  but  fearing  the  interposition  of 
part  of  the  National  forces  between  him  and  the  railway, 
Johnston  selected  the  south  bank  of  Peachtree  Creek,  near 
est  Atlanta,  for  his  next  defensive  line,  if  Sherman  should 
cross  above  him. 

As  Sherman,  however,  could  not  know  that  his  adversary 
would  not  meet  him  earlier  in  his  march,  as  he  had  done  at 
IX  —7 


146  ATLANTA. 

New  Hope  Church,  that  contingency  had  to  be  considered 
in  his  study  of  the  problem.  The  upper  route  was  plainly 
the  longer  and  the  more  difficult  one  in  itself ;  but  there 
were  other  considerations  which  became  decisive.  To 
adopt  the  lower  route  was  to  leave  the  enemy's  cavalry  the 
opportunity  of  crossing  the  river  at  points  practically  in  our 
rear,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  the  railway,  and  stopping 
supplies  ;  and  the  reasons  which  prevailed  to  make  Sher 
man  operate  by  his  right  at  the  Etowah,  were  still  more 
potent  at  the  Chattahoochee.  The  ever-lengthening  single 
line  of  communication  could  not  be  exposed  for  twenty  or 
thirty  miles  of  its  flank  till  the  Confederate  Army  should  be 
driven  within  the  lines  at  Atlanta  and  the  bridge  across  the 
Chattahoochee  rebuilt.  Besides,  Grant  telegraphed  that  it 
was  not  improbable  that  Johnston  would  be  reinforced  by 
the  troops  the  Richmond  Government  was  withdrawing 
from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  supposed  to  be  twenty  thou 
sand  or  more,  and  this  made  an  additional  reason  for  cut 
ting  the  Georgia  Railroad  near  Decatur  as  soon  as  possible, 
thus  preventing  that  direct  line  to  Richmond  from  being 
made  of  use  to  the  enemy. 

Sherman  therefore  determined  that  the  longest  way 
round  would  prove  the  surest,  and  took  the  chances  of  the 
difficult  ground  near  the  river  on  his  left  flank.  He  or 
dered  Schofield  to  move  out  from  the  river  by  way  of  Cross 
Keys  toward  Decatur,  McPherson  to  keep  farther  to  the 
left,  with  Garrard's  cavalry  on  his  flank  cutting  and  destroy 
ing  the  railroad  between  Decatur  and  Stone  Mountain, 
whilst  Thomas  with  more  than  half  the  whole  army  marched 
by  several  roads  from  Pace's  and  Phillips's  Ferries  on  Atlanta, 
his  left  following  the  road  by  Buckhead.  Approaching  the 
town  with  the  right  of  his  army,  Sherman  would  then  wheel 
the  whole  to  the  right,  letting  this  wing  cover  the  railroad, 


CLOSING   IN   ON   ATLANTA.  147 

as  his  left  had  done  at  Ackworth,  while  the  bridge  at  the 
Chattahoochee  should  be  rebuilt  and  fortified. 

In  this  movement  McPherson  would  have  three  or  four 
times  the  distance  to  travel  that  Thomas  had,  and  there 
would  be  the  danger  that  the  enemy  might  attack  the  right 
flank,  which  was  thus  presented  to  them  ;  but  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  was  a  single  organization  of  nearly  fifty 
thousand  men,  and  with  Thomas's  great  and  deserved  repu 
tation  for  military  skill,  unflinching  courage,  and  steady 
persistence,  Sherman  felt  confident  that  he  could  hold  the 
whole  Confederate  Army  at  bay  till  the  manoeuvre  should 
be  completed. 

Johnston  had  the  important  advantage  of  knowing  the 
country  by  occupation,  and  not  from  imperfect  maps.  He 
reckoned  with  confidence  on  the  probability  that  Sherman's 
right  wing  would  be  separated  from  the  centre  when  it 
should  cross  Peachtree  Creek,  and  planned  an  attack  upon 
it  with  the  greater  part  of  his  own  forces  when  it  should  be 
thus  exposed  and  while  it  should  be  in  motion.  His  for 
tifications  began  at  the  railroad  about  two  miles  from  the 
river,  and  extended  some  six  miles  east  till  they  reached 
the  Pea  Vine  Creek  at  its  junction  with  Peachtree.  There 
the  line  turned  south  along  Pea  Vine  Creek  till  it  reached 
the  Georgia  Railway  between  Atlanta  and  Decatur.  The 
ground  was  well  chosen  and  the  intrenchments  were  of  the 
formidable  character  with  which  we  are  already  familiar. 

But  Johnston  was  not  to  deliver  battle  upon  the  ground 
he  had  selected.  On  the  17th  of  July  he  knew  that  the  Na 
tional  Army  was  advancing  from  its  bridges  in  several  col 
umns  and  was  making  his  preparations  for  the  next  day's 
work,  giving  instructions  to  his  Chief  Engineer  with  no 
thought  or  warning  of  change  in  his  own  relations  to  the 
army,  when  he  received  telegraphic  orders  from  Richmond 


148  ATLANTA. 

to  turn  over  the  command  to  General  Hood.  General  Bragg, 
who  was  then  acting  as  Chief-of -Staff  to  the  Confederate 
President,  had  visited  the  army  two  or  three  days  before, 
but  had  given  no  intimation  to  Johnston  of  the  dissatisfac 
tion  of  the  Richmond  government  or  of  the  intended  change. 
The  ostensible  reason  was  his  failure  to  defeat  Sherman,  and 
his  unwillingness  to  give  assurance  that  he  could  even  an 
swer  for  the  permanent  safety  of  Atlanta  and  its  important 
railway  connections.  In  obeying  the  order,  as  he  did 
promptly,  Johnston  with  great  justice  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  Lee's  retreat  in  Virginia  had  been  quite  as  rapid 
as  his  own  and  quite  as  far :  and  intimated  that  the  resist 
ance  his  army  had  made  was  better  evidence  of  the  proba 
ble  future  than  any  sounding  promises  in  words.  It  is  now 
well  known  that  Mr.  Davis  did  not  like  Johnston,  and  he 
was  no  doubt  influenced  by  his  prejudices  to  believe  that  a 
more  aggressive  policy  would  do  for  Georgia  than  Lee  found 
practicable  in  Virginia. 

It  is  certain  that  the  change  of  Confederate  commanders 
was  learned  with  satisfaction  by  every  officer  and  man  in  the 
National  Army.  The  patient  skill  and  watchful  intelligence 
and  courage  with  which  Johnston  had  always  confronted 
them  with  impregnable  fortifications,  had  been  exasperat 
ing.  They  had  found  no  weak  joints  in  the  harness,  and  no 
wish  was  so  common  or  so  often  expressed  as  that  he  would 
only  try  our  works  as  we  were  trying  his.  It  was  now  known 
that  this  was  likely  to  come,  not  only  because  Hood's  char 
acter  as  a  soldier  implied  it,  but  because  the  reasons  for  the 
change  were  known  to  be  based  upon  a  determination  to 
pursue  a  more  aggressive  policy.  It  was  understood  that 
hard  blows  were  to  be  received  ;  but  Sherman's  whole  army 
was  supremely  confident  in  its  ability  to  take  such  prompt 
advantage  of  natural  and  artificial  means  of  defence,  as  to 


CLOSING  IN  ON   ATLANTA.  149 

punish  aggression  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  severely  enough 
to  reduce  his  strength  with  great  rapidity.  It  is  not  over 
praise  of  the  National  Army  to  say  that  its  veterans  were 
panic-proof ;  and  its  well-tried  courage  was  so  intelligent 
and  quick-witted  that  the  smallest  detachments  could  be 
relied  upon  to  do  a  wise  and  bold  thing  in  almost  any 
juncture. 

If  aggression  was  to  be  tried,  it  would  be  hard  to  find  any 
commander  better  fitted  than  Hood  to  test  it.  He  had 
gained  renown  as  a  division  commander  under  Longstreet  in 
Virginia,  and  at  Gaines's  Mills,  Second  Manassas,  Antietam, 
and  Gettysburg  he  had  shown  the  kind  of  courage  and  dash 
which  made  him  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  soldier  of  the  Jack 
son  school.  It  was  a  fatal  error  to  suppose  that  the  Army 
in  Georgia  could  afford  to  take  the  kind  of  initiative  now  in 
tended;  but  it  was  the  error  of  the  Kichmond  government, 
and  Hood,  though  he  had  been  freely  critical  of  Johnston's 
cautious  strategy,  seems  to  have  been  sincerely  reluctant  to 
take  the  command  under  the  implied  conditions. 

Johnston  tells  us  that  he  fully  informed  Hood  of  his  plans, 
both  for  attacking  Sherman  at  Peachtree  Creek,  and  then  of 
moving  the  bulk  of  his  troops  south  and  east  of  Atlanta  and 
striking  a  blow  upon  the  other  flank.  Whether  the  details 
of  Johnston's  method  would  have  been  the  same  as  Hood's 
is  uncertain,  but  Hood  adopted  the  general  ideas  of  his 
predecessor  in  both  parts.  The  promotion  of  Hood  was  ac 
companied  by  changes  in  the  command  of  two  of  the  three 
corps  which  composed  the  Confederate  Army.  General 
A.  P.  Stewart  was  assigned  to  what  was  formerly  Polk's 
corps,  General  Cheatham  took  Hood's,  and  Hardee  retained 
his  own.  On  the  morning  of  the  20th  July,  these  were  in  the 
Peachtree  Creek  intrenchments,  Stewart's  on  the  left,  near 
est  the  Chattahoochee,  Hardee  in  the  centre,  and  Cheatham 


150  ATLANTA. 

on  the  right,  with  the  Georgia  State  troops  under  General 
G.  W.  Smith  still  farther  on  that  flank. 

General  Thomas  had  not  been  able  to  get  a  pontoon 
bridge  at  Pace's  Ferry  laid  at  as  early  a  day  as  Sherman's 
order  of  the  14th  contemplated.  On  the  17th,  Wood's  divi 
sion  of  Howard's  corps,  which  was  then  at  Powers's  Ferry,  the 
next  ferry  below  Phillips's,  marched  down  the  left  bank  of 
the  river,  driving  off  the  enemy's  skirmishers  and  covering 
the  laying  of  the  bridge  at  Pace's  Ferry.  It  next  day  re 
joined  the  corps  near  Buckhead.  Palmer's  corps  crossed 
first  at  Pace's  Ferry,  and  Hooker's  followed.  Palmer  thus 
formed  the  right  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Hooker 
the  centre,  and  Howard  the  left.  Palmer  wras  scarce  more 
than  a  mile  from  Nancy's  Creek  when  he  crossed  the  river, 
and  as  that  stream  joins  Peachtree  only  a  little  further  to 
the  right,  it  is  evident  that  the  extreme  flank  of  the  army 
must  stand  fast  and  be  the  pivot  on  which  a  wheeling  move 
ment  was  made. 

On  the  18th,  Howard  was  at  Buckhead,  Palmer  at  the 
junction  of  Nancy  Creek  and  Peachtree,  with  Hooker  be 
tween.  Schofield  inarched  through  Cross  Keys  south,  to  the 
north  fork  of  Peachtree  Creek.  Sherman's  headquarters  were 
with  Schofield  that  night.  McPherson  reached  the  Augusta 
Eailroad  early  in  the  afternoon,  at  its  north  curve  two  miles 
from  Stone  Mountain,  and  seven  from  Decatur.  There  M. 
L.  Smith's  division  of  Logan's  corps,  with  Garrard's  cavalry, 
destroyed  several  miles  of  the  railway.  For  the  19th,  Sher 
man  ordered  Thomas  to  hold  on  with  his  right  near  Howell's 
Mill,  let  his  left  swing  across  Peachtree  Creek  about  the 
South  Fork,  and  connect  with  Schofield,  who  would  approach 
Decatur  from  the  north,  while  McPherson  did  the  same 
from  the  east.  Thomas  kept  his  troops  rather  closer  to  the 
right  than  this  order  implied,  for  it  would  have  taken 


CLOSING   IN   ON   ATLANTA.  151 

Hooker  more  nearly  into  Howard's  position,  and  allowed 
the  whole  of  the  Fourth  Corps  to  reach  out  toward  Scho- 
field ;  but  as  Sherman  said  a  day  or  two  later,  the  maps 
were  all  wrong,  and  the  general  officers  were  constantly  mis 
led  in  attempting  to  reckon  distances  or  connections  by 
them.  There  were  in  fact  two  "  Howell's  Mills,"  one  on 
Nancy  Creek,  and  the  other  on  Peach  tree,  and  the  position 
of  the  right  flank  would  be  changed  two  miles,  as  one  or 
the  other  of  them  were  understood. 

The  19th  of  July  was  spent  by  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  in  its  efforts  to  get  a  foothold  on  the  south  side 
of  Peachtree  Creek.  Davis's  division  of  Palmer's  corps 
attempted  to  cross  at  HowelFs  Mill,  but  finding  the  resist 
ance  there  very  stubborn,  made  an  effort  somewhat  lower 
down,  and  succeeded.  One  of  his  brigades  (Dilworth's) 
was  sharply  assailed,  but  repulsed  the  enemy.  A  bridge 
was  built,  some  hills  covering  the  creek  occupied,  and  the 
other  divisions  prepared  to  follow  the  movement  next  day. 
Geary's  division  of  Hooker's  corps  got  over  in  a  bend  of  the 
stream,  a  little  more  than  half  a  mile  above  Howell's  Mill. 
Wood's  division  of  Howard's  corps,  advancing  on  the  prin 
cipal  road  leading  from  Buckhead  to  Atlanta,  found  the 
bridge  in  its  front  burned,  and  the  crossing  commanded  by 
an  intrenched  line  of  skirmishers  on  the  high  ground  be 
yond.  He,  too,  was  obliged  to  resort  to  a  flanking  move 
ment,  and  after  a  sharp  contest  established  himself  on  the 
south  bank.  By  night,  therefore,  Thomas  had  three  heads 
of  column  over  the  stream,  which,  from  its  marshy  banks 
and  deep  muddy  channel,  was  no  inconsiderable  obstacle ; 
and  one  or  more  bridges  was  built  for  each  corps,  besides 
repairing  that  at  Howell's  Mill,  which  the  enemy  was  obliged 
to  abandon  after  Davis's  division  had  effected  its  crossing. 
At  all  these  points  the  resistance  had  been  made  by  infan- 


152  ATLANTA. 

try,  and  the  stubbornness  of  it  proved  that  the  principal  in 
trenched  line  was  not  far  in  front.  From  the  road  occupied 
by  Wood  to  that  held  by  Geary  was  less  than  a  mile  in  a 
direct  line  with  the  valley  of  Shoal  Creek  between,  and  the 
road  from  Howell's  Mill,  where  the  rest  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  would  follow  Davis,  ran  into  Geary's  at  the  plantation 
of  one  Embry,  but  a  little  way  in  front  of  Geary's  position. 
Newton's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  had  marched  on  a 
road  nearly  parallel  to  Wood's,  but  somewhat  farther  east. 
He  had  found  the  bridge  in  his  front  destroyed,  and  re 
ported  the  enemy's  infantry  in  force  on  the  other  side,  and 
was  therefore  instructed  by  General  Howard  to  move  to  the 
right  and  support  Wood,  which  he  did.  For  practical  pur 
poses,  therefore,  nearly  half  of  Sherman's  army  was  showing 
a  front  of  only  a  mile  on  the  right  flank,  while  the  other 
half,  though  converging  on  Atlanta,  reached  all  the  way  to 
Decatur,  some  eight  miles  away.  It  was  to  remedy  this 
that  Sherman's  order  was  made  directing  Howard  to  connect 
with  Schofield. 

Stanley's  division  had  marched  by  the  road  from  Buck- 
head  toward  Decatur,  which  crosses  the  north  fork  of 
Peachtree  about  half  a  mile  above  its  junction  with  the 
south  fork.  The  Confederate  cavalry  opposed  him,  and  as 
he  approached  the  creek  set  the  bridge  on  fire.  Stanley 
drove  them  off  and  got  possession  of  the  bridge  before  it 
was  much  injured,  quickly  repaired  it,  and  marched  his  di 
vision  to  the  south  side,  where  he  encamped  for  the  night. 

The  Confederate  general,  in  executing  the  purpose  of  at 
tacking  already  referred  to,  ordered  Cheatham's  corps  and 
the  Georgia  State  troops  to  hold  fast  on  his  right,  occupy 
ing  the  intrenched  line  from  Jones's  Mill  on  Clear  Creek 
eastward  a  mile,  and  then  south  to  the  Georgia  Railroad. 
This  salient  would  interpose  between  the  two  wings  of 


CLOSING  IN   ON   ATLANTA.  153 

Sherman's  army  as  they  were  moving,  and  Stewart  and 
Hardee  were  ordered  to  swing  forward  their  right  into  the 
interval,  to  attack  by  division  en  echelon  from  the  right, 
crushing  Thomas's  left  flank  if  possible,  and  driving  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  northward  and  westward  toward 
the  Chattahoochee,  with  the  muddy  and  difficult  bed  of 
Peachtree  Creek  behind  it. 

But  Schofield  and  McPherson  were  approaching  Atlanta 
from  the  east  faster  than  Hood  was  aware,  in  spite  of  very 
vigorous  efforts  of  Wheeler's  cavalry  to  retard  them.  On 
the  night  of  the  19th  Schofield  was  over  the  south  fork  of 
Peachtree,  and  at  Pea  Vine  Creek  on  the  Peyton  planta 
tions.  The  little  stream  before  him  is  a  branch  of  the 
south  fork  of  Peachtree,  and  runs  nearly  due  north,  par 
allel  to  Cheathani's  intrenchments,  a  mile  and  a  half  from 
them,  with  a  high  ridge  and  another  deep  hollow  between. 
Dodge's  (Sixteenth)  corps  of  McPherson's  army  connected 
with  Schofield's  left,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  20th  the 
whole  of  Sherman's  left  wing  advanced,  threatening  to  turn 
Hood's  extreme  right. 

This  necessitated  the  moving  of  Cheatham  further  in  that 
direction,  and  the  attack  which  Hood  had  planned  for  one 
o'clock  was  delayed  till  his  whole  command  could  take 
ground  to  the  right  for  about  the  distance  of  a  division 
front.  His  advance  was  thus  delayed  till  the  middle  of  the 
afternoon  ;  but  the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  being  continuous,  the  only  effect  of  the  delay  was  to 
shorten  the  distance  he  would  have  to  traverse. 

General  Thomas  was  in  some  embarrassment  to  determine 
how  best  to  carry  out  the  orders  to  connect  with  Schofield 
on  his  left ;  for  as  his  corps  were  advancing  on  parallel 
roads  toward  Atlanta,  the  character  of  the  country  was 
such  that  he  could  only  move  his  troops  to  the  left  by  con- 


154  ATLANTA. 

siderable  circuits  to  his  rear.  He  concluded,  therefore, 
to  let  Palmer  and  Hooker  go  forward  by  the  roads  they 
were  on,  to  keep  Newton's  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  on 
the  direct  Buckhead  and  Atlanta  road,  and  let  Howard  take 
Wood's  division  of  his  corps  by  a  detour  to  the  east,  unite 
it  with  Stanley's,  and  with  both  divisions  press  forward  till 
he  should  find  himself  within  supporting  distance  of  Scho- 
field.  Could  Thomas  have  known  the  position  of  Hood's 
lines  and  that  he  was  shifting  his  divisions  eastward,  he 
would  no  doubt  have  found  a  way  of  doing  the  same ;  for, 
as  it  turned  out,  Hood's  attack  fell  upon  Newton's  division 
and  Hooker's  corps,  leaving  Palmer's  corps  almost  wholly 
unemployed,  while  a  gap  of  nearly  two  miles  separated 
Newton  from  the  rest  of  the  Fourth  Corps  under  Howard. 
But  Thomas  had  no  means  of  seeing  through  the  impenetra 
ble  veil  of  the  forest-covered  hills  in  his  front,  and  the  acci 
dental  separation  of  his  corps  was  in  great  part  due  to  the 
misleading  maps  which  deceived  both  him  and  Sherman  as 
to  the  distance  between  the  wings  of  the  army. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th  Palmer  put  Johnson's  divi 
sion  over  the  creek  at  Howell's  Mill,  and  it  took  position 
on  the  left  of  Baird,  who  had  crossed  during  the  night. 
Davis's  division  still  retained  its  place  as  the  extreme  right 
of  the  army. 

Hooker  directed  Williams's  division  to  cross  in  rear  of 
Geary,  and  move  to  his  right.  After  getting  over  Geary's 
bridge,  Williams  took  a  country  road  leading  to  Embry's, 
where  the  direct  road  from  Howell's  Mill  comes  in,  and  thus 
extended  Geary's  line  parallel  to  the  general  course  of  the 
creek.  In  similar  manner  Hooker  directed  Ward's  division 
(formerly  Butterfield's)  to  form  on  Geary's  left.  As  the  short 
est  way  of  doing  this  from  his  position  on  the  north  side  of 
the  creek,  Ward  marched  to  the  bridge  in  rear  of  Newton's 


CLOSING  IN   ON   ATLANTA.  155 

division  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  after  crossing  took  posi 
tion  behind  some  lulls  overlooking  Shoal  Creek,  which  lay 
in  a  pretty  deep  valley  between  him  and  Geary.  In  this 
valley  there  was  open  country  along  the  stream,  especially 
about  Collier's  Mill,  which  was  a  little  in  rear  of  his  right 
flank. 

Newton  had  moved  his  division  forward  after  relieving 
Wood,  and  was  about  half  a  mile  south  of  Peachtree  Creek, 
with  his  left  flank  toward  Clear  Creek,  and  his  whole  line 
covering  the  cross  road  that  leads  to  Collier's  Mill.  All  of 
the  divisions  were  deployed  with  two  brigades  in  front  and 
one  as  a  reserve.  Newton  had  a  battery  on  the  road  in  his 
centre,  and  another  in  reserve,  and  had  covered  his  front 
hastily  with  a  barricade  of  rails  and  timber.  Ward  had  not 
been  able  to  move  his  cannon  across  the  ravines,  and  a  bat 
tery  of  his  division  was  left  near  the  bridge  and  was  used  by 
General  Thomas  with  excellent  effect  later  in  the  day. 
Geary  and  Williams  had  their  field  batteries  with  them,  and 
so  had  the  divisions  of  Palmer's  corps. 

About  three  o'clock  Hood's  lines  appeared,  and  a  violent 
combat  began  at  Newton's  left,  which  by  the  Echelon  move 
ment  ordered  by  Hood,  would  be  first  reached  in  the  attack. 
The  enemy  passed  Newton's  flank  near  Clear  Creek,1  but  was 
there  attacked  by  his  reserve  brigade  (Bradley's)  and  a  bat 
tery  of  artillery,  and  driven  back.  The  assault  now  reached 
Newton's  front,  and  Blake's  brigade  on  the  left  of  the  road 
with  the  battery  easily  held  their  ground.  On  the  right  of 
the  road  was  Kimball's  brigade,  and  the  enemy's  force  far 
outflanking  it,  it  was  forced  to  change  front  to  the  rear, 
holding  on  by  the  left  and  refusing  the  right.  Ward's  divi- 

1  It  is  called  Pea  Vine  in  Howard's  report ;  but  this  is  an  error.  See  IT.  S.  En 
gineers'  maps.  Pea  Vine  Creek  is  a  branch  of  the  south  fork  of  Peachtree,  sev 
eral  miles  higher  up  the  stream. 


156  ATLANTA. 

siou  was  lying  in  a  hollow  below  and  farther  to  the  right 
rear,  and  to  them  it  looked  as  if  Newton  was  beaten.  His 
brigade  commanders  seized  the  initiative  without  waiting 
for  orders,  and  leading  their  brigades  gallantly  to  the  hill 
top  before  them,  they  struck  the  flank  of  the  enemy  which 
was  assailing  Kimball.  Coburn's  and  Wood's  brigades  came 
up  on  the  left,  with  Harrison's  on  the  right,  and  their  sudden 
appearance  at  the  crest  of  the  hill  threw  the  enemy  before 
them  into  confusion. 

But  the  progressive  attack  had  now  reached  beyond  Shoal 
Creek,  and  Geary's  division  was  engaged.  His  left  front  was 
covered  by  a  ravine  leading  down  to  Shoal  Creek  and  his 
right  was  on  high  ground  and  thrown  somewhat  forward.  In 
front  of  his  left  was  open  ground,  and  here  his  artillery  was 
placed  with  Candy's  brigade.  Jones's  brigade  was  on  Candy's 
right,  with  a  heavily  wooded  country  before  it,  and  Ireland's 
brigade  was  in  rear  of  Jones.  The  shape  of  the  ground 
brought  the  collision  first  on  Geary's  right.  He,  too,  had  a 
slight  barricade  and  his  centre  and  left  held  firm,  but  he  was 
obliged  to  change  front  of  part  of  his  right,  and  to  deploy 
Ireland's  brigade  so  as  to  put  it  between  Jones  and  Candy, 
letting  Jones  continue  curving  rearward  till  he  connected 
with  Williams.  When  the  enemy  advanced  into  the  angle 
between  Ward's  division  and  Geary's  left,  they  were  met  with 
canister  from  Geary's  batteries  and  with  the  infantry  fire  in 
front  and  flank.  They  lost  their  organization,  and  were 
fearfully  slaughtered.  Few  battlefields  of  the  war  have 
been  strewn  so  thickly  with  dead  and  wounded  as  they  lay 
that  evening  around  Collier's  Mill. 

Williams  was  advancing  his  division  when  the  heavy  mus 
ketry  firing  on  the  left  warned  him  to  deploy.  He  was  on 
the  right  rear  of  Geary,  and  his  left  front  was  covered  by  a 
ravine  which  ran  into  Shoal  Creek  in  rear  of  Geary's  line. 


CLOSING   IN   ON   ATLANTA.  157 

His  right  rested  on  a  ravine  also,  which  separated  him  from 
the  Fourteenth  Corps,  and  his  centre  was  on  the  higher 
ground  between.  The  direction  of  all  these  ridges  and  ra 
vines  from  Newton  to  Williams  was  such  as  to  throw  for 
ward  the  right  of  each  command  as  it  rested  on  them,  and 
the  division  commanders,  except  Newton,  all  found  their 
right  flank  receiving  the  brunt  of  the  first  attack.  Williams 
deployed  Robinson's  brigade  on  his  left,  Knipe's  on  the  right 
of  it,  and  held  Ruger's  in  reserve,  distributing  his  batteries 
with  special  reference  to  sweeping  the  ravines  on  either 
flank  and  the  wooded  ridge  in  front  of  Knipe.  The  enemy 
pressing  in  between  Geary's  refused  right  flank  and  Robin 
son's  brigade,  suffered  almost  as  severely  as  in  the  similar 
situation  between  Geary  and  Ward,  though  the  woods  and 
thickets  here  gave  them  some  shelter.  On  Williams's  right 
they  tried  to  pass  between  him  and  Johnson's  division  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  but  Williams,  by  deploying  part  of  Rug 
er's  brigade,  defeated  this.  In  front  they  were  easily  re 
pulsed,  though  loth  to  withdraw. 

The  whole  of  the  Confederate  line  of  battle  was  now  de 
veloped,  and  did  not  reach  Palmer's  corps.  His  left  brigade 
(Colonel  Anson  McCook's)  assisted  in  repulsing  the  attack 
upon  Williams's  right,  but  does  not  seem  to  have  been  itself 
assailed.  A  warm  artillery  fire  was  kept  up  from  works  in 
front  of  Palmer  and  was  responded  to  by  his  batteries,  but 
no  advance  was  there  made  from  either  side. 

Not  content  with  this  first  repulse,  Hood's  division  com 
manders  rallied  their  men  again  and  again  to  the  attack. 
On  Newton's  left  there  was  nothing  to  oppose  them,  and 
they  tried  again  to  turn  his  flank.  General  Thomas  was 
there  in  person,  and  ordering  up  Ward's  batteries,  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  were  left  behind  their  division,  he  put  them 
in  a  position  to  sweep  the  valley  of  Clear  Creek,  and  drive 


158  ATLANTA. 

back  the  column  that  threatened  to  get  in  Newton's  rear. 
Along  the  whole  line  the  attack  had  been  repulsed,  and  its 
only  chance  of  success  had  been  in  the  first  surprise ;  yet 
with  sullen  determination  and  unwillingness  to  accept  de 
feat,  the  efforts  to  reform  and  advance  again  were  continued 
till  sunset,  when  the  enemy  retired  to  his  works. 

The  question  of  relative  losses  in  this  engagement  is  sur 
rounded  by  the  difficulties  which  have  been  discussed  in 
other  places.  Those  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  ex 
cept  in  Palmer's  corps,  are  fully  and  officially  reported,  and 
were  1,707  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  Of  these,  New 
ton's  division  lost  only  100,  having  succeeded  apparently 
in  making  better  cover  than  the  other  divisions  before  the 
attack  was  received  ;  Ward  lost  550,  Geary  476,  and  Williams 
580.  Of  these  about  one-fifth  were  killed.  Geary  alone  re 
ports  any  considerable  number  of  missing,  there  being  165 
in  his  division,  and  this  no  doubt  indicates  that  there  was, 
in  the  early  part  of  the  battle,  some  confusion  on  his  right, 
which  was  "in  the  air"  till  he  changed  front  and  connected 
with  Williams. 

As  to  the  Confederate  losses,  Hood,  though  writing  after 
the  publication  of  Sherman's  "  Memoirs,"  and  quoting  from 
its  account  of  this  engagement,  does  not  criticise  its  statement 
of  Hooker's  estimate  of  4,400  killed  and  wounded  in  front  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps.  This  is  strong  negative  testimony, 
and  the  other  evidence  more  than  sustains  it.  Geary's  fatigue 
parties  buried  409  Confederates,  and  he  reports  these  as 
being  in  his  front.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  they  were 
in  both  his  front  and  Ward's,  as  the  latter  makes  no  report 
on  this  point,  and  Collier's  Mill,  where  the  great  loss  was, 
stood  in  a  reentrant  angle  between  the  divisions.  Besides 
these  there  wrere  the  losses  in  front  and  on  the  left  of  New 
ton,  where  it  is  admitted  that  the  artillery  posted  by  Gen- 


CLOSING   IN   ON   ATLANTA.  159 

eral  Thomas  made  great  havoc,  and  where  200  of  the  enemy's 
dead  were  buried.  In  front  of  Williams  and  between  him 
and  the  Fourteenth  Corps  there  was  also  severe  fighting, 
and  Williams  reports  the  burying  of  dead,  though  without 
giving  numbers.  The  losses  in  Williams's  division  were 
heavier  than  Geary's  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  reputa 
tion  of  that  division  gives  assurance  that  it  gave  quite  as 
good  an  account  of  itself  in  the  punishment  of  those  who  at 
tacked  it.  In  the  absence  of  specific  reports  on  this  point 
from  all  the  divisions,  and  even  assuming  that  the  burial 
parties  from  Geary's  division  acted  for  most  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps,  it  would  seem  impossible  to  put  the  Confederate 
dead  below  800.  Hood's  medical  director's  report  makes 
the  proportion  of  killed  to  wounded  in  the  engagements 
around  Atlanta,  about  one  to  six.  This  would  make  his 
casualties  in  all,  including  prisoners,  about  six  thousand. 

Hood  and  his  subordinates  agree  in  saying  that  this  was 
intended  for  a  decisive  engagement,  and  that  the  order 
transmitted  from  the  General-in-Chief  down  to  regiments, 
was  that  the  troops  should  attack  desperately  whatever  they 
might  find  in  their  front,  and  strive  to  make  there  an  end  of 
the  campaign.  But  the  advance  of  Sherman's  left  wing  on 
that  day  was  more  rapid  than  the  Confederate  general  had 
reckoned  on,  and  the  urgent  reports  from  Wheeler's  cavalry 
and  from  Cheatham,  that  the  National  forces  were  outflank 
ing  them,  disjointed  his  plans.  First  Cheatham  was  ordered 
to  move  a  division's  length  to  his  right,  as  we  have  already 
seen ;  then  the  absolute  necessity  of  covering  the  Decatur 
road  was  such  that  Cheatham  ordered  his  right  under  Gen 
eral  Brown  to  extend  to  the  railroad.  Even  then  he  was 
obliged  to  put  part  of  his  troops  in  single  line,  and  the 
movement  to  the  right,  instead  of  covering  a  division  length 
of  front,  had  been  nearly  two  miles. 


130  ATLANTA. 

McPherson  was  advancing  along  the  railroad,  and  Scho- 
field  upon  a  parallel  road  a  mile  and  a  half  farther  north. 
Howard,  with  Stanley's  and  Wood's  divisions  was  on  Scho- 
field's  right,  a  mile  distant.  He  had  found  the  bridge  over 
the  south  fork  of  Peachtree  burned ;  but  after  some  sharp 
skirmishing  Stanley  succeeded  in  rebuilding  it  and  getting 
his  column  over  and  deployed.  Wood  followed  and  de 
ployed  on  Stanley's  right.  The  road  on  which  Howard  was 
marching  converged  on  that  used  by  Schofield.  It  was  the 
road  known  as  the  Cross  Keys  road,  approaching  Atlanta 
from  the  northeast,  by  way  of  the  Howard  House  and  Lewis 
Mill.  Schofield's  advance  division  (Cox's)  developed  a 
strong  line  of  intrenchments  crossing  the  road,  but  running 
nearly  parallel  to  it  toward  the  north.  The  leading  brigade 
was  soon  sharply  engaged  with  intrenched  skirmishers,  and 
the  others  formed  forward  on  the  left  of  it.  Hascall's  divi 
sion  passed  and  formed  in  a  similar  way  on  the  left  of  these, 
Stanley's  and  Wood's  divisions  came  into  line  on  the  right. 
Dodge's  (Sixteenth)  corps  had  been  abreast  with  Schofield 
near  Decatur,  but  the  converging  character  of  the  roads  had 
brought  Logan  (Fifteenth  Corps)  on  Schofield's  left,  Blair 
(Seventeenth  Corps)  was  on  McPherson's  left  flank,  and 
Dodge  was  thus  put  in  reserve.  Garrard's  cavalry  followed, 
destroying  the  railroad. 

At  one  o'clock,  the  hour  set  for  the  attack  by  Stewart 
and  Hardee  on  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Wheeler  was 
falling  back  so  close  to  Atlanta  that  Hood  ordered  him  to 
hold  on  at  all  hazards,  reminding  him  that  General  Smith 
with  all  the  reserve  artillery  was  in  the  works  behind  him. 
Gresharn's  division  of  Blair's  corps  (moving  across  the  coun 
try  over  which  Hardee,  in  a  couple  of  days,  was  to  march 
upon  the  rear  of  the  same  division)  pushed  the  Confederate 
cavalry  back  upon  a  bald  hill,  which  was  to  be  the  centre 


CLOSING   IN    ON   ATLANTA.  1G1 

and  key  of  a  desperate  combat  on  the  22d.  The  energy 
of  Gresham's  movement  was  splendid,  but  in  leading  the 
advance  of  his  column,  he  himself  fell,  terribly  wounded. 
Yet  the  odds  was  still  overwhelming,  and  about  six  o'clock  it 
was  so  evident  that  Wheeler  must  be  driven  within  the  forti 
fications  of  the  city  and  that  Cheatham's  line  was  stretched 
as  much  as  it  would  bear,  that  Hood  ordered  Hardee  to 
send  a  division  at  once  to  support  the  cavalry.  Hardee 
directed  Cleburne  to  march  in  obedience  to  the  order,  and 
this  splendid  division  moved  silently  into  the  breastworks 
on  the  commanding  ground,  including  the  bald  hill  south 
of  the  railway,  where  the  exhausted  cavalry  had  made  their 
last  stand  as  night  came  on. 

The  order  withdrawing  troops  from  Hardee  had  been  sent 
at  a  critical  moment,  and  to  understand  its  effect  it  is 
necessary  to  go  back  to  the  battle  on  Peachtree  Creek  and 
view  the  field  from  the  Confederate  side.  The  assault  by 
Stewart's  corps  seems  to  have  been  west  of  Shoal  Creek,  his 
right  entering  the  angle  between  Ward's  and  Geary's  divi 
sions,  and  his  left  extending  somewhat  beyond  Williams. 
Hardee  moved  down  the  space  between  Shoal  Creek  and 
Clear  Creek,  and  perhaps  to  the  east  of  the  latter  stream. 
He  had  only  Newton's  division  in  his  front,  though  New 
ton's  right  was  supported  by  Ward.  Hardee  formed  his 
troops  with  Bate's  division  on  his  right,  Walker's  in  the 
centre,  Maney's  on  the  left,  and  Cleburne's  in  reserve. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  Newton's  right  brigade  changed 
front  to  the  right  rear  as  the  enemy  approached,  and 
Walker's  division  first  struck  the  breastworks.  It  was  re 
pulsed,  but  its  persistent  courage  had  been  such  that  when 
it  retired  it  was  so  shattered  that  it  was  unfit  to  be  again 
put  into  action.  Bate  had  found  nothing  in  his  front,  but 
was  seeking  in  the  thicket  a  way  to  Newton's  left  flank. 


1G2  ATLANTA. 

Cleburne's  division  had  been  substituted  for  Walker's 
beaten  men,  and  Hardee  had  given  the  orders  for  another 
attack  when  the  command  from  Hood  was  received  calling 
at  once  for  a  division  to  keep  McPherson  out  of  Atlanta, 
and  Cleburne  was  sent.  Hardee  did  not  think  it  prudent 
to  resume  the  aggressive  with  his  diminished  forces,  and 
before  Bate  could  be  brought  into  line  to  supply  Cleburne's 
place,  night  was  upon  him. 

Hood  did  not  make  his  official  report  till  the  next  winter, 
when  his  campaign  had  closed  in  ruin  at  Franklin  and 
Nashville ;  then  he  sought  to  hold  Hardee  responsible  for 
this  among  other  misfortunes  around  Atlanta.  He  was 
neither  quite  just  nor  generous.  His  defeat  would  have 
been  only  more  costly  if  he  had  attacked  at  one  o'clock, 
moving  from  the  positions  Stewart  and  Hardee  then  oc 
cupied  ;  for  they  would  have  found  the  whole  of  Palmer's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  confronting  them,  as  well  as  the  troops 
which  actually  repulsed  them.  But  the  renewal  of  Har- 
dee's  effort  toward  evening  was  made  impracticable  by 
Hood's  own  order.  This  he  issued  simply  because  Sher 
man's  combinations  brought  McPherson  upon  Cheatham's 
flank  in  abundant  time  to  prevent  the  Confederate  general 
from  gaining  any  advantage  by  reason  of  the  gap  in  the 
centre  of  the  National  line.  If  Hood  had  not  moved  his 
troops  to  the  right,  or  if  he  had  not  taken  Cleburne  from 
Hardee  to  cover  that  flank,  Cheathani  would  have  been 
turned,  and  McPherson  would  have  followed  Wheeler's 
cavalry  into  the  city.1 

1  The  article  in  the  Southern  Historical  Papers,  before  referred  to  (vol.  viii.,  p. 
337),  puts  this  beyond  reasonable  controversy. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

BATTLE  OF   ATLANTA— DEATH   OF  McPHERSON. 

THE  21st  of  July  was  spent  by  the  Armies  of  the  Cum 
berland  and  Ohio  in  advancing  and  intrenching  skirmish 
lines  as  close  as  possible  to  the  enemy's  fortifications. 
General  Wood  was  able  to  swing  forward  his  division  north 
of  the  great  salient  in  his  front,  and  formed  a  connection 
with  Newton,  thus  bringing  the  whole  of  Howard's  corps 
again  into  line  together.  McPherson  made  firm  the  con 
nection  with  Schofield's  left  by  Logan's  (Fifteenth)  corps, 
and  directed  Blair  to  carry  the  high,  bald  hill  half  a  mile 
south  of  the  railroad,  forming  the  southern  extremity  of  the 
line  occupied  by  Cleburne's  division  the  night  before.  The 
assault  was  made  by  Force's  brigade  of  Leggett's  division, 
supported  on  the  right  by  Gresham's  division,  now  com 
manded  by  General  Giles  A.  Smith,  General  Gresham  hav 
ing  been  wounded,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  advance  of  the 
preceding  day.  Force  advanced  under  cover  of  the  hill 
itself,  which,  being  steepest  near  the  base,  protected  the 
attacking  line  from  the  enemy's  fire  at  first.  Soon,  how 
ever,  he  came  into  the  open,  and  dashed  forward  at  the 
barricade  before  him.  The  intrenchment  was  a  slight  one, 
but  Cleburne's  men  fought  with  their  usual  bravery,  and 
were  only  driven  out  after  a  sharp  combat,  and  with  a  loss 
on  our  side  of  250  killed  and  wounded.  The  hill  was  at 
once  intrenched,  though  subjected  to  an  enfilading  fire 


164  ATLANTA. 

from  the  enemy's  batteries  north  of  the  position,  where  their 
line  was  still  intact.  The  intense  heat  was  such  that  three 
staff  officers  in  Force's  brigade  alone  were  prostrated  by  it, 
and  sunstroke  added  considerably  to  the  list  of  casualties. 
But  the  hill  wras  strongly  fortified  by  its  captors,  with  trav 
erses  to  protect  the  guns,  and  its  value  was  tested  next  day. 
From  its  summit  Atlanta  lay  in  full  view,  with  the  large 
rolling  mill  just  inside  the  city  defences,  and  within  range 
of  Leggett's  guns. 

Both  of  Hood's  flanks  were  now  insecure,  and  he  prepared 
to  retire  from  the  Peachtree  line  during  the  night.  Col 
onel  Prestman,  his  chief  engineer,  had  reported  that  the 
works  on  the  north  side  of  the  city  were  badly  located,  and 
selected  a  more  advanced  line  on  higher  ground.  The  new 
line  was  staked  off  during  the  21st,  and  intrenched  during 
the  night  by  portions  of  Cheatham's  and  Stewart's  corps  and 
the  Georgia  troops  under  Smith.  It  began  at  the  former 
line,  where  the  Cross  Keys  road  entered  the  city,  thence  ran 
north  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile,  then  west  to  the  Chat 
tanooga  Kailroad.  A  similar  advanced  line  was  run  south 
ward  in  front  of  McPherson's  left  flank. 

Hood  determined  to  withdraw  into  these  works  all  of  his 
army  except  Hardee's  corps  of  four  divisions,  and  to  send 
this  by  a  long  detour  to  make  an  attack  upon  the  extreme 
flank  and  rear  of  McPherson's  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  ex 
pecting  to  follow  up  any  success  it  might  gain,  by  marching 
out  with  Cheatham's  corps  upon  Schofield,  and  hoping  thus 
to  roll  up  Sherman's  army  from  the  south.  His  original 
orders  contemplated  a  movement  by  the  McDonough  road, 
some  four  or  five  miles  southeast,  and  then  toward  Decatur  ; 
but  Blair's  corps  with  its  right  at  Leggett's  hill  had  both  its 
two  divisions  intrenched  along  the  McDonough  road,  with 
the  left  refused  so  as  to  face  the  south.  This  made  a  change 


BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA— DEATH  OF   McPHERSON.          165 


Operations  around  Atlanta. 


166  ATLANTA. 

of  orders  necessary,  and  Hardee,  withdrawing  in  the  night 
from  his  line,  two  and  a  half  miles  north  of  Atlanta,  marched 
through  the  city  by  a  road  west  of  Entrenchment  Creek 
W7hich  he  crossed  at  Cobb's  Mills,  then  turned  northeast 
toward  Decatur  till  his  head  of  column  was  within  about  two 
and  a  half  miles  of  that  place.  It  was  now  a  little  after  day 
break,  and  he  waited  for  his  troops  to  close  up  and  form, 
facing  the  northwest.  Wheeler's  cavalry  passed  the  line  and 
prepared  to  operate  still  further  to  the  east.  The  column 
had  met  with  the  usual  delays  of  night  marches.  Cleburne's 
division  had  left  the  front  of  McPherson's  works,  which  it 
was  now  to  assault  in  rear,  and  had  fallen  in  behind  Har- 
dee's  other  divisions  in  Atlanta  about  one  o'clock.  The  caval 
ry  moving  through  the  column  in  the  darkness  had  made 
further  annoyance  and  delay ;  but,  considering  that  the 
head  of  column  had  marched  some  fifteen  miles,  they  had 
made  good  speed.  Beginning  on  the  left,  the  divisions  were 
in  the  following  order,  viz.,  Maney,  Cleburne,  Walker,  and 
Bate.  After  a  short  rest,  the  order  to  advance  was  given, 
and  the  Confederate  divisions  entered  the  densely  wooded 
country  that  lay  between  them  and  the  National  lines,  mov 
ing  at  right  angles  to  the  road  they  were  leaving. 

Meanwhile,  with  the  breaking  day,  Sherman's  camps  were 
astir,  and  it  was  soon  found  that  the  intrenchments  in  front 
of  Schofield  and  Thomas  wrere  abandoned.  A  general  ad 
vance  was  ordered.  Schofield's  head  of  column,  which 
Sherman  accompanied,  came  in  full  view  of  the  town  at  the 
Howard  House.  The  fortifications  of  Atlanta  were  on  the 
opposite  hills,  just  across  the  deep  valley  in  which  was 
Lewis's  Mill,  and  the  works  were  thick  with  men  shovelling 
and  digging  as  if  for  life,  their  skirmishers  holding  the  line 
of  Clear  Creek  which  flows  northward.  Sherman  rode  for 
ward  to  reconnoitre,  till  his  escort  drew  the  fire  of  the  bat- 


BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA— DEATH  OF  McPHERSON.  167 

teries.  There  was  some  ostentation  in  the  way  the  men  on 
the  fortifications  worked,  but  no  one  suspected  what  ruse  it 
might  covrer.  A  few  batteries  were  soon  in  position  and  as 
they  opened,  the  enemy  vanished  behind  the  works  and  the 
siege  began.  Our  skirmishers  pushed  back  the  lines  before 
them  as  far  as  possible,  and  trenches  were  begun  on  every 
commanding  knoll,  soon  making  a  connected  line  from 
Thomas's  right  flank  to  the  works  held  by  McPherson  since 
the  day  before.  The  extreme  right  of  the  army  now  rested 
near  the  railway,  and  the  work  of  rebuilding  the  great 
bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee  was  already  progressing. 

McPherson  had  also  been  ordered  to  close  in  on  Atlanta 
when  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from  the 
front ;  but  Blair's  corps  was  only  separated  from  the  city 
forts  by  a  single  valley  with  its  creek  (a  branch  of  Entrench 
ment  Creek)  flowing  south.  To  make  room  for  Logan  he 
transferred  G.  A.  Smith's  division  to  his  extreme  left,  leaving 
Leggett  in  position  as  before.  Logan's  corps  was  advanced 
till  General  Charles  K.  Woods's  division  connected  with 
Schofield's  corps,  General  Morgan  L.  Smith's  division  was  in 
the  centre,  and  General  Harrow's  division  on  the  left,  con 
necting  with  Blair.  Dodge's  (Sixteenth)  corps  had  been  in 
reserve  since  July  20th,  but  had  moved  forward  on  the  pre 
ceding  evening.  Fuller's  division  bivouacked  about  a  mile 
east  of  Leggett's  division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  on  the 
high  ground  between  the  branches  of  Sugar  Creek,  a  tribu 
tary  of  South  River.  Sweeny's  division  of  this  corps  was 
near  the  line  of  the  Augusta  Railway,  due  north  from  Fuller's, 
and  McPherson's  headquarters  were  with  it.  The  supply 
trains  and  field  hospitals  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  were 
in  the  interval  between  the  Sixteenth  Corps  and  the  front 
lines,  except  a  part  of  the  train  which  was  at  Decatur, 
guarded  by  Sprague's  brigade  of  Fuller's  division. 


168 


ATLANTA. 


About  noon  on  the  22d,  both  divisions  of  Dodge's  corps 
were  moving  under  orders  toward  Blair's  left  flank,  when 
they  were  attacked  by  Walker's  and  Bate's  divisions  of  Har- 
dee's  corps.  Dodge's  men  were  marching  by  the  flank,  right 
in  front,  and  so,  fortunately,  had  only  to  halt  and  face  to  be 


Battle  of  Atlanta. 

in  line  of  battle.  McPherson,  who  had  just  left  General 
Sherman  at  the  Howard  House,  met  Logan  and  Blair  near 
the  railroad,  half  way  between  their  line  and  Dodge,  and 
they  were  together  when  the  continued  musketry  fire  from 
the  Sixteenth  Corps,  told  that  a  heavy  force  of  the  en- 


BATTLE  QF  ATLANTA— DEATH  OF  McPHERSOX.  169 

emy  was  in  the  rear.  The  corps  commanders  galloped  to 
their  commands  and  McPherson  hastened  to  Dodge,  first 
directing  Blair  to  send  two  regiments  to  cover  the  trains  and 
hospitals.  To  reach  the  divisions  of  Fuller  and  Sweeny  the 
Confederates  had  to  advance  over  some  open  fields,  where  the 
well-sustained  musketry  fire  upon  them  was  terribly  destruc 
tive.  Fuller's  division,  which  was  on  the  right,  sustained 
tho  first  brunt  of  the  attack,  and  repulsed  it ;  but  it  was 
renewed  with  great  determination.  The  Fourteenth  Ohio 
and  Welker's  batteries  were  put  in  position,  and  the  unflag 
ging  fire  of  the  two  divisions  made  it  impossible  for  Walker 
and  Bate  to  force  their  way  across  the  field.  McPherson, 
near  Fuller's  right,  had  ordered  the  trains  out  of  the  inter 
val,  and  had  received  several  messages  from  Blair  informing 
him  that  his  flank  was  also  engaged.  He  had  also  sent  to 
Logan  for  his  reserve  brigade  (Wangelin's)  to  fill  the  gap 
between  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps,  when,  satis 
fied  that  Dodge  could  hold  his  ground,  he  started  at  speed 
to  reach  Blair's  line  by  the  road  which  till  that  moment  had 
been  clear.  He  had  hardly  gone  a  hundred  yards  when  he 
ran  full  into  the  skirmish  line  of  Cleburne  advancing  through 
the  gap.  They  called  to  him  to  surrender,  but  raising  his 
hat  as  if  to  a  salute,  he  wheeled  to  gallop  away,  when  a 
volley  was  fired  and  he  fell  mortally  wounded.  His  staff 
had  been  scattered  carrying  orders,  and  he  was  alone  with 
an  orderly,  who  was  also  shot  and  captured ;  but  a  wounded 
soldier  near  by  managed  to  get  away  and  gave  information 
of  the  great  loss  the  army  had  sustained.  In  a  few  mo 
ments  the  shifting  tide  of  the  battle  had  withdrawn  the 
enemy  a  little,  and  the  general's  body  was  recovered  before 
it  was  yet  cold.  Fuller,  hearing  the  firing  advancing  beyond 
his  right,  had  sent  the  Sixty-fourth  Illinois  to  cover  that 
flank.  This  regiment  was  armed  with  the  Henry  repeating 
IX.— 8 


170  ATLANTA. 

rifles  and  made  so  hot  a  fire  that  Cleburne's  skirmishers  were 
checked  with  considerable  loss,  a  flag  and  some  forty  men 
being  captured.  Upon  the  prisoners  were  found  McPher- 
son's  equipments,  together  with  a  despatch  to  him  from  Sher 
man  detailing  the  plans  for  the  day,  which  there  had  not  yet 
been  time  to  send  to  the  Confederate  commanders.  Follow 
ing  this  advance,  Colonel  Strong  of  McPherson's  staff  had 
been  able  to  secure  and  carry  off  the  remains  of  his  beloved 
chief. 

The  advance  of  Hardee's  left  came  out  in  full  view  of 
Atlanta,  and  lapped  a  little  over  the  front  of  Blair's  refused 
left  wing.  The  form  of  the  works  enabled  Smith's  division 
to  repel  the  enemy  there  without  trouble  ;  but  as  the  rest  of 
Cleburne's  and  Maney's  divisions  moved  forward  into  the 
open  rear,  the  courage  of  the  troops  became  their  destruc 
tion,  for  they  were  soon  surrounded,  and  many  were  killed 
and  some  captured.  There  was  no  time  to  change  front  ex 
cept  by  facing  about,  and  this  the  rest  of  Smith's  division 
did,  leaping  over  their  breastworks  and  fighting  from  the 
other  side.  The  enemy's  advance  pressed  on  till  it  reached 
the  foot  of  the  bald  hill  and  commenced  the  ascent  to  attack 
Leggett  over  the  very  ground  Force's  brigade  had  assaulted 
the  day  before.  This  division,  too,  was  obliged  to  fight 
from  the  reverse  of  its  intrenchments,  but  determined  to  hold 
the  hill  at  all  hazards.  Force's  adjutant,  Captain  Walker, 
fell,  shot  through  the  thigh,  and  Force,  leaning  over  to  sup 
port  his  friend,  received  a  ball  through  the  head,  though  by 
almost  a  miracle  it  passed  below  the  brain  and  was  not  fatal. 

All  this  was  not  the  work  of  a  moment,  for  the  ground  was 
a  thicket  along  most  of  the  line  of  the  enemy's  advance,  and 
even  the  squads  of  men  broken  from  their  ranks,  fought  their 
way  slowly  to  the  rear,  making  Hardee  pay  dearly  for  all  the 
ground  he  gained.  Logan's  reinforcement  arrived,  and  push- 


BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA— DEATH  OF  McPHERSON.  171 

ing  forward  toward  Dodge's  right,  assisted  in  covering  a 
change  of  front  for  Blair's  left,  which  was  now  able  to  pivot 
on  the  bald  hill,  and  gradually,  by  stubborn  fighting,  to 
form  a  new  line,  which  by  the  aid  of  Wangelin's  brigade 
was  almost  continuous  with  Dodge's,  and  was  on  defensible 
ground. 

On  hearing  of  McPherson's  death,  Sherman  ordered  Lo 
gan,  the  senior  corps  commander,  to  assume  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  by  an  encouraging  message  full 
of  confidence  in  that  general  and  his  troops.  As  he  heard, 
however,  that  Sprague's  brigade  in  Decatur  was  also  at 
tacked  by  Wheeler's  cavalry,  he  ordered  Schofield  to  send  a 
brigade  to  cover  the  army  trains  behind  Pea  Vine  Creek  and 
to  assist  Sprague,  and  two  others  to  cover  the  left  flank  of 
Dodge's  corps  on  the  railroad.  Reilly's  brigade  of  Cox's 
division  was  detai]ed  for  the  former  duty,  and  the  division 
commander  with  Cameron's  and  Barter's  brigades,  and  the 
Fifteenth  Indiana  Artillery,  was  sent  on  the  direct  Decatur 
road  to  report  to  Logan.  As  they  passed  out  to  the  flank, 
Dodge  asked  for  one  of  the  brigades  in  his  line,  as  another 
attack  was  imminent,  and  Barter's  was  sent  him,  while 
Cameron's  was  taken  to  commanding  ground  within  a  mile 
and  a  half  of  Decatur  and  intrenched.  Sprague  was  soon 
hard  pressed  in  Decatur,  but  Keilly  going  to  his  assist 
ance,  Wheeler-was  repulsed  and  the  extreme  flank  in  that 
direction  was  made  secure.  M.  L.  Smith  succeeded  Lo 
gan  in  command  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Lightburn  took  temporary  command  of  Smith's 
division. 

Hood  himself  was  in  a  salient  of  the  Atlanta  fortifications 
from  an  early  hour  in  the  morning,  and  when  the  advance  of 
Hardee's  left  reached  the  flank  of  Blair's  corps,  they  came 
in  full  view,  across  an  open  valley.  He  watched  their  prog- 


172  ATLANTA. 

ress  till,  about  three  o'clock  they  had  driven  back  Blair's 
left  so  far  that  they  were  attacking  the  bald  hill  from  the 
south.  Then  he  ordered  Cheatham  to  advance  with  his 
corps  against  the  hill  and  the  line  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
north  of  it,  and  Smith  with  the  Georgia  troops  to  attack  the 
lines  of  Schofield  now  held  only  by  Hascall's  division  and 
Byrd's  brigade  of  Cox's. 

In  the  advance  of  Logan's  corps  early  in  the  morning, 
Colonel  Jones  (Fifty -third  Ohio)  with  two  regiments  of  M. 
L.  Smith's  division,  had  been  pushed  well  forward  and  oc 
cupied  the  top  of  a  hill  half  a  mile  in  front  of  the  rest  of  the 
corps,  having  with  them  two  guns  from  Battery  A,  First  Illi 
nois  Artillery.  The  advance  of  Cheatham's  corps  soon  out 
flanked  this  force,  but  Colonel  Jones  withdrew  it  in  good 
order  to  the  principal  line.  At  this  point  the  railway  passes 
through  a  deep  cut  near  which  was  a  largo  house  so  situ 
ated  as  to  mask  the  approach  of  the  enemy  and  cover  his 
advance  along  the  railway.  Jones  asked  leave  to  burn  the 
house,  but  failed  to  get  it — a  mistake  which  was,  in  part  at 
least,  the  cause  of  the  break  in  the  line  which  occurred 
there  a  little  later. 

Leggett's  division  had  just  repelled  the  attack  from  its 
rear,  fighting  from  the  front  of  their  own  breastworks,  when 
Cheatham's  attack  came,  forcing  the  men  to  leap  back  to  the 
other  side  and  again  fight  toward  their  proper  front.  The 
advantage  of  the  ground  enabled  Blair  to  hold  on  to  the  hill 
by  desperate  fighting,  but  part  of  Logan's  (Fifteenth)  corps 
north  of  it,  being  on  lower  ground  and  taken  in  reverse 
by  the  enemy's  cannonade  from  the  edge  of  the  wood  where 
McPherson  had  been  killed,  broke,  and  were  swept  back  to 
the  railroad,  where  they  formed  along  it  as  a  new  line.  This 
happened  as  follows.  Jones,  temporarily  commanding  Light- 
burn's  brigade,  had  for  a  time  driven  back  the  onslaught 


BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA— DEATH  OF  McPHERSON.  173 

upon  Iris  front,  and  the  rest  of  the  division  in  the  second 
line  had  their  attention  directed  to  the  rear  where  Hardee's 
fire  was  beginning  to  reach  them.  Cheatham  pushed  for 
ward  Manigault's  brigade  to  the  house  in  front  of  Jones,  oc 
cupying  it  and  firing  from  its  windows,  while  the  greater 
part  of  the  same  command,  massing  under  cover  of  the 
house,  rushed  through  the  railway  cut,  turning  the  flank  of 
Jones  and  forcing  his  men  to  fall  back  in  disorder,  though 
not  till  they  had  spiked  the  guns  of  the  Illinois  battery. 
The  second  line  of  the  division  gave  wray  under  this  front 
and  rear  attack,  and  here  it  was  that  De  Gres's  battery  of 
20-pr.  Parrotts  was  also  taken. 

Woods's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  hung  on  by  its 
right  to  Schofield's  position,  but  a  great  gap  in  the  line 
was  opened  in  the  centre  of  the  corps.  Sherman  himself, 
from  near  the  Howard  House,  had  this  part  of  the  field 
in  full  view,  and  immediately  ordered  Schofield  to  mass 
his  artillery  there  and  open  upon  the  enemy's  flank  as  they 
were  crowding  to  the  east.  This  was  done,  the  smooth  guns 
firing  spherical  case-shot  rapidly,  and  Cockerell's  battery 
of  3-inch  ordnance  rifles  double-shotting  with  canister; 
those  admirable  little  guns  proving  as  useful  in  a  close  en 
counter  of  this  sort  as  they  were  in  longer  range.  The  ad 
vance  of  Cheatham  was  checked  with  terrible  carnage,  and 
the  Fifteenth  Corps  rallying  and  making  a  counter-charge, 
the  enemy  were  driven  back  pell-mell,  the  lost  guns,  ex 
cepting  two,  were  retaken  and  the  intrenchments  reoc- 
cupied.  As  Hardee  and  Cheatham  were  operating  on  the 
sides  of  a  right  angle,  they  were  personally  miles  apart,  and 
their  attacks  could  not  be  made  simultaneous.  This  had 
fortunately  enabled  Blair  to  repel  the  assaults  in  front  and 
rear  alternately,  and  in  the  lull  of  the  strife  when  Cleburne 
and  Maney  were  reforming  for  other  efforts,  his  men  sue- 


174  ATLANTA. 

ceeded  in  making  a  light  line  of  breastworks,1  connecting 
the  bald  hill  with  Dodge,  and  the  corps  of  the  latter  covered 
its  front  in  a  similar  way. 

The  crisis  of  the  battle  was  now  passed,  and  though  the 
Confederate  generals  led  their  men  to  the  attack  repeatedly, 
they  only  increased  their  loss  without  seriously  imperilling 
the  position  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Schofield's  men 
in  single  rank  easily  repulsed  the  efforts  of  Smith's  Georgia 
troops  north  of  the  Howard  House,  and  though  Thomas,  in 
obedience  to  Sherman's  orders,  felt  of  the  works  along  the 
front  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  Stewart's  corps,  in  the 
elaborately  prepared  fortifications  of  the  city,  was  able  to 
show  a  front  which  he  did  not  think  it  wise  to  assault. 

As  night  fell  upon  the  field,  Hardee  withdrew  his  right 
wing,  making  a  half  wheel  to  the  rear,  to  the  ridge  between 
Sugar  Creek  and  Entrenchment  Creek,  by  which  he  kept  his 
left  in  practical  connection  with  the  salient  of  the  Atlanta 
fortifications  and  intrenched  in  a  tenable  position.  This 
would  no  doubt  have  made  the  point  d'appui  from  which 
Hood  would  have  extended  his  lines  southward  to  cover  the 
Macon  Railroad  had  Sherman  continued  to  operate  by  our 
left  flank. 

The  pressing  importance  of  increasing  the  gap  broken  in 
the  Augusta  Railroad,  in  view  of  the  warnings  Sherman  had 
received  from  Washington  to  expect  the  enemy  to  be  rein 
forced  by  that  route,  had  made  him  send  Garrard  with  the 
cavalry  eastward  to  Covington,  to  burn  bridges  and  destroy 
the  railroad  track.  This  Garrard  did  handsomely,  but  his 
absence  from  the  left  flank  of  the  army  had  enabled  Hardee 


1  In  Hood's  Advance  and  Retreat,  p.  189,  by  a  typographical  error  in  copying 
a  letter  from  General  Blair,  the  "light  line"  is  printed  "tight  line,"  and  has 
been  copied  in  that  way  into  Confederate  accounts  of  the  battle,  as  if  it  meant  a 
strong  line,  which  in  the  circumstances  was  impossible. 


BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA— DEATH  OF  McPHERSON.  175 

to  approach  without  warning,  and  gave  the  attack  the  mo 
mentary  advantage  which  resulted  from  his  sudden  appear 
ance  in  rear  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps.  It  was  an  attack  of 
four  divisions  upon  four,  in  the  first  instance,  with  the  enor 
mous  odds  of  an  attack  in  rear.  In  the  midst  of  the  melee 
resulting  from  this,  Cheatham's  assault  came  again  in  rear  of 
part  of  Blair's  troops,  adding  overwhelming  odds  in  num 
bers  to  the  disadvantage  of  position.  To  have  repulsed  the 
enemy  from  the  key -points  under  such  circumstances,  and 
to  have  reformed  on  the  interval  between  Blair  and  Dodge 
so  as  to  present  what  proved  an  impregnable  front  there, 
must  be  held  to  have  proven  fighting  qualities  in  the  troops 
which  have  been  rarely  equalled,  and  a  cool-headed  readiness 
in  commanding  officers  from  the  General-in-Chief  downward, 
which  combine  to  make  an  invincible  army. 

The  results  are  in  themselves  a  significant  comment  on 
Hood's  new  tactics  of  aggression.  The  total  loss  in  the  Na 
tional  army  was  3,521  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  with 
ten  pieces  of  artillery.  DeGres's  battery,  which  was  for  a 
time  in  the  enemy's  hands,  was  retaken  by  the  counter 
charge  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps.  The  other  guns  lost  were 
Murray's  "regular"  battery,  which  was  captured  while 
marching  in  the  road  in  rear  of  Blair's  corps  at  the  first  at 
tack,  and  two  guns  of  battery  A,  First  Illinois,  which  had 
been  with  General  Morgan  L.  Smith's  division  in  the  ad 
vanced  line  in  front  of  Logan's  corps,  but  were  taken  and 
dragged  off  when  the  line  afterward  broke. 

Of  the  enemy,  1,000  dead  were  delivered  to  their  flag  of 
truce  in  front  of  one  division  of  Blair's  corps,  422  were 
buried  in  front  of  Dodge's  corps,  about  700  were  buried  in 
front  of  Logan's  corps,  and  Blair  estimated  the  number  in 
front  of  his  other  division  as  many  as  those  delivered  under 
the  flag,  making  a  total  of  3,200.  Reducing  by  half  the 


170  ATLANTA. 

numbers  that  were  estimated,  and  there  would  still  be  at 
least  2,500  killed.  Two  thousand  Confederate  prisoners  were 
taken,  of  whom  half  were  wounded.  With  these  data,  no  in 
genuity  of  figuring  can  reduce  the  enemy's  total  loss  below 
the  ten  thousand  at  which  Logan  put  it. 

Hood  afterward  complained  of  Hardee's  movement  as 
made  too  slowly  and  not  far  enough  to  the  east,  and  his  at 
tack  as  not  vigorous  enough.  The  facts  do  not  justify  the 
complaint.  The  route  actually  travelled  was  fifteen  miles 
for  the  head  of  column,  or  more  than  seven  hours  ordi 
nary  marching.  The  night  and  the  passing  of  cavalry  made 
this  slower  and  more  difficult.  After  forming  and  moving 
through  thickets  and  over  broken  country  for  two  miles, 
where,  as  he  said,  it  was  often  impossible  to  see  ten  paces  in 
advance,  npon  dressing  his  lines  for  the  attack,  his  extreme 
left  just  overlapped  the  left  of  Blair's  corps,  his  alignment 
being  at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees  to  Blair's  and  in  rear 
of  it.  The  movement  of  blocks  upon  a  map  could  hardly  be 
more  exact,  and  to  those  who  were  accustomed  to  march 
through  that  difficult  country,  the  precision  of  it  is  marvel 
lous.  Hardee  did  not  know  of  the  presence  of  Dodge's 
corps  till  he  struck  it,  but  even  so  he  outflanked  it  also  on 
right  and  left,  and  could  not  have  wished  for  a  change  in 
his  line  if  he  had  known  in  advance  exactly  where  it  stood. 
The  attack  was  to  the  full  as  vigorous  and  persistent  as 
Hood's  own  in  front  of  Marietta  on  the  22d  of  June,  and 
it  was  made  as  early  as  could  have  been  expected.  The 
subordinate  general's  work,  viewed  as  a  piece  of  military 
manoeuvring,  will  excite  more  admiration  among  students 
of  the  art  the  more  it  is  examined.  The  causes  of  its  defeat 
have  been  already  stated. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

SIEGE  OF  ATLANTA— EZRA  CHURCH. 

SHERMAN'S  purpose  in  moving  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
upon  Decatur  and  then  to  Atlanta  on  the  east,  had  been  to 
destroy  the  Augusta  road  for  so  great  a  distance  as  to  pre 
vent  its  being  rebuilt  and  used  during  the  rest  of  his  opera 
tions  about  the  city.  Had  Hood  abandoned  the  town,  this 
wing  would  have  been  ready  to  march  to  the  Macon  Railroad 
at  Rough-and-Ready  Station  ;  but  the  question  of  supply 
and  of  easiest  reaching  the  southern  lines  of  railroad  near 
the  city  decided  Sherman  to  extend  his  lines  by  the  right 
flank.  He  only  waited  for  Garrard's  return  from  the  expe 
dition  to  Covington  and  for  resting  and  shoeing  the  horses 
of  Rousseau,  who  had  reached  the  army  after  cutting  the 
Montgomery  Railroad  near  Opelika. 

Some  delicate  questions  of  organization  also  demanded 
his  action.  The  lamented  death  of  McPherson  made  it 
necessary  to  assign  a  commander  to  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee.  Hooker  was  the  senior  officer  available,  if  the  whole 
army  were  considered,  and  Logan  if  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  should  furnish  the  commandant.  A  doubt  whether 
other  corps  commanders  of  the  army  would  cheerfully  serve 
under  Logan,  owing  to  some  existing  jealousies,  was  one 
of  the  reasons  for  making  a  selection  outside  of  that  organ 
ization.  Logan  and  Blair  had  been  very  active  and  promi 
nent  in  the  political  affairs  of  the  country,  and  both  ex- 
6* 


178  ATLANTA. 

pected  to  be  so  again  ;  but  Logan  had  won  his  military 
promotion  by  brave  and  valuable  service,  and  could  show 
honorable  scars  for  each  of  his  grades.  The  trait  in  him 
most  criticised  by  his  companions  in  arms  was  his  queru- 
lousness  and  disposition  to  find  fault  with  commands  given 
him.  He  could  see  fifty  reasons  why  a  different  order  should 
have  been  issued  ;  but  when  once  in  battle  his  conduct  was 
brilliant  as  well  as  judicious,  and  his  personal  gallantry  was 
proverbial.  His  conduct  on  July  22d  had  met  Sherman's 
warmest  approval,  and  the  despatches  of  the  latter  to  the 
Government  earnestly  disclaimed  any  implied  derogation  of 
Logan's  merits  in  appointing  another  to  the  command  of  the 
army. 

Hooker  was  the  senior  of  both  Sherman  and  Thomas,  and 
looked  upon  the  appointment  to  the  vacancy  as  his  right. 
Since  the  incident  of  June  22d,  Sherman  had  found  the  dif 
ferences  between  them  increasing,  and  honestly  doubting 
whether  he  could  have  the  cordial  co-operation  from  him 
which  was  essential  in  his  principal  subordinates,  he  put 
Hooker  out  of  the  list  of  those  eligible  for  assignment.  It 
is  possible  that  in  his  ultimate  choice  a  predilection  in  favor 
of  officers  bred  in  the  so-called  regular  army  might  have  had 
some  little  influence,  but  Sherman  repudiates  any  purpose 
but  that  of  securing  the  best  organization,  and  he  was  too 
broad  a  man  not  to  know  that  the  school  of  the  war,  for 
men  who  had  any  military  aptitude,  had  been  a  soldier's 
education  of  such  a  sort  that  any  question  of  the  school  they 
had  attended  as  boys  would  be  ridiculous. 

Afcer  consulting  with  Thomas,  Sherman  recommended 
Howard  for  the  position,  and  the  President  made  the  ap 
pointment.  Howard  and  Slocum  had  respectively  com 
manded  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  in  the  battle  of 
Chancellorsville  under  Hooker,  and  the  latter  had  charged 


SIEGE   OF  ATLANTA— EZRA   CHURCH.  179 

Howard  with  much  of  the  responsibility  for  the  disaster. 
When  the  two  corps  were  consolidated  into  the  Twentieth, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  present  campaign,  and  Hooker  was 
assigned  to  it,  Howard  had  been  given  the  Fourth  Corps, 
and  Slocum  had  been  sent  to  the  Mississippi  River  and  put 
in  command  at  Vicksburg.  To  Hooker,  therefore,  Howard's 
assignment  seemed  like  a  double  affront,  and  he  asked  to  be 
relieved.  Major-General  H.  W.  Slocum  was  then  recalled 
from  Vicksburg  to  take  command  of  the  Twentieth  Corps, 
though  it  was  near  the  end  of  August  when  he  arrived. 

In  Howard,  Sherman  found  most  of  the  same  traits  which 
made  his  association  with  Thomas  and  Schofield  a  satisfac 
tory  one.  Conscientiously  true  and  loyal  to  their  superior, 
all  three  of  them  asked  only  how  they-  might  most  thor 
oughly  carry  out  his  views,  without  captiousness,  hesitation, 
or  complaint.  Their  abilities  and  experience  made  them  at 
ease  in  the  handling  of  large  bodies  of  men,  and  it  is  rare 
that  a  large  army  has  had  its  principal  generals  so  cordial 
in  co-operation,  so  free  from  jealousies  or  intrigues,  and  so 
able  to  relieve  the  General-in-Chief  from  the  details  of  ad 
ministration  and  of  tactical  handling  of  troops.  For  Thomas, 
Schofield  and  Howard  both  had  a  respect  second  only  to 
that  they  felt  for  Sherman,  and  any  accident  which  might 
have  left  Thomas  in  command,  would  have  given  him  as 
able  and  faithful  support  in  his  subordinates  as  Sherman 
himself  found. 

In  the  command  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  Howard  was  suc 
ceeded  by  Major-General  D.  S.  Stanley,  which  completed 
for  the  present  the  more  important  changes  in  the  organ 
ization.  A  lively  correspondence,  however,  took  place  be 
tween  Sherman  and  the  War  Department  in  relation  to  pro 
motion  given  to  two  brigadiers  who  had  asked  to  be  relieved 
through  discontent  or  on  plea  of  ill-health,  and  had  by 


180  ATLANTA. 

political  influence  at  Washington  got  the  promotion  which 
had  not  been  accorded  to  any  who  had  continued  in  the 
field.  A  circumstance  which  had  caused  no  little  comment 
in  the  army  was  the  fact  that  with  the  general  orders  an 
nouncing  these  promotions,  which  were  published  to  the 
troops,  were  others  in  which  officers  of  the  line  were  sum 
marily  dismissed  the  service  for  tendering  their  resignations 
while  their  command  was  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 
Against  the  demoralizing  influence  of  the  "  spoils  system," 
which  constantly  tended  to  put  influence  at  Washington  in 
lieu  of  faithful  service,  Sherman  vigorously  protested  on 
behalf  of  his  army.  The  working  of  the  system  could  not 
be  better  illustrated  than  by  the  case  of  Colonel  Poe,  Sher 
man's  chief  engineer.  This  officer,  a  lieutenant  of  engineers 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  after  assisting  the  Governor  of 
Ohio  to  organize  his  State  troops,  was  made  colonel  of  a 
Michigan  volunteer  regiment,  and  by  distinguished  ability 
in  the  field,  rose  to  the  command  of  a  brigade.  For  gallant 
and  meritorious  service  in  the  campaigns  of  1861-62  in 
Virginia,  he  was  nominated  brigadier-general,  and  resigned 
the  colonelcy  to  enable  a  good  lieutenant-colonel  to  take 
the  rank.  The  President's  list  of  appointments  was  in  excess 
of  the  number  fixed  by  statute,  and  the  Senate  returned 
them  for  reduction.  Then  came  a  general  scramble  among 
the  political  "  influences,"  and  instead  of  a  simple  reduction, 
a  new  list  was  sent  in,  containing  some  never  before  recom 
mended,  and  dropping  many  of  those  who  would  not  seek 
such  aid.  In  this  way  Poe  lost  his  commission,  and  re 
turned  to  his  simple  rank  as  a  company  officer  in  the  staff 
corps,  after  demonstrating  his  abilities  as  a  general  in  the 
field  ;  but  his  self-respect  forbade  his  seeking  afterward  a 
line  command.  His  recognized  talents  were  attested  by  his 
being  made  the  chief  engineer  of  a  great  army  with  the  lin- 


SIEGE   OF    ATLANTA— EZRA   CHURCH.  181 

eal  rank  of  captain  only  :  a  thing  unprecedented  in  army 
organizations.  To  understand  what  might  seeni  almost  in 
subordination  in  Sherman's  correspondence  above  referred 
to,  in  which  he  said,  "If  the  rear  be  the  post  of  honor,  then 
we  had  better  all  change  front  on  Washington,"  it  is  neces 
sary  that  such  facts  should  be  remembered. 

In  the  Confederate  army  Hardee  had  sought  to  be  re 
lieved,  owing  to  his  dissatisfaction  with  Johnston's  removal 
and  the  assignment  of  Hood  to  command ;  but  he  had  with 
drawn  his  request  at  the  personal  desire  of  the  Confederate 
President.  Lieutenant-General  S.  D.  Lee  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  Hood's  old  corps,  and  joined  the  army  from 
the  west,  while  Major-General  Cheatham  returned  to  his 
division  in  Hardee's  corps.  Major-General  Walker  had  been 
killed  in  the  battle  of  Atlanta,  but  Hardee's  corps  was  so 
depleted  by  the  terrible  losses  of  that  day,  that  that  division 
was  broken  up  and  its  regiments  assigned  to  the  others. 

By  July  25th  the  railway  from  Chattanooga  was  in  running 
order  to  Thomas's  camps,  Colonel  Wright  having  built  the 
high  bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee  in  six  days.  Sherman 
was  now  ready  for  new  movements  of  his  infantry  by  the 
right  flank,  abandoning  the  Roswell  road  as  a  line  for  sup 
plies.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  ordered  to  send  its 
trains  and  field  hospitals  to  a  point  near  the  mouth  of  Peach- 
tree  Creek,  and  to  move  on  the  27th  by  successive  corps 
from  the  extreme  left  to  the  extreme  right,  leaving  Schofield 
for  the  moment  to  hold  the  eastern  end  of  the  lines  of  cir- 
cumvallation  by  drawing  back  part  of  his  command  into  the 
intrenchments  occupied  by  the  enemy  on  the  20th. 

Simultaneously  with  this,  the  cavalry  on  both  flanks  were 
organized  for  expeditions  toward  the  Macon  Railroad,  for  the 
purpose  of  cutting  Hood's  communications.  Rousseau  had 
returned  to  his  district  command,  but  Harrison's  cavalry 


182  ATLANTA. 

brigade,  which  had  come  with  him  from  Opelika,  reported 
to  McCook,  giving  him  a  division  about  three  thousand  five 
hundred  strong,  on  the  right  of  the  army.  Stoneman  united 
Garrard's  troopers  with  his  own  on  the  left,  and  had  about 
six  thousand  five  hundred  in  all,  near  Decatur ;  but  as  Gar 
rard's  troops  had  recently  been  hard  worked,  these  were 
to  be  used  as  a  reserve,  leaving  less  than  three  thousand  for 
the  more  active  duties  of  the  expedition  beyond  Jonesboro. 
After  carrying  out  his  orders  as  to  the  railroad,  Stoneman  was 
authorized,  at  his  own  desire,  to  march  on  Macon  and  Ander- 
sonville,  in  an  effort  to  rescue  the  National  prisoners  of  war 
in  the  military  prisons  there. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  both  cavalry  and  infantry 
were  in  motion.  Dodge's  corps  (Sixteenth)  first  left  its 
position,  marching  in  rear  of  the  army  crossed  Proctor's 
Creek  before  night,  and  passing  Davis's  division  of  Palmer's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  which  had  formed  a  recurved  right  flank, 
advanced  till  it  was  on  a  prolongation  of  the  general  line 
of  the  Cumberland  Army,  curving  around  the  city.  This 
brought  it  along  the  road  leading  south  from  Elliott's  Mill 
to  Mount  Ezra  Church,  facing  due  east,  and  having  before 
it  a  little  valley  in  which  ran  one  of  the  upper  branches  of 
Proctor's  Creek.  The  other  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  followed  during  the  night,  Blair's  (Seventeenth)  get 
ting  into  position  on  the  right  of  Dodge  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  extending  the  line  quite  to  the  church,  near  which 
the  north  and  south  road  is  crossed  by  a  more  important 
one,  leaving  the  southwest  suburb  of  Atlanta  near  the  race 
course,  and  running  west  to  a  village  near  the  Chattahoo- 
chee,  bearing  the  cacophonous  name  of  Lickskillet. 

The  railways  to  the  south  and  southwest  leave  the  city  at 
the  south  side  of  the  race-course,  and,  as  has  already  been 
noted,  run  together  for  five  miles  to  East  Point,  where  they 


SIEGE  OF  ATLANTA-EZRA  CHURCH.  183 

separate.  The  railway  line  is  the  watershed,  the  head 
waters  of  Proctor's  Creek,  Utoy  Creek,  and  Camp  Creek 
taking  their  rise  in  the  ravines  which  break  down  by  devious 
channels  to  the  north  and  west  toward  the  Chattahoochee, 
with  smaller  lateral  branches  often  running  between  hilly 
ridges  nearly  parallel  to  the  general  line  of  the  railway. 

Near  where  the  Lickskillet  road  leaves  the  city  there 
was  a  strong  salient  and  a  bastion  in  the  line  of  Confederate 
fortifications,  which  then  turned  a  little  east  of  south,  cross 
ing  the  railway  in  about  a  mile,  but  running  pretty  close  to 
it  for  the  last  half  of  that  distance.  Blair's  right  was  there 
fore  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  railroad,  and  if  the  city 
defences  continued  to  be  Hood's  line,  a  day  or  two  would 
certainly  enable  Sherman  to  cut  his  communications.  The 
Confederate  commander  already  had  his  engineers  at  work 
with  details  of  men  staking  out  a  new  line  for  trenches, 
leaving  the  city  fortifications  at  the  bastion  above  described 
and  running  southwest  some  four  miles,  crossing  the  north 
fork  of  Utoy  Creek,  and  resting  on  some  very  commanding 
hills  with  broken  ground  in  front,  near  where  runs  the  road 
from  Atlanta  to  that  same  Sandtown  on  the  Chattahoochee 
which  gave  the  name  to  the  oft-mentioned  road  north  of  the 
river.  The  course  of  this  line  diverged  somewhat  from 
the  railway,  so  that  at  the  Sandtown  road  it  was  nearly  two 
miles  away.  Johnston's  plans  at  Marietta  were  to  be  sub 
stantially  repeated,  and  the  warfare  of  flanking  lines  was  to 
be  prolonged  to  East  Point. 

Hood  had  suffered  so  severely  in  the  battles  at  Peachtree 
and  on  the  east  of  Atlanta,  that  his  troops  wrere  losing  their 
stomach  for  assaulting  intrenchments  ;  but  the  implied  con 
ditions  of  his  appointment  to  the  command  fettered  him, 
and  he  could  not  adopt  within  a  week  the  policy  of  his 
predecessor.  While  preparing  for  contingencies,  therefore, 


184  ATLANTA. 

he  determined  upon  another  effort  to  crush  Sherman's 
flank  ;  and  since  the  thing  was  to  be  again  tried,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  he  was  wise  in  determining  to  strike  How 
ard's  right  while  in  motion,  and  before  it  could  intrench. 
He  withdrew  Loring's  and  Walthall's  divisions  of  Stewart's 
corps,  to  support  General  S.  D.  Lee,  who  with  his  corps 
(lately  commanded  by  Cheatham)  was  ordered  to  move  out 
on  the  Lickskillet  road,  attack  Howard,  and  drive  him 
from  that  road  and  the  one  by  Ezra  Church.  Stewart's 
orders  directed  him  to  remain  in  support  of  Lee  near  the 
fortifications  till  needed,  and  next  morning  (29th),  rein 
forced  by  his  other  division  (French's),  to  move  beyond  Lee 
and  turn  completely  the  flank  of  Howard,  attacking  him  in 
rear.  Hardee's  corps  and  Smith's  Georgians  were  ordered 
to  occupy  the  works  in  front  of  Thomas  and  Schofield. 
This  was  the  repetition  of  the  tactics  of  the  22d,  but  with  less 
brilliancy ;  for  the  attack  by  Lee's  corps  on  the  28th  would 
put  Sherman  on  the  qui  vive,  and  the  chances  of  Stewart's 
following  the  movement  up  on  the  29th  would  be  small. 

Meanwhile  Logan  was  marching  into  position  near  Ezra 
Church,  and  Davis's  division  of  Palmer's  (Fourteenth)  corps 
was  ordered  by  Sherman,  the  evening  before,  to  make  a  con 
siderable  detour  from  Elliot's  Mill  beyond  where  Logan  was 
expected  to  be,  so  as  to  strike  in  flank  any  force  which 
might  attack  him.  Sherman  himself,  as  well  as  Howard, 
was  with  Logan's  corps  when  the  Confederates  under  Lee 
deployed  along  the  Lickskillet  road  and  advanced  to  the 
attack.  Logan's  men  had  made  some  cover  for  themselves 
after  the  presence  of  the  enemy  was  discovered,  and  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps  line  bent  back  from  Ezra  Church  nearly  at 
a  right  angle  to  Blair's.  The  ground  was  high  and  the  slope 
in  front  partially  open  ;  and  though  the  Confederates  ad 
vanced  with  their  usual  bravery  they  were  easily  repulsed. 


SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA— EZRA   CHURCH.  185 

They  were  then  reformed,  and  the  order  to  advance  again 
given  and  obeyed,  but  with  no  better  result.  Stewart  moved 
forward  his  two  divisions  to  Lee's  assistance,  and  they  also 
were  soon  hotly  engaged.  The  general  officers  exposed 
themselves  to  encourage  their  troops,  and  Stewart,  Loring, 
Brown,  and  Johnson  wrere  all  wounded  and  disabled.  In 
the  intervals  of  the  charges  the  National  line  was  made 
stronger,  and  each  attack  was  less  vigorous  and  had  less 
chance  than  the  one  before  it.  Blair  and  Dodge  sent  their 
reserves  to  support  Logan,  Howard  massed  his  artillery  to 
sweep  the  open  ground  on  his  flank,  and  before  sunset  the 
enemy  acknowledged  himself  beaten,  and  drewT  out  of  musket 
range.  In  the  last  attacks  portions  of  the  command  refused 
to  advance,  and  line  officers  with  their  drawn  swords  were 
seen  from  our  works  to  march  to  the  front  of  troops  that 
would  not  follow  them.1 

Sherman  was  hopeful  that  Davis's  division  would  arrive 
in  time  to  turn  the  repulse  of  the  Confederates  into  a  rout 
by  a  counter-attack  upon  their  flank  ;  but  the  lack  of  ac 
curate  maps  had  caused  it  to  get  upon  a  wrong  road,  and 
it  did  not  reach  the  field.  The  brunt  of  ths  attack  fell  upon 
the  divisions  of  Harrow  and  Morgan  L.  Smith,  which  formed 
the  centre  and  right  of  Logan's  corps,  but  while  warmly  en 
gaged,  their  line  was  never  seriously  in  danger.  Howard 
reported  his  losses  under  six  hundred  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing,  which  was  less  than  the  number  of  Confederate 
dead  left  upon  the  field  and  buried  by  Logan,  for  the  total 
of  these  was  almost  seven  hundred.  Howard's  estimate  of 
the  enemy's  loss  at  five  thousand  in  all  forms,  was  therefore 
a  reasonable  one,  and  subsequent  information  led  him  to  in 
crease  it. 

1  This  was  commonly  told  in  camp  at  the  time  by  officers  of  our  skirmish  lines, 
which  were  advanced  as  often  as  the  enemy  retired. 


186  ATLANTA. 

Hood,  in  his  memoirs,  passes  lightly  over  this  battle,  as  if 
it  were  a  chance  and  unpremeditated  engagement ;  but  the 
reports  of  his  subordinates  show  that  it  was  the  third  of  his 
serious  and  carefully  planned  efforts  to  defeat  his  adversary 
by  a  flank  attack.  For  some  reason  not  explained,  he  or 
dered  Hardee  to  go  to  the  front  and  assume  command  of 
both  corps  engaged,  neither  of  which  was  Hardee's  own  ;  but 
the  battle  was  over  by  the  time  that  general  could  reach  the 
field,  and  the  condition  of  the  troops  was  such  as  to  forbid 
new  efforts.  The  fact  is,  however,  used  with  great  force  by 
Hardee,  in  repelling  the  subsequent  assertions  of  Hood,  that 
the  latter  had  lacked  confidence  in  either  his  energy  or  his 
ability.  The  argument  which  Hood  also  used,  that  John 
ston's  policy  had  made  the  troops  timid,  is  not  supported  by 
the  facts.  If  the  offensive  tactics  which  he  had  adopted  was 
calculated  to  inspire  his  troops,  this  should  have  been  the 
most  confident  and  energetic  of  all  his  engagements ;  but  it 
was,  on  the  contrary,  the  least  so,  and  the  testimony  of  the 
prisoners  who  fell  into  our  hands  was  uniform,  that  the 
slaughter  which  had  occurred  on  the  20th,  22d,  and  28th 
July  in  quick  succession  was  looked  upon  as  useless  and 
hopeless  by  his  army.  In  the  chaffing  between  pickets 
which  often  occurred  in  the  lulls  of  the  long  contest,  a  Con 
federate  soldier,  in  answer  to  the  question,  "  Well,  Johnny, 
how  many  of  you  are  left,"  replied,  "  Oh  !  about  enough  for 
another  killing."  This,  at  the  end  of  July,  was  the  camp 
judgment,  and  it  came  from  an  infantry  never  excelled  in 
courage  or  tenacity.  Hood's  reasoning,  if  right,  should 
have  made  these  three  contests  the  preparation  for  more 
efforts  of  the  same  kind ;  but  the  effect  upon  himself  was 
such  that  he  never  repeated  the  method  till  his  affairs  had 
become  desperate  by  the  march  of  Sherman  upon  Jonesboro, 
more  than  a  month  later.  By  that  time  even  Jefferson  Davis 


SIEGE   OF   ATLANTA— EZRA   CHURCH.  187 

was  appalled  at  the  results,  and  wrote  him  on  the  5th  of 
August,  "  The  loss  consequent  upon  attacking  him  in  his  in- 
trenchnients  requires  you  to  avoid  that,  if  practicable." 
Johnston  could  hardly  have  dreamed  of  quicker  or  more 
complete  vindication  of  his  generalship. 


CHAPTEE  XV. 

THE   LINES    NEAR  EAST  POINT— JONESBORO-F  ALL   OP 
ATLANTA. 

THE  cavalry  expeditions  had  not  been  successful.  Mc- 
Cook,  on  the  right,  had  marched  down  the  west  bank  of  the 
Chattahoochee  to  Campbelltown,  and  crossing  there  had  suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  Lovejoy's  Station  on  the  Macon  road, 
seven  or  eight  miles  below  Jonesboro  and  about  thirty  from 
Atlanta.  He  hoped  to  make  a  junction  with  Stoneman 
there,  but  hearing  nothing  of  him,  he  did  much  damage  to 
the  railway,  burned  army  trains  and  some  five  hundred 
wagons,  taking  over  four  hundred  prisoners.  He  undertook 
to  return  by  the  same  route  he  had  travelled,  but  was  sur 
rounded  at  Newnan's  and  lost  his  prisoners,  though  he 
fought  his  own  way  through  with  a  total  loss  of  six  hundred 
men. 

Stoneman  had  moved  from  the  other  flank,  and  leaving 
Garrard  at  Flatrock,  east  of  Decatur,  crossed  the  Ocmulgee 
River  near  Covington  and  made  for  the  railroad  running 
from  Macon  to  Augusta,  on  which  he  destroyed  a  large  num 
ber  of  engines  and  cars  at  Griswold.  He  went  eastward  far 
enough  to  burn  the  bridge  over  the  Oconee,  then  reunited 
his  detachments  before  Macon  ;  but  the  river  was  between 
him  and  the  city,  and  after  shelling  the  town  he  moved  back 
toward  Clinton.  Being  intercepted  and  surrounded  by  what 
he  supposed  was  a  greatly  superior  force,  he  authorized  his 


LINES  NEAR  EAST  POINT.  189 

brigade  commanders  to  cut  their  way  out,  while  he,  with 
about  seven  hundred  of  his  men,  held  the  enemy  in  check 
till  the  others  got  through  and  then  surrendered.  His  sac 
rificing  himself  to  enable  his  subordinates  to  make  good  a 
retreat  was  personally  honorable  to  him,  but  the  facts  as 
afterward  discovered  showed  that  he  had  been  deceived  as 
to  the  enemy's  force,  and  that  his  position  was  by  no  means 
desperate.  Sherman  was  dissatisfied  with  the  lack  of  enter 
prise  shown  by  Garrard  during  Stoneman's  absence,  and 
rated  the  usefulness  of  his  cavalry  rather  low. 

The  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  the  right 
was  followed  by  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  which  moved 
from  its  position  on  the  left  flank  in  the  night  of  the  1st  of 
August.  General  Thomas  had  been  ordered  to  take  a  divi 
sion  from  the  Twentieth  Corps,  which  General  Williams 
temporarily  commanded,  and  with  it  and  Davis's  division 
already  beyond  the  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
swing  forward  that  wing  toward  Atlanta.  He  took  Ward's 
division  and  placed  both  it  and  Davis's  upon  the  Lickskillet 
road  a  mile  west  of  the  Alms  House,  and  Howard  wheeled 
his  right  forward  to  connect  with  them.  On  the  2d,  Scho- 
field  moved  up  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  intrenching  on  the 
banks  of  the  north  fork  of  Utoy  Creek,  and  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  again  brought  the  right  shoulder  forward  and 
gained  nearly  a  mile  of  new  ground  on  that  flank.  Ward's 
division  was  now  sent  back  to  the  Twentieth  Corps,  which 
extended  its  lines  so  as  to  relieve  Palmer,  who  with  the  rest 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  joined  Davis's  division  on  the  right. 

Sherman  was  now  of  the  opinion  that  his  right  wing  must 
be  near  the  railroad,  and  for  the  purpose  of  giving  unity  to 
movements  on  that  flank,  directed  Palmer  to  report  to  Scho- 
field  and  act  under  his  orders  temporarily.  This  raised  a 
question  of  rank,  as  Palmer's  commission  ante-dated  Scho- 


190  ATLANTA. 

field's,  though  both  were  made  to  take  effect  on  the  same 
day,  and  Schofield  was  senior  in  previous  grade.  Sherman 
decided  in  favor  of  Schofield's  claim,  but  Palmer  protested, 
and  asked  to  be  relieved  of  the  command  of  his  corps.  After 
vainly  endeavoring  to  persuade  Palmer  to  withdraw  his  re 
quest,  and  suffering  for  two  days  a  game  of  cross  purposes 
which  greatly  obstructed  and  delayed  movements  on  that 
flank,  Palmer  was  relieved,  and  soon  after  General  Jefferson 
C.  Davis  was  assigned  by  the  President  to  the  corps  com 
mand,  with  rank  of  Brevet  Major-General,  by  recommenda 
tion  of  both  Sherman  and  Thomas.  This,  however,  antici 
pates  the  order  of  events. 

On  the  morning  of  August  3d,  Palmer's  corps  was  ordered 
forward  to  co-operate  with  the  Twenty-third,  both  under 
command  of  Schofield,  who  determined  to  force  a  crossing 
of  the  north  fork  of  Utoy  Creek  where  it  makes  a  consid 
erable  bend  to  the  north.  Hascall's  division  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps,  and  Baird's  of  the  Fourteenth  were  assigned 
this  duty.  Hascall  promptly  crossed  with  but  little  opposi 
tion  and  occupied  a  high  ridge  on  the  south,  above  and  east 
of  Heron's  Mill,  taking  ground  to  the  left  in  accordance 
with  his  orders,  till  that  flank  rested  near  the  creek  at  its 
southward  curve.  Baird  was  to  follow  Hascall  and  extend 
on  his  right,  but  did  not  do  so  (owing  to  the  disputes  about 
the  general  command  of  the  movement)  till  five  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  when  General  Sherman  in  person  peremp 
torily  ordered  the  division  over,  and  it  took  the  position  as 
signed  with  its  right  resting  on  the  other  south  curve  of 
the  creek.  On  the  following  morning  Cox's  division  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  crossed  the  creek  and  formed  in  rear 
of  Baird,  with  orders  to  support  the  advance  of  the  latter. 
Palmer  was  ordered  to  move  Baird's  division  strongly  against 
the  enemy  in  front,  putting  over  Davis's  and  Johnson's 


LINES  NEAR  EAST   POINT.  19) 

divisions  of  the  corps  (the  former  temporarily  in  command 
of  General  Morgan),  and,  as  ground  should  be  gained,  swing 
ing  the  whole  out  to  the  south  and  east.  Again  delays  oc 
curred,  which  Sherman  characterized  as  unpardonable,  till 
toward  evening,  when  a  reconnoissance  was  made  by  Glea- 
son's  brigade  of  Baird's  division,  capturing  25  prisoners, 
and  sustaining  a  loss  of  26  in  killed  and  wounded ;  but  no 
general  movement  of  the  division  was  made.  Morgan  and 
Johnson  crossed  the  creek  somewhat  farther  to  the  right 
and  within  easy  supporting  distance.  Orders  for  the  5th 
were  issued  directing  Palmer  to  move  Baird's  division  for 
ward  and  endeavor  to  carry  the  position  before  him  or  drive 
the  enemy  into  their  principal  works  ;  to  move  Morgan's 
division  in  echelon  on  Baird's  left  flank,  taking  advantage  of 
any  success  he  might  have  to  continue  his  line  to  the  right ; 
and  to  march  Johnson's  division  to  the  right  beyond  Mor 
gan  and  advance  him  in  echelon  also  to  the  front.  Hascall's 
division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  being  in  a  bend  of  the 
creek  where  most  of  the  division  could  not  advanc^,  was 
ordered  to  support  Baird's  left.  Cox's  division  was  ordered 
to  march  to  the  right  to  support  Johnson's  division.  The 
whole  movement  was  to  begin  at  six  o'clock.  Duplicates  of 
the  orders  to  Palmer  were  sent  to  his  division  commanders 
by  General  Schofield,  to  make  sure  they  were  known.  Be 
fore  the  time  of  moving  in  the  morning  Baird  notified  Scho 
field  that  he  did  not  recognize  his  authority,  had  received 
no  orders  from  his  corps  commander,  and  no  notice  that  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  was  under  Schofield's  command.  His  re 
port  states  that  when  finally  he  received  orders  from  the 
corps  commander  he  had  no  information  of  the  position  of 
Morgan's  division  on  his  right,  and  moved  forward  about 
eight  o'clock.  The  advance  was  courageously  made  when  it 
began,  and  the  enemy's  intrenched  skirmish  line,  which  had 


192  ATLANTA. 

been  greatly  strengthened  since  the  day  before,  was  carried 
with  a  loss  of  83  killed  and  wounded.  One  hundred  and 
forty  prisoners  were  captured  from  the  enemy.  Morgan's 
division  moved  up  and  connected  with  BaiixTs  right,  but 
with  the  line  retiring  along  the  road  which  runs  from  the 
Sandtown  road  to  the  village  of  Lickskillet.  Johnson's 
division  formed  on  the  right  of  Morgan's,  and  afterward,  in 
pursuance  of  orders,  marched  to  a  wooded  ridge  overlooking 
a  small  stream,  tributary  to  the  principal  Utoy  Creek  and 
flowing  southwest  into  it,  Cox's  division  being  in  close 
support.  The  narrow  valley  was  open,  and  to  the  east  the 
hills  on  the  other  side  were  wooded.  No  effort  was  made 
to  cross  the  creek,  Johnson  resting  on  the.  western  side 
during  the  afternoon.  That  evening  Schofield  reported  to 
Sherman  :  "  I  am  compelled  to  acknowledge  that  I  have 
totally  failed  to  make  any  aggressive  movement  with  the 
Fourteenth  Corps."  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  was  ordered  to  relieve  Johnson's,  which  in  turn  was 
ordered  to  relieve  Hascall's.  The  latter  was  then  marched 
to  right  and  rear  of  Cox's.  This  was  early  in  the  morning 
of  the  6th,  and  during  the  night  the  constant  chopping  and 
falling  of  trees  along  the  hillside  east  of  the  creek  had  given 
evidence  that  the  enemy's  infantry  had  moved  in  force  upon 
it.  Encouraged  by  the  delays  of  the  past  forty-eight  hours, 
Hood  had  determined  to  intrench  the  line  of  the  Sandtown 
road  and  had  put  part  of  Hardee's  corps  upon  it,  making  a 
line  from  the  rough  and  high  ground  in  front  of  Baird  across 
the  ridge  dividing  the  branches  of  Utoy  Creek,  and  then 
dDwn  the  east  side  of  the  tributary  above  mentioned  to  the 
principal  stream  ;  thence  it  recurved  sharply  along  its  north 
bank.  The  distance  across  the  forks  of  Utoy  on  this  line  is 
about  two  miles.  Cox  was  ordered  to  make  a  reconnoissance 
in  force  by  one  brigade,  supporting  it  so  that  if  the  enemy's 


LINES   NEAR   EAST   POINT.  193 

line  were  earned  the  advantage  could  be  followed  up. 
Reilly's  brigade  was  detailed  for  the  purpose,  supported  by 
Casement's  (formerly  Cameron's).  The  advanced  brigade 
was  formed  in  line,  and  the  farther  margin  of  the  open 
ground  being  held  by  our  skirmishers,  it  marched  rapidly 
over  the  brook  and  up  the  slope  beyond.  It  soon  found 
itself  in  the  entanglement  of  felled  trees,  and  of  under 
growth  half  cut  off,  then  bent  down  and  interlaced,  but  ifc 
pushed  on  to  the  intrenchments.  They  were  found  to  be 
strongly  held,  and  though  some  of  the  assailants  reached  the 
parapet,  the  advance  of  the  brigade  was  arrested.  It  held 
its  position  at  the  entanglement,  a  hundred  yards  from  the 
parapet,  until  the  reconnoissance  developed  the  solid  line  of 
breastworks  extending  far  to  right  and  left,  occupied,  as  was 
learned  from  prisoners,  by  Bate's  division.  Casement's  bri 
gade  in  line  was  advanced  to  the  east  side  of  the  valley,  and 
under  its  cover,  Reilly  was  withdrawn,  with  a  loss  of  a  little 
over  three  hundred  men.  A  well  supported  skirmish  line 
was  intrenched  close  to  the  abatis  and  held  there,  prevent 
ing  the  enemy  from  coming  outside  his  works. 

Hascall  marched  to  the  main  stream  of  Utoy  Creek  and 
succeeded  in  crossing  with  two  brigades,  driving  away  the 
enemy's  cavalry  after  a  sharp  combat.  The  position  thus 
acquired  enfiladed  Bate's  line,  and  in  the  night  it  was 
abandoned.  The  Confederate  troops  retired  into  a  strong 
line  of  fortifications  extending  from  the  high  hills  near  the 
north  fork  of  Utoy  Creek  southward  across  the  Sandtown 
road  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  thence  bending  a  little  to 
ward  the  east  it  followed  the  hilly  ridges  behind  the  south 
ernmost  branches  of  Utoy  Creek  till  it  reached  the  railway  a 
mile  beyond  East  Point. 

While  matters  had  been  thus  progressing  on  the  extreme 
right,  active  demonstrations  had  been  made  on  other  parts 
IX.-9 


194  ATLANTA. 

of  the  line.  Stanley  had  advanced  strongly  supported  skir 
mish  lines  in  front  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  had  taken  the 
enemy's  intrenched  pickets  along  most  of  his  front.  The 
same  had  been  done  by  Williams  with  the  Twentieth  Corps, 
and  the  front  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  been  ad 
vanced  with  similar  results.  The  Fourteenth  and  Twenty- 
third  Corps  advanced  on  the  7th,  crowding  their  skirmish 
lines  close  to  the  Confederate  fortifications,  meeting  with 
opposition  which  General  Sherman  described  in  his  des 
patches  to  Washington  as  a  "  noisy,  but  not  a  bloody  bat 
tle."  Schofield's  advanced  division  (Cox's)  occupied  the 
hills  immediately  in  rear  of  Willis's  mill  pond,  its  right 
resting  on  the  principal  south  fork  of  Utoy  Creek,  Hascall's 
division  being  in  reserve  on  that  flank.  The  Fourteenth 
Corps  (Brigadier-General  R,.  W.  Johnson  in  temporary  com 
mand)  swung  its  right  forward  till  it  formed  a  connected 
line  with  Schofield's. 

Sherman  felt  that  he  had  now  stretched  his  line  about  as  far 
as  could  be  safely  done,  and  determined  to  try  the  effect  of 
cannonade  with  heavier  ordnance,  while  parallels  should  be 
worked  up  closer  to  the  enemy's  fortifications.  Hood  had 
the  Georgia  troops  with  heavy  artillery  in  the  works  in  front 
of  Thomas,  with  reserves  of  his  regular  troops  ready  to 
move  quickly  to  any  point  which  might  be  threatened. 
Hardee  held  his  extreme  left  in  front  of  Schofield,  and  the 
rest  of  his  army  was  in  the  space  between,  confronting 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Some  44-inch  Parrott  rifled 
cannon  were  ordered  up  and  put  in  battery  on  Thomas's 
front,  and  with  these  and  the  other  artillery  of  the  army, 
Sherman  cannonaded  the  town  and  the  enemy's  forts  for 
several  days.  He  directed  Schofield,  however,  to  continue 
extending  his  flank  as  far  as  he  could,  and  on  the  8th  a  bri 
gade  of  Hascall's  division  was  put  over  Utoy  Creek  on  the 


LINES   NEAR  EAST  POINT.  195 

south,  and  intrenched  on  a  hill  south  of  that  stream.  It  was 
followed  by  the  rest  of  that  division  in  a  day  or  two,  and  on 
the  12th,  Cox's  division  of  the  same  corps  made  a  reconnois- 
sance  in  force  to  the  junction  of  the  Campbelltown  road 
with  the  road  to  East  Point,  and  half  a  mile  eastward  along 
the  latter.  This  demonstrated  the  fact  that  the  Confederate 
lines  were  farther  in  front  of  the  West  Point  Kailway  than 
either  Sherman  or  Schofield  had  thought.  The  division, 
however,  was  not  brought  back  to  its  place  in  line,  but  en 
camped  on  Hascall's  right  rear,  the  Fourteenth  Corps  extend 
ing  its  front  so  as  to  fill  the  gap  and  reach  Utoy  Creek.  On 
the  15th  Schofield  advanced  his  right  again,  putting  Cox's 
division  at  the  crossing  of  the  Campbelltown  and  East  Point 
roads,  its  flanks  covering  them  both,  and  on  the  18th  it  was 
pushed  out  three-quarters  of  a  mile  southeast  and  intrenched 
in  a  nearly  semicircular  position  with  the  left  covering  the 
upper  valley  of  Utoy  Creek  and  the  right  that  of  Camp 
Creek.  This  was  the  extreme  point  reached  in  the  advanc 
ing  of  Sherman's  lines,  and  this  became  the  pivot  on  which 
the  movement  to  the  south  of  Atlanta  was  made.  The  suc 
cessive  advances  had  been  made  in  the  face  of  stubborn  re 
sistance  of  cavalry  supported  by  infantry  skirmish  lines,  but 
Hood  did  not  repeat  his  former  attacks  upon  the  flank  in 
force. 

On  the  same  day  that  this  last  advance  was  made,  Kil- 
patrick  was  sent  with  a  large  division  of  cavalry  to  make  a 
lasting  break,  if  possible,  in  the  Macon  road.  Starting  from 
the  right  rear,  he  crossed  the  railroad  to  West  Point  at  Fair- 
burn,  and  that  to  Macon  about  Jonesboro,  doing  both  some 
damage.  Hood  had  sufficient  notice,  however,  to  send  Jack 
son  to  meet  him,  and  although  Kilpatrick  made  the  entire 
circuit  of  Atlanta,  and  had  done  some  brilliant  fighting,  no 
permanent  interruption  of  the  railway  was  made,  and  tliQ 


196  ATLANTA. 

cars  were  running  into  Atlanta  as  usual  in  a  clay  or  two. 
During  Kilpatrick's  absence  constant  demonstrations  along 
the  line  were  made,  and  reconnoissances  in  force  from  the 
right  flank  on  the  19th,  20th,  and  21st,  were  pushed  as  far 
as  Camp  Creek  Church,  and  half  a  mile  on  the  road  to  Lib 
erty  Church,  close  to  the  forts  in  front  of  East  Point.  These 
were  continued  with  varying  strength,  down  to  the  time  of 
the  general  movement  to  be  narrated. 

Sherman  was  now  convinced  that  he  could  expect  no  per 
manent  results  from  cutting  the  enemy's  communications, 
unless  it  were  done  in  force,  and  he  seriously  resumed  the 
plan  which  he  had  communicated  to  his  principal  subor> 
dinates  in  orders  a  week  before,  viz.,  to  intrench  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps  (Slocum's),  at  the  Chattahoochee  bridge,  and 
swing  all  the  rest  of  his  army  to  the  south  of  Atlanta.  He 
ordered  half  of  all  baggage  sent  to  the  rear,  and  each  army 
to  provide  itself  with  ten  days'  full  rations,  which  should  be 
issued  so  as  to  last  fifteen  days. 

Since  the  14th,  the  greater  part  of  the  enemy's  cavalry 
under  "Wheeler  had  been  operating  against  the  railroad 
north  of  the  Chattahoochee.  He  attacked  Dalton,  where  the 
garrison  under  Colonel  Laiboldt  was  able  to  hold  him  in 
check,  till  General  Steedman  from  Chattanooga  could  come 
to  its  assistance,  when  Wheeler  was  repulsed.  The  railroad 
and  telegraph  were  cut  in  several  places,  but  the  damage  was 
trifling,  and  yielding  to  the  common  temptation  of  cavalry  to 
make  too  much  of  the  distance  they  may  go  behind  the  hos 
tile  lines,  Wheeler  marched  into  East  Tennessee,  where  he 
could  by  no  possibility  do  anything  to  affect  the  campaign. 

Satisfied  that  no  serious  mischief  was  occurring  in  his 
rear,  Sherman  began  his  movement  on  Thursday,  August 
25th.  Stanley's  (Fourth)  corps,  now  the  left  flank  on  the 
north  of  Atlanta,  marched  to  the  rear  of  Williams's  (Twen- 


LINES   NEAR   EAST   POINT.  197 

tietli),  and  Garrard's  cavalry,  dismounted,  held  the  Fourth 
Corps  lines.  Next  day  Stanley  was  at  Utoy  Creek,  massed 
in  rear  of  Davis's  (Fourteenth)  corps,  which  also  abandoned 
its  lines  to  its  skirmishers,  and  was  massed  near  Stanley.  Dur 
ing  the  night  Williams's  corps  marched  to  the  works  pre 
pared  at  the  railway  crossing  of  the  Chattahoochee,  where 
General  Slocum  arrived  and  assumed  command.  At  the 
same  time  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  marched  by  roads 
west  of  Thomas,  to  the  vicinity  of  the  village  of  Utoy,  and 
was  also  massed,  facing  southward  and  now  forming  the 
right  of  the  army.  Dodge's  corps  (Sixteenth),  in  conse 
quence  of  his  having  been  disabled  by  a  wound,  was  tem 
porarily  placed  under  command  of  General  Eansom.  Gar 
rard's  cavalry  covered  the  movement  at  the  rear,  Schofield's 
corps  (Twenty-third)  holding  fast  in  its  positions  in  front  of 
East  Point,  and  demonstrating  in  front  and  flanks. 

By  the  evening  of  the  27th,  it  will  be  seen,  all  of  Sher 
man's  army  except  the  Twentieth  Corps  was  between 
Atlanta  and  Sandtown,  echelloned  along  that  road.  Hood 
had  not  interfered  with  the  movement,  and  had  only 
followed  it  with  light  cavalry  reconnoissances.  But  his 
horsemen,  skirmishing  with  Garrard  on  the  north  and  with 
Kilpatrick  on  the  south,  were  able  to  locate  the  National 
forces  with  sufficient  accuracy,  and  he  jumped  at  the 
conclusion  that  Wheeler's  expedition  had  been  success 
ful  to  the  full  extent  of  his  hopes,  and  that  Sherman  was 
retreating  across  the  Chattahoochee  by  the  Sandtown  road, 
short  of  supplies.  His  illusion  was  confirmed  by  an  inci 
dent  which  occurred  the  same  evening.  An  old  woman  of 
the  neighborhood  had  applied  to  some  of  Hardee's  troops 
for  food,  and  stated  that  she  had  been  within  the  lines  of 
Schofield's  division  which  lay  nearest,  and  had  been  re 
fused  food  with  the  assertion  that  the  troops  had  not 


198  ATLANTA. 

enough  for  themselves.  She  had  managed  to  pass  the  lines 
and  carried  her  budget  of  news  to  the  enemy.  She  was 
sent  to  Hardee,  and  the  latter  thinking  her  knowledge  of 
positions  of  some  importance,  carried  her  to  Hood's  head 
quarters,  where  she  repeated  her  story.  Hood,  seizing  upon 
her  statement  that  the  National  forces  were  short  of  rations, 
exclaimed  that  it  fully  corroborated  his  belief  that  Sherman 
was  crossing  the  Chattahoochee  at  Sandtown.1  To  this  con 
viction  he  stubbornly  adhered  for  forty-eight  hours  longer, 
when  it  was  quite  too  late  to  make  new  combinations  to  keep 
his  adversary  from  the  railroad.  Had  he  suspected  the 
truth,  as  some  at  least  of  his  subordinates  did,  Lee's  and 
Stewart's  corps  would  have  been  in  line  in  front  of  Bed 
Oak  and  Fairburn  when  Sherman  approached  the  "West 
Point  Railway ;  his  right  would  have  covered  East  Point, 
and  another  long  flanking  operation,  probably  this  time  by 
the  left,  would  have  been  imposed  upon  the  National  army. 
Atlanta  would  have  been  abandoned,  but  Atlanta  was  only  a 
name — the  thing  it  stood  for  was  the  junction  of  the  west 
ern  and  southern  railways,  which  Hood  would  still  have 
held. 

The  trains  of  Sherman's  whole  army  marched  between 
the  two  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  Scho- 
field  was  kept  in  position  till  they  were  well  on  their  way 
from  Mount  Gilead  Church,  which  is  four  miles  southeast  of 
East  Point,  to  Red  Oak,  a  station  on  the  West  Point  Rail 
way,  seven  miles  from  the  former  place,  and  near  which 
Thomas  encamped  on  the  night  of  the  28th.  Howard,  with 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  reached  Fairburn  the  same 
evening,  five  miles  farther  southwest  on  the  same  road.  A 
day  was  now  given  to  thorough  destruction  of  some  miles 

1  The  story  was  narrated  to  the  writer  by  General  Hardee,  at  the  time  of  John 
ston's  surrender  in  North  Carolina  tho  following  spring. 


LINES  NEAR  EAST  POINT.  199 

of  the  railway,  burning  the  ties  and  twisting  the  heated 
rails.  Schofield  withdrew  a  little  from  his  isolated  position 
on  the  28th,  putting  his  corps  in  line  a  mile  northeast  of 
Mount  Gilead,  and  next  day  moved  into  connection  with  the 
left  flank  of  Stanley's  corps.  The  30th  the  movement  was 
resumed,  and  the  whole  army  was  between  the  two  rail 
roads,  except  Schofield's  corps,  which  moved  from  Eed  Oak 
Station  a  mile  and  a  half  toward  East  Point,  and  took 
position  there,  covering  the  movement  of  the  army  trains. 
The  Twenty -third  Corps  was  thus  separated  fully  three 
miles  from  supports,  and  fully  expected  a  blow  from  Hood. 
He  contented  himself,  however,  with  a  brisk  cavalry  recon- 
noissance,  and  during  the  skirmish  Schofield's  troops  threw 
up  a  light  intrenchment  in  preparation  for  more  serious 
contingencies.  His  dream  of  a  flying  enemy  was  dispelled, 
however,  and  in  its  place  he  substituted  that  of  a  movement 
of  two  corps  of  Sherman's  army  to  his  line  of  communica 
tions.  He  now  ordered  Hardee  with  his  own  and  Lee's 
corps  to  Jonesboro,  and  directed  an  attack  next  morning  on 
that  flank  of  the  National  forces. 

The  Macon  Eailway  runs  along  the  ridge  separating  the 
waters  of  the  Flint  on  the  west  from  those  of  the  Ocmulgee 
on  the  east,  and  Hardee  was  expected  to  drive  Sherman's 
corps  over  the  former  stream  if  they  had  crossed  it.  Gen 
eral  Cleburne  was  in  command  of  Hardee's  own  corps,  and 
no  officer  of  the  Confederate  army  had  a  better  established 
reputation  for  courage  and  energy.  He  was  delayed  in  get 
ting  into  position  by  finding  that  Howard  was  already  upon 
the  road  he  expected  to  take,  and  in  order  to  reach  the  right 
flank  of  the  National  forces  he  had  to  open  a  new  road.  It 
was  nine  in  the  morning  of  the  31st  before  Cleburne's  corps 
was  in  position,  and  Lee's  corps  did  not  get  up  on  his  right 
for  two  hours  more.  Finding  that  this  was  giving  Howard 


200  ATLANTA. 

time  to  intrench,  Hardee,  by  telegraph,  urged  Hood  himself 
to  come  to  the  front,  but  the  latter  deemed  it  unwise  to  leave 
Atlanta. 

Howard  had  been  advancing  on  the  30th  along  the  road 
from  Fail-burn  to  Jonesboro,  impeded  all  day  by  cavalry  of 
the  enemy,  who  made  a  stubborn  skirmishing  resistance  in 
order  to  give  Hardee  time  to  reach  Jonesboro  and  to  form 
at  Flint  Kiver. 

Sherman  had  indicated  the  Renfro  place  as  the  position 
where  his  right  wing  should  rest  at  the  close  of  the  30th, 
but  he  had  authorized  Howard  to  move  on  to  the  railroad  at 
Jonesboro  if  the  opportunity  offered.  There  was  no  water 
at  Renfro's,  and  although  he  got  reports  of  a  force  in 
trenched  at  Jonesboro,  sometimes  called  a  division  and 
sometimes  a  corps,  Howard  decided  to  advance  at  least  to 
the  Flint  River,  which  was  the  nearest  point  before  him 
where  water  enough  for  the  troops  could  be  had.  After  a 
brief  halt,  therefore,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  marched 
again,  in  two  columns,  Logan's  (Fifteenth)  corps  on  the  left, 
and  Ransom's  (Sixteenth)  on  the  right,  both  preceded  by 
portions  of  Kilpatrick's  cavalry.  The  advance  was  so  rapid 
that  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  unable  to  make  any  con 
siderable  stand.  At  the  Flint  River  the  bridge  was  found 
still  uninjured,  and  the  cavalry  covered  it  by  a  rapid  fire 
from  the  river  bank,  while  Hazen's  (formerly  M.  L.  Smith's) 
division  carried  it  and  the  barricades  defending  it,  by  a  bril- 
,  liant  dash.  The  head  of  Logan's  column  was  now  over,  and 
giving  the  enemy  no  time  to  rally,  though  night  was  coming 
on,  he  advanced  to  the  highest  ground  between  the  river  and 
the  railroad,  where,  by  Howard's  directions,  he  intrenched, 
putting  Hazen's  division  on  the  left,  Harrow's  on  the  right, 
and  Osterhaus's  in  second  line. 

As  Ransom  came  up  with  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  he  was 


JOXESBORO.  201 

placed  in  position  west  of  the  river  facing  to  the  south,  his 
left  being  nearly  opposite  Logan's  right.  Blair's  (Seven 
teenth)  corps  did  not  get  up  till  morning,  when  it  was  placed 
also  on  the  west  of  the  Flint,  but  in  rear  of  Logan's  left,  and 
facing  northeast. 

At  daylight  of  the  31st,  Logan  rectified  his  lines  on  the 
right  and  Eansom  built  a  bridge  in  front  of  his  left,  so  that 
he  connected  with  Logan.  Bridges  were  also  built  by  Blair 
and  Logan,  so  that  the  three  corps  were  in  mutual  support 
and  were  prepared  for  a  new  advance.  Howard  knew  by 
the  noise  of  the  trains  on  the  railway  that  a  concentration 
was  making  during  the  night.  His  position  was  somewhat 
perilous  till  he  knew  the  rest  of  the  grand  army  to  be  within 
supporting  distance,  and  he  spent  most  of  the  day  in  mak 
ing  his  position  strong,  meanwhile  communicating  with 
Sherman.  The  General-in-Chief  was  with  Thomas's  columns, 
which  were  in  motion,  and  it  was  not  till  late  in  the  day  that 
the  orderlies  sent  with  despatches  from  Howard  found  him 
and  he  became  aware  of  Hood's  new  movement. 

About  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Hardee  advanced 
against  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  his  attack  extending 
along  the  whole  front  of  Logan's  corps  and  one  division  of 
Ransom's.  Howard  sent  C.  R.  Woods's  division  from  Blair's 
corps  across  the  river  to  support  Logan's  left,  fearing  the 
enemy  might  get  between  that  flank  and  the  stream.  The 
attack  was  fierce,  but  neither  in  weight  nor  persistency  did 
it  seem  to  equal  former  efforts  of  the  Confederate  infantry. 
The  most  determined  part  of  the  assault  fell  on  Hazen's  di 
vision  ;  but  here  as  elsewhere  it  was  repulsed,  and  the  enemy 
retired,  leaving  over  four  hundred  dead  upon  the  field.  The 
Confederates  engaged  were  mostly  of  Lee's  corps,  and  their 
reports  would  indicate  that  that  officer,  supposing  he  heard 
the  signal  agreed  upon  between  him  and  Cleburne,  had  or- 


202  ATLANTA. 

dered  the  attack  before  the  latter  was  ready.  It  appears 
certain  that  there  was  some  failure  in  the  cooperation  in 
tended,  and  Cleburne's  corps  took  little  part  in  the  affair 
beyond  preventing  Kilpatrick  with  his  cavalry  from  crossing 
the  river  farther  to  the  right,  as  he  was  trying  to  do  under 
Howard's  orders.  Cleburne  followed  Kilpatrick  across  the 
river,  and  Howard,  to  meet  this  movement  and  protect  his 
trains,  directed  Blair  to  send  a  division  from  his  corps  to  the 
right  of  Eansom's,  and  Giles  A.  Smith's  was  detached  for 
that  purpose. 

But  a  little  farther  to  the  north  other  events  were  occur 
ring.  Sehofield  moving  in  the  morning  past  Morrow's  Mill, 
the  position  of  Stanley's  corps,  took  a  road  leading  to  the 
Macon  Kailway,  about  a  mile  south  of  Eough-and-Keady  Sta 
tion.  Stanley  took  one  a  little  farther  to  the  south,  and 
both  advanced  as  rapidly  as  a  strong  opposition  from  cavalry 
would  permit.  Schofield's  leading  division  (Cox's)  reached 
the  railway  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  found  there 
an  intrenched  line  covering  it  and  occupied  by  dismounted 
cavalry.  This  was  carried  by  a  charge  and  a  considerable 
number  of  prisoners  taken.  A  railway  train  was  within  sight 
but  stopped  at  the  noise  of  the  combat  and  steamed  back  to 
Atlanta.  The  division  marched  north  to  Eough-and-Eeady 
and  encamped,  and  Hascall's  division,  reaching  the  road  at 
the  same  place  as  the  other,  was  employed  in  destroying  the 
railway  south  to  the  point  reached  by  Stanley's  corps  at  four 
o'clock.  Stanley  also  began  the  work  of  destruction.  At 
six  in  the  evening  Carleton's  brigade  of  Baird's  division 
(Fourteenth  Corps)  reached  the  same  road  about  four  miles 
north  of  Jonesboro,  but  the  rest  of  the  division  did  not  get 
up  that  night. 

The  retreating  railway  train  which  carried  the  news  to 
Atlanta  that  Sherman's  infantry  were  moving  northward  on 


JONESBORO.  203 

Rough-and-Ready  Station,  carried  consternation  with  it. 
Hood  himself  seems  to  have  been  bewildered,  and  to  have 
seized  at  once  upon  the  idea  that  this  was  the  beginning  of 
a  general  attack  upon  Atlanta,  and  that  Sherman  had  only 
moved  by  his  right  flank  across  the  railways,  facing  north 
ward.  He  had  not  heard  of  Hardee's  combat  of  the  after 
noon,  and  without  awaiting  reports  from  him,  sent  at  six 
o'clock  peremptory  orders  for  the  return  of  Lee's  corps  to 
the  city,  directing  it  to  move  by  two  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
Hardee  was  ordered  to  cover  the  railway  and  the  provision 
and  ordnance  trains  behind  him  as  well  as  he  could.  Hood's 
despatches  informed  Hardee  that  there  were  indications  of  an 
attack  on  Atlanta,  as  the  National  forces  were  in  considerable 
force  at  Kough-and-Eeady,  and  it  was  thought  they  would 
strike  East  Point  the  next  day.  As  the  railway  and  tele 
graph  were  cut,  these  despatches  were  sent  by  courier,  and 
Lee's  movement  wras  timed  accordingly.  Lee's  corps 
marched  as  ordered,  but  was  not  destined  to  reach  Atlanta. 
Other  orders  met  it  on  the  way.  Hardee,  putting  a  bold 
face  on  his  losing  game,  stretched  his  corps  as  well  as  he 
could  to  hold  the  lines  intrenched  in  the  afternoon,  resort 
ing  to  the  old  device  of  heavy  skirmish  lines  in  front,  with 
reserves  ready  to  move  at  double-quick  step  to  a  threatened 
point.  Meanwhile  he  reported  to  Hood  the  actual  situa 
tion,  and  was  greatly  helped  in  his  defence  of  Jonesboro  by 
the  fact  that  Howard  knew  he  had  two  corps  of  the  Confeder 
ate  army  before  him  at  nightfall,  and  no  one  could  suspect 
that  one  of  them  would  be  recalled  to  Atlanta  during  the 
night.  Hood's  misjudgment  of  the  state  of  affairs  wras  one 
of  those  inexplicable  things  which  could  enter  into  nobody's 
calculation. 

On  the  night  of  the  31st,  Sherman  knew  that  he  held  the 
railway  from  Eough-and-Ready  to  near  Jonesboro,  and  that 


204  ATLANTA. 

Hardee  and  Lee  were  in  position  at  the  latter  place.  It  was 
possible  that  a  garrison  might  be  left  in  the  enceinte  of 
Atlanta,  but  it  was  probable  that  the  whole  Confederate 
Army  would  be  before  him  next  day.  He  therefore  sent 
orders  by  courier  to  Slocum,  directing  him  to  be  active  in 
discovering  the  condition  of  things  at  Atlanta,  and  to  enter 
the  place  if  possible.  Thomas  was  ordered  to  march  Davis's 
(Fourteenth)  corps  to  Howard's  left,  destroying  such  portions 
of  the  railway  as  it  could  reach  in  passing.  Stanley  with 
the  Fourth  Corps  was  directed  to  inarch  down  the  railway, 
destroying  it  thoroughly  and  then  joining  Davis's  corps. 
Schofield's  orders  were  to  perform  a  similar  work  of  destruc 
tion  from  Hough-and-Ready  southward.  All  these  orders 
looked  to  the  termination  of  the  campaign  when  Hood 
should  be  driven  south  of  Jon^sboro,  for  otherwise  the  rail 
way  would  have  been  carefully  preserved  instead  of  destroy 
ing  it.  Sherman  was  only  anxious  to  press  the  enemy 
enough  to  make  sure  of  the  evacuation  and  the  complete 
possession  of  the  railway  connections  at  Atlanta  ;  for  this 
carried  with  it  every  material  advantage  which  would  fol 
low  from  holding  any  point  north  of  Macon,  the  next  impor 
tant  intersection  of  railroads.  For  this  reason,  he  did  not 
hasten  the  movement  to  Howard's  support  beyond  the 
speed  which  might  be  consistent  with  thorough  work  in 
burning  the  ties,  twisting  the  rails  and  blowing  up  the 
masonry  of  the  road.  But  in  the  afternoon  he  joined  How 
ard  in  person,  accompanying  the  march  of  Davis's  corps, 
and  learned  that  Lee's  corps  had  disappeared,  and  only 
Hardee's  was  before  him.  This  put  a  new  face  on  affairs, 
and  he  despatched  orders  to  concentrate  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  in  haste,  so  that  Hardee  might  be  surrounded 
and,  if  possible,  captured  while  isolated  from  the  rest  of 
Hood's  army.  Thomas  ordered  Stanley  to  suspend  other 


JONESBORO. 


205 


work  and  hurry  forward  to  Jonesboro.  Davis  was  ordered 
to  put  his  corps  on  Howard's  left,  and  swinging  his  own  left 
boldly  forward,  endeavor  to  envelop  Hardee's  right.  Ho\v- 
ard  was  directed  to  send  two  divisions  of  Blair's  corps  by  a 
detour  to  his  right  and  put  them,  if  possible,  upon  the  rail 
road  south  of  Jonesboro.  Schofield  turned  his  head  of 
column  south,  moving  close  behind  the  Fourth  Corps. 


Ftdtral  Lines  -=-=~    Confederate  Lines  —~~  \/ 


Jonesboro. 

Hardee's  lines  had  been  formed  to  meet  Howard's  advance 
from  the  west,  and  their  direction  was  nearly  north  and 
south.  His  extreme  right  was  sharply  refused,  and  where  it 
reached  the  railroad,  ran  toward  the  southeast,  behind  a 
small  stream  and  valley.  Cleburne's  own  division  was  on 
that  flank,  Govan's  brigade  holding  the  angle,  with  Gran- 
berry  on  his  left,  and  Lewis  still  farther  to  the  right  and 


206  ATLANTA. 

rear.  As  Davis's  corps  approached,  Morgan's  division  con 
nected  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  having  Caiiin's 
(formerly  Johnson's)  division  on  the  left,  and  Baird's  in  re 
serve.  Staff  officers  were  despatched  to  hasten  the  move 
ment  of  Stanley's  corps,  and  Sherman's  impatience  at  the 
delay  became  so  great  that  Thomas  galloped  away  in  jDerson 
on  the  same  errand.  Davis  sent  forward  Edie's  brigade  of 
Carlin's  division  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  toward  the  rail 
road,  and  after  a  brisk  skirmish  it  occupied  a  hill  or  ridge 
extending  beyond  the  salient  angle  of  the  enemy's  lines. 
The  rest  of  Carlin's  division  was  now  formed  on  the  left  of 
Edie,  and  Morgan's  division  moving  by  the  main  road  lead 
ing  by  Chauibers's  Mill,  there  turned  to  the  left  and  formed 
on  Caiiin's  right.  Baird's  division  was  held  in  reserve  in 
rear  of  Carlin.  Prescott's  battery  was  put  in  position  on 
the  hill  held  by  Edie,  and  its  fire,  enfilading  part  of  the 
enemy's  line  near  the  angle,  disabled  a  number  of  his  guns 
there  and  did  much  execution.  Davis's  formation  was  in 
two  lines,  the  divisions  as  near  each  other  as  was  practi 
cable.  Being  ordered  forward  they  advanced  toward  the 
angle  of  Hardee's  works,  but  were  much  impeded  by  the 
tangled  and  broken  character  of  the  ground.  Edie's  brigade 
struck  the  salient  in  the  enemy's  line  and  carried  it,  suffer 
ing  considerably  in  the  attack.  The  Confederates  rallied 
and  repulsed  the  assailants,  Edie's  supports  not  arriving  in 
time  to  enable  him  to  hold  the  works  he  had  gained.  The 
line  was  reformed  near  the  foot  of  the  slope  on  which  the 
enemy's  breastworks  were,  and  the  alignment  was  rectified. 
Este's  brigade  of  Baird's  division  was  deployed  in  close  sup 
port  of  Caiiin's  right  and  put  under  his  orders.  The  ad 
vance  was  again  ordered,  just  before  five  o'clock,  and  this 
time  Este's  brigade  found  itself  in  front  of  the  salient,  and 
carried  it  with  a  dash,  losing,  however,  nearly  one-third  of 


FALL  OF  ATLANTA.  207 

its  numbers  in  the  few  minutes  it  was  under  the  enemy's 
fire.  The  rest  of  Carlin's  men,  sweeping  in  from  the  left, 
with  Morgan's  on  the  right,  surrounded  the  Confederates  in 
that  angle  of  their  line,  and  General  Govan  with  nearly  his 
whole  brigade  and  two  batteries  of  artillery  were  captured, 
the  gun-carriages  being  a  good  deal  injured  by  the  previous 
fire  of  Prescott's  battery.  Lewis's  brigade  on  Hardee's  ex 
treme  right,  and  Cranberry's,  which  was  next  on  the  left  of 
Govan,  now  fell  back,  making  a  new  line  and  showing  a  bold 
front,  while  Hardee's  centre  and  left  still  held  to  their  in- 
trenchments.  Stanley's  head  of  column  had  come  up  be 
fore  Davis's  attack  was  made ;  but  before  the  corps  was  de 
ployed  and  ready  to  advance  on  Davis's  left,  darkness  covered 
the  field  and  put  an  end  to  the  day's  operations. 

The  losses  in  Carlin's  division  were  371 ;  in  Baird's  (Este's 
brigade)  330,  and  in  Morgan's  division  about  the  same  num 
ber.  Over  three  hundred  of  the  enemy's  dead  were  left  on 
the  field.  Eight  hundred  and  sixty-five  were  surrendered 
with  General  Govan,  and  on  the  following  day  nearly  a  thou 
sand,  including  wounded  left  in  hospitals  by  Hardee,  were 
added  to  the  list  of  captured. 

Before  Lee's  corps,  which  had  left  Hardee  in  the  night, 
had  made  more  than  half  the  distance  back  to  Atlanta, 
Hood  discovered  his  mistake,  and  countermanding  its 
orders,  directed  it  to  take  position  to  cover  the  movement 
of  Stewart's  and  Smith's  corps  from  Atlanta.  It  was  too  late 
to  save  anything  which  had  not  been  removed,  and  large 
trains  of  ordnance  and  other  stores,  numbering  over  eighty 
cars  and  six  locomotive  engines,  were  left  to  be  destroyed 
by  the  cavalry  rear-guard.  During  the  night  Hardee  also 
evacuated  his  lines,  and  on  September  2d,  Hood  once  more 
assembled  his  army  at  Lovejoy  Station.  About  midnight  of 
the  1st,  the  noise  of  explosions  was  heard  in  the  direction  of 


208  ATLANTA. 

Atlanta,  and  it  hardly  needed  the  courier  whom  Slocum 
sent  forward  next  day  to  tell  that  the  city  was  abandoned 
and  the  stores  burnt  and  destroyed.  Slocum  had  been  met 
on  his  advance  in  the  morning  by  the  mayor  of  the  city,  who 
formally  surrendered  the  place,  and  he  lost  no  time  in  for 
warding  the  confirmation  of  the  welcome  news  to  Sherman, 
who  had  already  followed  the  retreating  Confederates  to 
Lovejoy  Station  and  was  developing  Hood's  lines  there  by 
the  sharp  skirmishing  which  had  been  the  everyday  work  of 
the  campaign. 

It  was  now  definitely  known  that  Atlanta  was  ours,  and 
"  fairly  won,"  as  Sherman  said  in  his  despatches  to  Washing 
ton,  and  he  issued  his  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  army 
to  the  vicinity  of  that  place,  for  a  brief  period  of  rest  and 
preparation  for  a  new  campaign.  The  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  occupied  the  city,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  en 
camped  at  East  Point,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  at  Decatur. 
The  cavalry  covered  the  flanks  and  rear,  from  Sandtown  to 
Eoswell  along  the  Chattahoochee. 

Hood  affects  to  wonder  that  Sherman  did  not  attack 
Stewart's  corps  on  the  march  from  Atlanta  on  September  1st. 
The  reasons  are  twofold.  The  presumption  was  that  Lee's 
corps  was  still  within  supporting  distance  of  Hardee.  In 
the  absence  of  positive  evidence,  his  eccentric  march  back 
toward  Atlanta,  in  obedience  to  Hood's  order,  could  not  have 
been  imagined  by  any  military  man.  To  get  up  the  Fourth 
Corps  on  the  left  and  envelop  Hardee  or  force  him  back 
upon  any  new  position  Lee  might  be  supposed  to  be  taking 
in  rear,  was  the  plain  dictate  of  wisdom.  This  was  what 
Sherman  was  doing,  and  he  was  exasperated  at  not  being 
able  to  complete  the  work  before  night  came  on.  The  cav 
alry  brought  no  information  of  the  movements  of  either  Lee's 
corps  or  the  rest  of  Hood's  army  ;  and  judging  by  probabili- 


FALL  OF  ATLANTA.  209 

ties  alone,  every  maxim  of  sonnd  strategy  dictated  the  plan 
of  interposing  as  much  as  possible  of  the  army  between 
Hardee  and  the  remainder  of  Hood's  forces,  which  must 
unite  with  him  by  some  road  coming  in  from  the  east. 

Hood  also  intimates  that  in  calling  Lee  to  him  it  was  his 
purpose  to  attack  the  exposed  flank  of  Sherman's  army. 
This  was  what  Sherman  expected  and  what  Schofield  also 
was  looking  for;  but  Hood's  despatches  to  Hardee  prove 
that  he  was  not  thinking  of  aggression  ;  he  talked  only  of 
defence,  and  was  seeking  in  vain  to  settle  in  his  own  mind 
any  satisfactory  theory  of  his  adversary's  plan.  Had  he 
meant  to  attack  the  flank,  surely  never  was  a  better  oppor 
tunity  than  that  of  September  1st,  when  Hardee  was  fight 
ing  against  odds  to  hold  his  position,  and  Schofield  had 
turned  his  back  on  Atlanta  to  march  into  position  at  Jones- 
boro.  The  Confederate  General  must  be  held  to  have  mis 
conceived  utterly  Sherman's  movements  from  August  25th, 
and  to  have  been  made  inconsistent  and  feeble  in  action 
by  his  uncertainty  as  to  the  situation.  Of  all  the  theories 
as  to  his  purposes  at  that  critical  time,  the  one  which 
would  make  him  take  the  bold  initiative,  as  he  had  done  in 
the  first  week  of  his  command,  is  the  one  most  entirely  un 
supported  by  evidence.  The  order  to  Hardee  to  march  to 
Jonesboro  was  neutralized  by  the  recall  of  Lee,  and  loses 
its  appearance  of  energy,  while  everything  else  combines  to 
show  that  he  was  groping  in  the  dark.  Sherman's  move 
ment,  on  the  other  hand,  was  boldly  conceived  and  system 
atically  executed.  His  corps  was  so  echeloned  that  had 
the  enemy  marched  out  of  Atlanta  to  attack  the  nearest 
flank,  Schofield  would  have  been  able  to  hold  him  in  check 
till  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  could  have  come  to  his 
assistance.  The  other  contingency  was  the  one  which  was 
tested.  Howard  was  attacked  by  Hardee's  and  Lee's  corps, 


210  ATLANTA. 

and  easily  repulsed  the  assault  till  the  arrival   of  Davis's 
corps  enabled  Sherman  again  to  assume  the  aggressive. 

The  campaign  as  a  whole  will  remain  a  most  instructive 
example  of  the  methods  of  warfare  which  may  be  said  to  be 
the  natural  outcome  of  modern  improvements  in  weapons, 
and  in  means  of  transportation  and  communication  when 
used  in  a  sparsely  settled  and  very  difficult  if  not  impracti 
cable  country.  At  the  time,  the  successful  termination  of 
the  long  hand-to-hand  struggle  was  hailed  as  the  assurance 
that  the  war  approached  its  close  ;  and  the  thanks  which 
Congress  and  the  President  bestowed  upon  Sherman  and 
his  army  were  only  the  faint  expression  of  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  nation  toward  the  General  and  his  troops. 


CHAPTEK  XVI. 

RESULTS. 

THE  investigation  of  the  comparative  losses  of  the  con 
tending  armies  is,  like  that  of  their  comparative  strength, 
one  of  no  little  difficulty.  The  system  of  returns  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  is  one  in  which  every  man  en 
listed  must  be  accounted  for,  and  the  figures,  like  the  debits 
and  credits  of  mercantile  account-books,  are  expected  to 
balance.  For  various  reasons,  no  such  fulness  of  accounts  is 
found  in  the  printed  reports  of  the  Confederate  armies.  The 
publication  of  the  archives  collected  at  Washington  will  at 
some  future  day  do  much  to  clear  up  the  question,  but  we 
are  forced  for  the  present  to  rely  upon  approximate  esti 
mates.  First,  however,  it  must  never  be  forgotten  that  the 
exact  system  of  the  National  army  was  not  enforced  by 
the  Confederates.  It  is  unnecessary  to  inquire  whether  this 
was  a  purposed  omission,  made  through  the  unwillingness  of 
the  Eichmond  Government  to  let  the  Southern  people  know 
the  terrible  cost  of  the  struggle  they  were  making,  or 
whether  it  resulted  from  the  embarrassments  of  poverty  and 
the  lack  of  the  means  for  keeping  up  elaborate  systems  of 
field  statistics.  The  fact  is  enough,  and  of  it  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  At  the  surrender  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
in  the  spring  of  1865,  that  officer  responded  to  an  inquiry  by 
General  Schofield  as  to  the  number  of  his  forces,  that  his 
report  of  effectives  was  about  sixteen  thousand  men,  yet 


212  ATLANTA. 

double  that  number  appeared  at  the  Provost  Marshal's  office 
at  Greensboro,  and  received  their  certificates  of  parole.  At 
that  time  General  Johnston,  who  was  perfectly  familiar  with 
both  systems  of  returns,  added  the  remark  that  they  had 
not  pretended  to  keep  up  the  accurate  forms  of  report  in 
sisted  upon  by  the  Adjutant-General's  Office  at  Washington. 

It  may  be  that  this  statement  should  apply  chiefly  to  the 
field  returns,  which  were  those  made  use  of  by  the  com 
manding  officers  in  active  operations,  and  that  more  sys 
tematic  tables  were  made  by  the  Adjutant-General's  office. 
If  so,  it  is  evident  that  the  Confederate  writers  have  not  had 
access  to  them,  and  that  their  assertions  are  based  upon  the 
imperfect  returns  to  which  reference  has  been  made. 

In  the  controversies  between  Confederate  officers  them 
selves  we  get  the  most  valuable  light  on  this  subject.  All 
the  testimony  supports  the  conclusion  that  they  rely  upon 
estimates  only,  and  that  from  a  very  early  period  of  the  war 
a  systematic  habit  was  formed  of  underestimating  their  own 
numbers  and  their  own  losses,  by  way  of  exaggerating  the 
odds  at  which  they  wrere  fighting,  and  of  keeping  up  the  popu 
lar  illusion  that  the  preponderance  of  strength  in  the  North 
was  made  up  by  superior  military  qualities  in  the  South. 
The  declarations  of  Hood  and  of  Jefferson  Davis  in  reference 
to  the  strength  of  Johnston's  army  in  May  have  already  been 
mentioned,  and  their  significance  shown.  Those  of  Johnston 
and  other  Confederate  authorities  in  regard  to  Hood's  army 
in  the  next  campaign  are  equally  instructive.  Taken  to 
gether  they  make  satisfactory  proof  that  during  the  summer 
of  1864,  the  proportion  of  seven  to  ten  is  a  fair  statement  of 
the  relative  strength  of  the  Confederate  and  National  armies 
in  Georgia,  and  the  numerical  superiority  on  the  one  side 
was  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  defensive  tactics  on 
the  other,  so  long  as  assaults  upon  intrenched  lines  were 


RESULTS.  213 

avoided.  The  palpable  fact  that  the  odds  would  be  not  only 
reversed,  but  made  still  greater  against  him,  if  he  adopted  the 
policy  of  carrying  the  enemy's  lines  by  main  force,  was  what 
constituted  the  difficulty  of  Sherman's  position ;  and  the 
movements  by  which  he  made  his  advance  to  Atlanta  and 
Lovejoy  Station  without  sacrificing  his  advantages,  are  what 
constitute  the  most  solid  foundation  for  the  highest  military 
reputation. 

As  to  the  losses  in  the  campaign,  the  table  given  by  Gen 
eral  Sherman  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  is  based  on  the  returns  in  the 
Adjutant- General's  office,  and  must  be  admitted  by  all  to  be 
thoroughly  reliable  in  regard  to  the  infantry  and  artillery. 
Sherman  tells  us  that  the  cavalry  were  irregular  in  their  re 
turns,  and  he  therefore  treats  the  imperfection  of  statistics 
in  that  arm  of  the  service  as  a  fair  offset  to  the  acknowledged 
omission  of  any  report  from  the  Confederate  cavalry  by 
Johnston  and  others. 

The  first  and  most  noticeable  omission  in  Confederate  re 
ports  is  of  the  list  of  "  missing."  This  does  not  include  those 
absent  at  home  without  leave,  and  who  are  technically 
classed  as  deserters,  but  those  who  have  disappeared  during 
an  engagement,  and  are  presumed  to  be  in  the  enemy's 
hands,  either  dead  or  as  prisoners.  Of  prisoners  alone  Sher 
man's  army  captured  twelve  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
eighty-three  (12,983),  which  were  officially  reported  and 
made  subjects  for  exchange.  These  nowhere  appear  in  the 
Confederate  reports  of  losses,  and  are  as  completely  ignored 
as  if  no  such  class  existed. 

Both  Johnston  and  Hood  refer  to  the  returns  of  Surgeon- 
General  Foard  for  their  account  of  losses,  and  the  appear 
ance  of  official  formality  in  these  statistics  is  well  calcu 
lated  to  impose  upon  the  investigator.  The  essential  ques 
tion  is  what  Surgeon  Foard  really  reports  upon.  He  certifies 


214  ATLANTA. 

that  the  reports  quoted  are  from  returns  made  to  his  office  ; 
but  what  was  required  to  be  returned  or  in  fact  reported  is 
left  entirely  to  conjecture.  The  natural  assumption  would 
be  that  it  would  be  a  return  of  all  casualties  which  occurred  ; 
but  it  is  now  demonstrably  evident  that  this  is  not  true. 
A  statement  of  General  Hardee  on  this  subject  has  already 
been  quoted,  but  a  more  explicit  reference  to  it  will  be  use 
ful.  Owing  to  the  vicissitudes  of  the  campaign  and  of  the 
war,  Hardee's  report  was  never  fully  made,  but  on  April  5, 
1865,  he  made  a  partial  report  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Confederate  Army,  in  which  he  reviews  some  of  the  state 
ments  of  Hood's  reports  which  had  then  been  published. 
It  is  in  this  official  report  that  he  makes  the  assertion  before 
referred  to,  that  while  Hood  sums  up  the  total  losses  of 
his  entire  army,  "from  the  date  of  his  assuming  command 
on  the  18th  July  to  the  Jonesboro  fight  inclusive,  at  five 
thousand  two  hundred  and  forty-seven  (5,247),  the  casual 
ties  in  my  corps  alone  during  that  time  considerably  ex 
ceeded  seven  thousand  (7,000)  in  killed,  wounded,  and  cap 
tured."1 

In  the  battle  of  Peachtree  Creek  the  greater  part  of  the 
losses  fell  upon  Stewart's  corps.  In  that  of  Ezra  Church 
they  were  wholly  in  the  corps  of  Lee  and  Stewart.  At 
Jonesboro  the  heaviest  loss  was  in  Lee's  corps,  which  at 
tacked  Howard's  intrenchments.  At  the  battle  of  Atlanta 
the  losses  were  almost  equally  divided  between  Hardee's  and 
Cheatham's  (afterward  Lee's)  corps,  as  is  shown  by  Logan's 
report,  which  gives  the  parts  of  the  field  on  which  they  fell. 
Surgeon  Foard's  report  appears  to  make  no  return  of  the 
losses  of  the  Georgia  State  troops  under  General  G.  W. 
Smith,  which  had  been  active  in  the  campaign  from  the  time 

1  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  viii.,  344. 


RESULTS.  215 

of  the  engagements  around  Marietta  in  the  latter  part  of 
June.  If  under  these  circumstances  the  casualties  in  Har- 
dee's  corps  "  considerably  exceeded  seven  thousand,"  it  is 
asking  too  much  of  our  credulity  to  put  the  whole  of  Hood's 
losses  in  the  same  period  at  less  than  three  times  that  num 
ber. 

If  we  draw  our  conclusions  from  the  number  of  dead  left 
upon  the  field  in  the  sanguinary  engagements  of  the  last  six 
weeks  of  the  campaign,  a  very  similar  result  will  be  reached. 
In  these  battles  over  four  thousand  of  the  Confederate  dead 
were  buried  by  Sherman's  troops  or  delivered  under  flags  of 
truce.  At  the  common  estimate  of  five  wounded  for  one 
killed,  which  accords  well  with  the  statistics  on  our  own 
side,  the  wounded  of  Hood's  army  must  have  exceeded 
twenty  thousand  in  the  period  in  question,  and  his  total 
losses  from  all  causes,  including  prisoners,  must  have  closely 
approached  thirty  thousand,  which  was  the  number  com 
monly  accepted  by  the  National  officers  who  made  the  most 
careful  investigation  at  the  time. 

Hood  has  constructed  an  ingenious  argument,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  reducing  his  losses,  out  of  the  comparative  effective 
strength  of  the  army  at  different  dates.  Nothing  could  be 
more  fallacious,  as  a  single  consideration  will  show.  On  the 
31st  July  his  tables  show  an  aggregate  of  absentees  belong 
ing  to  his  army  of  nearly  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven  thou 
sand.1  These  are  supposed  to  be  men  organized  into  the 
regiments  constituting  the  army,  but  who  were  away  from 
the  colors,  with  or  without  leave.  The  sweeping  conscrip 
tion  of  the  South  put  the  whole  able-bodied  population  into 
the  army,  those  who  were  absolutely  necessary  to  the  con 
tinued  organization  of  the  home  communities  being  fur- 

1  Advance  and  Retreat,  p.  218. 


216  ATLANTA. 

louglied  or  excused  from  active  military  service.  These, 
however,  remained  as  a  body  from  which  men  could  still  be 
drawn,  and  the  number  of  those  only  temporarily  excused  or 
absent  without  leave  was  very  large.  We  must  know  how 
many  were  returned  to  the  regiments  from  this  source  before 
any  comparison  of  the  reported  effective  force  at  two  dates 
can  have  even  an  approach  to  value.  The  same  tables  show 
on  September  20th  an  aggregate  of  these  absentees  of  one 
hundred  and  twenty-three  thousand,  or  fourteen  thousand 
less  than  at  the  close  of  July.  If  this  represents,  as  it  would 
seem  to  do,  the  number  which  the  extraordinary  efforts  of 
the  Confederate  Government  brought  back  to  the  colors  dur 
ing  that  period,  it  of  course  increased  Hood's  effective  force 
by  so  much,  and  shows  the  addition  which  must  be  made  to 
his  acknowledged  losses  in  order  to  make  an  approximate 
total.  The  result  thus  reached  is  significantly  close  to 
that  which  is  arrived  at  by  the  other  and  independent 
methods  of  inquiry.  In  whatever  way  the  subject  is  exam 
ined,  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  guesses 
and  estimates  of  the  Confederate  officers  are  not  in  any  sense 
complete  official  reports,  and  are  scarcely  half  of  their  casu 
alties  in  the  campaign. 

At  the  lowest  computation  the  destruction  of  life  and  the 
sufferings  of  the  many  thousands  of  wounded  and  sick  who 
filled  the  hospitals,  made  a  terrible  expenditure  of  all  that 
is  most  dearly  prized  by  a  civilized  people.  The  generous 
mind  glows  with  the  excitement  of  courageous  strife  and 
sets  no  bounds  to  its  admiration  for  military  heroism, 
whether  it  be  shown  by  the  general  who  commands  or  the 
soldier  who  pushes  his  way  through  the  abatis  to  his  enemy's 
works.  But  when  the  struggle  is  over,  and  the  fearful 
spectacle  of  suffering  and  bereavement  is  forced  upon  us, 
when  we  must  reckon  the  cost  by  the  unnumbered  graves 


RESULTS.  217 

and  the  almost  incalculable  destruction  of  wealth,  the  only 
comfort  or  consolation  which  can  be  found  must  be  the 
conviction  that  the  cause  was  so  holy  a  one  as  to  be  worth 
the  sacrifice. 

The  men  never  doubted  of  this  who  fought  under  Sher 
man  over  every  rood  of  ground  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta  ;  and 
their  intelligence  being  equal  to  their  faith  they  made  an 
army  which  has  perhaps  never  been  excelled.  Their  op 
ponents,  too,  were  worthy  of  them ;  for  they  also  had  per 
suaded  themselves  that  they  fought  for  independence  and 
liberty.  Brothers  of  a  common  stock,  of  equal  courage  and 
tenacity,  animated  by  convictions  which  they  passionately 
held,  they  did  on  both  sides  all  that  it  was  possible  for 
soldiers  to  do,  fighting  their  way  to  a  mutual  respect  which 
is  the  solid  foundation  for  a  renewal  of  more  than  the  old 
regard  and  affection. 

This  union  of  courage,  intelligence,  and  zeal  was  also  the 
source  of  new  expedients  in  warfare.  The  methods  used  at 
the  close  of  the  campaign  were  such  as  had  been  developed 
by  the  wonderful  experience  of  that  summer's  work.  From 
general-in-chief  to  the  men  in  the  ranks,  all  were  conscious  of 
having  learned  much  of  the  art  and  practice  of  warfare ;  and 
he  would  be  a  rash  critic  who  would  confidently  affirm  that 
he  could  find  better  means  to  attain  desired  ends  than  those 
which  were  employed  in  attack  or  defence  over  a  hundred 
miles  of  mountains  and  forests  in  Northern  Georgia. 
IX.— 10 


CHAPTEE  XVH. 

THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER— HOOD  UPON  SHERMAN'S 
LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION. 

THE  capture  of  Atlanta  was  followed  by  a  few  weeks  of 
repose  which  was  welcome  to  both  officers  and  men.  For 
Sherman  himself  it  was  a  period  of  mental  activity,  scarce 
less  intense  than  the  conduct  of  the  active  campaign.  The 
success  of  the  past  was  the  pledge  of  even  greater  labors  for 
the  future.  The  very  fact  that  the  President,  Congress,  and 
the  country  echoed  in  general  acclaim  the  flattering  judg 
ment  of  Grant  that  Sherman  had  "  accomplished  the  most 
gigantic  undertaking  given  to  any  general  in  the  war,"  fore 
told  that  he  and  his  army  must  prepare  themselves  for  new 
campaigns  and  new  struggles. 

It  was  no  easy  matter  to  settle  a  satisfactory  plan  of 
operations  for  the  fall  and  winter.  The  line  of  communica 
tions,  which  had  seemed  much  too  long  for  safety  when  the 
army  was  at  Chattanooga  in  the  spring,  was  now  140  miles 
longer.  Wheeler,  with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  was  still  far 
in  the  rear,  and  though  his  raid  had  stripped  Hood  of  his 
mounted  troops  and  had  thus  greatly  helped  Sherman's 
plans  in  the  movement  south  of  Atlanta,  the  National  gen 
eral  knew  very  well  that  there  was  still  much  risk  that  some 
serious  interruption  of  his  railway  might  at  any  time  make 
short  rations  in  his  camps.  It  had  been  his  hope  that  by 
the  time  he  should  reach  Atlanta,  Mobile  would  have  been 
taken,  and  a  shorter  line  for  his  supplies  opened  by  the 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER.  219 

way  of  Montgomery,  or  still  better  by  the  lower  Chatta- 
hoocliee  to  Columbus.  If  the  troops  under  General  Canby 
in  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  could  occupy  Southern  Ala 
bama,  coming  into  direct  cooperation  with  him  upon  his 
right  flank,  another  great  section  of  the  Gulf  States  would 
be  lost  to  the  Confederacy,  and  Sherman  could  face  to  the 
East  with  the  assurance  that  every  day's  march  was  diminish 
ing  the  territory  from  which  the  Richmond  Government 
could  draw  its  supplies  of  men  and  subsistence. 

But  Cariby  had  not  been  able  to  get  on  as  fast  as  was 
hoped.  The  naval  squadron  under  Admiral  Farragut  had 
forced  the  entrance  of  Mobile  Bay,  and  Fort  Morgan  was  in 
our  hands  ;  but  just  at  this  time  a  new  outbreak  occurred  in 
Missouri,  where  General  Price  had  succeeded  in  organizing 
a  considerable  force  of  Confederates,  and  A.  J.  Smith  with 
two  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  had  been  ordered  into 
that  State.  Canby's  power  to  advance  was  thus  lost,  and 
Sherman  was  in  no  little  doubt  whether  any  plan  of  cam 
paign  would  be  free  from  very  serious  embarrassments.  He 
thought;  that  no  good  could  come  of  merely  penetrating 
deeper  into  the  State  of  Georgia  till  some  definite  objective 
point  could  be  aimed  at.  It  seemed  wise,  therefore,  for  him 
to  look  to  occupying  Hood  pretty  closely  till  the  capture  of 
Wilmington  and  Savannah  should  give  assurance  of  a  new 
base  for  his  columns  if  he  marched  across  the  State,  and  a 
solid  footing  upon  the  lower  Chattahoochee  should  guarantee 
the  safe  possession  of  the  country  behind  him.  This  dono, 
he  was  ready  to  pledge  himself  to  occupy  Macon  and  a  point 
on  the  Savannah  River  below  Augusta  by  any  day  which 
Grant  would  name  as  one  on  which  Savannah  should  be  in 
the  possession  of  the  National  forces.  * 

1  See  his  letter  to  Grant  of  September  20th.     Sherman's  Memoirs,  ii.,  113,. 


220  ATLANTA. 

Whatever  the  plan  might  be,  nobody  dreamed  of  abandon 
ing  any  ground  already  gained.  Atlanta  must  be  held  and 
the  railway  to  Nashville  protected  till  some  new  and  decisive 
advantage  should  move  the  theatre  of  operations  much 
farther  to  the  east.  The  captured  city  must  be  made  a  for 
tified  depot  of  supplies  in  which  reserve  stores  for  a  great 
campaign  might  be  accumulated.  Its  military  importance 
had  been  fully  recognized  by  the  Confederates  in  making  it 
a  great  intrenched  camp  covering  the  radiating  railway  lines 
which  ran  from  it  to  all  points  of  the  compass  ;  but  its  pres 
ent  trenches  required  an  army  to  fill  them,  and  Sherman 
could  not  spare  an  army  for  that  purpose.  He  determined, 
therefore,  to  contract  its  enceinte  to  a  size  which  a  moderate 
garrison  could  defend,  and  to  occupy  the  buildings  within 
this  limit  for  military  purposes  only.  It  would  thus  be 
ready  to  stand  a  siege,  if  need  be,  whilst  he  was  operating 
toward  Columbus  or  Augusta.  This  necessarily  involved 
the  removal  of  the  non-combatant  population,  and  he  notified 
Hood  of  his  purpose  and  of  his  desire  to  make  the  measure 
as  little  distressing  in  its  details  as  possible.  His  right  to 
do  so  and  the  necessity  of  it  from  a  military  point  of  view 
are  beyond  dispute,  though  the  aggressive  course  which 
Hood  subsequently  took  gave  an  opportunity  for  a  much 
more  brilliant  stroke  than  was  then  hoped  for,  and  allowed 
Sherman  to  cut  quite  loose  from  his  base  of  supplies. 

Hood  and  the  Confederate  authorities  seized  upon  Sher 
man's  order  as  a  means  of  exciting  the  zeal  and  animosity  of 
their  people.  The  correspondence  between  the  two  generals 
was  spicy,  but  Hood's  part  of  it  is  so  manifestly  meant  for 
popular  effect  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  Sherman 
might  not  as  well  have  contented  himself  with  the  mere 
reiteration  of  the  order,  and  of  the  terms  on  which  the  re 
moval  must  be  made.  His  directions  to  furnish  transporta- 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN   OCTOBER.  221 

tion  for  families  and  household  stuff  were  so  ample,  and  his 
intention  was  so  generously  carried  out  by  Colonel  Willard 
Warner  of  his  staff,  that  nothing  was  left  which  the  citizens 
desired  to  carry  away,  and  at  the  close  of  the  business, 
Colonel  Clare,  who  had  been  appointed  by  Hood  as  his  rep 
resentative  under  the  flag  of  truce,  volunteered  a  written  tes 
timonial  to  his  associate  that  the  execution  of  the  order  had 
been  the  most  considerate  and  courteous  possible. 

The  Confederate  leaders  must  have  been  dull  indeed  if 
they  had  failed  to  understand  the  meaning  of  the  notice. 
Davis  hastened  in  person  to  Macon  to  consult  with  Hood, 
and  the  result  of  their  conference  was  a  decision  to  try  the 
fortunes  of  war  by  a  bold  initiative.  Hood  was  authorized 
to  place  himself  by  a  rapid  march  upon  Sherman's  lines  of 
communication  before  the  latter  could  complete  his  provis 
ioning  and  fortifying  of  Atlanta.  In  a  speech  at  Macon  on 
September  22d,  Davis  endeavored  to  rally  deserters  to  their 
standards  by  foreshadowing  an  attempt  to  transfer  the  war 
again  to  Tennessee.  Sherman  understood  the  warning  and 
published  the  speech  in  the  North  to  hasten  the  recruiting 
which  might  save  him  the  necessity  of  sending  back  part  of 
his  army  to  Nashville. 

The  number  of  regiments  whose  term  of  service  was  expir 
ing  was  so  great  as  to  reduce  our  forces  by  nearly  one-third 
during  the  month  of  September,  and  except  for  the  veterans 
who  had  re-enlisted  during  the  last  winter,  Sherman  could 
hardly  have  kept  the  field.  Recruits  were  collecting  rapidly 
in  the  depots  and  camps  of  instruction  in  the  North,  but  the 
policy  (wretchedly  false  from  a  military  point  of  view)  of 
organizing  them  into  new  regiments,  was  not  only  causing 
delay,  but  was  wasting  the  prestige  and  the  experience  of 
the  old  organizations  at  the  front.  These  were  dwindling 
to  a  tithe  of  their  original  numbers  and  dying  of  inanition, 


222  ATLANTA. 

when  new  and  doubly  vigorous  life  would  have  been  given 
them  by  adding  the  new  material  to  their  skeletons.  The 
recruits,  under  flags  which  were  already  blazoned  with  the 
names  of  Donelsoii  and  Vicksburg,  of  Stone  River  and  Mis 
sion  Ridge,  of  Knoxville  and  Atlanta,  would  have  become 
soldiers  of  double  value  with  double  speed ;  but  political 
reasons  were  powerful  and  the  efficiency  of  the  army  was 
sacrificed  to  them. 

For  the  time,  therefore,  the  account  showed  only  losses  in 
Sherman's  numbers,  and  the  apparent  necessity  of  waiting 
till  the  new  regiments  could  reach  the  front  made  officers 
of  all  grades  anxious  for  leaves  of  absence,  and  the  men  in 
the  ranks  for  furloughs.  Schofield  had  taken  advantage  of 
the  quiet  to  visit  Louisville  and  Knoxville  and  look  after  the 
business  of  his  department;  Logan  and  Blair  went  North  to 
take  part  in  the  Presidential  canvass.  Division  and  brigade 
commanders  and  subordinate  officers  of  all  ranks  pressed  so 
eagerly  for  an  opportunity  to  visit  their  families  and  homes 
that  it  was  thought  politic  to  allow  considerable  numbers  to 
do  so.  When,  then,  toward  the  end  of  September  rumors 
began  to  thicken  that  Hood  was  moving,  Sherman  would 
have  been  quite  willing  that  the  opening  of  the  fall  cam 
paign  might  be  a  little  longer  delayed. 

Whilst  Wheeler  was  trying  to  break  the  railroad  in  North 
ern  Georgia,  General  Forrest  had  already  started  upon  a 
similar  movement  in  Middle  Tennessee.  Crossing  the  Ten 
nessee  River  on  September  20th,  and  following  the  line  of 
the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Railway,  he  frightened  the  com 
mandant  at  Athens  into  an  unnecessary  surrender  and 
marched  north  as  far  as  Pulaski,  but  declined  an  engage 
ment  there  with  General  Rousseau,  who  was  awaiting  him. 
A  portion  of  his  command  moving  eastward  found  itself  in 
danger  of  being  caught  between  the  columns  of  Steedinan, 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER.  223 

who  was  marching  from  Chattanooga,  and  Konsseau  who  was 
closely  following  from  Pulaski.  General  Buford,  who  com 
manded  it,  made  attempts  to  capture  small  garrisons  at 
Huntsville  and  Athens,  but  was  repulsed  and  driven  south 
of  the  Tennessee  on  October  3d.  Forrest  remained  north 
of  the  river  a  few  days  longer,  destroying  a  few  miles  of  rail 
way,  but  accomplishing  nothing  whatever  of  importance,  and 
retreated  across  the  river  on  the  6th,  to  avoid  the  forces 
Thomas  was  concentrating  upon  him.  Like  nearly  all  the 
cavalry  raids,  it  was  a  mere  diversion  with  no  perceptible 
influence  on  the  campaign,  and  the  damage  done  to  commu 
nications  was  repaired  almost  by  the  time  the  troopers  were 
out  of  sight. 

The  threatening  character  of  the  rumors  wrhich  had  pre 
ceded  this  raid  showed  that  it  had  a  good  deal  of  impor 
tance  in  the  eyes  of  the  Confederates,  and  by  the  end  of  Sep 
tember  Sherman  had  thought  it  wise  to  send  Thomas  back 
to  Chattanooga,  where  he  also  placed  Wagner's  division 
(formerly  Newton's)  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  Morgan's  of 
the  Fourteenth,  whilst  he  sent  Corse's  division  of  the  Six 
teenth  Corps  to  Borne,  where  it  covered  the  railway  north 
of  the  Etowah.  The  cavalry  movement  alone  would  have 
been  treated  with  contempt,  but  all  indications  pointed  to 
activity  on  the  part  of  Hood  himself,  and  on  the  29th  Sher 
man  had  definite  information  that  the  Confederate  Army  had 
taken  the  initiative,  and  two-thirds  of  it  had  crossed  the 
Chattahoochee  some  twenty-four  miles  south  of  Atlanta. 
This  had  been  easy  for  Hood,  for  the  river  there  runs  due 
south  near  the  confines  of  Georgia  and  Alabama,  and  after  a 
short  flank  movement  to  the  west  he  had  been  able  to  pass 
it  in  safety.  It  was  now  the  important  question  to  Sherman 
to  decide  what  his  adversary  would  do,  for  he  did  not  mean 
to  be  led  off  upon  a  wild-goose  chase  if  he  could  avoid  it, 


224  ATLANTA. 

nor  had  he  any  thought  of  transferring  the  principal  theatre 
of  operations  to  Tennessee.  He  notified  Cox,  temporarily  in 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  to  be  ready  for  a  coun 
ter  movement  to  the  south  and  east,  and  directed  Thomas  to 
make  such  combinations  north  of  the  Tennessee  as  should 
quickly  dispose  of  Forrest  and  his  cavalry.  On  October  1st, 
in  issuing  preparatory  instructions  to  his  subordinates,  he 
informed  them  that  if  Hood  should  march  into  Alabama 
with  a  purpose  of  reaching  Tennessee,  he  should  order 
northward  to  General  Thomas  the  garrisons  and  detach 
ments  as  far  as  Kingston,  and  with  the  rest  move  upon 
Savannah  and  Charleston,  believing  that  this  would  force 
Hood  to  follow  him.  If,  however,  the  latter  should  try  to 
strike  the  railroad  south  of  the  Etowah,  he  would  turn  upon 
him.  In  this  purpose  he  ordered  General  Corse  at  Eome 
to  hold  fast  unless  the  Confederates  should  strike  south  of 
Alatoona,  but  in  that  case  to  join  his  forces  to  those  of 
General  Eaum,  who  commanded  between  the  Etowah  and 
Oostanaula,  and  act  against  the  enemy  from  Alatoona. 

For  a  day  or  two  strong  detachments  were  pushed  out  on 
different  roads,  a  division  being  sent  from  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio  southeast  to  Flatrock,  to  create  the  impression  of  a 
formidable  movement  in  that  direction.  On  the  2d,  how 
ever,  it  became  clear  that  Hood  was  marching  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Marietta,  and  Sherman  determined  to  wait  till  he 
was  fully  committed  to  the  movement,  then  cross  the  Chat- 
tahoochee  and  interpose  between  him  and  his  pontoon 
bridge.  Next  day  the  order  of  march  was  issued.  The 
Twentieth  (Slocum's)  Corps  was  to  hold  Atlanta  and  the 
Chattahoochee  bridge,  and  the  rest  of  the  army  to  go  at 
once  to  Smyrna  Camp  Ground,  south  of  Marietta.1  General 

1  The  "  Camp  Grounds  "  of  the  South  are  places  where  religious  camp  meetings 
were  held  from  time  to  time,  giving  a  name  to  the  locality. 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN   OCTOBER.  225 

Howard  was  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
General  Stanley  of  that  of  the  Cumberland,  and  General 
Cox  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  In  the  absence  of  Logan  and 
Blair,  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  were  command 
ed  by  Generals  Osterhaus  and  Ransom,  the  Sixteenth  being 
broken  up  and  its  two  divisions  put  into  these  corps. 

Hood's  general  plan  was,  as  he  himself  tells  us,  to  cut  our 
line  of  communications,  and  if  followed  by  Sherman,  retire 
westward  till  he  should  reach  the  Blue  Mountain  Railroad, 
which  runs  from  Selma  in  Central  Alabama  northeast 
through  Talladega,  reaching  at  that  time  a  point  about 
sixty  miles  southwest  of  Rome  and  near  Gadsden.  He 
hoped  thus  to  lead  Sherman  away  from  Atlanta  and  transfer 
the  seat  of  war  again  to  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee  River. 
On  October  3d,  the  main  body  of  his  forces  were  near  Lost 
Mountain,  whilst  Stewart's  corps  was  sent  to  the  railroad 
north  of  Marietta,  to  destroy  it  and  to  attempt  the  capture  of 
Alatoona  and  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  the  Etowah 
if  he  should  find  it  feebly  guarded.1  Stewart  captured  the 
small  posts  at  Ackworth  and  Big  Shanty,  and  rejoined  Hood 
on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  sending  French's  division  of  that 
corps  with  twelve  pieces  of  artillery  against  the  rocky 
gorges  of  Alatoona. 

But  during  the  3d  and  4th  Sherman's  army  was  in  motion. 
The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  passed  the  Chattahoochee  at 
the  railway  bridge  on  the  3d,  and  concentrated  at  Smyrna 
Camp  Ground.  The  cavalry  was  weak,  consisting  of  only 

1  In  an  important  paper  of  General  French,  published  in  the  Louisville  Courier 
Journal  of  June  11,  1881,  he  gives  a  copy  of  Hood's  official  orders  on  this  point, 
which  are  the  basis  of  the  statement  of  the  text,  and  shows  that  Hood  was  in 
error  in  saying  in  his  Advance  and  Retreat  (p.  257)  that  the  destruction  of 
the  supplies  at  Alatoona  was  contemplated.  It  is  hardly  conceivable  that  they 
should  not  be  mentioned  in  such  a  case.  French's  official  fepaftT*  to  be- found 
in  Annals  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  vol.  i.,  p.  316.  jf^i 


PTFI7BE3ITI 


226  ATLANTA. 

two  small  divisions  under  General  Elliott  (Kilpatrick's  and 
Garrard's),  and  these  found  the  enemy  in  force  already 
astride  of  the  railroad,  near  Big  Shanty.  On  this  report 
Sherman  naturally  concluded  that  the  whole  of  Hood's  army 
was  there,  and  pushed  the  head  of  his  column  straight  through 
Marietta  to  Kenesaw  Mountain,  whilst  he  signalled  to  Corse, 
over  the  heads  of  the  Confederates,  to  go  at  once  to  the  relief 
of  Alatoona.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Etowah  River 
runs  due  west,  and  that  Alatoona  is  a  pass  in  the  high  ridgo 
on  its  southern  bank.  It  looked  as  if  Hood  might  be  caught 
between  Sherman's  army  and  the  river  if  Alatoona  were  held. 
Stanley  reached  Marietta  in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  and 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  bivouacked  at  the  base  of 
Kenesaw,  from  whose  crest  could  be  seen  the  destruction  of 
the  railway.  Howard  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
crossed  the  Chattahoochee  and  reached  Smyrna  Camp 
Ground.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio,  moving  from  Decatur,  had 
to  make  a  detour  to  find  a  crossing  of  Peachtree  Creek 
where  a  bridge  was  carried  away,  the  wrater  being  swim 
ming  deep,  and  after  getting  over  the  Chattahoochee,  about 
two  o'clock,  were  ordered  to  march  up  the  river  to  the  Pace's 
Ferry  and  Marietta  road,  as  the  other  was  filled  by  troops 
and  trains.  To  do  this  another  deep  stream  filled  by  back 
wrater  from  the  Chattahoochee  was  bridged,  and  that  com 
mand  rested  at  Pace's  Ferry  for  the  night.  Sherman  went 
forward  to  Marietta  early  in  the  morning  of  the  5th,  and 
there  learned  that  the  enemy  had  moved  northward  toward 
Alatoona.  From  Kenesaw  he  could  see  the  smoke  marking 
the  mischief  done  along  the  railroad,  and  get  a  distant  view 
of  the  combat  raging  at  Alatoona,  eighteen  miles  away. 
But  he  could  also  see  the  smoke  of  great  camps  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Dallas,  where  Hood's  principal  force  was  lying,  that 
officer  being  in  this  instance  too  wary  to  venture  his  whole 
10* 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER.  227 

army  in  a  cul-de-sac  between  Sherman  and  the  Etowah.  He 
had  placed  them  where  It  was  impossible  for  the  National 
forces  to  envelop  him,  and  where  French  could  join  him  to 
ward  Koine  by  a  shorter  road  than  his  opponent  must  travel. 
The  reports  got  from  prisoners  and  the  country  people  were 
conflicting,  and  Sherman's  first  orders  were  for  the  Army  of 
the  Ohio  to  come  forward  to  Marietta,  while  that  of  the  Ten 
nessee  covered  the  line  to  the  Chattahoochee  facing  toward 
the  part  of  the  Confederate  army  which  was  between  Lost 
Mountain  and  Dallas.  Meanwhile  reconnoissances  were 
pushed  from  Kenesaw  forward,  to  get  more  reliable  news, 
and  the  signal  corps  with  flags  and  telescopes  endeavored  to 
open  communication  with  Alatoona. 

The  garrison  at  Alatoona  was  a  small  brigade  of  three 
regiments  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Tourtellotte  of  the 
Fourth  Minnesota,  insufficient  to  man  all  the  works  which 
had  been  constructed  for  the  defence  of  the  post ;  but  Gen 
eral  Corse  arrived  with  reinforcements  in  the  very  nick  of 
time  and  assumed  command.  He  brought  with  him  Row- 
ett's  brigade  of  three  regiments,  which  increased  the  garri 
son  to  almost  two  thousand  men.  The  train  which  was  sent 
back  to  Rome  for  the  remainder  of  his  force  was  a  good 
deal  delayed,  and  did  not  get  back  till  the  battle  was  over. 
The  Confederate  advance  was  in  the  night,  and  at  daybreak 
of  the  5th,  French  pressed  in  quickly  upon  the  place,  and 
after  a  vigorous  cannonade  for  some  two  hours  demanded  a 
surrender,  which  was  refused.1  He  then  assaulted  the 
works,  sending  Sears's  brigade  to  the  north  side  or  rear  of 

1  General  French  says  no  answer  to  his  summons  was  returned,  and  his  adju 
tant,  Major  Sanders,  came  back  without  one,  after  waiting  seventeen  minutes, 
which  were  given  for  a  reply.  General  Corse,  in  his  official  report  gives  a  copy 
of  French's  letter,  which  only  granted  five  minutes  for  consideration,  and  of  his 
own  tart  response ;  but  it  is  not  improbable  that  Major  Sanders  had  gone  back 
when  the  messenger  reached  the  outpost. 


228  ATLANTA. 

the  place  to  begin  the  attack,  while  Cockrell's  brigade, 
supported  by  Young's,  should  assault  from  the  west.  The 
defensive  works  consisted  of  two  field  redoubts,  one  on  each 
side  of  the  railway  and  covering  the  storehouses  near  the 
track.  Some  temporary  lines  of  trench  had  been  formerly 
made  outside  of  these,  and  were  held  with  some  tenacity, 
but  they  were  no  part  of  the  permanent  fortifications  of  the 
post.  The  redoubts  were  so  placed  that  they  each  swept 
the  front  of  the  other  with  its  fire,  the  cut  in  which  the  rail 
way  ran  being  sixty-five  feet  deep.  The  redoubts  crowned 
the  crests  of  hills  which  formed  part  of  the  general  ridge 
running  east  and  west,  and  from  which  spurs  ran  off  on  both 
sides.  French  placed  his  artillery  on  commanding  ground 
across  a  hollow  on  the  south  of  the  place,  with  two  regi 
ments  supporting  it.  His  batteries  not  only  enfiladed  the 
trenches  facing  westward,  but  commanded  the  railway  cut 
itself  and  made  communication  between  the  little  forts 
almost  impossible.  Tourtellotte  had  himself  occupied  the 
eastern  fort  and  had  a  section  of  the  Twelfth  Wisconsin 
battery  there.  Corse  occupied  the  fort  on  the  west  when 
he  came  on  the  ground,  and  the  other  section  of  Tourtellotte's 
battery  was  also  kept  there,  as  he  had  not  been  able  to 
bring  any  artillery  with  him.  Most  of  Rowett's  brigade, 
however,  was  put  in  the  advanced  line  across  the  ridge 
facing  west,  supported  by  the  Ninety-third  Illinois  from 
Tourtellotte's,  and  light  lines  of  skirmishers,  with  such  sup 
ports  as  could  be  given,  were  placed  both  north  and  south 
of  the  forts. 

Sears's  brigade  reached  the  position  assigned  to  it  by 
French,  his  line  extending  on  both  sides  of  the  railway.  He 
marched  swiftly  up  the  hill,  drove  off  two  companies  that 
supported  the  skirmishers  on  a  spur  in  that  direction,  and 
charged  down  in  flank  and  rear  of  Rowett's  men,  who  at  the 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER.  229 

same  moment  were  attacked  in  front  by  Cockrell's  Missou- 
rians  supported  by  Young.  The  Thirty-ninth  Iowa,  which 
was  on  Eowett's  right,  changed  front  in  part  to  the  right, 
and  resisted  like  veterans  as  they  were,  and  the  Seventh  and 
Ninety-third  Illinois,  facing  still  to  the  west,  bore  the  brunt 
of  Ccckrell's  attack  from  that  direction.  Tourtellotte  had 
repulsed  the  assault  on  his  fort  across  the  railway,  and  his 
guns  making  havoc  in  Sears's  flank  enabled  Kowett  to  make 
a  long  and  effective  resistance,  inflicting  great  loss  on  his 
assailants.  The  odds  were  too  great,  however,  and  after  two 
hours  of  stubborn  fighting,  Corse  was  obliged  to  draw  back 
his  line  to  the  trenches  immediately  around  the  redoubt. 
In  doing  this,  the  Thirty-ninth  Iowra  hung  on  to  cover  the  re 
treat  of  their  comrades  and  to  keep  it  from  becoming  a  rout. 
Colonel  Eedfield  fell,  shot  in  four  places,  and  a  hundred  and 
seventy  casualties  out  of  two  hundred  and  eighty  men  who  went 
into  the  engagement,  attested  the  devotion  of  the  regiment 
to  its  duty.  The  Seventh  Illinois  suffered  almost  as  much. 
The  attack  being  now  chiefly  concentrated  on  the  west  re 
doubt,  Tourtellotte  sent  from  his  side  strong  reinforcements, 
which  crossed  the  railroad  and  the  defile  which  was  swept 
by  the  Confederate  guns.  For  a  time  the  Fourth  Minnesota 
held  the  east  redoubt  alone,  but  it  was  joined  by  part  of  the 
Eighteenth  Wisconsin,  and  maintained  a  steady  fire  upon 
the  assailants  of  their  comrades  across  the  ravine,  as  well  as 
upon  those  who  made  weaker  demonstrations  on  the  east. 
The  guns  in  the  west  redoubt  were  out  of  ammunition,  and  a 
brave  fellow  volunteered  to  cross  to  the  other  side  and  bring 
back  an  armful  of  canister  cartridges,  which  he  did  in  safety. 
Corse  himself  received  a  rifle  ball  in  the  face  about  one 
o'clock,  and  was  insensible  for  half  an  hour  or  more,  but 
rallied  in  a  critical  juncture  to  encourage  his  men  to  "  hold 
the  fort."  Rowett  was  severely  wounded,  so  was  Tourtellotte, 


230  ATLANTA. 

and  the  trenches  without  and  the  ramparts  within  were  en 
cumbered  with  dead  and  wounded,  for  the  enemy's  fire 
swept  every  line  in  flank,  and  but  for  the  cross  fire  which 
the  guns  of  the  east  redoubt  had  upon  the  faces  of  the  other, 
the  western  one  must  have  become  untenable. 

The  charges  of  French's  troops,  which  had  been  repeated 
at  intervals  for  more  than  four  hours,  grew  sensibly  weaker 
after  one  o'clock,  and  his  nearly  disorganized  brigades  con 
tented  themselves  with  keeping  up  a  desultory  fire,  picking 
off  every  one  who  showed  himself  above  the  works.  Before 
two  o'clock  Sears  and  Cockrell  were  recalled,  and  partially 
reforming  them  behind  what  was  left  of  Young's  brigade, 
French  marched  away,  about  three  o'clock,  in  the  direction 
of  New  Hope  Church.  Whilst  the  sharpshooters  still  made 
the  signal  platform  a  place  of  extreme  peril,  Lieutenant  Mc- 
Kensie  of  that  corps  himself  signalled  to  Sherman  the  mes 
sage  which  he  would  not  order  any  of  his  squad  to  transmit, 
and  which  announced  that  the  attack  had  failed. 

French  had  sent  a  detachment  to  take  the  block -house  at 
the  Etowah  Eiver  and  burn  the  bridge  there  during  his  en 
gagement  at  the  post,  but  this  also  failed.  Another  block 
house  on  the  south  of  Alatoona,  where  the  railway  crosses 
the  creek  of  the  same  name,  was,  however,  made  untenable 
by  a  cannonade,  and  its  garrison  surrendered.  The  bridge 
there  was  burned,  but  it  was  of  inferior  importance.1 

Hood's  orders  had  declared  the  destruction  of  the  Etowah 
bridge  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  French  had 
made  a  desperate  effort  to  accomplish  it.  He  acknowledges 

1  In  his  description  of  the  place,  General  French  speaks  of  "  three  redoubts  on 
the  west  of  the  railroad  cut  and  a  star  fort  on  the  east."  In  this  he  is  wrong. 
The  authority  of  Colonel  Poe,  the  Chief  Engineer  who  laid  out  the  works,  is  ex 
plicit  in  support  of  the  assertion  that  there  were  only  two  redoubts  in  all,  and  no 
star  fort.  French  is  also  mistaken  in  saying  that  he  carried  the  principal  redoubt 
on  the  west.  Corse  remained  there  in  person  till  the  combat  closed. 


THE   MOVEMENTS  IN   OCTOBE3.  231 

a  loss  of  800,  of  which  120  were  killed  ;  but  as  General  Corse 
buried  230  of  the  Confederate  dead  and  had  over  400  pris 
oners  (among  whom  was  Brigadier-General  Young),  the 
enemy's  loss  was  plainly  greater  than  French  reported. 
Even  after  Corse  had  returned  to  Rome,  numerous  dead 
bodies  of  Confederates  wrere  found  in  the  woods,  where  the 
wounded  had  evidently  crawled  away  from  the  fire  and  had 
died  after  French's  retreat. 

In  Corse's  command  the  casualties  were  705  in  killed  and 
wounded,  and  French  claims  to  have  taken  205  prisoners, 
including  the  block-house  garrison. 

Looking  to  the  numbers  engaged,  this  was  no  doubt  one 
of  the  most  desperately  contested  actions  of  the  war.  The 
character  of  the  ground  gave  great  opportunity  for  the 
enemy  to  use  his  artillery,  and  the  partial  successes  at  the 
beginning  encouraged  French's  brigades  to  renewed  assaults, 
wrhich  cost  them  dear.  The  garrison,  with  Corse's  rein 
forcement,  was  not  large  enough  to  hold  all  the  detached 
works  :  they  tried,  perhaps,  to  hold  more  than  was  pru 
dent,  and  in  the  forced  abandonment  of  some  of  these  under 
fire,  they  suffered  losses  which  could  not  have  occurred  in 
the  ordinary  and  successful  defence  of  intrenchments. 

During  the  engagement  a  cavalry  reconnoissance  on  Stan 
ley's  front  gave  French  some  uneasiness,  and  he  learned  that 
our  infantry  were  at  Kenesaw ;  but  while  this  information 
may  have  hastened  his  retreat,  all  the  circumstances  make 
it  plain  that  he  was  fairly  beaten  in  his  efforts  against  the 
forts.1  He  claimed  to  have  had  in  his  possession  the  ware- 

1  By  a  singular  error,  Sherman's  and  Howard's  reports,  and  nearly  all  subsequent 
accounts,  including  General  French's  paper  above  referred  to.  speak  of  a  move 
ment  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  as  hastening  French's  retreat.  Historical  can 
dor  compels  the  writer  to  disclaim  for  his  command  this  honor.  On  October  5th, 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  marching  from  Pace's  Ferry  to  Marietta,  and  its 
movement  on  the  Gth  is  correctly  described  in  its  place.  See  Appendix  D. 


232  ATLANTA. 

houses  which  contained  nearly  three  million  rations  of  bread  ; 
but  this  must  have  been  a  momentary  thing,  for  it  is  incredi 
ble  that  they  should  not  have  been  destroyed  before  the  re 
treat,  when  every  soldier's  cartridge-box  contained  all  that 
was  needed  to  make  port-fires.  At  all  events,  the  stores 
were  saved,  and  Corse  was  able  to  signal  his  commander 
that,  despite  his  losses  and  his  own  wound,  there  was  no 
need  of  anxiety  about  the  post. 

Meanwhile  Sherman  was  concentrating  his  army  and  en 
deavoring  to  learn  what  part  of  the  opposing  forces  were 
toward  Dallas.  He  had  left  Slocum's  (Twentieth)  Corps  to 
hold  Atlanta  and  the  bridge-head  at  the  Chattahoochee 
crossing,  but  a  flood  in  the  river  had  partly  destroyed  the 
bridge  and  all  the  roads  were  heavy,  so  that  all  movements 
were  laborious.  During  the  5th,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
moved  into  the  old  lines  of  the  Confederates  near  Gulp's 
Farm,  covering  the  approaches  to  the  railroad  between  Ma 
rietta  and  the  river.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  marched  from 
Pace's  Ferry  to  Brushy  Mountain,  about  three  miles  north  of 
Marietta,  where  they  relieved  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
which  moved  to  the  left.  The  cavalry  was  not  strong  enough 
to  act  with  much  confidence,  and  had  not  succeeded  in  open 
ing  communication  with  Alatoona  by  the  morning  of  the 
6th,  bringing  in  only  rumors  obtained  from  the  countiy,  and 
Sherman  was  uncertain  whether  Stewart's  corps  had  rejoined 
Hood.  Impatient  that  the  cavalry  had  not  accomplished 
more,  on  that  morning  he  ordered  General  Elliott  to  open 
the  line  of  communication  with  Corse  by  roads  east  of  the 
railroad  and  bring  something  "  official  "  as  to  the  situation 
there.  Stanley  was  ordered  to  connect  with  Howard,  cover 
ing  the  roads  toward  Dallas,  with  his  right  at  Pine  Moun 
tain,  while  Cox  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  directed 
to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  force  westward  on  the  Burnt 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER  233 

Hickory  road,  sending  detachments  by  lateral  roads  and  en 
deavoring  to  get  definite  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  posi 
tion,  and  especially  of  the  whereabouts  of  French.  At  nine 
o'clock  the  corps  left  the  position  on  Stanley's  right,  which 
it  had  moved  into  that  morning,  and  marched  westward  by 
Pine  Mountain,  on  whose  top  Sherman  stationed  himself,  di 
recting  that  fires  should  be  lighted  from  time  to  time,  so  that 
by  the  smoke  of  these  he  could  mark  the  extent  of  the  recon- 
noissance.  The  roads  through  the  country,  which  had  been 
so  thoroughly  cut  up  in  June,  were  almost  impassable,  but 
by  two  o'clock  definite  information  was  sent  back  that  French 
had  rejoined  Hood  the  previous  evening.  The  advance  was 
pushed  to  Alatoona  Church,  which  had  been  the  left  of  our 
lines  before  New  Hope  Church,  while  the  road  from  Mount 
Olivet  Church  north  to  Ackworth  was  explored  by  one  de 
tachment,  and  another  pushed  southward  nearly  to  Lost 
Mountain,  driving  back  Hood's  cavalry  and  getting  satisfac 
tory  evidence  of  his  presence  in  force  in  that  direction, 
though  probably  moving  toward  Kingston  or  Kome.  The 
pillars  of  smoke  mapped  out  the  country  to  Sherman's  eye 
as  he  looked  down  from  the  place  where  Polk  had  been 
killed  in  June,  while  with  Johnston  and  Hardee  he  was 
watching,  in  a  similar  way,  the  movements  of  the  National 
Army.  Toward  evening  the  corps  was  recalled  to  the  junc 
tion  of  the  roads  near  Mount  Olivet  Church,  where  its  de 
tachments  concentrated,  and  the  General-in-Chief  felt  that 
he  was  master  of  the  situation. 

He  contented  himself  with  observing  his  adversary  for  a 
few  days,  putting  a  large  force  upon  the  repairs  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee  bridge  and  getting  out  ties  for  the  railway.  On 
the  7th,  Casement's  brigade  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was 
sent  to  Alatoona,  the  cavalry  were  watching  the  movements 
of  Hood,  skirmishing  with  those  of  the  enemy  near  New 


234  ATLANTA. 

Hope  Church.  Clearly  divining  his  adversary's  purpose  of 
drawing  him  back  from  his  position  in  the  heart  of  Georgia, 
Sherman  refused  to  be  toled  away,  but  sent  Corse  back  to 
Borne  with  his  division,  where,  in  the  forks  of  the  Etowah 
and  the  Oostanaula,  he  covered  the  railway  between  Eesaca 
and  Cartersville.  Notwithstanding  his  very  painful  wound, 
Corse  kept  the  field,  sent  detachments  to  destroy  all  the 
bridges  over  the  Etowah,  and  watched  the  crossing  of  the 
Coosa  below  the  junction  of  its  tributaries.  Sherman  now 
formally  repeated  his  proposal  to  Grant  to  break  up  the 
railroad  to  Chattanooga  and  turn  his  back  on  Hood,  march 
ing  directly  for  Savannah  by  Milledgeville  and  Millen.  On 
the  10th,  however,  he  received  news  from  Eome  that  Hood 
was  crossing  the  Coosa  about  twelve  miles  below,  threaten 
ing  to  turn  upon  Corse's  command  and  operate  still  further 
to  the  north  and  rear.  As  this  promised  active  work  close 
at  hand,  Sherman  immediately  ordered  a  concentration  of 
his  own  army  at  Eome,  directing  Thomas  at  the  same  time 
to  collect  his  forces  toward  Stevenson  so  as  to  resist  any  ef 
fort  of  the  enemy  to  cross  the  Tennessee.  At  Kingston,  on 
the  llth,  he  learned  that  Hood  had  not  approached  Eome, 
but  moved  in  some  other  direction,  his  whereabouts  being 
again  a  mystery.  Again  he  urged  upon  Grant  the  plan  of 
moving  upon  Savannah.  Hood  says  that  it  had  been  his 
purpose  to  attack  Eome  and  then  march  to  the  railroad  at 
Kingston,  but  he  formed  a  more  prudent  plan,  and  crossing 
the  Coosa  about  fifteen  miles  below  Eome  he  followed  the 
line  of  the  long  valleys,  protected  by  high  rocky  ridges,  to 
Eesaca.  In  this  movement,  as  all  the  rivers  were  high,  the 
Oostanaula  covered  his  right  flank,  and  he  hoped  to  take 
Eesaca  by  a  coup-de-main.  If  this  were  done  and  the  rail 
way  bridge  destroyed,  Sherman  would  necessarily  be  much 
delayed  in  following  him,  and  he  would  have  his  choice,  to 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN   OCTOBER.  235 

march  upon  Chattanooga  or  to  follow  down  the  left  bank  of 
the  Tennessee  westward.  He  sent  his  trains  and  reserve 
artillery  to  Jacksonville  and  Gadsden,  and  moved  without 
incumbrances. 

Sherman's  whole  army  was  assembled  about  Rome  on  the 
]  2th,  and  on  the  13th  he  pushed  strong  reconnoissances  down 
both  banks  of  the  Coosa,  Corse's  division  on  the  left,  and 
Garrard's  cavalry  on  the  right.  A  little  later  in  the  morn 
ing,  his  impatience  increasing,  he  ordered  Cox  with  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  to  follow  Garrard,  and  reach,  if  possible, 
the  site  of  Hood's  bridges,  to  learn  if  they  were  taken  up  and 
the  enemy  thus  committed  to  a  definite  movement  north  of 
the  river.  The  infantry  overtook  the  cavalry,  and  giving 
them  confidence  by  strong  and  close  support,  Garrard  ran 
over  the  Confederate  horsemen  and  captured  two  guns  and 
about  a  hundred  prisoners.  The  combined  movement  was 
pressed  vigorously.  The  place  where  the  bridge  was  laid 
was  reached,  and  a  part  of  the  cavalry  went  two  miles  be 
yond.  The  bridge  was  up,  and  it  was  learned  that  Hood 
had  taken  the  pontoons  north  with  him,  giving  out  that  he 
was  going  to  Tennessee.  The  news  was  passed  by  signal 
to  Sherman,  and  the  infantry  returned  to  Borne  the  same 
night.' 

Hood  reached  Resaca  on  the  12th,  approaching  the  place 
by  the  north  bank  of  the  Oostanaula,  and  summoned  it  to 
surrender,  saying  he  would  take  no  prisoners  if  he  carried 
it  by  assault.  Colonel  Wever,  commanding  the  garrison,  re 
turned  a  defiant  answer.2  Hood  took  position  about  the 
fortifications,  his  flanks  resting  on  the  Oostanaula  and  the 


1  See  Appendix  E. 

2  Hood  says  that  General  S.  D.  Lee  was  in  front  of  Resaca  with  his  corps  and 
made  the  demand  ;  but  the  'summons  was  signed  by  Hood  himself.     Sherman's 
Memoirs,  vol.  ii.,  155. 


236  ATLANTA. 

Connasauga,  but  he  did  not  assault.  A  reinforcement  of 
350  infantry  under  General  Eaum  reached  the  garrison  from 
Calhoun,  and  General  McCook  with  his  cavalry  covered  the 
movement  of  railway  trains  and  stores  to  Kingston,  and  then 
himself  marched  to  Resaca. 

Sherman  got  the  news  about  noon  of  the  13th,  and  put 
Howard  and  Stanley  at  once  in  movement  for  Resaca, 
signalling  Cox  to  follow  as  soon  as  the  work  on  which  he 
had  been  sent  was  accomplished.  Leaving  Lee's  corps  be 
fore  Resaca,  Hood  marched  Stewart's  to  Tilton  and  to  Dai- 
ton,  capturing  the  garrison  at  the  latter  place  (Forty-fourth 
United  States  colored  troops)  without  resistance.  But  at 
Tilton  the  block-house  and  little  intrenchment  was  held  by 
the  Seventeenth  Iowa  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Archer,  and 
his  answer  to  Stewart's  summons  was  like  Wever's.  The 
little  garrison  of  less  than  two  hundred  men  resisted  an 
overwhelming  force  for  several  hours,  and  only  showed  the 
white  flag  when  a  concentration  of  artillery  fire  had  knocked 
the  block-house  to  pieces  about  their  ears.  A  block-house 
in  Millcreek  Gap,  near  Buzzard's  Roost,  also  made  a  stout  re 
sistance,  but  was  captured.1  General  Schofield  had  reached 
Dalton  the  same  morning,  hastening  from  Knoxville  to  re 
sume  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  finding 
that  Hood's  whole  army  was  near  the  place,  had  sent  back  to 
Cleveland  all  trains  along  the  road.  Reporting  thence  by 
orders  from  Washington  to  General  Thomas,  who  was  at 
Nashville,  the  latter  directed  him  to  assume  command  at 
Chattanooga,  to  concentrate  all  trains  there,  and  hold  that 
place.  All  the  available  troops  in  Kentucky  were  ordered 
forward  to  Nashville,  General  Steedman  with  his  command 


1  General  Howard's  report  says  the  garrison  at  Dalton  surrendered  without  a 
blow.  For  the  defence  of  Tilton,  see  Iowa  Colonels  and  Regiments,  by  A.  A. 
Stuart,  p.  338. 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN   OCTOBER.  237 

was  sent  back  to  his  post  at  Chattanooga,  and  Schofield  pre 
pared  to  move  out  with  Wagner's  and  Morgan's  divisions, 
which  had  been  sent  back  from  Atlanta  two  weeks  before. 

Meanwhile  Sherman  reached  Kesaca  on  the  14th,1  and 
Hood,  having  failed  even  to  damage  the  railroad  seriously, 
made  haste  to  retreat  westward  to  Villanow,  having  gained 
nothing  by  the  rapid  movement  except  to  give  Wheeler  the 
opportunity  to  join  him  with  the  cavalry  which  had  been 
operating  in  that  region.  True,  he  had  drawn  Sherman  a 
hundred  miles  from  Atlanta,  but  the  Twentieth  Corps  occu 
pied  that  place,  and  the  whole  line  of  railway  from  there  to 
Chattanooga  was  solidly  held,  except  for  the  momentary 
break  at  Dalton.  Sherman  yielded  nothing  of  the  territory 
he  had  conquered,  and  still  had  in  hand  an  army  with  which 
he  was  anxious  to  meet  Hood  in  the  open  field,  while  Scho 
field  was  ready  to  join  him  with  the  two  veteran  divisions  at 
Chattanooga.  The  Confederate  general  was  only  making 
a  "raid,"  a  brilliant  one  in  its  way,  but  the  care  with 
which  he  avoided  battle,  or  even  an  attack  with  his  whole 
army  upon  a  post  like  Kesaca,  garrisoned  by  a  single  brigade, 
proved  conclusively  that  he  had  no  serious  purpose  of  stay 
ing  long  away  from  his  base  of  supplies  in  Alabama.  In 
the  retreat,  part  of  his  command  went  by  way  of  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  blockading  that  gorge  by  felling  the  timber,  so 
as  to  delay  Sherman's  pursuit.  The  latter  sent  Stanley  over 
the  ridges  north  of  the  blockade,  whilst  Howard,  followed 
by  Cox,  cleared  out  the  road  through  the  gap.  The  even 
ing  of  the  15th  found  Howard's  head  of  column  near  Villa 
now  and  Stanley  coming  in  on  his  right,  the  opposition  of 
Hood's  rear  guard  being  but  trifling.  On  the  16th,  C.  B. 


1  Sherman's  Memoirs  say  13th,  but  it  would  seem  to  be  a  misprint.  His  official 
report  says  "evening of  the  14th,"  and  this  agrees  with  the  reports  of  his  subor 
dinates. 


238  ATLANTA. 

Woods's  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  carried  Ship's 
Gap  in  Taylor's  Eidge,  capturing  part  of  the  small  rear 
guard  which  held  it.  The  ridge  is  a  high  and  almost  un 
broken  mountain  chain,  running  nearly  north  and  south,  on 
the  west  of  which  is  the  pleasant  and  fertile  valley  of  the 
Chattooga,  down  which  Hood  had  retreated,  doubling  his 
track  upon  the  line  of  his  march  northward  a  few  days 
before. 

Sherman  hoped  his  adversary  would  continue  on  to  Ten 
nessee,  feeling  absolutely  sure  of  forcing  a  surrender  of  the 
whole  army  in  that  event.  In  his  despatches  to  Schofield, 
this  feeling  found  vent  in  strong  expressions.  "  Invite  him 
in,"  he  said  ;  "send  him  a  free  pass."  He  halted  the  army, 
and  spent  a  day  in  active  reconnoissances,  whilst  his  com 
munications  with  Chattanooga  were  reopened,  and  the  work 
of  repairing  the  railway  was  begun.  He  sent  to  the  rear  his 
disabled  animals  and  his  field  hospitals,  and  by  evening  of 
the  17th,  was  assured  that  Hood  had  gone  south  by  way  of 
Summerville  toward  Gadsden,  giving  up  the  attempt  to  cross 
the  Tennessee  anywhere  above  Muscle  Shoals.  Hood  was 
not  unwise  in  this,  for  the  upper  river  was  patrolled  by  light- 
draught  gunboats,  and  with  Thomas's  detachments  actively 
watching  the  northern  bank  he  could  hardly  have  crossed 
without  Sherman's  overtaking  him,  unless  the  "pass,"  jocu 
larly  spoken  of,  had  been  indeed  given. 

On  the  18th  the  National  Army  was  again  in  motion. 
Howard  and  Stanley  marched  down  the  Chattooga  Valley  on 
parallel  roads,  whilst  Cox  took  the  road  on  the  east  side  of 
Taylor's  Eidge  to  Subligna,  and  thence  over  the  mountain 
by  Gover's  Gap  to  Summerville.  The  heads  of  columns 
skirmished  with  a  rear  guard  of  cavalry  as  they  advanced, 
but  there  was  no  serious  fighting.  At  Gover's  Gap  the  road 
was  scarped  in  the  side  of  a  precipitous  mountain,  and  this 


THE  MOVEMENTS  IN  OCTOBER.  239 

shelf  had  been  dug  away.  A  stubborn  defence  had  been 
prepared  here,  but  the  columns  on  both  sides  the  ridge  were 
so  nearly  abreast  of  each  other  that  the  pass  was  abandoned 
and  the  Twenty-third  Corps  occupied  it  before  evening. 
The  day's  march  by  this  route  had  been  twenty-two  miles. 
Next  day  Summerville  was  passed,  Howard's  head  of  column 
was  at  Alpine  and  Cox's  at  Melville,  and  on  the  20th  the 
whole  army  was  concentrated  at  Gaylesville  in  Alabama. 

Hood  reached  Gadsden  that  day,  where  he  met  General 
Beauregard,  and  a  plan  of  future  operations  was  discussed. 
That  subject  belongs  more  properly  to  the  next  volume. 
Sherman  remained  at  Gaylesville  seven  days,  watching  the 
movements  of  his  adversary,  proposing  to  follow  him  if  he 
attempted  to  cross  the  Tennessee  near  Guntersville,  but 
determined  to  carry  out  his  plan  of  a  march  to  the  sea  if 
Hood  should  go  to  Decatur  or  Florence.  Detachments  were 
stationed  on  the  Coosa  at  Cedar  Bluffs,  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  bridged  the  Chattooga  at  that  place,  and  preparations 
were  made  for  a  new  campaign. 

The  month  had  been  a  busy  one.  Hood's  activity  and 
generalship  had  been  worthy  of  high  praise,  but  he  had 
been  everywhere  foiled,  doing  very  little  damage  in  compari 
son  with  the  means  used.  Sherman  had  refused  to  give  up 
his  hold  on  Georgia,  had  driven  the  enemy  from  his  line  of 
communications,  and  now  stood  upon  the  edge  of  Alabama, 
fully  in  possession  of  all  the  valuable  results  of  the  cam 
paign,  arranging  the  details  of  a  movement  that  was  not  to 
be  a  brilliant  and  barren  march,  but  one  that  was  attractive 
to  him  because  it  promised  to  be  decisive  of  the  whole  war. 


APFENDIX  A. 

STRENGTH  OP  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 

THE  limit  necessarily  placed  to  the  size  of  this  volume  forbids  the 
detailed  examination,  in  the  text,  of  the  evidence  on  which  the  esti 
mate  of  the  Confederate  forces  is  based.  The  official  reports  and  re 
turns  now  in  the  military  archives  at  Washington  must  be  the  basis 
of  every  reliable  calculation,  and  are  unquestionably  trustworthy  as  far 
as  they  go.  These  demonstrate  the  fact  that  the  "Confederate  state 
ments  of  "effectives"  exclude  officers,  who  make  about  ten  per  cent,  of 
a  command,  as  well  as  all  private  soldiers  either  temporarily  sick  or  not 
bearing  arms  with  the  colors. 

The  separate  histories  of  State  troops  and  memoirs  of  regiments  fur 
nish  very  valuable  aids  in  checking  the  returns  of  strength  and  especially 
the  statements  of  losses  in  action.  As  an  example  of  results  thus  ob 
tained,  the  following  summary  of  evidence  in  regard  to  the  strength  of 
General  Johnston's  army,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  and  subse 
quently,  will  be  found  interesting.  It  is  based  upon  careful  researches 
made  by  Major  E.  C.  Dawes,  late  of  the  Fifty -third  Ohio,  independent 
of  those  upon  which  the  statements  in  the  text  were  made,  but  which 
the  author  has  verified  in  all  essential  particulars. 

The  Confederate  official  returns  above  referred  to  and  on  file  in  the 
War  Department,  show  that  on  April  30,  1864,  the  force  of  General 
Johnston  "present  for  duty,"  not  including  men  on  "extra  or  daily 
duty,"  but  only  officers  and  men  available  for  action,  was  as  follows, 
viz. : 


General  Johnston's  staff 

Officer?. 
14 

Privates. 

Total. 
14 

Hardee's  corps       

2,000 

18,634 

20,634 

Hood's  corps. 

1.575 

18.014 

20  189 

Wheeler's  cavalry 

757 

7  679 

8436 

Artillery  

164 

3,113 

3,277 

Engineer  battalion 

17 

425 

442 

4,527  48,465  52,992 

This  force  was  increased  before  the  opening  of  the  campaign.     Gen 
eral  Hood  ("Advance  and  Retreat,"  p.  7U)  Bays  that  General  Hardee 
IX.— 11 


242  ATLANTA. 

and  himself,  in  comparing  notes  about  May  7th  or  8th,  found  they  La:l 
about  42,500  "effectives, "infantry  and  artillery,  in  their  corps  besides 
the  reserve  artillery.  The  ''effective"  enlisted  men  in  those  corps  on 
April  30th  was  shown  to  be  38,104,  infantry  and  artillery.  The  in 
crease,  therefore,  in  one  week  was  about  4,500  privates,  or  5,000  officers 
and  men.  This  is  confirmed  by  Hardee's  memorandum  of  operations 
daring  the  campaign,  in  which  he  states  the  force  of  his  corps  at  th« 
beginning  of  the  campaign  at  "about  20,000  muskets  and  four  bat 
talions  of  artillery. "  (Johnston's  narrative,  p.  578.) 

Mercer's  brigade  joined  Johnston  May  3d.  It  consisted  of  four  Geor 
gia  regiments  (First,  Fifty-fourth,  Fifty- seventh  and  Sixty -third), 
which  had  been  on  garrison  duty  at  Savannah.  The  last  of  these  alone 
had  an  "effective"  total  of  814.  It  is  safe  to  estimate  the  four  regi 
ments  at  2,800,  officers  and  men.  About  August  1st,  after  passing 
through  the  terrible  battles  about  Atlanta,  the  division  (Walker's)  to 
which  Mercer's  brigade  belonged  was  broken  up  because  of  its  heavy 
losses.  A  note  to  the  return  of  that  date  gives  the  "present  and  ab- 
83nt "  total  of  the  brigade,  3,5^3. 

Loring's  division  joined  the  army  at  Resaca,  May  12th.  General  S. 
D.  Lee's  return  of  May  10th  shows  that  it  numbered  '/.for  duty"  4^9 
officers  and  4,716  men. 

Canty's  division  also  joined  Johnston  at  Resaca  about  May  7th  or 
8bh.  This  division  was  composed  of  Canty's  brigade  and  Reynolds's, 
formerly  McNair's.  Canty's  old  brigade  was  made  up  of  the  First, 
Seventeenth,  Twenty-sixth  and  Twenty-ninth  Alabama  and  the  Thirty- 
seventh  Mississippi.  Reynolds's  contained  the  First,  Second,  Fourth 
and  Fifth  Arkansas  and  Thirty-ninth  North  Carolina.  The  division 
had  also  two  batteries  of  field  artillery  (fourteen  guns)  and  two  organi 
zations  of  cavalry  commanded  by  colonels.  The  return  of  General  D. 
H.  Maury  for  the  "Army  in  the  District  of  the  Gulf,"  April  22,  1804, 
gives  the  effective  strength  of  this  division  at  5,564  privates,  with  421 
officers.  It  contained  a  brigade  of  heavy  artillery  which  had  been  in 
the  forts  about  Mobile.  The  sketch  of  the  Seventeenth  Alabama  in 
"Brewer's  History  of  Alabama"  says  that,  while  at  Mobile,  it  was 
drilled  as  heavy  artillery  and  had  charge  of  eight  batteries  on  the  shore 
of  the  bay.  The  Twenty-ninth  Alabama  had  also  been  on  garrkon 
duty  at  Mobile  from  July,  1863,  till  about  the  date  of  this  return. 

French's  division  joined  at  Cassville.  It  was  composed  of  Co^k- 
rell's,  Ector's  and  Sears's  brigades.  By  General  S.  D.  Lee's  return  of 
May  10th,  it  numbered  for  duty  385  officers  and  4,028  men. 

Quarles's  brigade,  as  Johnston  himself  tells  us,  joined  him  near  New 
Hope  Church,  with  2,200  "effectives,"  to  which  must  be  added  200  for 
officers. 

Jackson's  cavalry  division  joined  at  Adairsville,  with  a  strength  in 


APPENDIX   A.  243 

line  of  battle,  as  given  by  Lee's  return  of  May  10th,  of  405  officers  an.l 
4,072  men. 

A  division  of  Georgia  militia  also  joined  before  the  battle  of  Kene- 
saw  Mountain.  It  consisted  of  two  brigades  and  one  battalion  of  artil 
lery,  the  whole  commanded  by  General  G.  W.  Smith,  who  reported  ' 
them  ("Advance  and  Retreat,"  p.  352)  as  "a  little  over  3,000."  It  is 
safe  to  call  this  force  8,300,  officers  and  men,  and  it  was  increased  to 
over  5,000  subsequently.  Avery's  "History  of  Georgia"  says  there 
were  ten  thousand  in  the  trenches  of  Atlanta. 

SUMMARY. 

General  Johnston's  force  at  Dalton,  May  1,  1864,  being  officers  and  men 

then  present  for  duty 52,990 

Increase  in  Hood's  and  Hardee's  corps 5.000 

Mercer's  brigade,  May  2d 2.800 

Loring's  division.  May  12th 5.145 

Canty's  division  (except  First  Alabama),  May  8th 5, SOU 

Total  at  Resaca t 71,235 

Jackson's  cavalry,  Adairsville,  May  1 7th 4, 477 

French's  division,  Cassville,  May  18th 4,413 

First  Alabama  (Canty's  division),  May  24th 650 

Quarles's  brigade,  New  Hope,  May  24th 2,400 

Georgia  militia,  Kenesaw,  June  20th 3,800 


Total  before  crossing  the  Chattahoochee 86,475 

There  must  still  be  added  the  constant  and  large  increase  in  all  the 
corps  of  the  army  from  recruits,  conscripts,  convalescents,  and  return 
of  men  from  detached  service.  As  the  life  of  the  Confederacy  was  at 
stake,  it  is  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  any  effort  was  spared  to  in 
crease  Johnston's  strength  to  the  utmost.  At  the  end  of  April,  there 
were  troops  under  General  S.  Jones  in  the  Department  of  South  Caro- 
Ina,  Georgia,  and  Florida,  numbering  25,498  "effectives."  In  the  De 
partment  of  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  East  Louisiana,  there  were  under 
S.  D.  Lee,  on  June  1st,  present  for  duty,  16,562  officers  and  men,  as 
shown  by  his  official  return. 

The  last  return  of  General  Johnston  in  this  campaign,  dated  July  1 0, 
1864,  shows  the  number  of  troops  to  have  been  as  follows,  viz.,  aggre 
gate  present  and  absent,  135,092,  present  73,849,  effectives  50,932. 

The  first  return  of  General  Hood,  dated  July  31,  1864,  shows  aggre 
gate  present  and  absent,  136,684,  present  65,601,  effectives  44,495. 

Here  is  an  apparent  diminution  of  the  number  present,  while  there  is 
an  increase  of  the  aggregate.  This  is  accounted  for  as  follows.  Three 
battalions  of  reserves  joined,  numbering  1,348,  and  193  recruits,  making 
an  increase  of  1,541  in  aggregates.  But  the  number  of  "absent  with 
out  leave"  (prisoners)  increased  by  5,047,  "  with  leave"  3DO,  sick 3, 752, 
detached  700 ;  total  decrease  in  tne  *'  present"  9,799.  The  sad  Jen  in- 


244  ATLANTA. 

crease  in  sick  (wounded),  and  absent  without  leave  (prisoners),  tells  part 
of  the  story  of  the  battles  of  Peachtree  Creek  and  Atlanta. 

An  analysis  of  the  reports  in  the  Government  archives  will  ultimate 
ly  throw  great  light  on  the  question  of  the  losses  of  the  Confederate 
Army  under  General  Johnston  during  this  campaign.  The  example  of 
a  single  division  will  illustrate  this.  French's  division  joined  Johnston 
about  May  20th  and  down  to  the  end  of  June  it  was  engaged  only  in  the 
affairs  about  New  Hope  Church,  Pine  Mountain,  and  Kenesaw.  It 
made  no  assaults,  fought  defensively  behind  breastworks,  and  was  not 
seriously  assaulted  except  at  Kenesaw,  where  its  loss  was  light. 

Yet,  on  July  15th,  in  response  to  a  circular  from  the  army  head 
quarters,  General  French  submitted  a  report  in  which  the  casualties  in 
that  division  foot  up  1,178,  viz.  :  killed  154,  wounded  675,  prisoners 
349.  Of  the  ten  infantry  divisions  of  that  army,  French's  certainly 
must  have  suffered  the  least,  and  probably  not  more  than  half  as  much 
as  either  Loring's,  Stevenson's,  Hindman's,  Stewart's,  or  Bate's;  for 
all  of  them  had  met  with  disastrous  repulses  in  assaults  upon  our  in 
trenched  lines.  Stevenson's  losses  in  May  alone  were,  killed  121, 
wounded  565,  prisoners  531,  total  1,217,  as  appears  from  his  report 
found  in  the  third  volume  of  the  Southern  Historical  Society's  papers. 

French's  report  above  mentioned  shows  also  the  increase  of  the 
army,  by  additions  of  conscripts,  return  of  absentees,  etc.,  there  being 
an  addition  of  1,046  to  his  list  of  "  effectives  "  during  the  two  months 
referred  to. 


APPENDIX  B. 

Organization  of  the  Army  in  the  Field,  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  WILLIAM  T.    SHEEMAN   COMMANDING. 

ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS  COMMANDING. 

FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD  COMMANDING. 

2.  MAJOR-GENERAL  DAVID  S.  STANLEY  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL  D.  S.  STANLEY  COMMANDING. 

2.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  NATHAN  KIMBALL  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— (\)  Brigadier-General  CHARLES  CRUFT  ;  (2)  Colonel  ISAAC  M. 
KIRBT.  Second  Brigade.— (1)  Brigadier-General  WALTER  C.  WHITTAKER  ;  (2) 
Colonel  JACOB  E.  TAYLOR.  Third  Brigade. — Colonel  WILLIAM  GROSE.  Artil 
lery. — Battery  "B,"  Independent  Pennsylvania,  and  the  5th  Indiana  Battery. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  NEWTON  COMMANDING. 

2.  BUIGADIER-GENEKAL  GEORGE  D.  WAGNER  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.—  Brigadier-General  NATHAN  KIMBALL.  Second  Brigade.— (1) 
Brigadier-General  G.  D.  WAGNER;  (2)  Colonel  EMEKSON  OPDYCKE.  Third  Bri 
gade.— (1)  Brigadier-General  C.  G.  HARKER  ;  (2)  Colonel  LUTHER  P.  BBADLEY. 
Artillery.— Batteries  '•  G,"  1st  Missouri,  and  "  M,"  1st  Illinois. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  THOMAS  J.  WOOD  COMMANDING. 
First  Brigade.— Colonel  WILLIAM  H.  GIBSON.     Second  Brigade.— (I)  Briga 
dier-General  WILLIAM  B.  HAZEN;  (2)  Colonel  P.  SIDNEY  POST.    Thvrd  Brigade. 
— (1)  Brigadier-General  SA.MUKL  BEATTY  ;   (2)  Colonel   FREDERICK  KNEFLER. 
Artillery.— 6th  Ohio,  and  Bridges'  Illinois  batteries. 


FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  M.  PALMER  COMMANDING. 

2.  BREVET    MAJOR-GENERAL   JEFFERSON    C.    DAVIS     COM 
MANDING. 


216  ATLANTA. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

1.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  RICHARD  W.  JOHNSON  COMMANDING. 

2.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  H.  KING  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  WILLIAM  P.  CARLIN.  Second  Brigade.— 
(1)  Brigadier- General  JOHN  H.  KING;  (2)  Colonel  WILLIAM  L.  STOUGHTON. 
Third,  Brigade,.— (1)  Colonel  JAMES  M.  NIEBLING  ;  (2)  Colonel  BKNJAMIN  F. 
SCRIBNER.  Artillery. — Batteries  "A,"  1st  Michigan;  and  "C,"  1st  Illinois. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

1.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JEFFERSON  C.  DAVIS  COMMANDING. 

2.  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  JAMES  D.  MORGAN  COMMANDING. 

Fit-fit  Brigade,.—  Brigadier-General  J.  D.  MORGAN.  Seco?id  Brigade.-  Colo 
nel  JOHN  G.  MITCHELL.  Third  Brigade.— (1)  Colonel  DANIEL  McCooK ;  (2) 
Colonel  CALEB  J.  DILWOBTH.  Artillery.— 2d  Minnesota,  "I"  2d  Illinois,  and 
5th  Wisconsin  batteries. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ABSALOM  BAIRD  COMMANDING. 

First  brigade.— (1)  Brigadier-General  JOHN  B.  TURCHIN  :  (2)  Colonel  MORTON 
C.  HUNTER.  Second  Brigade. — (1)  Colonel  F.  VANDERVEER;  (2)  Colonel  NEW 
ELL  GLEASON.  Third  Brigade. — Colonel  GEORGE  P.  ESTE.  Artillery. — 7th  In 
diana  and  19th  Indiana  batteries. 


TWENTIETH   ARMY   CORPS. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER  COMMANDING. 

2.  MAJOR-GENERAL  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM  COMMANDING. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALPHEUS  S.  WILLIAMS    COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  JOSEPH  F.  KNIPE.  Second  Brigade.— 
Brigadier- General  THOMAS  H.  RUGER.  Third  Brigade.— (1)  Brigadier-General 
H.  TTNDALE  ;  (2)  Colonel  JAMES  S.  ROBINSON.  Artillery.— Batteries  "M"  and 
"I,"  1st  New  York. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  W.  GEARY  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  CHARLES  CANDY.  Second  Brigade. — (1)  Colonel  A. 
BUSCHBECK  ;  (2)  Colonel  PATRICK  H.  JONES.  Third  Br'gade.— Colonel  DAVID 
IRELAND.  Artillery. — Battery  "E1'  Independent  Pennsylvania,  and  13th  New 
York. 

THIRD   DIVISION. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL  DANIEL  BUTTERFIELD  COMMANDING. 

2.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  T.  WARD  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— (1)  Brigadier-General  W.  T.  WARD;  (2)  Colonel  BENJAMIN 
HARRISON.  Second  Brigade. — Colonel  JOHN  COBURN.  Third  Brigade. — Colonel 
JAMES  WOOD,  Jr.  Artillery. — Batteries  "  C,"  1st  Ohio,  and  "I,"  1st  Michigan. 


CAVALRY. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  L.  ELLIOTT,  CHIEF  OF  CAVALRY. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 

COLONEL  EDWARD  M.  MoCOOK  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  A.  P.  CAMPBELL.    Second  Brigade.— Colonel  O.  H.  LA- 
GRANGE.     Third  Brigade.— Colonel  L.  D.  WATKINS.    Artillery.—  18th  Indiana. 


APPENDIX   B.  247 

SECOND    DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  KENNER  GARRARD  COMMANDING. 
First  Brigade.— Colonel  WILLIAM  B.  SIPES.     Second  Brigade.— Colonel   R.  H. 
G.  MINTY.    Third  Brigade.— Colonel  A.  O.  MILLER.    Artillery.—- Chicago  Board 
of  Trade  Battery. 

ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. 

1.  MAJOR-GENERAL    JAMES    B.    McPHERSON    COMMAND 
ING. 

2.  MAJOR-GENERAL  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD  COMMANDING. 


FIFTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  A.  LOGAN  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 

1.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  PETER  J.  OSTERHAUS  COMMANDING. 

2.  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  CHARLES  R.  WOODS  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.- (I)  Brigadier-General  CHARLES  R.  WOODS;  (2)  Colonel  WIL 
LIAM  B.  WOODS.  Second  Brigade. — Colonel  JAMKS  A.  WILLIAMSON.  Third 
Brigade.— Colonel  HUGO  WANGELIN.  Artillery. — Battery  "  F  "  2d  Missouri  and 
4th  Ohio  Independent. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

(1)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  MORGAN  L.  SMITH  COMMANDING. 

(2)  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  J.  A.  J.  LIGHTBURN  COMMANDING. 

(3)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  B.  .HAZEN  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— (1  )Brigadier-General  GILES  A.  SMITH  ;  (2)  Colonel  J.  S.  MAR 
TIN  :  (3)  Colonel  THEODORE  JONES.  Second  Brigade. — (1)  Brigadier-General  J. 
A.  J.  LIGHTBDRN;  (•->)  Colonel  WELLS  S.  JONES.  Artihery.— Battery  '-H,"  1st 
Illinois,  and  "  A,v  1st  Illinois. 

THIRD   DIVISIONS 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  E.  SMITH  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  JESSE  I.  ALEXANDER.  Second  Briaade.— Colonel 
GREEN  B.  RAUM.  Third  Brigade.. — Colonel  JABEZ  BANBURY. 

FOURTH   DIVISION. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  HARROW  COMMANDING. 
First    Brigade. — Colonel     REUBEN     WILLIAMS.      Second     Brigade. — Colonel 
CHARLES  C.  WALCUTT.     Third  Brigade. — Colonel  JOHN  M.  OLIVER.     Artillery. 
'—1st  Iowa  Battery. 


SIXTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS.* 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GRENVILLE  M.  DODGE  COMMANDING. 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

(1)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  THOMAS  W.  SWEENY  COMMANDING. 

(2)  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  JOHN  M.  CORSE  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  ELLIOTT  W.  RICE.    Second  Brigade.— (1)  Colonel  P.  E. 
BURKE;   (2)  Colonel  AUGUST    MERSY  ;  (3)  Lieutenant  Colonel  PHILLIPS;   (4) 


1  This  division  garrisoned  Alatoor.a  and  other  posts,  and  was  not  with  the 
moving  column. 

2  The  First  and  Third  Divisions  of  this  corps  were  left  in  the  Mississippi  Val 
ley.     After  the  fall  of  Atlanta  the  Second  Division   was  transferred  to  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps,  and  the  Fourth  to  the  Seventeenth. 


248  ATLANTA. 

Colonel  R.  N.  ADAMS.  Third  Brigade.— (\}  Colonel  M.  M.  BANE  ;  (2)  Brigadier- 
General  WILLIAM  VANDERVEER.  Artillery.  -Battery  1>H,"  1st  Missouri  Light 
Artillery. 

FOURTH   DIVISION. 

(1)  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  JAMES  C.  VEATCH  COMMANDING. 

(2)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  W.  FULLER  COMMANDING. 

Firxt  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  JOHN  W.  FULLER.  Second  Brigade.— Col 
onel  JOHN  W.  SPRAGUE.  Third  Brigade.— (\)  Colonel  JOHN  TILLSON  ;  Colonel 
JAMES  H.  HOWE.  Artillery.— 14th  Ohio  Battery. 


SEVENTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  FRANK  P.  BLAIR,  JR.,  COMMANDING.1 

THIRD   DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  MORTIMER  D.  LEGGETT  COMMANDING. 

First  Unmade.— (1) Brigadier-General  MANNING F.  FORCE:  (2)  Colonel  GEORGE 
E.  BRYANT.     Second  Brigade.— (\)  Colonel  ROBERT  K.  SCOTT  ;  (2)  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  G.  F.  WILES.     Third  Brigade.— Colonel  ADAM  G.  MALLOY.     Artillery. 
—3d  Ohio,  Battery  "  D"  1st  Illinois,  8th  Michigan  Battery. 
FOURTH  DIVISION. 

(1)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WALTER  Q.  GRESHAM  COMMANDING. 

(2)  BRIGADIEK-GENERAL  GILES  A.  SMITH  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— (\)  Colonel  WILLIAM  L.  SANDERSON  ;  (2)  Colonel  B.  F.  POTTS. 
Second  Brigade. — Colonel  GEORGE  C.  ROGERS.  Third  Brigade. — Colonel  WIL 
LIAM  HALL.  Artillery. — Company  "F,"  2d  Illinois. 

Besides  the  artillery  above  mentioned,  the  following  batteries  were 
in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  viz. :  Illinois,  batteries  u  E,"  "F,"  and 
"  G  "  of  1st  Light  Artillery  ;  batteries  "  F  "  and  "  G  "  of  2d  Light  Ar 
tillery,  and  Cogswell's  Battery.  Indiana,  3d,  9th,  and  14th.  Michigan, 
3d  Battery.  Minnesota,  1st  Battery.  Ohio,  ?th,  8th,  10th,  15th,  and 
26th  batteries.  Wisconsin,  6th,  7th,  and  12th.  Only  part  of  them 
were  at  any  one  time  with  the  moving  column.  They  were  under  the 
direction  of  Colonel  Andrew  Hickenlooper,  Chief  of  Artillery. 


ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO. 

TWENTY-THIRD  ARMY  CORPS. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION.* 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  ALVIN  P.  HOVEY  COMMANDING. 
First  Brigade.— Colonel  RICHARD  F.  BARTER.     Second  Brigade.— (I)  Colonel 
JOHN  C.  MCQUISTON  ;  (2)  Colonel  PETER  T.  SWAINE. 


1  The  First  and  Second  Divisions  of  this  corps  were  left  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley. 

2  At  the  beginning  of  June  this  division  was  distributed,  the  1st  Brigade  to  the 
ad  Division,  and  the  2d  Brigade  to  the  2d  Division  of  the  corps. 


APPENDIX  B.  249 

SECOND   DIVISION. 

(1)  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  HENRY  M.  JUDAH  COMMANDING. 

(2)  BRIGADIER-GENEKAL  MILO  S.  HASCALL  COMMANDING. 

First  ttriga.de.—  (1)  Brigadier-General  NATHANIEL  C.  MCLEAN;  (2)  Colonel 
JOSEPH  A.  COOPER.  Second  Brigade. — (1)  Colonel  JOHN  R.  BOND;  (2)  Colonel 
WILLIAM  E.  HOBSON.  Third  Brigade.— Colonel  SILAS  A.  STRICKLAND.  Artil 
lery.— Shields"  19th  Ohio  and  Paddock's  6th  Michigan  batteries. 

THIRD    DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JACOB  D.  COX  COMMANDING. 

First  Brigade.— Colonel  JAMES  W.  REILLY.  Second  Brigade.— (1)  Brigadier- 
General  M.  D.  MANSON;  (2)  Colonel  DANIEL  CAMERON;  (3)  Colonel  JOHN  S. 
CASEMENT.  Third  Brigade. — (1)  Brigadier-General  N.  C.  MCLEAN  ;  (2)  Colonel 
ROBERT  K.  BYRD  ;  (3)  Colonel  THOMAS  J.  HENDERSON.  Artillery. — Harvey's 
15th  Indiana  ;  Wilber's  23d  Indiana,  and  "  D  "  1st  Ohio  (CockerilTs). 


CAVALRY,   ARMY  OP  THE  OHIO. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  STONEMAN  COMMANDING. 

FIRST   DIVISION. 
COLONEL  ISRAEL  T.  GARRARD  COMMANDING. 

The  cavalry  of  the  army,  though  nominally  connected  with  the  three 
subordinate  armies,  was,  during  the  active  campaign  organized  into 
four  commands,  which  were  assigned  to  duty  by  General  Sherman  as 
circumstances  required,  and  as  will  be  seen  by  the  narrative  of  the 
campaign.  One  division  was  usually  upon  each  flank  and  one  covering 
the  communications  at  the  rear,  whilst  the  fourth  was  ready  for  expedi 
tions  in  front  which  might  be  ordered.  The  nearest  subordinate  army 
commander  usually  exercised  authority  over  the  cavalry  cooperating 
with  him. 

In  the  War  Department  records  for  June,  they  are  stated  as  follows  : 

PRINCIPAL  CAVALRY  COMMANDERS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  STONEMAN. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JUDSON  KILPATRICK. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  KENNER  GARRARD. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  EDWARD  M.  McCOOK. 


APPENDIX   C. 

CONFEDERATE  ARMY.1 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  commanded  by  GEN 
ERAL  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON  for  period  ending 
June  30,  1864. 


HARDEE'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  WM.  J.  HARDEE  COMMANDING. 

MAJOR-GENERAL   B.    P.   CHEATHAM'S   DIVISION. 
Brigade*. — Maney's,  Wright's,  Strahl's,  Vaughn's. 

MAJOR-GENERAL   W.   H.    T.    WALKER'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades. — Mercer's,  Jackson's,  Gist's,  Stevens'. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  PAT.  R.  CLEBURNE'S  DIVISION. 
Brigades. — Folk's,  Loring's,  Govan's.  Smith's. 

MAJOR  GENERAL   W.   B.    BATE'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades.—  Tyler's,  Lewis's,  Finley's. 


HOOD'S  ARMY  CORPS. 
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  J.  B.  HOOD  COMMANDING. 

MAJOR  GENERAL   T.   C.    HINDMAN'S   DIVISION. 

Brigades.— Deas',  Colonel  J.  G.  COLTART  Commanding;  Manigault's;  Tucker's, 
Colonel  J.  H.  SHARP  Commanding;  Walthall's,  Colonel  SAM.  BENTON  Commanding. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  C.  L.   STEVENSON'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades. — Brown's,  Cumming's,  Reynolds',  Pettus'. 


1  The  Confederate  Army  did  not  have  its  corps,  divisions,  etc.,  numbered  ;  they 
were  known  by  the  names  of  the  commanders,  and  in  the  case  of  the  brigades, 
seem  to  have  continued  to  bear  the  name  of  the  brigadier  commanding  at  the  be 
ginning  of  the  campaign,  even  when  changes  in  command  occurred. 


APPENDIX  C.  251 

MAJOR-GENERAL   A.    P.    STEWART'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades. — Stovairs,  Clayton's.  Gibson's,  Baker's. 


WHEELER'S  CAVALRY  CORPS. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  JOS.    WHEELER  COMMANDING. 

MAJOR-GENERAL   WM.  T.    MARTIN'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades. — Allen's,  Iverson's. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL   J.   H.   KELLEY'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades.—  Anderson's,  Dibbrell's,  Hannon's. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.   T.   C.   HUME'S   DIVISION. 
Brigades. — Ashby's,  Harrison's,  Williams'. 


ARTILLERY. 
BKIGADIEU-GENERAL  F.  A.  SHOUP  COMMANDING. 

BATTALIONS  i   ATTACHED   TO   HARDEE'S  CORPS. 

COLONEL  M.  SMITH  COMMANDING. 
Battalions. — Haxton's,  Hotchkiss',  Martin's,  Cobb's. 

BATTALIONS  ATTACHED  TO  HOOD'S  CORPS 

COLONEL  B.  F.  BECKHAM  COMMANDING. 
Battalions.—  Courtney's,  Eldridge's,  Johnston's. 

WHEELER'S   CORPS. 
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  F.  W.  ROBERTSON  COMMANDING. 

Five  Batteries. 

RESERVE   BATTALIONS. 
Eight  Batteries.— Williams',  Palmer's,  and  Waddell's  battalions. 


DETACHMENTS. 

ESCORTS  (CAVALRY). 

General  Johnston's  Headquarters.  Company  "A"  and  Company  "B." 
Headquarters— Cheatham's,  Cleburne's,  Walker's,  Bate's,  Hardee's,  Hindrnan's, 
Stevenson's,  Stewart's.     One  company  each. 

ENGINEER  TROOPS. 
MAJOR  J.  W.  GREEN  COMMANDING. 

Divisions. — Cheatham's.    Cleburne's,    Stewart's.    Hindman's,    Buckner's,   De 
tachment  of  Sappers  and  Miners.     One  company  each. 

1  Three  batteries  in  each  battalion. 
11* 


252  ATLANTA. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Major- 
General  W.   W.  Loring  for  period  ending  June  30,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  S.  G.  FRENCH'S  DIVISION. 
Brigades.  —  Ectors,  Cockrell's,  Sears' s. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  W.  LORING'S  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  S.  FEATHERSTONE  COMMANDING. 
Brigades. — Adams's,  Featherstone's,  Scott's. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  ED.  C.  WALTHALL'S  DIVISION. 
Brigades.—  Quarles's,  Canty's,  Reynolds'. 


CAVALRY. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  H.  JACKSON  COMMANDING. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  H.  JACKSON'S  DIVISION. 
Brigades.— Armstrong's,  Ross's,  Ferguson's. 

ESCORTS  (CAVALRY). 
Three  companies. 


ARTILLERY. 

Brigades.1— Storrs's.  Meyrick's,  Preston's,  Waitie's. 

1  Three  batteries  each. 


APPENDIX  D. 

BATTLE  OF  ALATOONA. 

THE  numerous  authorities  which  have  perpetuated  the  error  referred 
to  in  the  foot-note  on  p.  231,  make  it  proper  to  refer  a  little  more  fully 
to  the  evidence.  The  writer's  field  despatches  for  October  contain  the 
following : 

No.  169. 

PACE'S  FERRY  ROAD,  October  5,  1864,  5.45  A.M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SHERMAN,  Smyrna  Camp  Ground  : 

By  working  late  last  evening,  we  got  over  our  train,  the  head  of  my 
column  resting  on  the  Pace's  Ferry  and  Marietta  road.  We  had  to 
bridge  a  creek  forty  feet  broad,  which  was  filled  by  back-water  from 
the  Chattahoochee,  swimming  deep.  The  road  along  the  Chattahoochee 
is  not  good,  but  we  shall  get  along.  The  column  is  now  starting.  I 
can  get  no  definite  information  of  roads  on  right  of  railroad,  but  from 
my  remembrance  of  what  we  learned  when  we  were  at  Smyrna  Station 
in  Julv,  I  hope  to  get  through. 

(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G. 

No.  170. 

SMYRNA  CAMP  GROUND,  October  5,  1864. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  COOPER,  Commanding  Second  Division  : 

Sir — The  third  division  is  marching  along  the  railroad  to  Marietta, 
and  I  am  very  anxious  that  the  trains  should  reach  there  also  at  an 
early  hour.  If  you  have  not  crossed  the  railroad  when  this  reaches 
you,  you  may  put  your  whole  command  on  the  railroad,  except  one 
regiment  for  a  rear  guard  for  the  train,  to  follow  the  wagon-road.  A 
corps  has  been  stationed  at  Ruff's  Mills  (between  here  and  the  Sand- 
town  road)  to  cover  this  road,  which  makes  it  safe.  I  will  either  meet 
you  at  Marietta,  or  leave  orders  for  you.  Try  to  prevent  all  straggling, 
and  do  not  hurry  your  men  too  much. 

(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G. 

No.  171. 

NEAR  MARIETTA,  October  6,  1864. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  REILLY,  Commanding  Third  Division : 

General  Vanderveer  had  two  regiments  and  a  section  of  artillery  on 
Brushy  Mountain,  the  high  ground  a  little  further  to  the  right  than 


254  ATLANTA. 

your  right  now  rests.  I  think  you  will  have  to  put  your  left  brigade 
over  there,  and  let  General  Cooper  take  the  place  vacated  on  your  left. 
Please  look  at  the  ground,  and  do  so  unless  you  can  detach  a  regiment 
or  so  with  a  section,  and  so  hold  the  right  by  a  detachment. 

(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G.  Commanding. 

No.  172. 

NKAB  MARIETTA,  October  6,  1864. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL,  COOPER,  Commanding  Second  Division : 

You  may  put  in  your  command  on  Reilly's  left  this  morning — put 
ting  them  in  two  lines  for  the  present. 

(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G.  Commanding. 

Special  field-orders,  No.  85. 

HKADQUARTEBS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

In  the  field,  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN,  October  6,  1864. 

I.  Major-General  Stanley,  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  will  occupy  a 
strong  defensive  position  across  the  Marietta  and  Burnt  Hickory,  and 
Marietta  and  Dallas  roads,  his  right  near  Pine  Hill,  and  left  behind 
Noses  Creek. 

II.  Major-General  Howard,    Army  of  the  Tennessee,  will  join  on 
the  left  of  General  Stanley,  and  make  a  line   covering  the  Powder 
Spring  road ;  and  the  cavalry  on  that  flank,  General  Kilpatrick,  will 
prevent  any  enemy  from  reaching  the  railroad  below  Marietta. 

III.  Brigadier-General  Cox,  Army  of  the  Ohio,  will  move  out  on 
the  Burnt  Hickory  roai,  via  Pine   Hill,  and   Mount    Olivet   Church, 
west,  until  he  strikes  the  road  by  which  the  enemy  have  moved  on  Ala- 
toona.     He  will  have  his  columns  ready  for  a  fight,  but  not  deployed. 
He  will  park  his  wagons  near  Kenesaw. 

IV.  General  Elliott  will  send  cavalry  to-day  to  Big  Shanty,  Ack- 
worth,  and  Alatoona,  and  bring  back  official  reports. 

V.  The  utmost  attention  must  be  given  to  the  grazing  of  animals, 
parking  wagons,  and  economizing  rations. 

By  order  of  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
(Signed)  L.  M.  DAYTON,  Aide-de-Camp. 


My  pocket-diary  contains  the  following  entry  : 

"Thursday,  October  6th. — March  at  nine  o'clock  via  Pine  Mountain 
to  Sandtown  road,  and  make  reconnoissances  in  all  directions.  On 
the  right,  nearly  to  Ackworth ;  in  front,  to  Alatoona  church ;  on  left, 
nearly  to  Lost  Mountain  and  to  Hardshell  church.  The  enemy  have 
retreated  south  beyond  Lost  Mountain." 

In  making  reports  after  a  considerable  interval  of  time,  General  Sher 
man  evidently  made  by  accident  a  mistake  of  a  day  in  the  dates,  and 
the  error  has  perpetuated  itself  in  numerous  ways. 


APPENDIX  E. 

MOVEMENTS  OF  OCTOBER  13,  1864. 

IN  his  Memoirs,  General  Sherman,  misled,  apparently,  by  his  formal 
orders  for  the  day  which  he  subsequently  modified,  has  inadvertently 
spoken  of  the  movement  of  Corse's  division  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Coosa  as  that  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  guns  and  the  accom 
plishment  of  his  wish  for  definite  information.  His  official  report  has 
it  correctly.  It  says:  "I  therefore  on  the  llth  moved  to  Rome  and 
pushed  Garrard's  cavalry  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  under  General 
Cox,  across  the  Oostanaula,  to  threaten  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  passing 
north.  Garrard's  cavalry  drove  a  cavalry  brigade  of  the  enemy  to  and 
beyond  the  narrows  leading  into  the  valley  of  the  Chattooga,  capturing 
two  field  pieces  and  taking  some  prisoners." 

The  following  are  from  the  field  despatches  of  the  writer. 

No.  179. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

October  13,  1864,  8  A.M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  SHERMAN,  Commanding,  etc.  : 

Your  despatch  received.  Garrard  fills  the  road  ahead  of  me  and  is 
pushing  on.  My  infantry  is  close  on  his  heels.  He  finds  some  cavalry 
in  his  front,  but  no  serious  resistance  as  yet.  He  has  not  reached  the 
position  where  the  enemy  had  their  battery  yesterday.  As  soon  as  he 
is  seriously  checked,  I  will  have  him  give  way  and  let  the  infantry 
through.  Very  respectfully,  etc. , 

(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G.  Commanding. 


No,  180. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

5>£  miles  from  Rome,  October  13,  1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  SHERMAN,  Commanding  M.  D.  M.  : 

Garrard  is  pushing  on  finely,  my  infantry  in  close  support.  He 
has  driven  Armstrong's  cavalry  the  last  two  miles,  captured  two  pieces 
of  artillery  and  a  number  of  prisoners.  Citizens  report  a  larger  force 


256  ATLANTA. 

of  cavalry  (Harrison's  division)  ahead.  I  leave  one  division  of  infantry 
to  cover  the  roads  coming  in  from  SSummefville  by  Texas  Valley,  and 
push  the  other  forward. 

Very  respectfully,  etc., 
(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G.  Commanding. 


No.  183. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

October  13,  1864,  1.45  P.M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  SHERMAN  : 

We  have  found  the  place  where  the  bridge  was.  The  information 
is  positive  that  Hood  took  it  north  with  him.  A  brigade  of  cavalry 
went  two  miles  beyond.  I  am  returning  with  the  infantry. 

(Signed)  J.  D.  COX,  B.  G. 


INDEX. 


NOTE. — Regiments,  batteries,  etc.,  are  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States,  excepting  batteries  called  by  their  captain's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.  These  are  indexed  under  BATTERIES. 


Ac K WORTH,  Ga.,  64  et  seq.,  67  et  i 
seq.,  79,  84,  89,  92  etseq.,  147, 
225,  233 

Adairsville,  Ga. ,  46  et  seq.,  54  et 
seq.,  63,  69 

Adams,  Colonel,  108 

Alabama,  regiments  oc :  Four 
teenth,  100;  Thirty-second, 
72;  Fortieth,  100;  Fifty- 
eighth,  73 

Alatoona  Creek,  65,  89,  95  et  seq., 
99 

Alatoona,  Ga.,  49,  67,  75  et  seq.,  | 
79,    89,    94  et  seq.,    104,   143, 
224  et  seq.,  230,  232  et  seq. 

Alatoona  Pass,  63  et  seq.,  84,  87, 
94 

Alms  House,  Atlanta,  189 

Alpine,  239 

Anderson,  Colonel  A.,  master  of 
railway  transportation,  4,  61 

Andersonville,  182 

Annapolis,  Md.,  17 

Antietam,  149 

Archer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  M. , 
236 


Armstrong,  cavalry   of,  84  et  seq. 

Athens,  Ala.,  223  et  seq. 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  16,  21,  23,  29,  68  et 
seq.,  83,  90,  93,  131,  134,  136, 
14 L  et  seq,,  144  et  seq.,  152  et 
seq.,  160,  162  et  seq.,  166  et 
seq.,  170  et  seq.,  174,  177,  181 
et  seq.,  188  et  seq.,  195  et  seq.  ; 
fall  of,  207,  212  et  seq.,  216 
et  seq.,  220  et  seq.,  232,  237 

Augusta,  Ga.,  150,  167,  174,  188, 
220  et  seq. 

Austin,  Major  J.  B.,  sharpshooters 
of,  72 

BAIRD,  Brigadier-General  Absa 
lom,  division  of  (Fourteenth 
Corps)  73,  84,  122,  154,  190  et 
seq.,  202,  206  et  seq. 

Banks,  Major-General  N.  P.,  at 
New  Orleans,  6  et  seq.  ;  to 
move  from  New  Orleans  to 
Mobile,  23  et  seq. 

Barnhill,  Colonel  R.  S.,  127 

Barter,  Colonel  Richard  F.,  bri 
gade  of,  140,  171 


258 


INDEX. 


Bate,  Major-General  W.  B.,  divi 
sion  of,  38,  68,  70,  84  efc  seq., 
96,  98,  103,  161  et  seq.,  ICO, 
168 et  seq.,  193 

Batteries:  Cockerell's,  173;  De 
Gres's,  173,  175;  Murray's, 
175;  Paddock's,  113;  Pres- 
cott's,  206  et  seq.  ;  Shield's, 
112;  Winegar's,  110;  Wood- 
bury's,  110 

Beauregard,  General  G.  T.,  239 

Big  Creek  Gap,  11 

Big  Shanty  Station,  94  et  seq.,  97, 
225  et  seq. 

Big  Spring,  52 

Blair,  Major-General  F.  P.,  57; 
corps  of,  65,  84,  92  et  seq.  ; 
joins  McPherson,  99  et  seq., 
171  et  seq.,  177;  at  Atlanta, 
105,  142,  160,  163  et  seq.,  167 
et  seq., 182  et  seq.,  191,  201  et 
seq.,  205;  goes  North,  222 

Blake,  brigade  of,  154 

Blue  Mountain,  225 

Bradley,  Colonel  Luther  P.,  bri 
gade  of,  156 

Bragg,  General  Braxton.  relieved 
by  Johnston,  5 ;  reinforced 
by  Longstreet,  13  ;  separated 
from  Longstreet,  14 ;  relieved 
by  Johnston,  25  et  seq. ,  29  ; 
Chief-of -Staff  to  Jeff.  Davis, 
148 

Brown,  Major-General  John  C.,  un 
der  Cheatham,  159 ;  wounded, 
185 

Brown's  Saw  Mill,  75 

Brush  Mountain,  92,  95  et  seq., 
103 

Brushy  Mountain,  231 

Buckhead,  148,  150  etseq.,  154 

Buckuer,  Major-General  S.  B.,  12 


Buell,  Colonel  G.  P.,  138 

Buford,  General,  223 

Bull's  Gap,  17 

Burnside,  Major-General  Ambrose 
E. ,  begins  the  construction  of  a 
railway,  2 ;  takes  command  of 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  9  ;  co-oper 
ates  with  Rosecrans,  10  et  seq.  ; 
receives  thanks  of  Congress, 
13  ;  relieved  by  Foster,  14  et 
seq.  ;  again  takes  command  of 
Ninth  Corps,  17 

Burnt  Church,  Ga.,  89 

Burnt  Hickory,  Ga.,  64  et  seq., 
67,  70,  73  et  seq.,  84,  89,  93  et 
seq.,  124,  232 

Buttertield,  Major-General  Daniel, 
division  of,  34 ;  drives  back 
Hood,  47,  70  (note),  73,  73, 
91  et  seq.,  105,  109,  111,  114, 
154 

Buzzard's  Roost,  Ga.,  30,  34,  37 
et  seq.,  236 

Byrd,  Colonel  Robert  K.,  brigade 
of,  119  et  seq.,  122  et  seq.,  138 
etseq.,  172 

CALHOUN,  Ga.,  31,  36,  46  et  seq., 

49  etseq.,  236 
Cameron,  Colonel  Daniel,  brigade 

of,  107,  122  et  seq.,  138  et  seq., 

171,  193 

Campbell's  Station,  14 
Campbelltown,    Ga.,  141   et    seq., 

145,  188,  195 
Camp  Creek,  36,  42  et  seq.,  183, 

195  et  seq. 
Canby,  Major-General   E.  R.    S., 

219 
Candy,  Colonel  Charles,  brigade  of, 

72,  156 
Canton,  108 


INDEX. 


259 


Canty,    Brigadier-General    James,  ' 
36 

Carleton,  Colonel  C.  H.,  brigade  of, 
202 

Carlin,  Brigadier-General  W.  P., 
division  of,  200  et  seq. 

Cartersville,  Ga.,  49,  54  et  seq.,  GO, 
06  et  seq. ,  234 

Casement,  Colonel  John  S.,  bri 
gade  of,  57,  107,  139,  193,  233 

Cassville,  Ga.,  49  et  seq.,  53  et 
seq.,  OOetseq.,  09 

Catoosa  Springs,  Ga.,  25,  33 

Cedar  Bluffs,  239 

Chambers's  Mill,  206 

Chancellorsville,  178 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  2,  19,  224 

Chattahoochee  River,  27,  04,  83, 
93  et  seq.,  102,  123,  131  et  seq., 
130  et  seq.,  140  et  seq.,  144  et  I 
seq.,  149,  153,  107,  181  et  seq., 
188,  190  et  seq.,  208,  219,  223 
et  seq.,  232  et  seq. 

Chattanooga,  Tenn. ,  1  et  seq. ,  6  et 
seq.,  10,  13  et  seq.,  25,  29,  40, 
143,  104,  181,  196,  218,  223, 
234  et  seq. 

Chattooga  River,  238  et  seq. 

Chattoogata  Mountain,  34  (note)  et 
seq. 

Cheatham,   Major-General  B.  F.,  j 
division  of,  38,  50,   103,  137; 
given  Hood's  command,  149; 
at  Jones's  Mill,  152  et  seq. ,  159 ;  , 
at  Atlanta,  161  et  seq. ,  164, 171  j 
et  seq.  ;  returns  to  his  division  • 
in  Hardee's   corps,  181,  184 ;  | 
losses  of,  214 

Cheney's  Farm,  107,  109  et  seq., 
119 

Chickamanga,  1,  13,  29 

Chit  woods,  11 


Cincinnati,  Ohio,  2,  10  et  seq. 

Clare,  Colonel  C.,  221 

Clear  Creek,  152,  155,  157,161,  166 

Cleburne,  Major-General  Patrick 
R.,  division  of,  39,  79,  103,  161 
et  seq.,  166,  169  et  seq.,  173; 
in  command  of  Hardee's  corps, 
199,  201  et  seq.,  205 

Cleveland,  Ohio,  236 

Cleveland,  Tenn.,  18,  30,  40 

Clinch  River,  12,  29 

Clinton,  188 

Cobb's  Mills.  166 

Coburn,  Colonel  John,  brigade  of, 
156 

Cockrell,  Brigadier-General  Fran 
cis  M.,  brigade  of  (Missou- 
rians),  229 

Cockerell,  Captain  Giles  J.,  bat 
tery  of,  101,  173 

Collier's  Mill,  155  et  seq.,  158 

Columbus,  Ga.,  219 

Conasene  Creek,  66 

Connasauga  River,  30,  36,  42,  51, 
230 

Coosa  River,  234  et  seq.,  239 

Coosawattee  River,  51  et  seq. 

Corinth,  Miss.,  7 

Corse,  Brigadier-General  John  M. , 
223  et  seq.,  226  et  seq.  ;  casu 
alties  of,  231  et  seq.,  234  et 
seq. 

Covington,  Ga.,  174,  177,  188 

Cox,  Brigadier-General  J.  D., 
temporarily  in  command  of 
Twenty-third  Corps,  17;  at 
Dr.  Lee's,  33  ;  at  Kin  cannon 
Cross  Roads,  35,  37,  43  et  seq. ; 
at  Cartersville,  57,  74  et  seq., 
78 ;  at  Burnt  Church,  89,  91, 
94  et  seq.  ;  supported  by  Has- 
call,  99  et  seq.,  107  et  seq.,  110 


260 


INDEX. 


et  seq.,  119  et  seq.  ;  strength-  ; 
ens  his  position,  123 ;  on  the  j 
Chattahoochee,    138,    140 ;    at  | 
Peach  tree,  160,  171  et  seq. ;  at  j 
Utoy  Creek,  190  et  seq.,  194  et 
seq.  ;  carries  by  a  charge  the 
Macon    Railway,    202 ;    tem 
porarily  in  command  of  Army  j 
of  the  Ohio,  224 ;   on  Burnt  | 
Hickory  Road,  232,  235  et  seq. 

Crab  Orchard,  11 

Crittenden,  brigade  of,  in  Cox's 
division,  140 

Cross  Keys,  146,  150,  160,  164 

Crow  Valley,  38 

Croxton,  Colonel  J.  T. ,  142 

Culp's  Farm,  106  et  seq.,  109  et 
seq.,  112,  114,  119  et  seq.,  232  j 

Cumberland,  Army  of  the,  53,  58,  i 
66  et  seq.,    70,   74,    84,  92   et 
seq.,  102,  105  et  seq.,  121,  124, 
132;  losses  of,  135,  147,  150  et 
seq.,  158,  160,    163,   174,  198,  I 
204,  208,  209,  225  et  seq.,  232 

Cumberland,  Department  of,  1,  4 
et  seq.,  14,  24  et  seq.,  31,  40, 
50  et  seq. 

Cumberland  Gap,  Ky.,  2,  11  et 
seq. 

DALLAS,  Ga.,  64  et  seq.,  68  et 
seq.,  73  et  seq.,  76,  85,  89,  94, 
226  et  seq.,  232 

Dalton,  Ga.,  5,  19,  24  et  seq.,  35 
et  seq.,  58,  69,  118,  196,  217, 
236  et  seq. 

Dana,  Charles  A.,  Assistant-Secre 
tary  of  War,  13 

Dandridge,  Tenn.,  16et  seq. 

Davis,  General  Jefferson  C.,  divi 
sion  of,  34,  48,  50,  57,  65,  70, 
73  et  seq.  ;  relieved  by  Mc- 


Pherson,  84,  86,  89,  121  ct 
seq.,  125,  151  et  seq.,  154,  182, 
184  et  seq.,  189;  succeeds 
Palmer,  190,  197,  204  et  seq.  ; 
joins  Sherman,  210 
Davis,  Jefferson,  his  confidence  in 
Bragg  and  estrangement  from 
Johnston,  25  et  seq.  ;  John 
ston's  letter  to,  28 ;  his  esti 
mate  of  Confederate  losses,  88; 
his  dislike  to  Johnston,  148, 

181,  186 et  seq.,  212,  221 
Decatur,  Ala.,  1,  57,  141,  239 
Decatur,  Ga.,  144  et  seq.,  150,  152, 

159  et  seq.,  164,  166  et  seq., 
171,  177,  182,  188,  208,  222, 
226 

De  Gres,  Captain  J.  C.,  battery  of, 
173,  175 

Derby's  House,  101 

Dilworth,  brigade  of,  151 

Dr.  Lee's  House,  Ga.,  33 

Dodge,  Brigadier-General  Gren- 
ville  M. ,  commands  Sixteenth 
Corps,  21,  43,  45  et  seq.,  74,  95, 
105  ;  on  the  Sandtown  road, 
133,  141,  et  seq.,  153,  160,  167 
et  seq.,  170  et  seq.,  174  et  seq., 

182,  185, 197 
Dogwood  Valley,  33 
Donelson,  221 
Dug  Gap,  34,  38 

EAST  POINT,  145,  182  et  seq.,  193, 

195  et  seq.,  203,  208 
Echota,  Ga. ,  48  (see  Fite's  Ferry) 
Edie,  Major  I.  R.,  brigade  of,  206 

et  seq. 
Elliott,  Brigadier-General  W.   L., 

226,  232 

Elliott's  Mill,  182,  184 
Embry,  plantation  of,  152,  154 


INDEX. 


Emory  Gap,  11 

Entrenchment  Creek,  160  et  seq., 
174 

Este,  Colonel  George  P.,  brigade 
of,  206 

Etowah  River,  49,  53  et  seq. ,  57  et 
seq.,  63  et  seq.,  66  et  seq.,  69, 
76,  84,  89,  94  et  seq.,  97,  135, 
146,  223  et  seq.,  230,  234 

Euharlee,  05  et  seq. 

Ezra  Church,  214 

FAIRBURN,  195,  198,  200 

Farmer's  Bridge,  Ga.,  50 

Farragut,  Admiral  D.  G.,  219 

Feather  ston,  Brigadier -General 
W.  S.,  division  of,  103,  126 

Field's  Mill,  51 

Fite's  Ferry,  Ga.,  48,  51 

Flatrock,  188,  224 

Flint  River,  199  et  seq. 

Florence,  239 

Foard,  Medical  Director  A.  J., 
213  et  seq. 

Force,  Brigadier-General  M.  F., 
brigade  of,  99  et  seq.,  105,  163 
et  seq.,  170 

Forrest,  Major-General  N.  B.,  cav 
alry  of,  7,  222  et  seq. 

Fort  Morgan,  219 

Fort  Saunders,  14 

Foster,  Major-General  John  G., 
succeeds  Burnside,  15,  17 

Frazer,  Brigadier- General  John 
W.,  surrenders  to  Burnside,  12 

French  Broad  River,  16 

French,  Major-General  S.  G.,  di 
vision  of,  63,  103,  126  et  seq., 
184,  225,  227  et  seq.,  230  et 
seq. ,  233 

Fuller,  Brigadier-General  John 
W.,  division  of,  167,  169 


GADSDEN,  Ala.,  225,  235,  238  et 
seq. 

Gaines's  Mills,  149 

Gallup,  Colonel  G.  W.,  11 1  et  seq. 

Garrard,  Brigadier-General  Ken- 
ner,  cavalry  of,  44,  47  et  seq., 
50  et  seq.,  57,  66,  70,  74,  94, 
105,  118;  at  Marietta,  132; 
sent  to  seize  the  Roswell  fac 
tories.  134,  136  et  seq.,  141, 
146,  150;  destroys  railroad, 
160,  174,  177;  near  Decatur, 
182  ;  left  at  Flatrock  by  Stone- 
man,  188  ;  at  East  Point,  197 ; 
at  Big  Shanty,  226 ;  at  Rome, 
235 

Gaylesville,  Ala  ,  239 

Geary,  Brigadier-General  John 
W.,  division  of,  34,  52,  67,  70, 
72  et  seq. ,  92  ;  forced  to  re 
tire,  99,  105,  109  et  seq. ;  losses 
of,  113 ;  report  of,  114,  151  et 
seq.  ;  movements  of,  154  et 
seq.  ;  losses  of,  158  et  seq., 
161 

Gettysburg,  Penn,  battle  of,  10, 
14,  149 

Gilgal  Church,  93,  95  et  seq.,  99 
et  seq.,  105,  124 

Gleason,  Colonel  Newell,  brigade 
of,  191 

Govan,  Brigadier-General  D.  C., 
brigade  of,  205  et  seq. 

Gover's  Gap,  238 

Granberry,  Brigadier-General  H. 
B.,  Texan  brigade  of,  38,  79, 
207  et  seq. 

Granger,  Major-General  Gordon, 
Fourth  Corps,  14,  17 

Grant,  Lt.  Gen.  U.  S.,  Commander 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  1,  3  et  seq.  ;  re- 


2G2 


INDEX. 


inforced  at  Vicksburg,  10; 
assumed  command  of  the  Mil 
itary  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  13  et  seq.  ;  consults  with 
Foster,  17;  made  Lieutenant- 
General,  19 ;  his  plan  of  cam 
paign,  23 ;  despatch  to  Sher 
man,  130;  telegram  from,  146, 
218  et  seq. ;  urged  by  Sherman 
to  move  on  Savannah,  234 

Greensboro,  212 

Gresham,  Brigadier-General  W,, 
Q.,  160  et  seq.,  163 

Grigsby, Brigadier-General  J.  War 
ren,  Kentucky  cavalry  of,  3S 

Griswold,  188 

Gulf,  Department  of,  1,  219 

Guntersville,  239 

HALLECK,  Major-General  Henry  ; 
W.,  Lincoln's  Chief -of -Staff,  I 
3  ;  Sherman's  despatch  to,  134 

Hardee,  Lieutenant- General  Wm.  ; 
J.,   at  Rocky   Face,    35,   38 ;  j 
at     Resaca,     42  ;      reinforces  J 
Hood,   47,   50;    at  Kingston, 
53    et    seq.  ;    Johnston's    or 
ders  to,  68 ;  at  Dallas,  70,  74 ; 
pressed  by  McPherson,  76,  79, 
84 ;  losses  of,  85,  87  ;  at  Gilgal 
Church,    96 ;  suggests  a   con 
ference  of  Confederate  gener 
als,  98  ;  followed  vigorously  by  ! 
National  Army,  100  et  seq.  ;  at  j 
Marietta,  108,    110,    113,    117,  j 
127,  136,  149,  152;  at  Atlanta,  j 
160;  sent  to  support  cavalry,  ! 
161  et  seq.,  sent  to  attack  Mc- 
Pherson's  rear,  164  ;  at  Atlan-  ! 
ta,  166,  168,  170  et  seq.  ;  com-  j 
plained  of  unjustly  by  Hood, 
176  ;  withdraws  his  request  to 


be  relieved,  181,  184  ;  vindica 
tion  of,  186;  at  Sandtown, 
192  ;  at  Atlanta,  194,  197  eb 
seq.  ;  endeavors  to  hold  his 
position,  203  et  seq.  ;  separated 
from  Hood,  209  et  seq.  ;  state 
ment  of,  214;  losses  of,  215, 
233 

Harker,  Brigadier-General  C.  G., 
brigade  of,  34,  37  et  seq.,,  45, 
If2,  121  ;  mortally  wounded, 
125 

Harmon,  Colonel  O.  F.,  killed,  1T> 

Harrison,  Colonel  Benjamin,  bri 
gade  of,  156, 181 

Harrow,  Brigadier-General  Wm. , 
division  of,  85,  167,  120,  185, 
200 

Hartsuff,  Major  General  George 
L.,  commands  Twenty -third 
Corps,  10  et  seq.  ;  relieved  by 
Cox,  17 

Hascall,  Brigadier-General  IVIilo 
S.,  division  of  (Twenty-third 
Corps),  74,  78,  89,  91,  95  ;  sup 
ports  Cox,  99  et  seq.,  108  et 
seq.,  112  ;  losses  of,  113  etseq., 
120,  122 ;  relieved  by  Hooker, 
132,  139, 160,  172,  190  et  seq.  ; 
in  front  of  Atlanta,  194  et 
seq.  ;  at  Rough  and  Ready, 
202 

Hazen,  Brigadier-General  Wm.  B., 
brigade  of,  77,  79 ;  carries  the 
bridge  'over  Flint  River,  200 
et  seq. 

Heron's  Mill,  190 

Hindman,  Major-General  T.  C., 
division  of, -38  et  seq.,  55,  79, 
108,  110 

Hobson,  Colonel  Wm.  E.,  brigade 
of,  111 


INDEX. 


2G3 


Holston  Valley,  Tenn.,  2,  9,  12,  14 
et  seq.,  17,  20 

Hood,  General  J.  B. ,  statement  of, 
28,  30,  38  ;  at  Resaca,  39,  42  ; 
reinforced,  47,  50 ;  at  Cassville, 
53  et  seq.  ;  directed  to  follow 
Hardee,  08  ;  intrenchments  of, 
69,  72 ;  assaulted  by  Hooker, 
73,  79  et  seq.,  87  et  seq.  ;  be 
hind  Noonday  Creek,  96,  99 ; 
holds  the  upland  above  Noon 
day  Creek,  103  et  seq.,  108  et 
seq.  ;  determined  attack  of, 
112,  115,  117,  119;  insufficient 
force  of,  120,  123,  127,  133; 
supersedes  Johnston,  148  et 
peq.  ;  plans  of,  153  et  seq.  ;  ral 
lies  his  men,  1 57 ;  losses  of, 
158  et  seq.  ;  orders  to  Wheeler, 
160;  orders  to  Hardee,  161; 
his  campaign  closed,  162;  pro 
poses  to  retire,  164  ;  at  Atlan 
ta,  171  (note),  173,  174  et  seq.  ; 
his  complaints  of  Hardee,  176 
et  seq. ,  181 ;  flaws  in  his  policy,  j 
183  et  seq. ;  his  apologies  for  de 
feat,  186  ;  intrenches  Sandtown  j 
road,  193;  on  the  defensive, 
1£4  et  seq.  ;  deceived  as  to 
Sherman's  resources,  197  et 
seq.,  203  et  seq.  ;  evacuates  At 
lanta,  208  et  seq.  ;  strength  of 
his  army,  212  et  seq. ;  losses  of, 
215  et  seq.,  218  et  seq.  ;  his  cor 
respondence  with  Sherman, 
220  et  seq.  ;  activity  of,  2^3  et 
seq. ,  230,  232  et  seq. 

Hooker,  Major-General  Joseph,  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps,  33;  at 
Buzzard's  Roost,  37,  40,  44,  47 
et  seq.  ;  mistakes  route,  51  et 
seq.  ;  moves  toward  Cassville, 


•r3  et  seq. ,  56 ;  crosses  0:1 
Schofield's  pontoons,  66,  67 ; 
reports  of,  69 ;  at  Dallas,  70, 
74  et  seq.  ;  assaults  Hood,  73, 
74  ;  at  New  Hope  Church,  80  , 
change  of  position  of,  84,  86 ; 
supports  Schofield,  89,  91  et 
seq.,  95;  occupies  Hardee's 
front,  101,  105;  at  Gulp's 
Farm,  106,  108 ;  position  of, 
109;  orders  breastworks 
thrown  up,  110  et  seq.,  113; 
reports  of,  114,  115,  117; 
awaits  Thomas's  orders,  122; 
relieves  Hascall,  132  ;  at  Pace's 
Ferry,  150  et  seq.  ;  movements 
of,  154  et  seq.  ;  estimate  of 
losses,  158 ;  sketch  of,  177  et 
seq.  ;  asks  to  be  relieved,  179 

Horn  Mountain,  35 

Hovey,  Brigadier-General  Alvm 
P.,  division  of,  35,  37,  42,  74, 
84,  91  et  seq.  ;  asks  to  be  re- 
lieveel,  95 

Howard  House,  160,  166,  168,  173 
et  eeq. 

Howard,  Major-General  O.  O  ,  of 
Fourth  Corps,  33  et  seq.,  37, 
40 ;  captures  prisoners,  41,  43 
et  seq.,  52,  54,  66  et  seq.,  70, 
73,  75  et  seq.,  78 ;  losses  of,  79 ; 
at  Pickett's  Mill,  80 ;  position 
of,  84,95,  97,  102,  105  et  seq., 
109,  111,  117,  121  et  seq.,  124, 
126  et  seq.,  at  Pace's  Ferry, 
134 ;  ordered  to  support  Scho- 
field,  141  et  seq.;  atBuckhead, 
150  et  seq.;  movements  of,  154 
et  seq.;  atPeachtree,  160, 163; 
recommended  as  McPherson's 
successor,  178etseq.;  attacked 
by  Hood,  181  et  seq.;  connects 


204 


INDEX. 


with  Thomas,  189;  at  Fair- 
burn,  19S  et  seq.;  joined  by 
Sherman,  204  et  seq. ;  attacked 
by  Hardee  and  Lee,  209;  at 
Jonesboro,  214  ;  note,  231,  232, 
238  et  seq. 

Howell's  Mills,  150  et  seq.,  154 
Huntsville,  Ala.,  8,  21,  223 
Hurlbut,  Major-General    Stephen 
A.,    commands     one     column 
under  Sherman,  6 

ILLINOIS,  regiments  of :  Seventh, 
228;  Thirtieth,  99;  Fortieth, 
127;  Sixty-fourth,  169;  Nine 
ty-third,  227  et  seq.  Batteries 
of  :  A,  First,  172  et  seq.,  175 

Indiana,  batteries  of  :  Fifteenth, 
171;  Myer's,  119 

Iowa,  regiment  of :  Thirty-ninth, 
228.  Batteries  of  :  First,  85 ; 
Seventeenth,  236 

Ireland,  brigade  of,  156 


JACKSON,  Lieutenant-General  T. 
J.,  brilliant  campaign  of,  24 

Jackson,  Major-General  W.  H. , 
cavalry  of,  63,  67  et  seq.; 
capture  of  dispatch  to,  71 ;  di 
vision  of,  74 ;  losses  of,  88 ; 
holds  Lost  Mountain,  100  et 
seq. ;  at  Powder  Springs,  108, 
119;  pursued  by  Reilly,  123, 
130;  on  the  Chattahoochee, 
136,  149;  sent  to  meet  Kil- 
patrick,  195 

Jacksonville,  235 

Johnson,  Brigadier-General  R. 
W.,  division  of  (Fourteenth 
Corps),  73;  position  of,  76  et 
«eq.,  84,  92,  154,  157,  190  et 


seq.;  in  temporary  command 
of  corps,  194,  206 

Johnson,  Major-General  Edward, 
under  Hood,  wounded,  185 

Johnston,  General  Joseph  E.,  at 
Dalton,  5  et  seq.,  19,  23 ; 
strong  position  of,  24  ;  super 
sedes  Bragg,  25  et  seq. ;  effec 
tive  force  of,  28  ;  his  position 
denned,  29  et  seq.;  concen 
trated  movement  against,  33 
et  seq.;  disposition  of  his 
troops,  38;  sends  troops  to 
Resaca,  39  et  seq. ;  position  of, 
42 ;  at  Camp  Creek,  44 ;  or 
ders  a  pontoon  bridge  across 
the  Oostanaula,  46;  defective 
position  of,  47 ;  his  opinion  of 
Sherman's  ability,  49  et  seq., 
53  ;  plans  to  leave  Adairsville, 
54 ;  gives  orders  to  retire,  55 
et  seq. ;  loses  favorable  oppor 
tunity,  63 ;  at  Marietta,  64  et 
seq.,  67;  position  of,  68;  dis 
patch  from,  captured,  71  ; 
prisoners  taken  by,  79,  80; 
position  of,  83  et  seq. ;  report 
to,  86  et  seq.;  losses  of,  88; 
retreats  north  of  Kenesaw, 
93;  his  skilful  defence,  93; 
evacuates  his  lines,  94  ;  con 
centrates  his  infantry,  96  et 
seq.;  at  Gilgal  Church,  100, 
102  et  seq.,  108  ;  losses  of,  112, 
114  et  seq.;  at  Kenesaw,  116 
et  seq.;  insufficient  force  of, 
120  ;  losses  of,  127,  130  et  seq.  ; 
on  north  bank  of  the  Chatta 
hoochee,  133  et  seq.,  140  et 
seq.;  difficulties  of  his  posi 
tion,  144  et  seq. ;  superseded 
by  General  Hood,  147  et  seq.; 


INDEX. 


265 


Hardee's  dissatisfaction  at  his 
removal,  181,  183  ;  policy  vin 
dicated  186  et  seq.,  198  (note), 
211  et  seq.,  233 

Jonesboro,  183,  186,  188,  195,  199 
et  seq.,  202  et  seq.,  209  et  seq., 
214 

Jones,  Colonel  Patrick  H.,  bri 
gade  of,  156 

Jones,    Colonel  Wells  S.,    Fifty- 
third  Ohio,  172  et  seq. 
Jones,  Colonel  Bush,  72 
Jones,  Major-General  S.,  13 
Judah,  Brigadier-General    Henry 
M.,  division  of,  35,  37,  43  et 
seq. 

KEMP'S  Mills,  95 

Kenesaw  Mt.,  Ga.,  29,  64,  81,  83, 
95,  103,  105,  116  et  seq.,  120, 
132,  226  et  seq.,  231 

Kentucky,  regiments  of  :  Twelfth, 
138;  Fourteenth,  111 

Kilpatrick,  Colonel  B.  L.,  Fifth 
Ohio  Infantry.  47 

Kilpatrick,  Brigadier-General  Jud- 
son,  cavalry  division  of,  35,  43; 
wounded,  46,  48 ;  division  of, 
66,  68;  makes  a  circuit  of 
Atlanta,  195  et  seq.,  200,  202, 
226 

Kimball,  Brigadier-General  Na 
than,  brigade  of,  121,  155  et 
seq. 

Kincannon  Cross  Roads,  Ga. ,  35 

Kingston,  Ala.,  11,  224 

Kingston,  Ga.,  49,  51,  53  et  seq., 
56,  58,  C3et  seq.,  68,  89,  93,  96, 
et  seq.,  232  et  seq.,  236 

Kirby,  Colonel  Isaac  M.,  brigade 
of,  106 

Knipe,  Brigadier-General  Joseph 
12 


F.,  brigade  of,  109  et  seq.,  113, 
157 

Knoxville,  Tenn. ,  2,  10,  12  et  seq., 
222,  236 

LA  FAYETTE,  143 

La  Grange,  Colonel  O.  H.,  brigade 
of,  38  ;  captured,  39 

Laiboldt,  Colonel  B.,  196 

Lay's  Ferry,  Ga.,  46  et  seq.,  57 

Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills,  25,  33 

Lee,  Dr. ,  House  of,  33 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  17,  23; 
defensive  operations  of,  24, 
26,  130,  148 

Lee,  Lt.  Gen.  S.  D.,  assigned  to 
Polk's  command,  98  ;  assigned 
command  of  Hood's  corps,  181, 
184 ;  reinforced  by  Stuart, 
185,  198,  199 ;  defeat  of,  201 ; 
starts  for  Atlanta,  203  et  seq., 
208 et  seq.,  losses  of  214  (note), 
235 ;  before  Resaca,  236 

Leggett,  Brigadier-General  M.  D., 
division  of,  99,  105,  163  et 
seq.,  167,  170,  172 

Lewis,  Brigadier-General  Joseph 
H.,  brigade  of,  205  et  seq. 

Lewis  Mill,  160,  166 

Lexington,  Ky.,  2,  10,  12 

Liberty  Church,  196 

Lickskillet,  182  et  seq.,  189, 192 

Lightburn,  Brigadier-General  J. 
A.  J.,  brigade  of,  46,  120; 
commanding  division,  171  et 
seq. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  enterprise  of 
his  administration,  2 ;  ques 
tions  of  precedence  settled  by, 
4 ;  urged  to  send  relief  to  Ten 
nessee,  9  ;  acknowledges  Burn- 
side's  services,  13 ;  appoints 


266 


INDEX. 


Sherman  Grant's  successor,  19, 
178,  180,  190 ;  bestows  thanks 
on  Sherman  and  his  army,  210, 
218 

Little  Kenesaw,  Ga.,  124,  126 

Little  Peachtree  Creek,  145 

Logan,  Major-General  John  A., 
commands  Fifteenth  Corps, 
21,  42  et  seq.,  45,  74,  84; 
losses  of,  85  et  seq.,  95,  99, 
105,  120,  126,  129,  132,  150, 
160,  163,  167  et  seq.,  170; 
given  command  of  Army  of 
Tennessee,  171,  172,  175; 
character  of,  177  et  seq.,  184et 
seq.,  200  et  seq.  ;  report  of, 
214;  goes  North,  222  ;  absence 
of,  225 

Longstreet,  General  James,  in  East 
Tennessee,  5 ;  attacks  Burn- 
side,  13  et  seq.  ;  recalled  by 
Lee,  17,  148 

Lookout  Mountain,  117 

Loring,  Major-General  W.  W., 
division  of,  39,  41  ;  succeeds 
Polk  temporarily,  98  ;  driven 
back  by  Thomas,  99,  103,  108, 
115,  117,  126,  184;  wounded, 
185 

Lost  Mountain,  Ga.,  29,  64,  83,  92, 
96,  99  et  seq.,  104  et  seq.,  215, 
227,  233 

Loudon,  Tenn. ,  13  et  seq. 

Louisville,  Ky.,  2,  222 

Lovejoy's  Station,  188,  207,  213 

MCCLURE'S  FEHRY,  Ga.,  51  et 
seq. 

McCook,  Colonel  Anson,  of  Pal 
mer's  Corps,  157 

McCook,  Colonel  Daniel,  division 
of,  123,  125 


McCook,  Brigadier-General  Ed 
ward  M.,  division  of  cavalry 
of,  33,  35,  38,  66  et  seq.,  71, 
76 ;  victory  of,  77 ;  at  Ack- 
worth,  92,  94,  236 

McDonough  Road,  164 

McKensie,  Lieutenant  J.  W.,  230 

McLean,  Brigadier-General  N".  C., 
brigade  of,  76  ;  position  of,  77 
et  seq. 

Macon,  Ga.,  145,  174,  177,  181  et 
seq.,  188,  195,  199,  202,  204, 
219,  221 

McPherson,  Major-General  James 
B.,  commands  one  column  un 
der  Sherman,  6 ;  succeeds 
Sherman  in  command  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  21,  24  et 
seq.;  Sherman  sends  him 
against  Resaca,  31  et  seq. ;  in 
Johnston's  rear,  33,  35  et 
seq.;  at  Snake  Creek  Gap, 
39  et  seq. ;  position  of,  42 ; 
ordered  to  move  on  Resaca, 
43,  46;  ordered  across  the 
Oostanaula,  48,  50;  at  Cal- 
houn,  51 ;  on  Johnston's  flank, 
52,  53,  66 ;  at  Van  Worth,  70 ; 
moves  on  Dallas,  74,  76 ;  re 
lieves  Davis,  84  et  seq.;  re 
lieves  Hooker,  89,  91 ;  at  Ack- 
worth,  93  ;  at  Big  Shanty  Sta 
tion,  94  et  seq.;  joined  by 
Thomas,  99 ;  captures  320 
prisoners,  100,  105  et  seq.,  113, 
115  et  seq.,  118  et  seq.;  at  Lit 
tle  Kenesaw,  124,  131  et  seq., 
141  ;  orders  to,  142  ;  Sher 
man's  orders  to,  146  et  seq.; 
at  Stone  Mountain,  150 ;  near- 
ing  Atlanta,  153;  at  Peach 
Tree,  160,  162;  makes  con- 


INDEX. 


267 


nection  with  Schofield,  163  et ! 
seq.,  166  et  seq.;  death  of,  169  | 
(note),  170  et  seq.,  177 

McQuiston,  Colonel  John  C.,  bri 
gade  of,  111 

Manassas,  149 

Maney,  Major-General  George,  di 
vision  of.  161,  166,  170, 173 

Manigault,  Brigadier-General  A. 
M.,  172 

Manson,  Brigadier-General  M.  D., 
brigade  of,  45 

Maps  :    Georgia,    20  ;    New   Hope  j 
Church,  71  ;  Atlanta,  90,  165, 
168;  Jonesboro,  205 

Marietta,  Ga.,  29,  04  et  seq.,  69, 
85,  89,  93  et  seq.,  96  et  seq., 
100  et  seq.,  102  et  seq.,  107  et 
seq.,  119  et  seq.,  123  et  seq., 
129,  132,  134,  137,  144,  176, 
183,  215,  224 et  seq.,  227  (note), 
231  et  seq. 

Martin,  Major-General  William 
T.,  cavalry  of,  46 

Melville,  239 

Meridian,  Miss.,  5  et  seq. 

Milam's  Bridge,  66  et  seq. 

Mill  Creek  Gap,  24,  30,  33  et  seq., 
38,  236 

Milledgeville,  Ga.,  234 

Millen,  Ga.,  234 

Minnesota,  regiment  of :  Fourth, 
227  2°9 

Mission  Ridge,  22 

Mississippi,  Military  Division  of, 
13,  19 

Missouri,  regiment  of:  Twelfth, 
45 

Mitchell,  Colonel  John  G.,  brigade 
of,  86,  122 

Mobile,  Ala.,  6  et  seq.,  23,  21  Set 


Montgomery,    Ala.,    7,   141,    144, 

177,  219 

Morgan,  Fort,  see  Fort  Morgan 
Morgan,  Brigadier- General  J.  D., 

brigade  of,    122,  1V>1  et   seq., 

206  et  seq.,  223,  237 
Morristown,  Tenn.,  14,  16  et  seq. 
Morrow's  Mills,  202 
Mount  Ezra  Church,  182,  184 
Mount  Gilead  Church,  198  et  seq. 
Mount  Olivet  Church,  95,  233 
Mud  Creek,  100  et  seq. 
Murray,  battery  of,  175 
Muscle  Shoals,  Ala.,  238 
Myer,  battery  of,  119 

NANCY'S  CREEK,  145,  150  et  seq. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  2,  7,  15,  19,  21 
et  seq.,  162,  220  et  seq.,  236 

New  Hope  Church,  Ga.,  68,  80  et 
seq.,  83,  92,  94,  99  et  seq.,  129, 
146,  230,  233 

Newnan,  142,  188 

New  Orleans,  La.,  6,  23 

Newton,  Major-General  John,  di 
vision  of,  of  Fourth  Corps,  34 
et  seq.,  37,  44  et  seq.,  52,  78, 
102,  106,  121  et  seq.,  125,  41 
et  seq. ,  152  ;  movements  of, 
154  et  seq,,  158,  161,  163,  223 

Newton's  Mills,  95 

Newtown,  Ga. ,  51 

New  York,  battery  of :  Thirteenth, 
110 

Nickajack  Creek,  83,  119,  128  et 
seq.,  131  etseq.,  142 

Nodine,  brigade  of,  106 

Noonday  Creek,  95  et  seq.,  99, 
103 

Nose's  Creek,  101,  104  et  seq.,  107 
etseq.,  126 

Noyes,  Colonel  E.  F.,  133 


238 


INDEX. 


OCMULGEE  RIVER,  144,  188,  199 

Oconee  River,  188 

Ohio,  Army  of,  48,  50,  53,  58,  66, 
70,  76  et  seq.,  92,  94, 109,  132  ; 
losses  of,  135,  163,  189,  208, 
224  et  seq.,  232,  236 

Ohio,  Department  of,  1  et  seq.,  5 
et  seq.,  14  et  seq.,  24,  26,  31, 
35,  37,  40 

Ohio,  regiments  of :  Fifth,  47 ; 
Seventh,  72  ;  Fourteenth,  169  ; 
Fifty-third,  172;  One  Hun 
dred  and  Third,  107,  139, 
Battery  of  :  Cockerell's,  101 

Olley's  Creek,  109  et  seq.,  112, 
118  et  seq.,  122  et  seq.,  130, 
132 

Oostanaula  River,   30,  35  et  seq., 

42  et  seq. ,  46  et  seq. ,  50  et  seq. , 
57,  63,  66,  224,  234  et  seq. 

Oothcaloga  Creek,  50  et  seq. 
Opdycke,  Colonel  Emerson,  37 
Opelika,  Ga.,  141,  177,  183 
Osterhaus,  Brigadier-General  Pe 
ter  J.,  division  of,  45,  85,  200, 
225 
Owen's  Mills,  Ga.,  72,  74 

PACE'S  FERRY,  134,  137  et  seq., 
146,  150,  226,  231  (note),  232 

Paddock,  battery  of,  112 

Palmer,  Major- General  John  M. , 
of  Fourteenth  Corps,  33  et 
seq.,  37,  40 ;  at  Camp  Creek, 

43  et   seq.,  48,  54,  65  et  seq., 
70,  73,  84,  93,  95  et  seq.,  102, 
105  et  seq.,  117,  121   et  seq., 
124   et  seq.  ;  at  Pace's  Ferry, 
150    et    seq.  ;    movements  of, 
154   et   seq.,    157;    losses    of, 
158,  162,   183,    184;     directed 
to   act   under   Schofield's   or 


ders,  189 ;  relieved  of  his  com 
mand,  190 

Parke,  Major-General  John  G., 
commands  Ninth  Corps,  10 ; 
marches  against  Longstreet, 
17 

Peachtree  Creek,  83,  145,  147, 
149  et  seq.,  155,  160  et  seq., 
164,  181,  183,  214,  226 

Pea    Vine    Creek,  147,    153,   155 

(note),  171 

;  Peyton,  plantation  of,  153 
!  Phillips's  Ferry,  139,  142,  146,  150 
'  Pickett'sMill,  77,  79  et  seq.,  87,  93 

Pillow,  Major-General  Gideon  J., 
143 

Pine  Mt.,  Ga.,  29,  63,  83,  92,  94  et 
seq. ,  98,  232  et  seq. 

Poe,  Colonel  O.  M.,  Chief  Engi 
neer,  94,  ISO,  230  (note) 

Polk,  Lieutenant-General  Leoni- 
das,  28  ;  at  Resaca,  39  et  seq.  ; 
position  of,  42  et  seq. ,  44 ; 
weakened,  45 ;  repulsed,  46 ; 
marches  to  Calhoun,  47 ;  at 
Cassville,  53  et  seq. ;  at  Adairs- 
ville,  63;  position  of,  68,  79 
(note),  87  ;  killed,  98,  149,  233 

Poplar  Place,  38 

Port  Hudson.  La. ,  3 

Potomac,  Army  of  the,  1 8 

Powrder  Springs,  83,  107  et  seq., 
119,  130 

Powers's  Ferry,  142,  150 

Prescott,  battery  of,  200  et  seq. 
i  Prestman,  Colonel  S.  W.,  83,  102, 
164 

Price,  Major-General  Sterling,  219 
I  Proctor's  Creek,  95,  182  et  seq. 
i  Pulaski,  Term.,  222  et  seq. 

Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  65,  68,  71  et 
seq.,  74  et  seq.,  77 


INDEX. 


269 


RACCOON  CREEK,  66  et  seq. 

Ransom,  Brigadier-General  T.  E. 
G.,  197,  200  et  seq.,  '-325 

Raurn,  Brigadier-General  Green 
B.,  224,  230 

Red  Clay,  25,  33 

Redfield,  Colonel  James,  fell,  228 

Red  Oak,  198  et  seq. 

Reese,  Captain  C.  B.,  Chief  Engi 
neer  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  46 

Reilly,  Brigadier-General  James 
W.,  brigade  of,  57,  109,  112, 
119  et  seq.,  122  et  seq.,  140, 
171,  193 

Renfro,  200 

Resaca,  Ga.,  30  et  seq.,  35  et  seq., 
39 et  seq.,  45  et  seq.,  48etseq., 
57  et  seq. ,  63,  66,  69,  234  et  seq. 

Reynolds,  Brigadier-General  D.  ! 
H.,  Arkansas  brigade  of,  38 

Richland  Creek,  67 

Richmond,  Ky.,  2 

Richmond,  Va.,  5,  19,  23,  28,  39, 
49,  lo">,  145  et  seq.,  219 

Ringgold,  Ga.,  25,  33,  40 

Robinson,  Colonel  James  S.,  bri 
gade  of,  109,  157 

Rockcastle  River,  11 

Rocky  Face,  Ga.,  24,  29  et  seq.,  j 
33  et  seq.,  37  et  seq.,  40  et  i 
seq. 

Rome,  Ga.,  6,  39,  43,  48,  et  eeq., 
57,  05  et  seq.,  70,  84,  223 
et  seq.,  227,  231,  233  et  seq. 

Rosecrans,  Major-General  VV.  S., 
succeeded  by  General  Thom 
as,  1  ;  co-operates  with  Burn- 
side,  10  ;  at  Chattanooga,  13 

Roswell,  Ga.,  134,  136  et  seq., 
141  et  seq.,  144,  181,  208 

Rottenwood  Creek,  131 


Rough-and-Ready    Station,    177, 

202  et  seq. 
Rousseau,    Major-General    Lovell 

H.,   139  et  seq.,  177,  181,  223 

et  seq. 
Rowett,  Colonel  Richard,  brigade 

of,  227  et  seq. 
Ruff's  Station,  133 
Ruger,  Brigadier-General  Thomas 

H.,  brigade  of,  109,  111,  157 

SANDERS,  Major  D.  W.,  226  (note) 
Sandtown,  Ga.,  93,  96,  101,  106  et 
seq.,  109,  117,  120,122  et  seq., 
130,  132  et  seq.,  141,  144  et 
seq.,  183,  192  et  seq.,  197  et 
seq.,  208 

Saunders,   Captain   Ed.   D.,  mor 
tally  wounded,  91 
Saunders  Fort,  see  Fort  Saunders 
Saunders,    Brigadier-General    W. 

P.,  killed,  14 

Savannah,  Ga.,  2,  219,  224,  234 
Schofield,  Major-General  John  M., 
commands  the  department  of 
the  Ohio,  2 ;  against  Long- 
street,  5  et  seq. ;  succeeds  Fos 
ter,  15,  17,  21  ;  at  Red  Clay, 
25;  before  Dalton,  33,  35; 
presses  Johnston's  front,  37  et 
seq. ;  at  Rocky  Face,  39,  40 ; 
at  Snake  Creek  Gap,  42  et 
seq. ,  45,  47 ;  at  Echota,  48, 
50 ;  fords  the  Connasauga, 
51 ;  moves  toward  Cassville, 
53  et  seq.;  despatch  from 
Sherman,  56  ;  advances  Cox's 
division,  57;  at  Dallas,  66; 
crosses  at  Milam's  Bridge,  67, 
72  (note)  ;  marches  toward 
Owen's  Mills,  74  ;  severely  in 
jured,  75  ;  position  of,  77,  84 ; 


1270 


INDEX. 


crosses  Alatoona  Creek,  89 ; 
transfers  Hovey's  division  to 
his  left,  92  et  seq. ;  his  orders 
to  Cox  and  Hascall,  99  etseq., 
104  ;  marches  along  Sandtown 
road,  106  et  seq. ;  position  of, 
109  et  seq.,  117,  119,  122,  124; 
at  Olley's  Creek,  130  et  seq.; 
report  of,  137  ;  at  Phillips1  s 
Ferry,  143;  Sherman's  orders 
to,  146;  at  Peachtree  Creek, 
150  et  seq.,  160;  joined  by 
McPhersoa,  163,  164,  166  et 
seq.,  171  et  seq.;  his  associa 
tion  with  Sherman,  179,  181, 
184  et  seq.;  at  Utoy  Creek, 
189  et  seq  ;  before  Atlanta, 
194  et  seq.;  in  front  of  East 
Point,  197  et  seq.;  at  Rough- 
and-Ready  Station,  202,  204 
et  seq.,  209  et  seq.;  visits 
Louisville  and  Knoxville,  222  ; 
at  Dalton,  236  et  seq. ;  Sher 
man's  despatches  to,  238 

Scribner,  Colonel  Benj.  F.,  brigade 
of,  77  et  seq. 

Sears,  Brigadier-General  C.  W., 
brigade  of,  227  et  seq. 

Selma,  Ala.,  225 

Shenandoah  Valley,  146 

Sherman,  Major-General  William 
T.,  succeeds  Grant  in  com 
mand  of  Army  of  the  Tennes 
see,  3  et  seq. ;  moves  to  relief 
of  Burnside,  14,  17 ;  succeeds 
Grant  in  command  of  Division 
of  the  Mississippi,  19 ;  analysis 
of  his  character,  21 ;  vigorous 
measures  of,  22  et  seq.  ;  effec 
tive  force  of,  25  et  seq. ;  accepts 
Thomas's  plan  of  attacking 
Johnston,  31  et  seq.  ;  moves  his 


forces,  33  et  seq.  ;  disappoint 
ed  at  McPherson's  course,  37  ; 
directs  McPherson  to  strength 
en  his  position,  39  ;  success  of, 
41  ;  at  Snake  Creek  Gap,  42  et 
seq.  ;  on  the  Oostanaula,  46  et 
seq.  ;  at  Adairsville,  48;  John 
ston's  opinion  of,  49,  51 ;  hopes 
for  a  pitched  battle,  52  et  seq., 
his  despatch  to  Scho field,  56  et 
seq.  ;  orders  all  baggage  left 
behind,  59,  61,63  ;  at  Kingston, 
64  ;  orders  his  centre  to  move 
southward,  65,  67  et  seq.  ;  po 
sition  of,  70  et  seq.  ;  makes  a 
map,  75,  76 ;  plans  of,  83  et 
seq.,  86  et  seq.  ;  his  estimate 
of  Confederate  losses,  88  ;  re 
sumes  his  flanking  movement, 
89  ;  at  Ackworth,  93  et  seq.  ; 
plans  of,  96  et  seq.  ;  his  ad 
vance  along  Sandtown  road, 
101,  103,  107 ;  his  rebuke  to 
Hooker,  114;  his  trouble  in 
keeping  his  army  supplied, 
116  ;  his  plans,  1 18,  120,  122  ; 
losses  of,  127  ;  resumes  his  plan 
of  operations,  130;  his  orders  to 
Thomas,  132  et  seq.  ;  his  de 
spatch  to  Halleck,  134  ;  his  es 
timate  of  prisoners  taken,  136 
et  seq.  ;  at  Vining  Station, 
138;  secures  a  crossing  of  the 
Chattahoochee,  140  et  seq.  ; 
deliberations  of,  144  et  seq., 
148  et  seq.  ;  at  Peachtree 
Creek,  150  et  seq.  ;  memoirs, 
158, 159, 162, 164  ;  reconnoitres, 
166;  at  Howard  House,  168, 
170  (note)  ;  gives  Logan  Mc 
Pherson's  command,  171,  173 
et  seq.  ;  purpose  of,  177  ;  ap- 


INDEX. 


271 


proves  of  Logan,  ITS  et  seq., 
183  et  seq.  ;  his  dissatisfaction 
with  Garrard,  189  ;  recom 
mends  General  Davis  as  Palm 
er's  successor,  190,  191  et  seq. ; 
cannonades  Atlanta,  208  et 
seq.,  212;  buries  the  Con 
federate  dead,  215,  217  et  seq., 
219 ;  his  correspondence  with 
Hood,  220  et  seq.  ;  determines 
to  cross  the  Chattahoochee, 
224  et  seq.,  227,  230,  231 
(note)  ;  concentrates  his  army, 
232  et  seq.  ;  assembles  his 
army  at  Rome,  235  et  seq. 

Shields,  Captain  Joseph  C.,  bat 
tery  of,  112 

Ship  Gap,  Ga.,  33,  238 

Shoal  Creek,  152,  155  et  seq.,  161 

Sligh's  Mills,  67,  74 

Slocum,  Major-General  H.  W.,  178 
et  seq.  ;  at  Chattahoochee 
Bridge,  1 96  et  seq. ,  ordered  to 
enter  Atlanta,  204;  Atlanta 
surrendered  to,  208 ;  ordered 
to  hold  Atlanta,  224,  232 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  Jno.  E., 
of  Fifteenth  Corps,  143 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  W.  Sooy, 
6  et  seq. 

Smith,  General  Giles  A.,  45,  120 ; 
commands  Giesham's  division, 
163,  167,  170,  202 

Smith,  General  G.  W.,  commander 
of  the  Georgia  militia,  117, 
150,  164,  174,  184;  losses  of, 
214 

Smith,  Brigadier-General  Morgan 
L.,  division  of,  85,  120,  126, 
132,  150,  167  ;  succeeds  Logan 
in  command  of  Fifteenth 
Corps,  171,  172,  175,  185,  200 


Smith,  Major-General  A.  J.,  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  8, 
219 

Smyrna,  Ga.,  124,  131,  134,  138, 
224  et  seq. 

Snake  Creek  Gap,  31,  33,  35,  39 
etseq.,42,  47,  51,  59,  237 

Soap  Creek,  137  et  seq. 

Somerset,  Ky.,  11 

South  River,  167 

Sprague,  Colonel  John  W.,  brigade 
of,  167,  171 

Spring  Mills,  54 

Spring  Place,  Ga. ,  48 

Stanley,  Major-General  D.  S.,  di 
vision  of,  44,  78,  10(5,  121  et 
seq.,  152,  154;  at  Peachtree, 
160;  succeeds  Howard,  179; 
in  front  of  Atlanta,  194 ;  north 
of  Atlanta,  196  et  seq.,  199  ; 
at  Rough-and-Ready  Station, 
202 ;  ordered  to  destroy  the 
railroad,  204  et  seq. ;  in  com 
mand  of  the  army  of  the 
Cumberland,  225,  231  ;  ordered 
to  connect  with  Howard,  232 
et  seq.;  starts  for  Resaca,  236 
et  seq. 

Steedman,  Major-General  Jas.  B., 
given  command  of  the  North 
ern  part  of  Georgia,  142 ;  rein 
forces  Laiboldt,  196,  222,  236 

Stevenson,    Major-General    Carter 
L.,  division  of,  38,  44,  47,  108, 
110,  112 
|  Stevenson,  Ala.,  21,  234 

Stewart.  Lt.  Gen.  A.  P.,  division 
of,  38,  44,  72,  108;  assigned 
to  command  of  Folk's  corps, 
149,  153;  at  Atlanta,  160  et 
seq.,  164,  174,  184;  goes  to 
Lee's  assistance,  185,  198,  208 


272 


INDEX. 


et  seq.;  losses  of,  214;  cap 
tures  posts  at  Ackworth  and 
Big  Shanty,  225  et  seq.,  232; 
atTilton,  236 

Stilesboro,  Ga.,  64  et  seq.,  67  et 
seq. 

Stoneman,  Major-General  George, 
cavalry  under,  18,  40,  48,  54  et 
seq.,  66  et  seq.,  70;  occupies 
Alatoona,  89 ;  at  Ackworth, 
92,  94 ;  reconnoitres  toward 
Lost  Mountain,  96,  99  et  seq.  ; 
at  Powder  Springs,  107  et  seq., 
130  ;  at  Sandtown,  133  et  seq., 
141  et  seq. ;  unites  Garrard's 
troopers  with  his,  182  ;  devas 
tations  of,  188  et  seq. 

Stone  Mountain,  Ga.,  29,  146, 
150 

Stone  River,  223 

Strickland,  Colonel  Silas  A.,  bri 
gade  of,  111 

Strong,  Colonel  Wm.  E.,  170  (note) 

Stuart,  A.  S.,  236  (note) 

Subligna,  238 

Sugar  Creek,  167,  174 

Sugar  Valley  P.  O.,  Ga.,  36 

Summerville,  238  et  seq. 

Sweeny,  Brigadier-General  Thos. 
W.,  division  of,  46,  167,  169 


TALLADEGA,  Ala.,  225 

Taylor's  Ridge,  238 

Tennessee,  Army  of,  50,  54,  57  et 
seq.,  65,  71,  73  et  seq.,  84,  86, 
89,  93,  95,  99  et  seq.,  126,  131 
et  seq.  ;  losses  of,  135, 141,  164, 
167,  171,  174,  177,  181  et  seq., 
189,  194,  197  et  seq.,  300  et 
seq.,  206,  208,  225,  227,  232, 


Tennessee,  Department  of,  1  et 
seq.,  14,  21,  24  et  seq.,  31,  33, 
35,  42,  44,  46 

Thomas,  Major-General  George  H., 
Rosecrans's  successor,  1  et 
seq.,  6,  14,  21 ;  with  Sherman, 
25 ;  his  campaign  plan,  31 ;  at 
Tunnel  Hill,  33,  34  (note)  ; 
presses  Johnston's  front,  37, 
40 ;  directed  to  reinforce  Mc- 
Pherson,  43  et  seq.  ;  ordered 
to  cross  at  Resaca,  48,  50,  52 
et  seq.  ;  directed  to  move 
South,  65  et  seq.  ;  sends  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  from 
Burnt  Hickory,  70  ;  report  of, 
72  (note) ;  ordered  to  support 
Hooker,  73,  76  ;  reinforced  by 
Davis,  84,  87,  92  et  seq.  ;  di 
vides  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  into  three  columns, 
95,  97  ;  batteries  of,  98  ;  makes 
connection  with  McPherson, 
99  et  seq.,  102,  104;  his  sug 
gestions  to  Sherman,  118  et 
seq.,  121  et  seq.,  126;  ordered 
to  advance  through  Marietta, 
132  et  seq.,  141  ;  orders  to, 
142  ;  Sherman's  orders  to,  146 
et  seq.  ;  at  Pace's  Ferry,  150 
et  seq.  ;  embarrassment  of, 
153  et  seq.,  157  et  seq.,  167, 
174,  178  et  seq.,  181,  184;  or 
dered  forward  toward  Atlanta. 
189  et  seq.  ;  at  Atlanta,  194, 
197;  at  Red  Oak,  198,  201; 
ordered  to  destroy  the  road, 
204  et  seq.  ;  at  Chattanooga, 
223  et  seq.,  234  ;  at  Nashville, 
236,  238 

Tilton,  Ga.,  30,  39,41,  51,236 

Tompkinsville,  Ky.,  11 


INDEX. 


273 


Tourtellotte,   Lieutenant-Colonel, 

227  et  seq. 
Trickum,  Ga.,  33 
Turner's  Ferry,  134,  142 
Tunnel  Hill,  Ga.,  29  et  seq.,  33  et 

seq. 
Two  Run  Creek,  54 

UNITED  STATES,  regiment  of: 
Forty-fourth  (colored),  236. 
Battery  :  Murray's,  175 

Utoy  Creek,  183, 189  et  seq.,  192  et 
seq.,  197 

VAN  HORNE'S  History,  34  (note) 
Van  Wert,  Ga.,  65,  70,  73  et  seq. 
Varnell  Station,  Ga.,  33,  35,  38 
Veatch,  Brigadier-General  James 

C.,  division  of,  43,  45 
Vicksburg,  Miss.,  1,   3,    5  et  seq., 

lOetseq.,  179,  222 
Villanow,  Ga.,  33  et  seq.,  40,   42, 

237 

Villa  Rica,  74,  85 
Vining's  Station,  134,  138,  141 

WAGNER,  Brigadier-General  G.  D., 
brigade  of,  121,  223,  237 

Walcutt,  Colonel  Chas.  C.,  brigade 
of,  85,  120 

Walker,  Major-General  W.  H.  T., 
division  of,  38  ;  at  Resaca,  39, 
46,  103,  161  et  seq.,  166,  16S  et 
seq.;  killed,  170,  181 

Walthall,  Major-General  E.  C.,  di 
vision  of,  103,  184 

Wangelin,  Colonel  Hugo,  brigade 
of,  169",  171 

Ward,  Brigadier-General  Wm.  T., 
division  of,  114,  154  et  seq., 
158,161,  189 

Warner,  Colontl  Willard,  221 
12* 


Washington,  D.  C.,  War  Depart 
ment  at,  3,  10, 13, 19,  22,  174, 
180,  181,  194,  208,  212,  236 

Watauga,  13 

Watkins,  Colonel  D.  D.,  142 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  129 

West  Point,  Ga.,  195, 198 

Wever,  Colonel  Clark  R.,  235  et 
seq. 

Wheeler,  Major-General  Joseph, 
cavalry  of,  38,  40  et  seq.,  50, 
67  et  seq.,  79 ;  losses  of,  88,  96, 
105, 108,  115, 136,  140, 155,  159 
et  seq.,  162, 166,  171 ;  repulsed, 
196  et  seq.,  218,  222 ;  in  North 
ern  Georgia,  222,  237 

White,  Brigadier-General  Julius, 
14 

Whittaker, Brigadier-General  Wal 
ter  C. ,  brigade  of,  106,  121 

Williamsburg,  Ky.,  11 

Williams,  Brigadier-General  Al- 
pheus  S.,  division  of,  40,  45, 
70,  72,  105  et  seq.,  109  et  seq.; 
losses  of,  113,  154  et  seq.;  his 
•losses,  158  et  seq.,  161,  189, 
194,  196  et  seq. 

Willis's  Millpond,  194 

Wilmington,  219 

Winchester,  Tenn.,  10 

Winegar,  Captain  Chas.  E.,  bat 
tery  of,  110 

Winter's  Gap,  11 

Wisconsin,  regiment  of :  Eigh 
teenth,  229.  Battery  of: 
Twelfth,  228 

Woodbury,  battery  of,  110 

Wood,  Brigadier-General  T.  J., 
division  of,  34,  44,  76  et  seq., 
102,  10(5,  121,  151  et  seq.,  154 
et  seq.  ;  forms  a  connection 
with  Newton,  163,  173 


274 


INDEX. 


Woods,  Brig.  Gen.  Charles  R.,  bri 
gade  of,  45,  156,  167,  201,  237, 
et  seq. 

Wright,  Colonel  W.  W.,  efficiency 
of  his  engineering,  61,  94,  97, 
181 


YAZOO  River,  10 

Young,  Brigadier-General  W.  H.7 

brigade  of,  228  et  seq. ;  taken 

prisoner,  231 

ZION  CHUKCH,  108 


OP  THE 

HIVERSITT 


MESSRS.    CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

are  publishing,  under  the  general  title  of  THE 

CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR, 

a  series  of  volumes,  contributed  at  their  solicitation  by  a 
number  of  leading  actors  in  and  students  of  the  great  conflict 
of  1 86 1 -'65,  with  a  view  to  bringing  together,  for  the  first 
time,  a  full  and  authoritative  military  history  of  the  suppres 
sion  of  the  Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  narrative,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possibility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
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the  time  would  be  allowed  to  pass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a  work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection.  These  /acts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work. 


From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  ol  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special 
information  everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received 
every  aid  that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking  ;  and  in  announcing 
the  issue  of  the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the 
thanks  which  the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express 
elsewhere. 


The  volumes  of  the  series  will  be  duodecimos  of  about  250 
pages  each,  illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under 
the  direction  of  the  authors.  They  will  appear,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  chronological  order  of  the  Campaigns  of 
which  they  treat ;  and  by  their  preliminary  and  concluding 
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will  practically  cover  the  entire  field  of  the  war. 

The  price  of  each  volume  will  be  $1.00. 


The  following  volumes  are  now  ready  : 

I.— THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION.  By  JOHN  G. 
NICOLAY,  Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln;  late 
Consul-General  to  France,  etc. 

A  preliminary    volume,  describing   the  opening  of  the  war.  and   covering  the 
period  from  the  election  o:  Lincoln  to  the  end  of  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run. 

II.— FROM  FORT  HENRY  TO  CORINTH.  By  the  Hon. 
M.  F.  FORCE,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati ;  late 
Brigadier-General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  lyth  Corps:  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
20th  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1862: 
covering  the  capture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 


III.— THE  PENINSULA.  By  ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB,  LL.D., 
President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York  ;  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i86i-'62  ;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  commanding  2cl  Div., 
2d  Corps ;  Major  General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

The  history  of  McC'ellan's   Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Fight. 


IV.— THE  ARMY  UNDER  POPE.  By  JOHN  C.  ROPES, 
Esq.,  of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint 
ment  of  McClelian  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862. 


V.— THE  ANTIETAM  AND  FREDERICKSBURG.  By 
FRANCIS  WINTHROP  PALFREY,  Bvt.  Brigadier  Gen'l,  U.S.V., 
and  formerly  Colonel  2Oth  Mass.  Infantry;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the 
2Oth  Massachusetts  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  ;  Member  of 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massachu 
setts  Historical  Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClelian  to  the  general  command,  Sept.  1862,  to  the 
end  of  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 


VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG.  By 
ABNER  DOUBLEDAY,  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.A.,  and  Maj. 
Gen'l,  U.  S.V.  ;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chancellorsvillc  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  aftei  the  latter  battle. 


VII.— THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.  By  HENRY 
M.  CIST,  Brevet  Brig.  Gen'l  U.S.V. ;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 
Major  Gen1!  Rosecrans,  and  afterwards  on  that  of  Major  Gen'l 
Thomas;  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 


IX.— THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  ATLANTA.  By  the  Hon. 
JACOB  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio ;  late  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  of  the  United  States;  Major  General  U.S.V.,  com 
manding  Twenty-third  Corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta 
and  the  Carolinas,  etc.,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to  the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X.— THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA— FRANKLIN  AND 
NASHVILLE.  By  the  Hon.  JACOB  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the   Surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 


The  following  volumes,  now  preparing  for  early  publica 
tion,  will  complete  the  series  : 

VIII.— THE  MISSISSIPPI.  By  FRANCIS  VINTON  GREENE, 
Lieut,  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army  ;  late  Military  Attache  to  the 
U.  S.  Legation  in  St.  Petersburg;  Author  of  "the  Russian 
Army  and  its  Campaigns  in  Turkey  in  1877-78,"  and  of  "Army 
Life  in  Russia." 

An  account  of  the  operations — especially  at  Vicksburg  and    Port   Hudson — by 
which  the  Mississippi  River  and  its  shores  were  restored  to  the  control  of  the  Union. 

XL— THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY  in  1864.  The  Cam 
paign  of  Sheridan.  By  GEORGE  E.  POND,  Esq.,  Associate 
Editor  of  the  Army  and  Navy  Journal. 

XII.— THE    CAMPAIGNS    OF    GRANT    IN   VIRGINIA. 

By   ANDREW   A.    HUMPHREYS,    Brigadier  General   and  Bvt. 
Major  General,  U.S.A.;    late   Chief  of  Engineers;   Chief  of 
Staff,  Army  of  the   Potomac,  1 863-' 64  ;    commanding  Second 
Corps,  1 864-' 65,  etc.,  etc. 
Covering  the  Virginia  Campaigns  of  1864  and  '65,  to  Lee's  surrender. 


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